



A N
A C C O U N T
O F T H E
War in India,
B E T W E E N T H E
E N G L I S H and F R E N C H,
O N T H E
C O A S T of C O R O M A N D E L,
From the Year 1750 to the Year 1760.
T O G E T H E R W I T H
A R E L A T I O N of the late Remarkable E V E N T S
O N T H E
M A L A B A R C O A S T,
And the E X P E D I T I O N S to
G O L C O N D A and S U R A T;
With the O P E R A T I O N S of the F L E E T.
I L L U S T R A T E D W I T H M A P S, P L A N S, &c.
The Whole Compiled from O R I G I N A L P A P E R S.

By R I C H A R D O W E N C A M B R I D G E, E s q;

L O W D O N:

Printed for T. JEFFERYS, the Corner of St. Martin's-lane, Charing-cross.

MDCCCLXI.



P R E F A C E

THE importance and novelty of a subject of which we have hitherto had imperfect and inaccurate accounts, induced me to seize every opportunity of making myself acquainted with the transactions in the East-Indies by the perusal of authentic Papers. The satisfaction I received from those I had already seen, excited an eager desire for further enquiry, and urged me to agree to any conditions under which I might be enabled to gratify my curiosity.

NOTHING but a determination to write some account of India, could have entitled me to the sight of such materials as I have been favoured with, or have properly introduced me to the
a 2 free



P R E F A C E.

free conversation of the persons principally concerned ; which, as it has afforded me the greatest pleasure, as well as instruction, I ought never to mention without due acknowledgments. As I esteem it a singular honour to have been indulged so much beyond my expectation, by all whom I have taken the liberty to trouble on this occasion, I am bound to declare, that every person to whom I have applied, without exception, has given me full satisfaction in every point on which I had occasion to consult him, and has done it with the utmost politeness.

AFTER this, I need not dwell upon any further inducements to write ; and yet the great reputation which the nation, and so many individuals have acquired in the East-Indies, has doubtless been another very inviting circumstance.

THERE had been two very partial accounts published by the French ; and as Mr. Dupleix also in his MEMOIRE has misrepresented many principal facts, it became necessary to state them in their true light.

THOUGH



P R E F A C E

THOUGH nothing appears more impertinent than the prefixing an account of a work to the book itself; yet, as it is usual with most people to form a false conception of things, and then to be displeased if they do not find the realities exactly conformable to the opinions they have entertained, it may in some cases be pardonable to endeavour to remove such prejudices.

It will not appear strange, that the generality of the world, through the habit of reading novels, and works of imagination, should expect from an history of the East (which has generally been made the scene of most of their ideal stories) a tale of adventures full of wonder and novelty, and nearly bordering upon romance. Neither are we to be surprised if others of a serious cast, having also, at the same time, an elegant turn of mind and a taste for ornament, should have expressed an expectation, and, perhaps, hinted their advice, that, in order to engage the attention of the reader, the work ought to be embellished with the strange manners of a remote people, the works of art and the wonders of nature in so
very



P R E F A C E.

very distant and different a climate from our own.

IT is sufficient to say, in answer to this, that the work before us is not a history of India, nor of war in the interior parts of India, but of war on the coast ; of war between two European nations, who have not, till very lately, had any connection with the governing people of the country. It has been entirely owing to the war, that an European has been allowed to have any kind of familiar commerce with them, or that the servants of the Company have been admitted to an acquaintance with their courts, the splendor of which has been greatly lessened by the war. The war alone has taught them the geography of the country a hundred miles round their settlements; and, within these few years, those who had been at Madura, which is about that distance, were as eagerly listened to when they returned to Madras, and their accounts were as new to all that heard them, as if they had come from Pekin : but it does not appear that those accounts were very amusing, or that they would afford any entertainment to make up for the
the



P R E F A C E.

vii

the interruption they would give to the thread of the history.

WHEN the design of the work is once explained, it will then best be seen whether it has been properly executed. The two things chiefly proposed by it were, first, to make the generality of the readers acquainted with the geography of the country, of which they have as yet very imperfect and confused notions ; and, in the second place, to lay before the more informed, an exact, clear, and impartial state of facts, drawn entirely from authentic papers ; by which they may judge for themselves, without comment or reflections to bias them, whether the civil and military officers of the English, or French East India Company abroad, have acted with the most uprightness and bravery, in the course of the war, and the negotiations relative to it.

THIS being the real Design of the work, every kind of decoration that was not necessary to illustrate facts would have diverted the attention of the reader from a close view of the conduct of the two nations, by which he is form his judgement.

HAD



HAD these materials fallen into the hands of any person capable of rendering them more pleasing, by his superior taste in composition, and a happy elegance of style, surely he would have employed those talents injudiciously; had he bestowed them on this work: for the greatest part of it (in order to support by authorities what is advanced as fact) is an assemblage of treaties, debates, grants, articles of war, and letters. These are here a necessary, but they are not a favourite part of any work: but there are two pieces that are the most valuable and essential to the whole. The siege of Fort St. George, which being a journal, must of course be dry; and Colonel Lawrence's own narrative of his campaigns, which, though full of instruction, was written in a camp, with the soldier-like plainness which is the distinguishing character of that excellent officer.

IT is now submitted to the public, whether it would have been proper to have given a different colour to the continuation of a narrative which had pleased all who had seen it, by its unaffected simplicity: and if, after what has been said, I shall be convicted of an error in judgment



P R E F A C E

ix

judgement, it will neither surprize nor give me any concern, provided I am not proved to have made any essential mistake in matters of fact. And herein I flatter myself I cannot be greatly to blame, as I am certain that I have not put down any material Circumstance without the authority of authentic papers, or without consulting with the several persons concerned, and examining most thoroughly every thing that has appeared dubious.

As I have taken so much pains not to give credit too hastily to any Informations I may have received, I may be allowed to desire the reader will not too rashly give ear to such testimony as he may think will confute them; and particularly, that he will not suppose a man the better acquainted with facts for having been in India, unless he has been in that very part which was the scene of the transaction in question; for the several settlements being some as remote from others as England is from Turkey or Africa, the people on one coast have sometimes no more knowledge of what is doing on the other, than we have at home.



P R E F A C E.

IT is also to be expected, that those who have been witnesses to any event which it has been thought proper to relate concisely, will be ready to impute that brevity to a want of information ; when, at the same time, the European reader will think that very narrative too long, and the detail too minute and uninteresting.

I HAVE, therefore, in handling every new subject, endeavoured to confine myself to the most recent, as well as the most important events, alone ; and have avoided going too far back in point of time, as that might occasion a confusion, by introducing a variety of persons, and a multiplicity of strange names ; which would certainly give a heaviness, if not a ridicule, to the whole.

THIS naturally leads to the mention of another difficulty.

THE Asiatic Monarchs are exceedingly fond of assuming new names, and frequently bestow them on others as a very serious and important favour ; and indeed they generally confer them
engraved



P R E F A C E.

xi

engraved on a seal-ring, which exempts the wearer from all taxes, tolls, and imposts, wherever he appears with it in the dominions of the Prince who bestows it.

By this means it often happens, that different persons have the same appellation, and that the same person is called by different names, which creates a confusion not always in the power of the writer to prevent; since it is by no means proper to alter a name in the signature of original papers; and yet, when the reader sees the same person signing a different name * from that which he is commonly distinguished by, he will be apt to think there is some mistake.

As it is impossible to find out any criterion to spell the Persic and Indian names by, since they are so variously pronounced and so differently written by persons of the same nation, I cannot pretend to be exact in this particular. The French having published an account of the war

See page 229. The several names used by the Vizier, who is commonly called Shaw Abadin Cawn.



some years ago, many readers will have been habituated to see names of some of the principal persons spelt after their manner ; therefore, for the sake of conformity, I have used the same consonants as I find employed by M. Dupleix and his countrymen ; but as their vowels are pronounced so very differently from the English, I have, for the most part, altered them accordingly. The word which signifies a warrior, is written by the English jung, jing, or jenk ; but as the French, and particularly M. Dupleix, write it zing, I have done so likewise ; for though many hold the other to be the true pronounciation, there are some who make it doubtful ; especially when they say the word Gentoo, or Jentoo, might be spelt with a z * ; and it becomes the more a matter of indifference, when we call to mind the reciprocal letters of the Spaniards ; who spell many words both with the x † and j, and give exactly

* IN like manner, Jemidar is very often spelt Zemidar.

† THE Spaniards, in their voyage to Peru, having occasion to mention our ship the Chichester, write it Sixter ; and as we have most of our spellings of eastern words from foreigners, or inaccurate seamen



P R E F A C E.

xiii

actly the same found to the one as to the other.

I COULD hardly avoid saying thus much, on a subject very uninteresting in itself, and, possibly, tiresome to the generality of readers ; I shall therefore pursue it no further.

seamen and traders, it may be allowable to make some alterations ; though, from the force of habit, some people will condemn those which are made upon the best reasons. The French having always been imitated by us in the spelling of Schah and Khan, though the words have for that reason often been pronounced wrong, the obvious spelling of these names with the w, which helps to give the true sound to the vowel, will at first be thought a blameable singularity : to avoid a charge of that kind, I have not often deviated from the common spelling, but as it was necessary to do it sometimes, I have particularly taken care to alter such as might mislead the reader into the supposition of false etymologies, and give him erroneous ideas of things : as in the usual spelling of the word *Sea-poy*, which made it generally supposed, that the *Se-poys*, who are foot soldiers, were either sailors or marines.

GLOS-



G L O S S A R Y

O F

PERSIC and INDIAN NAMES.

ARZEE,	A REQUEST, or petition
BANG,	An intoxicating juice of a vegetable
BATTA,	An extraordinary allowance to the army when abroad in the field, or in any country garrison where provisions are scarce
BETEL,	A leaf, not unlike that of a kidney-bean ; it grows on a vine exactly in the same manner ; and is in great use, from the Prince to the beggar. They constantly chew it, mixed with Chinam and Betel-nut ; for the Betel-leaf and the Betel-nut are from different plants. The farmers of Madrafs pay the Company from six to seven thousand pounds a year for the exclusive privilege of vending it
BRAMIN,	A priest
BUCKSHEE,	Treasurer to the Mogul
BUNDER,	A custom-house
CHINAM,	Fine slacked lime
CHOP,	A small seal, on which is engraved the name of the Mogul and the year of the hegira
CHOULTRY,	An open house for all travellers, the same as a Turkish caravanferai. A bramin resides always in or near it, to keep it clean, and to furnish travellers with water, &c He is maintained by an endowment
CHOUT,	Properly a fourth, but commonly used to express the tribute which the Marattas claim and raise on all the governments in India



G L O S S A R Y

CIRCAR, or SIRCAR, COFFREES,	} A general name for the government, or persons concerned in the administration (By the French called Cafres) is now become the general name for all negroes who are brought to India from the Cape, the coast of Guinea, or any other parts of Africa, and chiefly from Madagascar: they are brave and steady in the field
COLITRIES,	Inhabitants of the woods under the government of the Polygars
COOLEY,	A labourer of any kind
COSS,	A little more than two miles
COWLE,	A protection
DOOLEY,	A woman's chair, somewhat like a sedan
DURBAR,	The court of a Mogul Prince, or place where they meet in council
DUSTUCK,	An order
ENAM,	A gift
FIRMAN, or PHIRMAUND,	} A patent, or paper signed by the Mogul
GENTOU, ZENTOO,	} Indians, Idolaters
HOUSBULHOOKUM,	A patent, or paper signed by the Vizier
JAGEER, or JAQUEER,	} A territory or domain granted for a particular use, either to maintain a number of troops, or keep a fort in repair; and sometimes as a pension.
JEMIDAR, or ZEMIDAR,	} Officers of horse or foot, and sometimes people of rank employed about the persons of the great in the administration
KILLEDAR,	A Governor of a fort
LACK,	Of roupees, about twelve thousand five hundred pounds
MAUND,	A variable weight; at Bengal, seventy-six pounds; at Surat, thirty-seven pounds one-half; in Persia, the Tabarese Maund is only six pounds
MOORS,	The Mahometans improperly so called
NABOB,	A Governor of a province, appointed by the Souba, or Viceroy
NAIB,	A deputy
OMRAHS,	Privy Counsellors, men of the first rank in the empire; they are under the Vizier, but are mostly concerned in all the revolutions of the state
PADDY,	Rice in the husk
PAGODA,	An Indian temple
PAGODA,	A coin paid by the Company at eight shillings, but intrinsically worth seven shillings and eight pence
PALLANKEEN,	A bed, supported by a wooden or ivory frame of six feet long, and near three feet broad, fastened at each end



G L O S S A R Y.

end with cross sticks to a bamboo fifteen feet long, which forms an arch over the pallankeen or bed, and is covered with a canopy of cloth lined with silk, and stiffened with ribs of the coconut tree

PARAGANA,	Any district of country
PARSEES,	Worshippers of fire
PATAMAR,	A post or messenger sent from place to place
PEONS,	A name for the infantry of the Deckan; they are armed with a broadsword, and sometimes with a matchlock
PERWANNA,	A paper signed by the Nabob
PETTAH,	The town surrounding an Indian fort
PHOUSDAR,	A renter
POLYGAR,	Lord of a small territory
RAJA,	The highest title of the Gentoo princes
ROUPEE,	About two shillings and fivepence
SANEDS,	Commissions, or grants for particular countries
SARDAR,	An officer of horse
SEPOYS,	Indian soldiers, which are entertained and disciplined by Europeans
SHROFF,	A money changer, or banker
SIRPAH,	A rich dress of the country
SOUBA,	Viceroy of one of the two great provinces
TANK,	A pond, or pool of water
TANKA,	The revenue appropriated by the Mogul for the maintenance of a fleet at Surat
TOM TOMS,	Drums
TOPASSES,	Black foot soldiers, descended from Portuguese marrying natives, called Topasses because they wear hats
VAKEEL,	An agent or minister for the Moors



INTRODUCTION.

FOR the better understanding any accounts of a country, with which the European reader is so little acquainted, it is necessary first to inform him of such particulars as serve to explain the transactions and events in the work before him.

It is generally supposed, that the Peninsula within the Ganges is under the immediate government of the Mogul himself, and that the royal mandates from Delli are, according to the received notion of so arbitrary a dominion, obeyed in the most remote parts of the coast. This is so far from the truth, that a great part of that vast Peninsula never acknowledged any subjection to the throne of Delli, till the reign of Aurengzebe; and the revenues from those Indian kings and Moorish governors, who were conquered or employed by him, have, since his death, been intercepted by the viceroys, which his weaker successors have appointed for the government of the Peninsula: so that at this time neither can the tribute from the several potentates reach the Court of Delli, nor the vigour of the government extend from the capital to those remote countries. And ever since
A the



ii I N T R O D U C T I O N.

the province of Indostan was ruined by Nadir Shaw, the weakness of the Mogul, and the policy and confirmed independency of the Viceroys have in a manner confined the influence of the government to its inland department.

LET it therefore be understood, that the Sovereign possesses a third only, and that the least valuable part, of his own vast empire. Bengal, the smallest, but most fertile province, is governed by a Viceroy. The other division, called the Deckan, extending from Balasore Jagonaut (or thereabouts, for the geography is certainly not settled) to Cape Comorin, is also delegated by the Mogul to another Viceroy, of exceeding great power, having within his jurisdiction seven large territories, to which he has the undisputed right of nominating seven Nabobs, or governors of provinces. In all parts of India there are still large districts, which have preserved, with the Gentoo religion, the old form of government under Indian Kings called Raja's. Such are Maissore, whose capital is Seringapatam, and Tanjore, whose capital is Tanjore. There are also among the woods and mountainous parts of the country several petty Princes, or heads of clans, distinguished by the name of Polygars. These are all tributary to the Nabobs, and those to the Viceroy, whose capital is Agra. The Carnatick is that part of the Deckan which comprehends the principal settlements of the Europeans, Madrafs, and Pondichery, and also Arcot. To establish the government of the last named province, and to oppose the hostile intentions of Mr. Duplex, the English East-India company engaged in this war in support of Mahomet Allee Cawn.



I N T R O D U C T I O N. iii

As it is necessary, that the reader should be well acquainted with the geography of this country, without which he can never have any just notion of the government of it, the most accurate maps of particular spots seen procured, and distinctly engraved; and there is annexed an outline of the whole country unincumbered with the smaller divisions, and containing only the names of such places as are most frequently mentioned, in order to give at one view, a full idea of the whole empire of India within the Ganges, and to shew the consequence of the two great viceroyalties, compared with that of the principal seat of government.

THE chain of mountains which run through the peninsula from north to south, are the cause of an extraordinary phenomenon in natural history. The countries which are separated by these mountains, though under the same latitude, have their seasons and climate entirely different from each other; and while it is winter on one side of the hills, it is summer on the other side. On the coast of Malabar a south-west wind begins to blow from the sea at the end of June, with continued rain, and rages against the coast for four months, during which time the weather is calm and serene on the coast of Coromandel; and towards the end of October, the rainy season, which they term the Change of the Monsoon, begins on the coast of Coromandel: at which time, the tempestuous winds bearing continually against a coast in which there are no good ports, make it so dangerous for the shipping to remain there, for the three ensuing months, that it is scarce ever attempted. This is the cause of the periodical return of our ships to



iv I N T R O D U C T I O N.

Bombay, where there is a secure harbour, and convenient docks.

WHEN the reader has been made acquainted with so much of the geography of the country, as is absolutely necessary for his understanding the nature of the government, it will be proper that he should be satisfied in regard to certain doubts and difficulties that will naturally arise in the perusal of the work.

WITHOUT a few previous explanations, he will never be able to conceive, by what means a handful of Europeans should appear so respectable in the field, when opposed to a multitude of Asiatics. As this is owing to a number of concurring circumstances, it will be requisite to give some account of such of their manners, habits, and prejudices, as may have a nearer or more remote influence on their military character.

NOTHING appears a greater difficulty to the military men in this part of the world, than the possibility of subsisting such vast multitudes as the Asiatic armies frequently consist of, especially with so large a proportion of horse.

IF it be matter of astonishment, that such numbers of fighting men are frequently brought into the field, how will it appear when it is added to the account that every horse-man has two servants, one to take care of his horse the other to procure him forage, and that all these are accompanied by their wives and children, that there always follows



I N T R O D U C T I O N. v

follows the camp a moveable town of shops, where every thing is to be sold as in their cities, some hundreds of elephants for state only, and a train of women (with their numberless retinue) belonging to the Prince and the great officers. For wherever the Sovereign he is more taken up with a vain ostentation of pomp and magnificence, than with the object of the war; and it is his pleasure that his subjects should abandon the capital in order to augment his * numbers.

To

* I took a view of the Lefkar, or Mogul's camp, which is one of the greatest wonders I ever beheld (and chiefly for that I saw it set up and finished in less than four hours) it being no less than twenty English miles in compass, the length someways three coffes (about seven miles) including the skirts: in the middle, where the streets are orderly, and tents joined, there are all sorts of shops, and so regularly disposed, that every man knows whither to go directly for what he wants; each man of quality, and every trade being appointed how far from the King's tents they shall pitch, what ground they shall take up, and on what side, without ever altering. All which, as it lies together, is almost equal to any town in Europe for greatness: but no man must approach the royal quarter, by a musket-shot every way, which is now so strictly observed, that none are admitted but by name: and the time of the durbar in the evening is omitted, and spent in hunting or hawking on pools by boat, in which the King takes wonderful delight, and his barges are removed on carts with him.

Sir Thomas Roe's Journal.

In imitation of their Sovereign, and from the same motives of pride and vanity; the lesser Princes and Viceroys, affect the same magnificence in the splendor of their camps and the number of their followers. Those who were with Nazirzing in 1750, give the like description of his camp, being well assured that it exceeded twenty miles in circumference; but as for the numbers, there is no way of ascertaining them; therefore they only say, they were reported on the spot to have been 300,000 fighting men, and might possibly have been near 200,000; and the followers of the camp said to have exceeded a million, might possibly have amounted to half that number. Nazirzing's army being, at that time, in the heart of his own dominions, and undisturbed by marauders, was regularly supplied from all the neighbouring towns, which, by receiving ready money for their provisions, were enabled to pay the arrears of their revenues, so that the Viceroy maintained



vi I N T R O D U C T I O N.

To provide for all these, the whole country is put in motion, and the strictest orders are given for all provisions to be brought into the camp. By these means, all the cities far and near are exhausted, but the camp, for the most part, is plentifully supplied

THE forage is procured in the following manner. Every horse-man is allowed a man for the purpose, who is constantly employed in cutting turf, and washing the roots of it: and this is a more hearty food for a horse than grass. A shower of rain produces another crop in a few days time: and in case of continued dry weather, they move their camp to fresh ground *

MANY of the Indians obtain from all kinds of animal food, and the greatest part of them use rice, as their common and almost only sustenance: and as they have so great a veneration for Cows, they are all prohibited by their religion, from killing any of that species; therefore there generally is a sufficient supply of beef for the Mahometan soldiery, and the small proportion of Europeans. But to lessen the

tained this amazing multitude by the collections and contributions which he raised in his march, without diminishing from the treasures which he always carried with him, and which served to fill twenty tents with gold and silver coin.

* They also feed their horses in the rice fields, and where meat is plenty, they boil the offal to rags, and mixing it with butter and some sorts of grain make balls of it, which they thrust down the horses throat. In a scarcity of provisions, they give them opium, which has the same effect both on the horses and men, for at once it damps their appetites, and enables them to endure fatigue. The horses of the country, are naturally so exceedingly vicious, that they are not to be broke in the manage, and cannot be brought to act with the same regularity in the field, as a squadron of European cavalry. The Persian horses being more gentle and docile, are greatly esteemed, and often valued at a thousand guineas. Those of India, sell for fifty or a hundred. See Page 141, 142.



I N T R O D U C T I O N. vii

surprize of the more exact calculator, it must be supposed, that these numerous armies seldom keep the field any time, without great loss by famine; for a very considerable diminution is scarcely felt, amongst such numbers, and scarcely regarded from any notions of humanity: a fact also, therefore, neither considered as any thing extraordinary; nor will the memory of it ever prevent the assembling of another multitude, who must also be liable to the same chances of subsisting or starving, as accident shall determine. In like manner, allowance must be made for the great loss and damage they sustain in men, beasts, and all the implements of war, as often as they move in difficult roads and † defiles, and particularly in their method of passing over great rivers. For their rivers, when they are not fordable, in the rainy season become torrents, being swelled to such a degree, that they are not to be passed but flantwise, the landing place being frequently above a mile below the place of embarkation, and heavy vessels, built of timber, could not be brought up against the stream to serve again.

THEY therefore make large boats of a kind of basket-work which they cover with skins. As there must al-

† We marched every other day about four cosses only, with such a train of baggage, as was almost impossible to be kept in order; we passed through woods, and over mountains thick of bushes, where many camels perished; and many people tired with the difficulties of an impassable way, went away to Agra, and all complained. I lost my tents and carts, but by midnight we met again. The king rested two days; for the Leikars could not in less time recover their order; many of the king's women, and thousands of coaches, carts, and camels, lying in the woody mountains without meat or water. He himself got through on a small Elephant that will climb up rocks, and pass such traits, that no horse or beast I have seen, can follow him.

Sir T. Ree's Journal.



viii I N T R O D U C T I O N.

ways be great plenty of hides in so numerous an army, they are easily made. They are very light and manageable and yet will carry above fifty horse, and are capable of transporting the heaviest artillery.

It is owing entirely to an ignorance of the manners of the Asiatics, that many people imagine they can never be made soldiers. It may perhaps be shewn that they never will, whilst the same wretched government and abhorrence of innovation subsists: but those are greatly mistaken, who attribute their dread of fire arms, and particularly of artillery, to a dastardly disposition, and an invincible timidity.

THE true cause lies in the inexperience of their leading men, who never understood the advantages of discipline, and who have kept their infantry upon too low a footing. Their cavalry (which are, among them, very respectable, and also well paid) though not backward to engage with sabres, are extremely unwilling to bring their horses within the reach of our guns; so that they do not decline an engagement so much through fear for their lives, as for their fortunes, which are all laid out in the horse they ride on. As an instance of the affection they contract for so serviceable a creature, Morarow, the general of the Marattas, having had his favourite horse shot, mourned for him three days, after their manner, that is to say, was so long without his turban.

SUCH of the natives as have been disciplined and encouraged by Europeans, and formed into a regular infantry, and



I N T R O D U C T I O N. ix

under officers of their own, and generally known by the name of Sepoys, have familiarized themselves to fire arms, and behaved well behind walls ; and when we give them serjeants to lead them on, they make no contemptible figure in the field.

Nothing is so ruinous to their military affairs, as the false notion which is generally entertained among them, and chiefly by their commanders, in relation to artillery. They are terrified with that of the enemy, and foolishly put a confidence in their own ; and what is the most fatal mistake, they place their chief dependance on the largest pieces, which they neither know how to manage nor move. They give them pompous and founding names, as the Italians do to their guns, and have some pieces which carry a ball of seventy pounds. When we march round them with our light field pieces, and make it necessary to move those enormous weights, their bullocks, which are at best very untractable, if a shot comes among them, are quite ungovernable ; and at the same time are so ill harnessed, that it causes no small delay to free the rest from any one that shall happen to be unruly or slain.

In war with the Asiatics alone, we have a much greater advantage in their being so very tenacious of their old manners, than in their want of bravery. Not only the Prince himself, but every Raja, who has the command of all the forces he can bring into the field, be they more or less, always appears among them mounted on an Elephant, and is at once the General and ensign, or standard of that corps,

a

who



x I N T R O D U C T I O N.

who keep their eyes constantly on him ; and if they lose sight of him for a moment, conclude that all is lost. Thus we find, Aurengzebe gained two battles by the treachery of those who desired his two victorious brothers to get down from their Elephants, mount their horses and pursue the vanquished : their troops missing them, immediately dispersed. The same practice, continued to this day, affords our engineers a fair opportunity of deciding the fate of a whole detachment, by one well directed discharge of a six pounder : and those enormous beasts, now seem to be brought into field for no other end but to be a mark for our artillery. It is said, they begin to see the danger of this practice, but surely that might have been found long since ; for before the use of artillery, the General, thus distinguished, was in like manner exposed to the arrows of a whole army, and yet we always find them in the same perilous station. Porus is said to have been pierced with nine arrows, and to have sunk from his Elephant with innumerable wounds. It should seem probable, that not merely their regard for antient manners, but the expediency of keeping their troops together by this signal, will induce them to continue the same method ; the necessity of which will appear from the conduct and success of Aurengzebe, who, when he found his army giving way on every side, ordered chains to be fastened about the legs of his Elephant, to convince them that he would not give the example of flight ; and that those to whom his life was dear or interesting, could preserve it by no other means but firmly maintaining their ground. It may perhaps be a farther illustration of this practice, to shew the conformity of customs among remote and different barbarous nations, unskilled in the military science.



I N T R O D U C T I O N. xi

IN the histories of America, we find Montezuma represented as performing no part of a general, but only fitting in an exalted stage on men's shoulders, and serving as a conspicuous standard to his troops.

To shew that they themselves are sensible of the danger of being thus exposed, they will sometimes avail themselves of the only device that can afford them any security. For it has been observed, that several Elephants caparison'd alike, with riders in the same rich and splendid habits, have appeared in different parts of the field on the same day.

ANOTHER great obstacle to their success in war, is their superstition, and particularly their strict observance of lucky and unlucky days, which often prevents them from taking the most obvious advantages of an enemy.

BEING fond of all kinds of beasts of prey, they keep great numbers of them, and often visit them before they give battle; and if they find them heavy and dull, they think it a bad omen, and a reason sufficient to postpone their intended design of an action; and on the other hand, the accidental fury of the animal is regarded as a happy omen of success. They have also a custom of matching two wild beasts, most commonly elephants; and having given their own name to the one, and that of the enemy to the other, they bring them together to fight in presence of their army: but in this custom, they are not altogether to be condemned for superstitious folly, since they have the
a 2
policy



xii I N T R O D U C T I O N.

policy to make it a very unequal match, and to give their own name to the strongest.

THE art of influencing the vulgar to engage in any great undertaking, by the aid of these prejudices, is rare, where the chiefs are themselves also superstitious: but it frequently happens, that great obstacles are by these means thrown in their way, and many of their designs made to miscarry by artful people. In order to give an authentic representation of such practices, the following extract of a letter from Colonel Lawrence, to the Governor of Fort St. George, is here inserted.

“ WE made one march nearer the enemy, and intend-
 “ ed to have posted ourselves this day on the road between
 “ Wandewash and Pondichery, but were prevented by
 “ the following unforeseen accident. For some days past,
 “ the black people attending the camp, have been very
 “ sickly, and some of them died every day, and that by
 “ almost instantaneous deaths, owing partly to the season
 “ of the year, and in some measure to bad water. A
 “ Bramin, most probably employed by the enemy, came
 “ into our camp, and by pretending inspirations, he
 “ gathered about him a crowd of Malabar people; these
 “ he threatened with the vengeance of their gods if they
 “ followed the camp, and very artfully insinuated, that
 “ the present reigning sickness amongst them, was a pu-
 “ nishment inflicted on them by their god, who was of-
 “ fended at their remaining with the English. Upon
 “ this, all the * Cooleys deserted.”

* Blacks who are hired to carry the baggage, and sometimes to draw the guns.



I N T R O D U C T I O N. xiii

BUT what is the greatest obstacle of all, to their becoming a military people, is, that those who have once had such success in the field, as to obtain the name of Fortunate, being thereby considered as invincible, and in consequence unmolested for a time, are willing to save the needless expence of an army. For this reason there are few veterans, and most of their armies consist of an assemblage of various people hastily brought together from different parts; so that there can be no such thing as discipline, without which, numbers are but an impediment, and bravery ineffectual.

NOTWITHSTANDING they have so severely suffered by being surprized in the night by the Europeans; they can never be brought to establish either order or vigilance in their camp: and when they have acted with us as allies, the most earnest remonstrances could never prevail with them to be sufficiently upon their guard, when in the neighbourhood of the French, or to quit their ground in the † morning, to co-operate with us in surprizing the enemy.

AT the close of the evening, every man eats an inconceivable quantity of rice, and many take after it some kind of soporific drugs; so that about mid-night, the whole army is in a dead sleep: the consequence of these habits is obvious; and yet it would appear a strange proposition to an Eastern Monarch, to endeavour to persuade him, that the security of his throne depended upon the regulation of the meals of a common soldier: much less would he be prevailed on to restrain him in the use of that opium, which

+ See Page 20



xiv I N T R O D U C T I O N.

is to warm his blood for action, and animate his soul with heroism. It must fill the mind of an European foldier at once with compaffion and contempt, to fee a heap of thefe poor creatures, folcly animated by a momentary intoxication, crowded into a breach, and both in their garb and impotent fury, refembling a mob of frantic women.

THERE is certainly an appearance of effeminacy in the Eaft-tern drefs, which has at all times greatly contributed to leffen their military character with the European nations, who; from their own habits and prejudices, will naturally receive a ftrange impreffion, upon fecing a body of horfe in filk or cotton robes. Thefe laft mentioned particulars are not infifted on as any part of the argument; the foregoing accounts will fufficiently demonftrate, that a nation under fuch circumftances, can never become a military people.

AND yet, there is no character they are fo fond of as that of a warrior; and as they have no other notion of government, they have been, from time immemorial, continually at war with one another. They will ftill talk in a very high ftrain of their paffion for military glory; and as the word *zing*, in their language, fignifies a foldier, it will appear, by the frequency of that termination to moft of the names mentioned in the following fheets, how generally they affect the honour of that title.

UPON this occafion, it would be great injuftice to our commanders on the coaft of Coromandel, not to obferve,
that



I N T R O D U C T I O N. xv

that they have always had to contend with a superior body of Europeans, conducted by leaders of experience and rank in the French army.

THUS far it has been requisite to relate such of the Asiatic manners, as may give some light to the accounts of their military operations ; and it might perhaps be not altogether unpleasing to the reader, nor useless on this occasion, to relate some farther particulars of the Moors, who are the governing people of India, and particularly of the Mogul. To enter into a minute description of the customs, of the Indians, though they were the original inhabitants (besides that Bernier, Thevenot, Tavernier, and * others, have treated of them at large) is not the design of this work, and more particularly belongs to the commercial history of these countries. But for the illustration of the events of war, the manners of the † Moors who have usurped the government, are chiefly to be examined into.

It is extremely difficult to give any recent account of these princes, as they are by custom proud, have a contempt for other nations, and admit no one to their courts,

* There is a very good account by Terry, chaplain to Sir Thomas Roe's embassy, printed along with the English translation of Pietro de la Valle's travels to the Malabar coast.

† It is a great impropriety to call the Mahometan-usurpers of India by the name of Moors : and yet, as the writers of all nations have always given them that appellation, it would now be a greater impropriety to deviate from that usage.

unless



XVI I N T R O D U C T I O N.

unless it be such as by any peculiar talent may happen to administer to the gratification of some present fancy, or to the relief of any disorder they may labour under. They have an implicit faith in the abilities of the European physicians. It is owing to this opinion, that Bernier was enabled to give so ample and authentic an account of the life and manners of Aurengzebe. He travelled with him in his extraordinary journey to Cachemire, of which he has given a clear, comprehensive, and most entertaining journal. As Bernier's whole account of the Mogul Empire, is so full and instructive, it is much more proper to recommend the perusal of it to the reader, than to transcribe, as is too often the practice, from a book that is in every body's hands, and which is, throughout, full of use and entertainment.

BUT on the other hand, where there are books that, amidst a quantity of useless matter, have some few curious particulars; or when any scarce tract is either out of print, or only to be found among large collections; in such case, it may be allowable to give extracts of the most useful passages. The justness of the foregoing observation, will be shewn, if the majority of readers shall happen to be unacquainted with the journal of so eminent a person as Sir Thomas Roe, who was ambassador from James I. to the Mogul Jehan Guire. As no Englishman has lately had the opportunity of so familiar an intercourse with those Monarchs, the accounts given by him of the splendor of the Mogul, so greatly diminished of late years, with some particulars of his private life, may not improperly be here inserted: and it is to be remark'd, that so strict is their attachment



INTRODUCTION.

xvli

attachment to antient manners, that they never change their modes of life or fashions; and therefore whoever reads a description of them in any distant time, will have a most exact representation of their present manners.

Extract of a Letter from Sir THOMAS ROE,
to the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, dated
Adsmere, January 29, 1615.

“ *THESE people have no Written Laws, the King’s judgment binds; who sits and gives sentence once a week with much patience, both in civil and criminal causes, where sometimes he sees the execution done by his Elephants with too much delight in blood.*

His Governors of provinces rule by his Firmans, which are his letters or commissions authorizing them, and take life and goods at pleasure.

In revenue he doubtless exceeds either Turk or Persian, or any Eastern Prince, the sums I dare not name: but the reason, all the lands are his, no man has a foot. He maintains all that are not mechanics, by revenues bestowed on them, reckoned by horses; and the allowance of many is greater than the estates of German Princes. All men rise to greater and greater Lordships as they advance in favour, which is got by frequent presents, rich and rare. The Mogul is heir to all that die, as well those that gained it by their industry, as merchants, &c, as those that live by him. He
b takes



I N T R O D U C T I O N.

takes all their money, only leaving the widow and daughters what he pleases. To the sons of those that die worth two or three millions, he gives some small Lordship to begin the world anew. The King sits out in three several places three times of the day, except something extraordinary hinder him: an hour at noon to see his elephants fight, from four till five to entertain all comers, to be seen and reshiped; from nine till midnight amidst his principal men in more familiarity, being below among them.

All the policy of his state is to keep the greatest men about him, or to pay them afar off liberally. There is no council, but every officer gives the King his opinion apart. He (meaning Jehan Guire, Grandfather of Aurengzebe) is of countenance cheerful, and not proud in nature, but only by habit and custom, for at night he is very affable and full of gentle conversation.*

The buildings are all base, of mud, one story high. I know not by what policy the King seeks the ruin of all the antient cities which were nobly built, and now lie desolate and in rubbish. His own houses are of stone, handsome and uniform. His great men build not, for want of inheritance, and as far as I have yet seen, live in tents or houses worse than our cottages."

* And whether at home or abroad, to keep a great number of spies continually about them.



INTRODUCTION.

xix

A Letter of the same date from Sir THOMAS ROE, to the East-India Company.

“ *AT my first audience, the Mogul prevented me in speech, bidding me welcome as to the brother of the King my master : and after many compliments, I delivered his Majesty's letter, with a copy of it in Persian : then I shewed my commission, and delivered your presents, that is, the coach, the virginals, the knives, a scarf embroidered, and a sword of my own. He, sitting in his state, could not well see the coach, but sent many to view it, and caused the musician to play on the virginals, which gave him content. At night, having staid the coachman and musician, he came down into a court, got into the coach, and into every corner of it, causing it to be drawn about. Then he sent to me, though it was ten o'clock at night, for a servant to put on his scarf and sword after the English fashion, of which he was so proud, that he walked up and down flourishing it, and has never since been seen without it. But after the English were come away, he asked the Jesuit, whether the King of England was a great King, that sent presents of so small value, and that he looked for some jewels.*

There is nothing more welcome here, nor did I ever see men so fond of drink, as the King and Prince are of red wine, whereof the Governor of Surat sent up some bottles, and the King has ever since solicited for more : I think four or five casks of that wine will be more welcome than the richest jewels in Cheapside.”

Extracts



INTRODUCTION.

Extracts from Sir THOMAS ROE'S Journal.

“ **T**HE King having been far gone over night in wine, some, however accidentally or maliciously, spoke of the last merry night, and that many of the nobility drank wine, which none must do without leave. The King forgetting his order, asked who gave it, and answer was made the Buckshee; for no man dares say it was the King when he makes a doubt of it. The custom is, that when the King drinks, which is alone, sometimes he will command the nobility to drink after him, which if they do not, it is looked upon as a crime: and so every man that takes a cup of wine of the officer, has his name writ down, and he makes his obeisance, though perhaps the King's eyes are clouded. The King not remembering his own command, called the Buckshee, and asked whether he gave the order, who falsely denied it, for he had it from the King, and by name called all that drank with the Ambassador. The King then called for the list, and the persons named in it, and fined some one, some two, and some three thousand roupes; and some that were nearer his person, he caused to be whipped before him, they receiving a hundred and thirty stripes with a terrible instrument, having at the ends of four cords, irons like spur-rowels, so that every stroke made four wounds. When they lay for dead on the ground, he commanded the standers-by to spurn them, and after that, the porters to break their staves on them. Thus most cruelly mangled and bruised they were carried out: one of them died on the spot, some would have excused it by laying it on the Ambassador, but the King re-
plied



INTRODUCTION.

xxi.

plied he only ordered a cup or two to be given him. Drunkenness is a common vice, and an exercise of the King's, yet it is so strictly forbidden, that no man can enter the Guzelcan when the King sits, but the porters smell his breath, and if he have but tasted wine, he is not suffered to come in, and if the reason of his absence be but known, it will be a difficult matter to escape the whip; for if the King once takes offence, the father will not speak for the son

The second of September was the King's birth-day, and kept with great solemnity. On this day the King is weighed against some jewels, gold, silver, stuffs of gold, silver, and silks butter, rice, fruit, and many other things, of every sort a little, which is all given to the Bramins.

He was so rich in jewels, that I own in my life I never saw such inestimable wealth together. The time was spent in bringing his greatest elephants before him; some of which being lord-elephants, had their chains, bells, and furniture of gold and silver, with many gilt banners and flags carried about them, and eight or ten elephants waiting on each of them, cloathed in gold, silk, and silver.

In this manner about twelve companies passed by most richly adorned, the first having all the plates on his head and breast set with rubies and emeralds, being a beast of wonderful bulk and beauty. They all bowed down before the King, making their reverence very handsomely: this was the finest show of beasts I ever saw.



I found the Mogul sitting on his throne, and a beggar at his feet, a poor silly old man, all ragged and patched. The country abounds in this sort of professed poor holy men; they are called Fakeers, and held in great veneration: and in works of mortification and voluntary suffering, they outdo all that ever has been pretended either by Heretics or Idolaters. This miserable wretch cloathed in rags, crowned with feathers, and covered with ashes, his Majesty talked with about an hour so familiarly, and with such seeming kindness, that it must needs argue an humility not found easily among Kings. The beggar sat, which the King's son dares not do. He gave the King a present of a cake mixed with ashes, burnt on the coals, and made by himself of coarse grain, which the King willingly accepted, broke a bit and eat it, which a nice person could scarce have done; then he took the clout that wrapped it up, and put it into the poor man's bosom, and sent for a hundred roupees, and with his own hand poured them into the poor man's lap, and gathered up for him what fell besides. When his collation or banquet, and drink came, whatsoever he took*

* There are few books of Voyages among the Turks or Indians which do not make mention of the Fakeers or Joguies. The former is a Turkish word, and signifies poor, the latter is the Indian name for these extraordinary saints, for such they are esteemed, and are called Santos at Cairo, and in many other parts. It is well known that the veneration paid to the numerous body of these worthless and insolent beggars, is owing to the opinion of extraordinary sanctity which a few of this sect acquire by the performance of certain singular and fantastical vows. Some have made a vow to hold their arms above their head till they contract a stiffness, and can never be moved: others to keep their hands clenched till their nails grow through them: others to sit in chairs full of sharp nails, to drag a heavy chain, to carry vast weights about their necks, or fire on their heads. Some years ago one of these made a vow to measure the length of the whole empire with his own body; and at this time there is a Fakeer who every day rolls himself round the rock at Trichinopoly, which is a mile in circumference.



INTRODUCTION.

xxiii

to eat he broke and gave the beggar half; and rising, after many humiliations and charities, the old wretch not being nimble, he took him up in his arms, though no cleanly person durst have touched him, and embracing him three times, laying his hand upon his heart and calling him father, left him and all of us in admiration.

*While the King appeared at the window, two eunuchs stood on two tressels with long poles, and feather-fans at the end of them, fanning him. He bestowed many favours, and received presents. At one side in a window were his two principal wives, whose curiosity made them break little holes in a grate of reed that hung before it, to gaze on me: I first their fingers, and then, they laying their face close, first the one and then the other, I could sometimes discern their full proportion. They were indifferently white, with black hair smoothed up: but if there had been no other light, their diamonds and pearls had sufficed to show them. When I looked up they retired, and were so merry, that I supposed they laughed at me. On a sudden the King rose, we retired to the Durbar, and sat on the carpets, attending his coming out. Not long after he came and sat about half an hour, till his Ladies at their door had mounted their elephants, which were about fifty, all of them richly adorned, but chiefly with turrets on their backs, all enclosed with grates of gold wire to look through, and canopies over of cloth of silver. Then the King came down the stairs with such an acclamation of health to the King, as would have out roared cannon. At the foot of the stairs, where I met him, and shuffled to be next, one brought a mighty
carp,*



carp, another a dish of white stuff like starch, into which he put his finger, and touched the fish, and so rubbed it on his forehead: a ceremony used presaging good fortune. Then another came and girt on his sword, and a ring on his buckler, set all over with diamonds and rubies, the belts of gold suitable: another hung on his quiver with thirty arrows, and his bow in a case, being the same that was presented by the Persian Ambassador. On his head he wore a rich turbant, with a plume of Heron's feathers, not many, but long: on the one side a ruby unset as big as a walnut, on the other side a diamond as large; in the middle an emerald much bigger. His staff was wound about with a chain of great pearl, rubies and diamonds drilled. About his neck he wore a chain of three strings of most excellent pearl, the largest I ever saw. Above his elbows, armlets set with diamonds, and on his wrists, three rows of several sorts; his hands bare, but almost on every finger a ring; his gloves, which were English, stuck under his girdle. His coat of cloth of gold without sleeves, upon a fine semian as thin as lawn. On his feet a pair of buskins embroidered with pearl, the toes sharp and turning up. Thus armed and accoutred, he went to the coach that attended him with his new English servant, who was clothed as rich as any player, and more gaudy, and had broke four horses, which were trapped and harnessed in gold and velvets. This was the first coach he ever sat in, made by that sent out of England, and so like, that I knew it not but by the cover, which was a Persian gold velvet. He sat at the end, and on each side went two eunucks, who carried small maces of gold set all over with rubies, with a long bunch of horse-tail to slap the
flies



I N T R O D U C T I O N.

XXV

fies away. Before him went drums, base trumpets, and loud musick ; many canopies, umbrellas, and other strange ensigns of majesty, made of cloth of gold, set in many places with rubies. Nine led horses, the furniture all garnished, some with pearls and emeralds, some only with studs enamelled. The Persian Ambassador presented him a horse. Next behind came three palankeens, the carriages and feet of one plated with gold, set at the ends with stones, and covered with crimson velvet, embroidered with pearl, and fringes of great pearl, hanging in ropes a foot deep, a border about it set with rubies and emeralds : and a footman carried a footstool of gold set with stones. The other two palankeens were covered and lined only with cloth of gold. Next followed the English coach newly covered and richly adorned, which he had given to Queen Nourmabal, who sat in it. After them a third, in which sat his youngest sons. Then followed above twenty elephants royal, led for him to mount, so rich in stones and furniture that they glittered like the sun. Every elephant had sundry flags of cloth of silver, gilt sattin and taffety. His noblemen he suffered to walk on foot, which I did to the gate, and left him. His Wives on their elephants were carried half a mile behind him.

When he came before the door, where was his eldest son kept prisoner, he stayed the coach, and called for him. He came and made reverence, with a sword and buckler in his hand, his beard grown to his middle, a sign of disfavour. The King commanded him to mount one of the spare elephants, and so rode next to him, with extraordinary applause
d
and



and joy of all men, who are now filled with new hopes. The King gave him one thousand roupes to cast to the people. His Tailor, Asaph Chan, and all those monsters, were yet on foot : I took horse to avoid the croud and other inconveniences, and crossed out of the Leskar before him, waiting till he came near his tents. He passed all the way between a guard of elephants, having every one a turret on his back, and on the four corners of each, four banners of yellow taffety, and right before a piece of cannon carrying a bullet as big as a tennis-ball, the gunner behind it. They were in all about three hundred. Other elephants of state went before, and behind, about six hundred, all of which were covered with velvet, or cloth of gold, and had two or three gilded banners : several footmen ran along the way with skins of water to lay the dust before the King. No horse or man was suffered to come within two furlongs of the coach, except those that walked by on foot ; so that I hastened to his tents to attend his alighting. They were walled in about half an English mile in compass, in form of a fort, with several angles and bulwarks, and high curtains of a coarse stuff made like arras, red on the outside, and within figures in panes, with a handsome gatehouse ; every post that bore these up was headed with brass. The throng was great : I had a mind to go in, but no one was permitted, the greatest in the land sitting at the door ; however I made an offer, and they admitted me, but refused the Persian Ambassador. In the midst of this court was a throne of Mother of Pearl, borne on two pillars raised on earth, covered over with a high tent, the pole headed with a knob of gold : under that, canopies of cloth of gold, and under-foot carpets. When the
King



INTRODUCTION.

xxvii

King entered, every man cried joy and good fortune, and so we took our places. He called for water, washed his hands, and departed. His women went in some other way to their apartments. and his son I saw not.

Within this inclosure were about thirty divisions with tents. All the noblemen retired to theirs, which were in excellent forms, some all white, some green, some mixed, all inclosed as orderly as any house, in the most magnificent manner I ever saw. The vale shewed like a beautiful city, for the baggage made no confusion; I was ill provided with carriages, and ashamed of my equipage; for five years allowance would not have provided me an indifferent tent answerable to others, and to add to the grandeur, every man has two, so that one of them goes before to the next ground and is set up a day before the King rises from the place where he is.

A Circumstance which may appear trifling, will greatly contribute to compleat the idea which Sir THOMAS ROE has given us of the Moors in India.

It happened there was among the presents, a picture of Venus leading a Satyr by the nose. The Mogul when he saw this, shewed it to his courtiers, and bid them remark the action of the woman, the blackness of the Satyr's skin, and other particulars, giving them to understand, he considered it as a reflection on the people of Asia, whom he supposed to be represented by the Satyr, as being of their complexion; and that the Venus lead-
ing



ing him by the nose, denoted the great power the women in that country have over the men.

It was indeed too apposite an emblem ; and this, together with the annexed picture, taken from real life in the country, will give a just representation of the luxurious indolence in which they pass the greatest part of their lives, except when they are at war. As they sit for the most part (when they are not with their women) upon their sofas, smoking, and amusing themselves with their jewels, taking coffee or sweet-meats, seeing their quails fight, or such like pastimes ; nothing surprises them so much as to see a European walk about a room and none but their very young people ever rise for amusement or exercise only.

Though Sir THOMAS ROE represents the pride of the Mogul as scarcely supportable to an Englishman, yet that Embassador appears to have been favoured in a very extraordinary manner. The extreme disregard which the Asiatic Sovereigns naturally have for Europeans, is fully set forth in the following extract from M. de Buffŷ's letter published in Mr. Duplex's Memoirs. It is a just and most authentic picture of the haughty demeanor and assuming arrogance of those people, and will prove what has been advanced of the very little intercourse we could have had with them.

Extract



COLONEL LAWRENCE's
NARRATIVE OF THE WAR,
ON THE
COAST of COROMANDEL,

From the Beginning of the Troubles to the Year 1754.

THE authority of the Nabob Mahomet Allee Cawn having been disputed by the French, was the first cause of the war. I shall endeavour to shew how he founded his right, and with what justice the French supported his competitors. I shall trace it from the year 1730, as the different appointments, made since that time by the viceroys of the Deckan, have a necessary connection with many parts of this narrative, and lead to a knowledge of the persons principally concerned in this scene of troubles. 1730.

THE viceroy of the Deckan, in the year 1730, was called Nizam Almuluck. According to his right of nominating a Governor of the Carnatick, now more generally known by the name of the Nabob of Arcot, he appointed Sadet Allee Cawn, who was succeeded by his nephew Deust Allee Cawn, who governed in the year 1740.



1738.

CHUNDA SAIB, a man of no family or riches, but endowed by nature with talents, and a capacity that made ample amends for what fortune had denied him, had the command of a small district of country, and could bring about an hundred horse into the field. He served under Deust Allee Cawn, to whom his genius soon made him known, and so useful, that he advanced him, and married him to one of his daughters.

THE kingdom of Trichinopoly was then under the Gentou government. The king dying, left no children, and appointed his brother's son to succeed. The dowager queen, supported by her two brothers, put in a claim to the regency, till her eldest brother's son was of a fit age to reign. There was a third party formed, by a relation of the deceased king, who demanded the throne as his right, and brought a large army to support his pretensions*. The king's party was soon thrown out of the competition, and the dispute continued between the queen and the king's relations. The queen applied to the Nabob of Arcot, and he came to her assistance, and with him Chunda Saib, as his general, who managed affairs so well, that, having weaken'd both, he formed a stronger party for himself, and waited with patience till his scheme was ripe for execution. Under pretence of a visit to the queen, he introduced himself and some troops into the town, got possession of it, put to death all the different competitors, plundered and imprisoned the queen, who, finding no resource left, poisoned herself; first burning the alcoran on which Chunda Saib had sworn that his only views in this visit were to shew marks of respect and regard. Thus the government of the kingdom of Trichinopoly was changed in 1738, and still continues under the Nabob of Arcot; and is commonly given to one of his nearest relations.

IN the year 1740, the Marattas invaded Arcot, and overthrew Deust Allee Cawn in a battle which cost him his life. His son, Subter Allee Cawn, on his father's death, fled to Madras, and there obtained the protection of Mr. Benyon, then governor. Soon after he received a grant from Nizam Almuluck, appointing him Nabob of Arcot; but, in the year 1744, he was treacherously murdered, at a feast made by his brother-in-law Moo-

* The Gentou queen's name was Menâ hama. Her competitor, the king's relation, Trimolalaik.



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

tis Allee Cawn, at Velloure, a strong fort, twelve miles from Arcot. 1748.

COZA ABDALLAH CAWN succeeded him, and was himself, shortly after, succeeded by Anaverdy Cawn, our present Nabob's father, who was appointed, by the viceroy of the Deckan, nabob of Arcot, in the year 1745.

CHUNDA SAIB remained at Trichinopoly till the year 1741, when the Marattas came a second time into the country, besieged the town, got possession of it, and took him prisoner. He was carried to Sattarah, the Marattas' capital, and there confined till 1748, the year in which Nizam Almuluck died.

NIZAM ALMULUCK left four sons, Gauzedy Cawn, Nazerzing, Salabatzing, and Nizam Al'te.

THOUGH the succession in this country is not hereditary, yet it commonly runs in the same family, especially when the survivors have power to make good their pretensions, and money to secure the Mogul's appointment. Gauzedy Cawn, the eldest son, was then Bucshee, or paymaster-general to the Mogul, the second man in power, next to the Vizier, in this mighty empire. He having perhaps more ambitious views, refused the viceroyalty of the Deckan, but made over his interest to the second son Nazerzing, who was appointed by the Mogul Shaw Hamet.

NIZAM ALMULUCK had also a nephew, Eradmoodin Cawn, commonly called Muzapherzing, who, on his uncle's death, laid claim to the Carnatick, founded, as he said, on a promise from his uncle. But Nazirzing refused his consent, and confirmed Anaverdy Cawn, agreeable to his father's appointment. On this refusal Muzapherzing declared he would support his pretensions by open force. His first step was to go to Sattarah, and apply to Bal-laze ow, chief of the Marattas, for assistance. There he saw Chunda Saib, who still remained prisoner. Muzapherzing engaged to get him released, and Chunda Saib, on his side, promised to go to Pondichery, and influence Mr. Dupleix to assist and support him in his cause. The Maratta chief contented to every thing, and promised his assistance. He kept his word in regard to the releasing



1749. of Chunda Saib, but sent no troops. Chunda Saib set out for Pondichery, in 1748, and Muzapherzing prepared to raise an army.

CHUNDA SAIB succeeded, made some presents, and promised much more; and, when Muzapherzing was ready, they were joined by six hundred French, and a train of artillery. In July 1749, they marched for Arcot, and there encountered Anaverdy Cawn, who lost the victory and his life. His eldest son, Mauphus Cawn, was taken prisoner, and his second son, Mahomed Allee Cawn, the present Nabob, made the best of his way to his government of Trichinopoly, waiting there for an opportunity to revenge his father's death. The victorious army pursued the blow, took Arcot, and overran the whole province. They afterwards returned to Pondichery, where Muzapherzing appointed Chunda Saib Nabob, of Arcot.

THEY remained quiet at Pondichery, till Admiral Boscawen sailed for Europe, not daring to move till he was out of sight. The day after, October 21, 1749, they took the field, and raised contributions all over the country. The king of Tanjore, having refused to acknowledge Muzapherzing, or Chunda Saib, they marched and laid siege to his capital. The French were commanded by Mr. Law, nephew of the famous Mississippi Law. They soon made a breach, but the troops within seeming determined to defend it, they were afraid to venture an assault. By protracting the siege, the people in the town were reduced to their last barrel of powder; but, however, they saved the place, by compounding for some lacks of *roupees in ready money, and a bill for seventy-five lacks more. The enemy raised the siege, but, after one day's march, the French army returned, and insisted on a sum of money for themselves, alledging that they had not received any part of what was paid. However, it was to no purpose, for the king of Tanjore, having received in that time a reinforcement of Sepoys and gunners, and a large quantity of powder from Trichinopoly, refused to give any more. Still the breach remained open, which the French would not attack. In the mean time, certain accounts came of Muzapherzing's march from Aurengabad towards Arcot, in order to punish Muzapherzing, and Chunda Saib, for their rebellion. This obliged them to raise the siege a second time in good earnest, and return to Pondichery. This passed in January 1750.

A lack of roupees is about 12,000 l. Sterling

EVER



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

5.

EVER since Anaverdy Cawn's defeat, his son, Mahomed Allee Cawn, had desired our assistance. It was necessary to put a stop to the progress of the French, whether in justice to assist the lawful prince against rebels, or as an act of self-defence, and to prevent an increase of power in an oppressive neighbour, that must, at last, have proved our ruin. This determined us to protect the Nabob Mahomet Allee Cawn, till we could know Nazirzing's determination : captain Cope was therefore sent with a detachment to Trichinopoly 1750.

NAZIRZING had given orders to the Nabob to join him on his march, in obedience to which he set out from Trichinopoly, at the head of a large army of horse, and the English detachment commanded by Captain Cope, and joined Nazirzing at * Waldore, in February 1750. As it is customary amongst all Eastern princes to make presents on the first visit, when the Nabob waited on Nazirzing, he asked him what he had brought : the Nabob took Captain Cope by the hand, and, presenting him, said he had brought the gentleman and the assistance of the English nation. Nazirzing was pleased with the answer, conferred some honours on Captain Cope, and, a few days after, appointed Mahomed Allee Cawn to succeed his father, as Nabob of Arcot and Trichinopoly.

MUZAPHERZING and Chunda Saib marched out of Pondichery with their army, and two thousand Europeans commanded by Mr. Dauteuil, with a large train of artillery, and a numerous body of Sepoys. They took post within a few miles of Nazirzing, at whose earnest and repeated request, I marched with six hundred men, accompanied with Mr. Westcott, one of the council, with a commission to treat with Nazirzing, in which we were assisted by Capt. Dalton.

WE joined him at Villanure, and were very graciously received suitable to the dignity of an Eastern prince, at the head of three hundred thousand men, of which he declared me Generalissimo. He proposed to me to attack the enemy immediately : I told him, in the Eastern stile, that he must be sure of victory wherever he fought, yet the attack might be attended with

* A fort some miles west of Pondichery.

some



1750. some difficulty, and cost him the lives of many brave men, as the enemy were strongly posted *, and had with them a large train of artillery. But that, if he pleased to march between them and Pondichery, he might, by cutting off their communication, oblige them to fight at a greater disadvantage.

HOWEVER just my proposal might be, his answer was as follows: What! shall the great Nazirzing, the son of Nizam al Mulk, even for an advantage, seem to retreat before so despicable an enemy? No, he would march and attack them in front. I told him he might do as he pleased, I was ready to support him.

THE two armies were so near, that the next day we cannonaded, and were drawn out to engage.

IN this situation, a messenger came to me from Mr. Dauteuil, to acquaint me, " That although we were engaged in different causes, yet it was not his design nor inclination, that any European blood should be spilt: but as he did not know our post, should any of his shot come that way, and hurt the English, he could not be blamed." I sent him for answer, " That I had the honour of carrying the English colours on my flag gun, which if he pleased to look out for, he might know from thence where the English were posted;" and I assured him, I should also be very loth to spill European blood; but, if any shot came that way he might be assured I would return them.

To know, I suppose, whether I was in earnest, a shot was fired from their battery over our heads: I ordered three guns to answer it, and saw them well pointed. Mr. Dauteuil seeing us resolved not to look tamely on, and probably fearing the success of an action, thought it more prudent to retreat in the night. Lest his heavy artillery should retard him, he, for the greater expedition, left eleven pieces behind; and what was worse, part of his artillery-men with them, the better to conceal his design; for he gave

* The French were entrenched, and had 20 pieces of cannon. Nazarzing had 800; but his principal officer of artillery was an Irishman, for the natives, in general, think every European an engineer. I happened to find fault with this gentleman's disposition of his artil-

lery, which was in a hollow, where his cannon were hid. He gravely replied, " What, did I think him mad, or foolish enough, to expose his excellency's cannon, by placing it on a rising ground?"



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

7

out, he was only going to alarm our camp in the night, and would be back in the morning.

1750.

NAZIRZING having immediate notice of his retreat, soon routed Muzapherzing's and Chunda's Saib's forces; fell in with the unfortunate French gunners left behind as a sacrifice, and cut most of them to pieces. We saved as many as we could, taking them by force out of the hands of the Moors, got their wounds dressed by our surgeons, and took all the care of them that humanity required of us. In return,

Mr. Dupleix wrote a long protest against me, for making French subjects prisoners in time of peace; but the poor fellows, more sensible of the obligations they were under to us, very gratefully acknowledged our tender usage, and confessed it was entirely owing to us that they were saved.

THE same night a large detachment of Marattas from Nazirzing's camp, commanded by Morarow *, were sent in pursuit of Mr. Dauteuil. They came up with him the next day. Mr. Dauteuil formed his men into a square. Morarow attacked and broke it with only fifteen men, imagining his whole party in his rear; but seeing his danger, he with that handful, when surrounded, boldly pushed for it; and breaking through the opposite side, cleared his way with six men, having lost nine in the attack.

ON the retreat of the French and their army being dispersed, Muzapherzing submitted to, and implored the mercy of his uncle, who received him into his camp, and detained him as a state prisoner; but Chunda Saib, whose sole dependance was on Mr. Dupleix, continued obstinate, and retreated with the French to Pondichery. Muzapherzing's submission, as will shortly appear, was only politic, and, that he might be nearer at hand, to execute a scheme, which in a few months was put in execution, to the ruin and pence of his uncle's life. The consequence of the victory

Morarow, whose name often occurs in the history, is a Maratta, who by supporting the division in the country, has made himself considerable from a small beginning; he sides with no party but as he finds his advantage in it, and as easily changes sides; he commands about 3000 very good horse. When he

is not employed or paid by any prince, he scours the country for himself, and raises contributions where he can get most, and with least dispute. His real master is the Nana Shah Raja; but he obeys his orders just as they are conducive to his own interest.

was



1750. was the retaking of Arcot, which again acknowledged its lawful master.

MR. DUPLEIX, after this disgrace, wrote a long letter to Nazirzing, which he would not open or read but in our presence. Though he pretended submission to the viceroy, he had still the presumption to dictate to him, and insist, that none of the family of Anaverdy Cawn should ever govern the province of Arcot. Ambassadors came also to treat publicly for an accommodation. But their real business was privately to concert measures with Shanavas Cawn, Nazirzing's prime minister and the * chiefs of the conspiracy, which was first laid in Pondichery by Chunda Saib and Mr. Dupleix, who promised to assist them to the utmost of his power, as it plainly appeared afterwards. Though this was carried on with great secrecy, I had information that some design was on foot against Nazirzing, and that Shanavas Cawn was principally concerned in it. I therefore desired my interpreter to acquaint Nazirzing with what I had heard, and in particular what concerned his prime minister. But so great were the apprehensions of the person we employed as linguist, that he did not dare to say what I directed him, nor accuse a person in such high favour and power as Shanavas Cawn, who was present, so much did he dread his resentment, which I plainly discovered from the answers I received from Nazirzing, and the confusion of the interpreter.

PART of our instructions to Nazirzing were, to obtain an enlargement of our bounds round Madras, which he frequently promised, and certainly intended to perform, had not his minister, who was in an opposite interest, contrived to disappoint us, by delaying and putting us off from time to time. Seeing ourselves only amused, — we pressed our demands with more earnestness, and Nazirzing promised we should be immediately satisfied; but desired we march with him to Arcot, a proposal we could by no means consent to, as it would have left our settlements and frontiers exposed to the insults of 2000 French, and Chunda Saib, who at this time was raising another army. We also endeavoured to make him sensible, that his march to Arcot removed him too far from

The two principal of which were the Naldor or Calicut and Condapore. These two are under the viceroy of the Deccan; the country is in the Sulthanip of Golkonda; they have in their pay numbers of Patans, who

are reckoned the best soldiers amongst the Hindoo moors; as the policy of the British empire requires frequent alliances with the Patans are esteemed very potent in the kind of villany.



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

9

his enemies, who were only waiting for a favourable opportunity to renew the troubles. That it was easy for him, by staying where he was, to finish the business effectually, and to distress his enemies, by cutting off their communication with the country, and thereby oblige them to accept of whatever terms he would please to offer them. But the more we urged against his march to Arcot the more his favourite pressed him to it. Our removal from him was the great subject of the party, that had resolved his ruin. 1750.

FINDING all our endeavours were of no weight against a determined Scheme, we marched to our settlements, and Nazirzing to Arcot, where, lulled into a security, by what he was willing to look upon as a victory, he gave himself up entirely to the pleasures he was fondest of, women and hunting. Nothing was omitted by the faction to amuse him, and take off his attention from business, or whatever might lead to a discovery of the designs which were carrying on against him.

THE detachment commanded by Morarow, sent in pursuit of the French, when they retreated from Nazirzing, encamped near Pondichery, with their usual carelessness. The French attacked them in the night, when they little expected, and were as little prepared for an enemy, and easily put them to the rout, killed a great many, and got possession of their camp and baggage. This success animated the French, and they once more took the field with Chunda Saib, and marched for Trividy, a fortified pagoda, situated about sixteen miles west of fort St. David, which being garrisoned only by country troops, they soon got possession of it.

THE Nabob, Mahomet-Allee Cawn, who had attended Nazirzing to Arcot, and was constantly pressing him to return to the charge, to command a party from the army, to oppose and punish the French, and Chunda Saib: and at the same time applied to the English for the aid of Europeans, and a train of Artillery. Captain Cope more, with 400 of the military, and a body of sepoy, marched to assist him; and in conjunction they moved towards the enemy. I should at that time have taken the field myself, but the chair becoming vacant by the removal of Mr. Fløyer I was obliged to take the government till Mr. Saunders, who was appointed to succeed, could



1750. could come from Vizagapatam, and soon after his arrival, I embarked for England.

THE Nabob had agreed to pay the whole expence of our troops in the field; but a large present to Nazirzing for his commission having exhausted his treasury, instead of money, we got only trifling excuses, with which he put us off from day to day, till at last the expences falling entirely upon us, and the Nabob, for want of Magazines and money, being unable to march his army between the French and Pondichery, Captain Cope had orders to return.

THE very next night after, the French and Chunda Saib attacked the Nabob in his camp. It could not be called a battle, but a rout; the troops, instead of fighting, running away in small parties, every thing fell into the victor's hands; even the Nabob, with difficulty, made his escape, almost singly, and unattended, to Nazirzing.

THE enemy did not remain idle, but followed the blow and partly by threats, partly fair promises, got possession of Gingee, a place exceeding strong by nature, and not ill fortified, according to the eastern manner. They took care to secure their new conquest by a strong garrison, supporting it well with artillery and ammunition.

NAZIRZING, roused from his lethargy by the loss of Gingee, and reflecting on its consequences, immediately marched from Arcot to retake that important place, declaring he would succeed, or never return. Muzapherzing and his faction now thought it a proper time to put their schemes in execution; Nazirzing with his army surrounded Gingee; the French, and Chunda Saib were encamped under the walls.

NOTHING now was wanting but to strike the blow which was concerted in the following manner. The French were to attack that part of the camp which the Nabobs of Cadajah and Condanore occupied, and their troops had instructions to make no resistance. The Nabobs had engaged on their part to assassinate Na-



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

II

1750.

Nazirzing at his first appearance, on the alarm. The attack was no sooner begun, but the two Nabobs made directly for Nazirzing's tent, and meeting him as he came out, they intreated him to mount his elephant and punish the rebels. The unfortunate prince was disposing himself to follow their advice, when the stroke was given, the one stabbing him with a poniard, while the other shot him with a pistol. His head was severed from his body, fixed on a spear, and brought to his nephew Muzapherzing, who being immediately released, and mounted on his late uncle's elephant, was proclaimed through the camp Viceroy of the Deckan. Little or no resistance was made any where; so general was the consternation, that every body thought of saving themselves, not knowing who were friends or enemies, nor how to oppose a succession they so little expected. The French pushed their way to Nazirzing's tents, where was found an immense treasure, in money and jewels, by which many made their fortunes, but none so largely as Mr. Dupleix, a fortune, by all accounts, not to be equalled at that time, by any subject in Europe.

To perpetuate the memory of this famous victory, which the French had boasted of as superior to any thing of the kind recorded in history, Mr. Dupleix, near the place where the massacre was committed, caused a town to be built, called Dupleix * Fateabat, and to record the share the French had in it, a pillar now lies at Pondichery, designed to be erected in the market place, with a pompous Latin inscription, giving an account of the engagement, and the French valour. Unluckily future ages will not be the wiser for it; for captain Clive, a year after, in retaking the Arcot country, burnt the town, and destroyed the monument on which the pillar was to have been erected.

THE victorious army returned to Pondichery in January 1751, with a most sumptuous train of the princes of the Deckan, and divided the spoil. Muzapherzing declared Chunda Saib Nabob of Arcot, and its dependencies, and associated Mr. Dupleix in the government with himself. On this Mr. Dupleix assumed the state and formalities of an eastern prince. He held his Durbar in the palace at Pondichery, and suffered neither the natives, nor his own countrymen to approach him without a present after the eastern

The place of victor

C 2

manner.



1751. manner, he mounted his elephant, and was proclaimed Nabob. Mahomed Allee Cawn escaping with the utmost difficulty, and without attendants, made the best of his way to Trichinopoly, notwithstanding the great search made to seize his person.

It was agreed at Pondichery, that Chunda Saib should raise an army, and assisted by the French, endeavour to make good his appointment to the government of Arcot under Mr. Dupleix: the Muzapherzing should march with the late Nazerzing's army to Srirangabad, the usual residence of the princes of the Deckan; accompanied by Mr. Buffly, at the head of 600 French, 3000 sepoys, and a large train of artillery. They began their march the beginning of 1751, and on the road the two Nabobs of Cadapah and Condanore, jealous of Muzapherzing and the power of the French, and not thinking themselves sufficiently rewarded, upon various pretexts fomented a quarrel, till at length they proceeded to farther outrages, which produced an engagement. The Patans advanced to attack the French, but were unable to stand the cannonade. After they were obliged to retire, they fell upon Muzapherzing's flank, routed his army, and in some measure revenged Nazirzing, in the death of his nephew, the chief of the conspirators. A great many of the Patans were killed, and amongst the rest the Nabob of Condanore.

THE next day, the chiefs of the army proclaimed Sallabatzing, brother to Nazirzing viceroy of the Deckan, though there was a strong party for the son of Muzapherzing. At this time the troubles at the court of Delly, prevented the Mogul from settling the affairs of the Deckan; he only made an appointment of Gawzedy Cawn to the government, and resolved to support him with an army, when the state of his affairs would permit. The new prince * sent Saneds to Mahomed Allee Cawn in the month of March, confirming him Nabob of Arcot.

UPON the death of Nazirzing, captain Cope was again sent in January 1751, with a strong detachment, to support the Nabob in Trichinopoly, after an offer made to Chunda Saib and his allies, of the quiet possession of the whole province, except that fort and its dependencies.

Saneds are commissions or grants for particular countries.

CHUNDA



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

13

CHUNDA SAIB and the French treated this proposal with the highest contempt, and immediately raised troops and took the field. We collected about five hundred men from all our garrisons, and sent them under the command of captain De Gingins to observe their motions, who finding their intentions were for Trichinopoly, moved that way also; and at the same time, a party from that garrison, of about 110 men, marched to meet captain De Gingins, followed by what troops the Nabob could raise, commanded by his brother bdial Vahob Cawn. The first party met captain De Gingins at idachilum, and from thence the army moved in conjunction to Volconda, where they were also joined by the Nabob's forces, amounting in the whole to about 2000 horse, 3000 sepoy, and 600 Europeans.

1751.

VOLCONDA is a considerable town about 45 miles from Trichinopoly, in the road to Arcot. The governor at first seeming in our interest, amused us for two days, with promises to deliver up the fort; but soon after Chunda Saib and the French appearing, he threw off the mask, and declared against us. The next night we attacked the fort without success, and the army, after some loss, was obliged to retreat to Outatour, 17 miles from Trichinopoly.

THE enemy's army, consisting of about 6000 horse, 4000 seapoy, and 600 Europeans, followed our army to Outatour, and encouraged by the success of an ambuscade, in which some of our men fell, by following too closely a party of Chunda Saib's horse, they attacked our camp, but were repulsed: however, not thinking our post tenable, should the enemy repeat their attack, we retreated to the banks of the Coleroon, facing Trichinopoly. Chunda Saib's army increasing daily, our people thought themselves obliged also to quit that post, and to cross the river to the island opposite Trichinopoly. The enemy still following, we abandoned that post, and passing the river Cauvery the 17th of July, we encamped under the walls of Trichinopoly.

CHUNDA SAIB and the French immediately took possession of our post, and raised some batteries again the town, from across the river; but finding the distance too great, even for a shot at almost its greatest range, they left a party to secure Seringam Pagodas, and crossing the river, encamped on the plain on the east side of the town



1751. town, at the French Rock, and there contented themselves with cannonading and throwing in some shells.

THE Nabob beginning then to be in want of men and money, applied to the King of Maissore, who supplied him indeed with both, but in small parties, and smaller sums at a time, the common way of doing business in this country. Thus remained affairs at Trichinopoly, the enemy contenting themselves with a useless cannonade, which however they adorned with all the terms the most regular siege; and we waiting for our promised reinforcement, encamped under the walls of the fort, to keep our communication as open as possible.

THE French bringing almost their whole force into the field with Chunda Saib, and leaving Arcot but poorly defended, a scheme was laid to reduce part of that country to the Nabob's obedience. Captain Clive commanded the party. This expedition was attended with uncommon success, which some people were pleased to term fortunate, and lucky; but, in my opinion, from the knowledge I have of the gentleman, he deserved, and might expect from his conduct every thing as it fell out. A man of an undaunted resolution, of a cool temper, and a presence of mind, which never left him in the greatest danger. Born a soldier, for without a military education of any sort, or much conversing with any of the profession, from his judgment and good sense, he led an army like an experienced officer, and a brave soldier, with a prudence that certainly warranted success. This young man's early genius surprised and engaged my attention, as well before as at the siege of Davecottah, where he behaved in courage and judgment, much beyond what could be expected from his years, and his success afterwards confirmed what I had said to many people concerning him.

CAPTAIN Clive, in the month of August, having joined a detachment of our army at Trichinopoly, was soon recalled for the intended expedition; and being arrived at Madras, marched with 300 Europeans, and about 500 sepoys. His officers were chiefly Writers, or other servants of the company, never before employed in a military capacity and yet, with this force, he surprised and took Arcot, the capital of the province, on the first of September. The French truly sensible of this disgrace, and knowing the



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

15

the importance of the place, concerted measures to retake it, and collected all the men they could spare under Raja Saib, son to Chunda Saib, who, with a large detachment from his father's army, marched and invested Arcot the twenty third of September. During the siege, which lasted two months, they dismounted two eighteen-pounders, upon which Mr. Clive wrote the governor of Madras word that he was mounting the last eighteen-pounder he had left, but that he had still three months provisions, and thought himself able to defend a breach whenever the enemy should make an assault. A party was detached from the army at Trichinopoly to support him, on notice of whose approach, the enemy resolved to make their last effort; they attacked the breach, and the fort in three different places; at every attack they were beat off with considerable loss, and captain Clive taking advantage of their confusion sallied out, and following the blow, took all their cannon, levelled their trenches, and returned to the fort.

1751.

THE party by this time came up, as also a detachment of Maratta's commander by Budgerow a brother of Morarow, which enabled captain Clive to take the field. He marched out of Arcot in search of the French and Chunda's Saib's son, never giving them time to rest, but pursuing his good fortune, he took the forts of Timery, Cauvery-pauk, Aranie and Conjeveram, and compleated it by a total defeat of the enemy at Cauvery-pauk in the month of March 1752. Their army was entirely destroyed and Raja Saib obliged to take shelter in Pondichery, where M. Dupleix refused to see him. By this victory, a large part of the Arcot country was recovered for the Nabob.

BEFORE we enter on the affairs of Trichinopoly, the chief scene of our military operations, it will be requisite that the reader should be well informed of the singular circumstances of the Plain in which it is situated. By comparing the following description with the accurate map annext, the importance of the posts and other objects contended for, will be readily conceived and understood.

TRICHINOPOLY is situated on a plain which once was crowded with rich villages and plantations of trees, but since the war, hardly a trace of either is left. The town is in form of an oblong square, the longest sides of which are East and West. On the North runs the river Cauvery, less than half a-mile from the fort. The town

was



1751. was formerly no more than a wall round the foot of a rock, in circumference about twelve hundred yards. As the inhabitants increased, the town was augmented to half of the present oblong, with a cross wall, the traces of which still remain; the third augmentation was made to the southward, and incloses the town as it now stands. It is at present near four miles in circumference, with a double enceinte of walls with round towers at equal distances according to the Eastern method of fortifying. The ditch is near thirty feet wide but not half so deep; and at different seasons it is more or less supplied with water, but never quite dry. The outward wall is built of a grayish stone, each stone from four to five feet long and all laid endways. It is about eighteen feet high, and four or five thick, without parapet or rampe, nothing but a single structure of stone, and is very properly called a wall: the other is more properly a rampart. The distance between them is about twenty-five feet, the height of the rampart thirty. The rampe is equal in thickness at bottom with the height of the rampart, 30 feet, decreasing in thickness like the profile in the margin. The terre-plein of the parapet is about ten feet, and the parapet is for the most part, seven or eight feet high, covering the men entirely, with loop-holes to fire through. Some bastions have been constructed by us, as regular and good, as the ground would admit of, built on the foundations of the round towers. They are mostly on the angles of the square and on the West face, about the middle of the curtain called Dalton's battery, even with the outward wall. The town is very well supply'd from the river by water courses which direct the water into large square ponds or tanks that have communication by aqueducts.

A most extraordinary rock stands in the middle of the old town, and is about 300 feet high; on the top of it is a pagoda which was of singular use to us the whole war; its height commanding even as far as Tanjore which is forty miles. Here was constantly stationed a man with a telescope who gave us by signals and writing an account of all the enemy's motions. The buildings on this rock and those which are cut out on the the sides of it are very surprising works in a country where they have so few tools to facilitate their labour.

THE soil on the East and West sides for two miles round, and on the North side as far as the river is rich and good, but does not run deep.



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

17

After digging a foot or two you find it rocky, and to the South face, there is so little mould that it will not admit of cultivation; but every other part, in time of peace, produces rice in great plenty. The plain runs in length from east to west about 19 miles; from the boundaries of the Tanjore kingdom, to the head of the island westerly. Its breadth is unequal, from 7 to 12 miles. On the north it is bounded by the river Cauvery, and on the south by Tondeman's woods.

1751.

THE different rocks, whose situation and distance are described on the map, afford very good posts for an army, either as advanced ones, or to cover a flank. The plain, though seemingly level, is full of hollow ways, sufficient to conceal or cover troops; and gives a person who is thoroughly acquainted with the ground, great advantages. Water is always to be had on the plain, by sinking wells, and in some places it is collected in basins, either formed by nature or art. This element is so great and useful a blessing in this country, that no pains are spared in saving and keeping all that falls. However, the water on the plain is very unwholesome, as standing waters generally are; besides, it is so impregnated with saltpetre, with which the earth abounds, that in some places it is too brackish to be drank, and most commonly occasions bilious disorders.

THE island of Seringam is formed about 6 miles north-west of Trichinopoly, by the river Cauvery, which divides itself into two branches. That to the northward takes the name of the Coleroon, that to the southward preserves its old name the Cauvery. Each of these rivers, after a course of about 90 miles, empty themselves into the sea. The Coleroon at Davecotah, the Cauvery near Tranquebar, at about 20 miles distance from each other.

THIS island 15 miles east of Trichinopoly, is so narrow, that both the rivers would rejoin in the same channel, were they not prevented by a high bank, which keeps them asunder. This bank was made at a great expence, and is constantly kept in repair by the kings of Tanjore. The use of it is to direct the course of the river Cauvery through that kingdom, by the means of water courses and canals, which distribute it into proper channels all over the country, and are the source of riches and fertility. The river, by
D its



1751. its natural course, waters the north side of the kingdom, and by a large channel which they have made near the bank, the southern side receives also a sufficient quantity of that useful element, without which, in this part of the world, there can be no fertility.

THE Bank is about seven feet wide at top; it rises from the foundation with a slope on each side. This bank is as strong as wood, stone, earth, and straw can make it, and sufficient to support, and confine the currents on each side. Its height from the common level of the water is near 20 feet, to which the river can never rise; so that there is no danger of an inundation. It is about a mile in length; afterwards the land naturally widening, there need no more precautions to prevent the rivers from joining. A number of people are constantly employed, to see that the water makes no encroachments, and if it does, to apply a remedy immediately. The repairs each year are paid by a general tax on the country, which amounts to about 20000 pounds annually. The bank forms on the island, what I have called, in my Narrative, the Pa's; and by its position and situation it will appear how capable it is of defence, with a small number of men, even against an army. Above a mile distant from it, to the east, was a fort called Koiladdy, which being built for the preservation of the bank, was destroyed by the enemy, about the time we last marched to Tanjore. The enemy had often threatened to cut the bank if the King would not comply with their measures; at last they carried their threats into execution in the year 1754; but luckily at a season when it was least detrimental, for in three months, with our assistance, it was repaired. However, the damage in that little space of time, and the cost of repairing it, amounted to fifty thousand pounds; from whence may be seen how easily the masters of that bank may give law to the King of Tanjore; and how much it is his interest to be a friend to the Nabob of Trichinopoly, to whom he is obliged to pay tribute for the bank, three lack of rupees yearly. In this island, facing Trichinopoly, stand the famous Pagodas of Seringam; some others, but not so remarkable, called Jembikishna, are at half a mile distance to the east. Seringam is little more than a mile distant from Trichinopoly. The Pagodas are surrounded by seven square walls of stone; each wall has a gateway in the middle of each side of the square, pointing to one of the four cardinal points. The gateways are ornamented



namented in the manner of that country, with crowded emblematical figures of their divinities. The principal gateway in the outward wall, which faces Trichinopoly, is a curious piece of architecture, though yet unfinished. It is formed by pillars 32 feet high in the shaft, with capitals. Four of these pillars are of one stone each, but the largest stones are those which are laid across the top of the gateway; they measure 33 feet long, and five and an half one way, and four feet ten inches the other. The space between the outward and second walls measures 310 feet, and is proportionably between the rest. No Europeans are admitted into the last square, it being the Sanctum Sanctorum, and few have gone farther than the third.

1751.

SERINGAM was the post occupied by the enemy all the war; once indeed they suffered by taking shelter there, but that was owing to our having the Marattas on our side, and a sufficient number of troops to cut off their communication, and for want of provisions, obliging them to surrender. We never since had the fortune to be equal to them, much less superior, and by that means it has proved a sure refuge to them on many occasions, and we have never had it in our power to dispossess them, since the Maissoreans took possession, in consequence of their agreement with the Nabob. It is an excellent post for an army that can keep their communication open. The ground about it is so full of difficulties, by hollow ways, and water courses, that a besieging army must run the hazard of losing a great many men before they can carry their point. Jeimbikishna has but a single enciente of wall, and nothing remarkable but its magnitude and vicinity to Seringam.

ADJOINING to Trichinopoly is the kingdom of Tanjore, bounded on the north by the Coleroon, on the east by the sea, on the south by two countries which belong to two powerful Poligars, the one called Marravar, the other Tondeman, and on the west by Trichinopoly. The boundaries commence at 14 miles distance from the fort last mentioned. Near the mouth of the Coleroon, we have a fort called Davecotah, which once belonged to the kingdom of Tanjore, but was taken by us while I commanded in the year 1749. The possession of this has enabled us to support the Nabob and king of Tanjore, who is well pleased with its being in our hands, and has therefore granted it to the company, with some territory annexed.



1751. nexed. The next settlement on the coast, given also by the king of Tanjore, belongs to the Danes, and is called Tranquebar. Next to that, the French have one called Carrical; and to the southward of it the Dutch have another, called Negapatam. Thirty miles from thence is a place called Adriapatam, which finishes the territories of the king of Tanjore along the sea coast. The distance of the first, Davecotah, from the last is about 90 miles, which is the broadest part of his kingdom. It decreaseth by degrees in breadth, and Trichinopoly is 30 or at most 40 miles wide. Its length from the west to the sea is about 100 miles. The revenues of this small kingdom, well managed, may produce near a million yearly. The king was a friend to us and the Nabob the whole war; this is, he found it his interest to be so, because he knew well the French and Maissoreans wanted nothing less than his country, and we found it much our interest to keep him our friend. His country was the only communication we had left with the coast; for since the Maissoreans and Marattas had joined the French, they were masters on the north side of the Coleroon. What confirmed him the more in our interest, was the just fear he had, that if the Maissoreans were once masters of Trichinopoly, they would willingly extend their dominions to the sea, and his kingdom was too easy and beneficial a conquest to remain long unattempted: besides, he hated the French since their setting up Chun a Saib, and laying siege to his capital.

AT Trichinopoly we were in daily expectation of the King of Maissore's troops, who marched out of Seringapatam, the capital of the Maissore kingdom, to a place called Carroor, about 50 miles from Trichinopoly. The King of Maissore, besides his own proper forces, had also engaged Morarow and his Marattas to come to our assistance. Twelve hundred of these joined us in November, and another party, as I have already said, were with captain Clive in the Arcot province. The Nabob's brother and a party of Europeans marched to hasten the junction of the Maissoreans. Thus ended the year 1751.

IN January we were joined by another party of Marattas, and 4000 Maissore horse, besides 3000 irregular troops called * Colle-

* The Colleries are inhabitants of the woods, under the government of the Polygars, another name for the Gentou governors. The great-

est in power are the Rajahs, the least the Polygars.



ries, who live on plunder, and are notorious thieves, particularly for stealing of horses, in the practice of which they are both daring and expert. They creep along the woods with a spear, 18 or 20 feet long, trailing on the ground, which they manage on occasion with great dexterity. They are troublesome in the field by giving frequent alarms, and in their woody country it is dangerous to attack them.

1752.

THE Maiffore general (commonly called the Dolaway) * Nander-
auze, had not yet joined us with the remainder of the army. The
enemy had sent a party on his road, who took post in a village, by
which he was obliged to pass. We sent another party to dislodge
them, commanded by captain Cope. Our first attack was unsuccess-
ful, partly owing to captain Cope being mortally wounded in the
beginning of the engagement, and our having been misinformed
as to the enemy's strength and number. However, the party being
reinforced, we carried our point. Nanderauze and Morarow, with
about 2000 horse, joined us the 26th of the month, and our party
returned the 28th with the rest of the army.

THE King of Ganjore after many solicitations, sent also his troops,
under the command of his general Monagee ; and Tondeman came
likewise in to our assistance.

IN this situation were affairs when I landed from England the 15th
of March ; captain CLIVE was then just ready with a party to march
to Trichinopoly. On the 17th I joined him, and took the com-
mand. The party consisted of 400 Europeans, and 1100 se-
poys.

THE situation of our affairs made it highly requisite to hasten
the march with all expedition ; fatal spirit of division having
unhappily crept in amongst our officers, so that many opportuni-
ties and advantages were lost, which gave the country alliance but
an indifferent opinion of our conduct.

* The King of Maiffore was a minor ; the
kingdom was then governed for him by his
two uncles, the one, called Nanderauze, com-

manded the army, the other ruled in the ca-
binet.



1752.

ON the 27th of the same month, being arrived within 18 miles of Trichinopoly, I was met by the commanding officer of artillery, who brought me intelligence that the enemy had posted a strong party at Koyladdy, within cannon-shot of the road I was to pass the next day.

IN order to join the army as soon as possible, I dispatched my guides to find out another road, judging it of consequence to avoid the enemy's post, especially as I had a very large quantity of ammunition and stores, part of which I laid up in Tricatapolly, a fort belonging to the King of Tanjore, that it might not retard my march the next day.

By some mistake of my guide, we were led within reach of the very post I wanted to avoid. To draw off the fire of their battery from my party, I ordered some guns from my rear division to answer theirs, and leaving a guard to support them, the main body were directed to move on slowly, inclining to the left, which, with a small loss, brought us out of reach of their guns: upon which we halted till the party and guns came up. We then continued our march without interruption, and incamped that night within ten miles of Trichinopoly.

THE next morning we were joined on our march by the troops, and about 200 soldiers, commanded by the captains Clarke and Dalton, within four miles of Trichinopoly. Captain De Gings sent his adjutant to inform me, that the whole of the enemy was in motion towards me. Their right was at their incampment of Chucklepollam, a village on the banks of the river Cauvery, and facing the pass: Their left extended almost to the French Rock, a strong post in their possession. Their cavalry was on the left of their infantry, extending all the way to Elmiseram, another very strong post on an inaccessible rock, on which they had mounted some large cannon. As I had no intention to engage, till my entire junction was made, and till I had lodged my stores in the fort, I marched round Elmiseram, purposing to come in by the Sugar-loaf Rock. Our baggage on the left flank was secured by the march of the army, which kept moving, ready to form, with their front to the enemy.



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

23

THE enemy advanced and began to cannonade. We immediately halted behind a large bank, which covered our party from their guns, but which was easily got over, if they should advance and appear determined to attack.

1752.

THE artillery was posted on the top of the bank, which was high and commanded all round. Their cavalry came on near enough for grape-shot to do execution. They stood for some time, till Al lum Cawn, the officer who commanded them, was killed, and above 200 more; on which they retreated. The rest of the army chose to follow their example; the French bringing up their rear, moved back to their camp, and left us to finish our march to Trichinopoly.

I WAITED the next day on the Nabob, the Maiffore general, and the rest of the alliance, in order to settle the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign *. There it was agreed to attack the enemy in their camp; and in case they chose rather to retreat to the island than stand an engagement, to take such measures as entirely to cut off their communication with the country; which we effected soon after, and obliged them to surrender for want of provisions.

READY and reliable as these country people appear in councils, they are ever dilatory, and slow in execution, superstitiously tied down to fasts and feasts, lucky and unlucky days: nothing spurs them on to act, till those ridiculous customs are complied with, which seldom happens before the opportunity is lost. Thus three or four days were thrown away in these trifling delays; and the enemy apprised of our design, prudently, as we then thought, determined to retreat to the island for their greater security, burning and destroying a large magazine of provisions, intended for the siege of Trichinopoly. By this sudden and unexpected retreat, we had a more compleat victory, which made some amends for what I before was concerned at, the not having it in my power to attack them as we proposed.

* The army consisted of 1200 Europeans, and Topasses in battalion; sepoy in our pay 2000. The Nabob, Maiffore Marattas and

Tanjore forces above 1500 horse. Their infantry of all sorts 10,000.

THIS



1752.

THIS retreat to the island was on the 3d of April. The army under Mr. Law consisted of 600 Europeans, Topasses, and Coffrees, 1800 French sepoy, and about 15,000 black cavalry and infantry; Mr. Dupleix's account says 20,000 in all.

WE now endeavoured to cut off their supplies, which they mostly received from the other side of the Coleroon, their communication being open that way quite to Pondichery. Promising myself great success from the activity and vigilance of captain Clive, I detached him with 400 of my best Europeans, 1200 sepoy, and 4000 horse, to take post on the other side. He crossed the two rivers, about seven miles below Seringam, at a pass near Dolaways Choultry.

I ALSO sent captain Dalton to take the post of Elmiseram where the enemy had cannon. The place surrendered after a faint resistance. Captain Clive having acquainted me that he had taken post at a village and a Pagoda, called Samiaveram, about ten miles from Seringam, and on the high road to Arcot and Pondichery, through which their convoys must pass, I paid him a visit the 8th of April after Elmiseram was reduced, to concert what further measures were proper to be pursued. We agreed that he should make an attack on Pitchunda, a place which they had fortified, situated on the bank of the Coleroon, opposite to Seringam, and commanding the pass of that river. But it was first necessary to storm Lalgroody, a mud fort, where the enemy had a large magazine of grain, and this captain Clive executed three days after the necessary dispositions were making for the siege of Pitchunda. Having received intelligence that a party of the enemy were at Outatoor, 15 miles from Samiaveram, with a large convoy of stores, captain Clive marched the 15th of April to intercept them, leaving only a small party to secure his post till his return. The French being advised of his march, thought so good an opportunity of retaking a post of that consequence ought not to be neglected. They therefore formed a detachment from their army, who had orders to march after dark, that their attack might be made at day-light, on the party which were left in the Pagoda.

ON captain Clive's arrival at Outatoor, he found no enemy nor convoy, and suspecting the report to have been a finesse of the enemy, in order to draw him from Samiaveram, he resolved, after refreshing his



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

25

his people, to return immediately to his former post. He arrived near the Pagoda about eleven at night, his men, fatigued with so long a march, went to rest, and captain Clive retired to his pallan-keen *. 1752.

THE French, ignorant of captain Clive's return, began their march in the night from their army, and arrived about four in the morning at Semiaveram, where they found every thing as quiet as they could wish: their guides led them directly to the pagoda: their approach, the 16th of April, the party left there in the morning challenged, and were answered Friends, by some deserters from us. This contented our people, who imagining them some of captain Clive's returning party, were not convinced of their mistake till the sepoys began to fire.

CAPTAIN Clive awaked, and alarmed at the firing, ran immediately towards it, by which means he joined the French sepoys, who were pushing into the Pagoda, and imagining them his own troops, who endeavoured to screen themselves from an attack, began to reprimand them in the country language, angrily demanding what they were firing at. The sepoys, in this confusion, paid little regard to him, till one of their officers suspecting him to be an Englishman, drew his sword, and cut at him, which he parried, by advancing forwards and receiving the blow from near the hilt; another officer of our sepoys accidentally coming to his assistance, cut the fellow down, and disengaged captain Clive, who by this time perceiving his mistake, and by great good fortune getting out of their hands, went in search of his detachment, which he found under arms; but in the mean while his own party in the Pagoda was dislodged, and the French were in possession of the post.

HE therefore instantly formed his detachment, and marched to the Pagoda, and finding the enemy in possession, he immediately ordered the gate to be stormed. The officer who attempted it was

* A pallankeen is a bed, supported by a wooden or ivory frame of six feet long, and near three feet broad, fastened at each end by cross sticks to a bamboo arched in the

middle, 15 feet long, which forms an arch over the palankeen or bed, and is covered with a canopy of cloth lined with silk, and stiffened with ribs of the coconut tree.



1752. received by a platoon of the enemy, who killed him on the spot, and many of his people.

ON this it was thought necessary that our cannon should be sent for, and a summons was made to the French commanding officer, signifying, that as it was impossible to escape, it was most prudent for him to surrender. The French officer bravely endeavoured to disengage himself, by sallying out of the Pagoda; but being killed in the attempt, with some of his foremost people, the rest surrendered at discretion. The French sepoys without the Pagoda seeing it surrendered, endeavoured to steal off; but the day beginning to dawn, they were perceived and pursued by the Maratta cavalry, who riding in amongst them, inhumanly cut them all to pieces.

MONAGEE with the Tanjore troops undertook to retake Koiladdy. He succeeded April 21st, and the Nabob gave the King of Tanjore a grant of it, as it guarded the bank, which conveyed the river Cauvery into his country.

As nothing now remained to obstruct our designs on Pitchunda, I took post on the island to cover the cannon and ammunition necessary for the attack of it. The garrison consisted of 72 Europeans, 49 * Topasses, and some sepoys; and on the defence were mounted three pieces of cannon and two mortars.

RECEIVING intelligence that the enemy had a party at Outa-toor, I sent captain Dalton with 150 Europeans, 400 sepoys, and 1000 horse, to dislodge them; he came up and had some skirmishes with them, but expecting to renew the fight the next day, the 2d of May, he found the place abandoned.

MONS. D'AUTEUIL and his party marched off in the night, left the greatest part of their convoy of stores, with which captain Dalton returned to captain Clive, who by this time had laid siege to Pitchunda. I therefore ordered him to continue with Mr. Clive; and a battery being opened on the 8th, on the 10th the garrison surrendered prisoners of war, and were sent to the Nabob at Tri-

* Topasses are the descendants of the Portuguese who first settled in India, and married with the natives. They differ very little

in colour from the Indians themselves. They have the name of Topasses given them from their wearing hats.



chinopoly. Thus their communication was entirely cut off from the other side the Coleron, Monagee having taken Koiladdy. I ^{1752.} detached our Coffrees* with two guns, to secure the pass on the island, who threw up an intrenchment, which might alone have defended them against the whole body of the enemy's army; so inaccessible is this pass, any where but in front, and there it does not admit of more than two men abreast. I then encamped at Chuckleypollam, facing the pass of the Cauvery.

THE Maissoreans and Marattas on our right extended to Warriore Pagodas, and from thence a chain of cavalry to the extremity of the island, to prevent any supplies slipping through, Monagee and the Tanjore troops on our left, the main body at Dolaways Choultry, to defend that pass between them and us, all Tondeman's and the other Polygar's Colleries. Such was our situation. The enemy who encamped till then on the island, struck their tents the 18th of May, and took shelter under cover of the walls of Seringam, giving out that they would receive us there. To distress them the more, we passed the Cauvery to the island, and encamped on the east side of Vembikishna, where some days after we threw up an entrenchment quite across from river to river, intending to wait there till we could get up some heavy cannon from Davecotah; having but one 18 and one 12 pounder, artillery not sufficient to make a breach. Monagee took possession of my post at Chuckleypollam. We were in this situation, when intelligence came that Mr. D' Auteuil, who was lately driven out of Outatoor by captain Dalton, was then at Volconda, with a large quantity of stores. Captain Clive, on the first notice, formed a party, and marched the 27th. He returned the 29th with Mr. D'Auteuil and his whole party prisoners. They consisted of three officers and 50 men, 300 sepoy's and as many horse.

AT this time the enemy were so reduced for want of provisions, that the Indian army, on pardon and protection promised by the Nabob, came over to us in great numbers; one of their generals in particular, named Coop Saib, joined us, with a thousand horse, a large body of sepoy's, and 14 elephants.

* Coffrees (by the French called Cafres) is now become the general name for all negroes who are brought to India from the Cape, the

coast of Guinea, or any other parts of Africa, and chiefly from Madagascar. They are brave and steady in the field.



1752. CHUNDA SAIB dispirited and reduced to the greatest extremity, and without money to pay his troops, willing to try if he had a friend in Monagee the Tanjore general, demanded leave to pass through his camp to Tanjore, which was very readily granted; and, as is too much the custom in like cases, the moment he was in the power of his enemy he was made a prisoner. He might, no doubt, have escaped to Pondichery, but in these circumstances he dreaded Mr. Dupleix.

NEXT day, June 1st, the Nabob, the Maissore and Maratta generals, Monagee and myself, being assembled, it was debated how to dispose of him. I was silent on this occasion, and they were of different opinions. The Nabob and Monagee judged it very dangerous to let out of their hands a man who had already given them so much trouble. The Maissore general and Morarow were for having him in their possession. Finding they could not agree, I proposed that we should have the care of him, and keep him confined in one of our own settlements: this was by no means approved, and we parted without coming to any resolution; but some of Monagee's people put an end to the dispute by cutting off his head, which was done the 3d of June *

THUS did Chunda Saib pay the just price of his ambition and presumption. In private life he is said to have been a man of great benevolence, humanity, and generosity: with regard to his public character; in this country, ambition being a venial fault, every man who succeeds is a great man; if he fails, he is only reckoned unfortunate.

M. D'AUTEUIL was brought prisoner to Trichinopoly, and on giving his parole not to serve against the Nabob, was released. The enemy became so much straitened for want of provisions, that they could hold out no longer. Mr. Law therefore thought in earnest of surrendering, and to that end desired our mediation with the Nabob. We met in consequence, and explained to him the Nabob's terms, which were in general;

* Mr. Dupleix, in his Memoire, falsely asserts, that Col. Laurence himself ordered the death of Chunda Saib, notwithstanding that

calumny had been clearly refuted in the country.

THAT



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

29

THAT the Pagodas of Jembikishna and Seringam should be delivered to the Nabob, with all the guns, stores, and ammunition. That the Europeans, Topasses, and Coffrees should be prisoners of war. That the officers should give their parole not to serve against Mahomed Allee Cawn and his allies, and the deserters be pardoned.

1752.

THESE articles being signed by Mr. Law on the 3d of June, captain Dalton took possession of Seringam, and the French marched out, being about 600 Europeans and 300 sepoy. The rest of their allies accepting of the Nabob's cowl or protection, separated and dispersed. In Seringam we found thirty pieces of cannon, ten of which were 18 and 12 pounders, the rest field-pieces, two large mortars, a number of cohorns, and a great quantity of ammunition, and all kind of military stores.

CAPTAIN Campbell with a party escorted the prisoners to Fort St. David. The Pagodas being thus secured, and every thing so happily finished to the southward, I imagined we had only to put the Nabob in quiet possession of his territories to the northward, where many places still remained with the French, but Gingee was the only fort of consequence which could give us any trouble.

ON my representing the ill consequence of our delays, and pressing the Nabob to march with his allies, and reduce the rest of the province, I perceived in him much unwillingness and unaccountable backwardness; but this mystery was at length explained. The Maissoreans refused to march till the Nabob had delivered up Trichinopoly, which they demanded, as they said, according to agreement; insisting, that as they had performed their part of the treaty, it was but just the Nabob should fulfil his also.

THE Nabob justly objected, that it was neither their agreement, nor reasonable, that the fortress of Trichinopoly should be the price of its relief, but that when the King of Maissore had settled him in quiet possession of all his other dominions, he should then be ready and willing, according to his real intention and meaning, to give up that place.

THE



1752.

THE Maifloresans seeming satisfied, promised to march and remove this objection. In confidence that they would follow, we marched with our Europeans to Outatoor the 16th of June, but not finding our allies, or the Nabob follow us, we returned the 18th of June, hearing that Morarow with his Marattas intended putting a stop to the Nabob's march.

I ENDEAVOURED to reconcile the chiefs; but I found Morarow wanted no less than Trichinopoly for himself; an agreement therefore between the two contending parties never could procure it him, wherefore he separately advised both not to give up their pretensions; hoping a breach would give him an opportunity to effect what he saw was not to be obtained by any other method.

THE Nabob, by giving up Trichinopoly and its dependencies, without being in possession of the rest of the Arcot countries, quit-
ted for ever that part which alone, of all his pretensions he was actually in possession of. The King of Maiflore's friendship and alliance was of great consequence, but it also might be purchased too dear; for however he might promise to assist the Nabob in the recovery of his other countries, when he was once in possession of the place, if he should refuse to fulfil this part of the engagement, who could force him? Other compensations were proposed, and the Nabob even offered to give him a promise under his hand, to deliver Trichinopoly in two months if he would but march with and assist him.

NANDERAUZE promised he would follow and join the Nabob with his troops, in order to march towards our settlements. The Maifloresans and Morarow remained encamped under the walls of Trichinopoly, seemingly friends, and every day talked of following the Nabob. Monagee with the King of Tanjore's troops returned home, and Tondeman followed them. The Tanjoreans could never be brought to consent to the giving Trichinopoly to the Maifloresans.

ON the 28th marched from Outatoor through Volcondah and Verdachulum, and arrived before Trivedy on the 7th of July. The enemy had left there a small party, which, on the Nabob's summons,



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

31

summons, surrendered. There I left the army, under the command of captain De Gingins, being in so bad a state of health that I could not keep the field. 1752.

It will not be improper to shew what the French were doing at Pondichery. To give Dupleix his due, he was not easily cast down; his pride supported him, and at the same time his mind was full of resources; the injustice of his cause never disturbed him; and, provided he could gain his ends, the means never gave him any concern. His council was chiefly composed of his own creatures, who never disputed what he proposed. He was married to a woman, endowed with as much spirit, art and pride, as himself; born in the country, mistress of all the low cunning peculiar to the natives, and well skilled in their language.

THE surrender of Mr. Law happened at that season of the year, when the ships arrived from Europe, and brought a large reinforcement, to which Mr. Dupleix added all the sailors from the company's ships, sending Lascars on board to navigate them to China. Thus he collected new troops; and not to want a pretender to the government of Arcot, on Chunda Saib's death, he proclaimed Raja Saib his son, Nabob of the province; but afterwards, that he might seem to have an undoubted right of appointing whom he pleased, he gave out that the Mogul had sent him Saneds or commissions, declaring him governor of all this part of the Carnatick, from the river Kristnah to the sea. These Saneds were proved to be a forgery, and the whole contrivance detected in the most public manner, as will appear.

THE supposed messenger from Delly was received with all the honour and ceremony usually paid to an ambassador from the Mogul; and that nothing might be wanting to compleat the farce, Mr. Dupleix himself, in the country manner, with musick and dancing-girls before him, mounted on an elephant, received with due reverence from the hands of the pretended ambassador, his commission from the Mogul, and in consequence of his appointment, gave out all orders from that time as such; he even kept his Durbar or court, sat on a sofa, and received presents from his council as well as the natives, like a Prince of the country; and thus endeavoured to support the character of Subah of the Deckan.



1752.

MR. DUPLEIX, to return to my subject, finding that Chunda Saib's son would be of little use to him, by his interest in the country, or his money, offered the Nabobship of Arcot to the governor of Vellore, Mootis Allee Cawn, a man every way fit for his purpose, and besides, very rich. Mootis Allee Cawn was to find money, and Dupleix Europeans. Under different pretences, and at different times, he got from him about three lack of roupees; but the titular Prince finding he was only amused, demurred till Dupleix would give him better proofs of making good his promises. As there was no more money to be got, Dupleix had no further occasion for him, and left him where he found him, only something the poorer.

As I have said before, there was still a good deal of the Arcot province in the hands of the French, and Chunda Saib's friends, which we should have endeavoured to recover. Our forces were not very considerable; we had lost a great many men; there was a strong garrison left in Trichinopoly, and we had but few recruits that year. The French had many more, besides pressing the seamen into their service. However, enough might have been spared to go with the Nabob and gather his rents, and to recover the greatest part of the country. Instead of beginning by degrees, which at that time was all our strength would admit of, the governor of Madras resolved to attack Gingee.

GINGEE is situated to the west of Pondicherry. It is surrounded with mountains, and the roads, or more properly passes, leading to it, begin between those mountains, at about ten miles distance. An army within those passes may be easily blocked up, unless they can afford to secure themselves, and keep their communication open with country. It consists of two towns, called the Great and little Gingee. The first to the southward, the other to the northward. They are both surrounded by one wall, three miles in circumference, which incloses the two towns, and five mountains of ragged rock, on the summits of which are built five strong forts. The two towns are divided from east to west by a wall lined with cannon, which one of those five rocks defends as a citadel. The place is inaccessible, except from the east and south-east. Four roads lead to it, by the one our army marched, the other faces towards Arcot, the third



third to Wandewash, and the fourth to Pondichery. The place was well supplied with all manner of stores, and garrisoned by 150 Europeans, and sepoy and black people in great numbers. Such was the state of Gingee when we resolved to besiege it. Ill as I was, at that time, with the fever, I set out from Fort St. David for Madras, to see the governor, and try if I could dissuade him from the attempt.

1752.

I REPRESENTED the situation and strength of the place, compared to the force we could send, and even allowing that we could have marched our whole force, the number would not be sufficient for the attack, and at the same time to provide for our security, by keeping the passes open, and protecting our convoys of provisions, which must come from Fort St. David, as no supply could be expected from a country disaffected by its neighbourhood to Pondichery. Besides, we had also an enemy at our back, with a force sufficient, at least, to stop our convoys. I represented to him that the Nabob's affairs also required our settling other places first, where we were sure of success; and we ought to consider what an impression the least check would make on the minds of these fluctuating, and yet unsettled people.

THESE, with several other reasons, determined me to dissuade the governor from the attempt; but he declared to me, that he had ordered a party, and it must go.

MAJOR Kinneer was sent with a detachment, from the army at Trivedy, of 200 Europeans; the Nabob also sent his troops, about 600 horse, and 1500 sepoy.

THEY marched the 23d of July, and arrived before the place the 26th. A summons was sent, which the French answered very civilly, by saying, they kept it for the King of France, and were resolved to defend it. Soon after, intelligence was brought that a party marched from Pondichery of 200 Europeans, and 1500 sepoy. Two pieces of battering cannon, ammunition, &c. were ordered out, under an escort of 150 Europeans. The French posted themselves on the road our convoys were obliged to pass, upon which Major Kinneer judged it better to leave Gingee, against which he



1752. had no prospect of success, and meet the French ; finding it of most consequence to keep his communication open.

THE French had made choice of a good post, with a river and the village of Vickarivandy in their front, and seven pieces of cannon well disposed. Our men attacked, but were very warmly received, and galled by a brisk fire from behind walls. A blundering commander of our artillery, (a Frenchman who had deserted and was taken into our service) contrived to post our cannon so, that they could not favour the attack ; which major Kinneer endeavouring himself to rectify, was wounded in the leg, and many of the men and officers killed ; which obliged him in the end to retreat, but in very good order. Thus ended the expedition against Gingee. Poor major Kinneer was almost recovered of his wound, but fretting at his disappointment, was seized with a fever and flux, which carried him off some time after.

THE French, animated as usual upon the least success, joined this party with all the force they could bring into the field. They marched close to the bounds of Fort St. David. I was still at Madras, but having received an account of their motion, orders were sent to our troops in St. David's, to march out and encamp. Captain Schaub's company of Swiss was also sent by sea from Madras. The party went in boats, though I desired they might be sent in a ship which was in the road, as well for the safety and ease of the troops, as a security against any attempts of Mr. Dupleix, who, I very well knew, was capable of doing any thing to answer his present purposes.

MR. DUPLEIX, on notice of the embarkation, sent a ship out of Pondichery road, and took captain Schaub and his whole company, and carried them into Pondichery, and there detained them prisoners of war. An action against the law of nations, and an open violation of the peace then subsisting between us and the French ; sacred here, as well as in Europe, though we were allies in different causes. Immediately on news of this, ill as I still continued, I embarked with captain Gaupp's Swiss company, on board the Bombay Castle, the ship I had asked for the other party.



I ARRIVED at St. David's the 16th of August, and the 17th ^{1752.} took the field with 400 Europeans, 1700 sepoy's, and 4000 of the Nabob's troops, and nine pieces of cannon. I found the enemy-encamped within sight of us, and after reconnoitring their situation, I resolved to attack them the next morning; which they either got information of, or suspected, for they marched off that night to Bahoor. I followed them the next day, for they still retreated, till they came very near their own bounds, with the village of Villanour in their front, three miles from Pondichery.

MR. DE KERJEAN, a nephew of Mr. Dupleix, commanded this army. By his uncle's order, he protested in a long letter, against our entering their bounds, forbidding us to follow the Prince of the country even in his own territories. The absurdity of these protests, to which we had too long paid some regard, was greatly increased since Mr. Dupleix had thrown off the mask, by taking captain Schaub and his party prisoners.

I WAS encamped at a Pagoda called Trichanky, from whence I had a view of their camp; consisting of 400 Europeans, 1500 sepoy's, and 500 cavalry. In hopes of bringing them to an engagement, I attacked their advanced post at Villenour; but as they would not support it, I could do no more than drive out that party, my orders not permitting me to follow them into their bounds.

FINDING it impossible to bring on an engagement, I marched back and incamped at Bahoor, two miles from Fort St. David, to see if my retreat would encourage De Kerjean to follow us. As no people are naturally more elated with trifles, (I mean when they have not at their head a man of solidity, experience and judgment) I had hopes this scheme might take. The event more than answered my expectation. Mr. Dupleix ordered De Kerjean to follow us, conjuring him to improve the minute, and make the proper use of our fears. De Kerjean, suspecting it might be otherwise, represented his thoughts of our retreat, which only procured him a more peremptory order, to march after us immediately; for Mr. Dupleix told him, he was convinced we would not fight; that he expected the* Prince every hour with Mr. Dela Touche, who should

* The Prince was a very large French company's ship, with 700 men, and presents from the French King for the Mogul, Salabatzing

and Chunda Sath: she was burnt in her passage to India, and scarce a man saved.



1752. instantly supersede him. He was therefore obliged to obey, and accordingly encamped next day, within two miles of us, and I made a disposition for attacking him the morning after.

ON the 26th of August, at two in the morning, our little army was under arms ; our sepoy's in front in one line, our battalion formed a second, with the artillery divided on our flanks. A high bank on our left flank, extended to the French camp, and behind it were posted the cavalry, with orders to march as we did ; and if they saw the enemy in any confusion, on our attack, they were immediately to make the proper advantage of their disorder. The ground permitting us, we marched in that order, and came up in time to begin our attack, a little before dawn of day. Our sepoy's were challenged by the enemies advanced post, and not answering, received their fire and returned it, still marching on. The Europeans followed in good order, and kept shouldered while our sepoy's were engaged with theirs. The day just then beginning to break, we saw the French battalion drawn out a little upon our left. On their right was the bank I mentioned before, and on their left a tank or pond of water, which obliged us to incline, to make our front equal to theirs. We then advanced, while they continued all the time a very brisk fire from their cannon. The small arms soon began ; our men advanced firing ; and the French stood their ground, till our bayonets met. The violence of the attack was made by our grenadiers and two platoons, who threw the enemy into disorder, and soon after their whole line was broke. They then threw down their arms, and ran for it. Every moment our cavalry was expected to charge ; but they, instead of pursuing, employed themselves in plundering the camp, which gave time to many of the French to retreat to Areacopong. The action, however, ended greatly in our favour. Mr. Kerjean, fifteen officers, and 100 private men were made prisoners, and many more were wounded, or fell in the engagement. Their artillery, consisting of eight pieces of cannon, with all their ammunition, tumbrils, and stores, fell into our hands. We had one officer killed, three or four wounded, and seventy eight men killed and wounded. The Nabob, highly delighted at our success, though displeased at the behaviour of his own people, returned with me to Fort St. David, where we received accounts that three thousand Marattas were on their march from Trichinopoly to join
the



the Nabob; but we had reason to suspect their intentions; they were to have joined the French, if our success had not prevented them. Nanderauze, the Maissore general, still remained before Trichinopoly, with Morarow, outwardly our friend, but ready to seize the first opportunity to get possession of the town: they therefore kept captain Dalton continually on the watch, the more so as it was necessary to seem as if we did not suspect them, or know any thing of their treating with the French. Mr. Dupleix did not lose so fair an opportunity of endeavouring to bring the Maissoreans to his interest. He therefore promised Nanderauze not only Trichinopoly, but gave him hopes that the kingdom of Tanjore might also be added to it.

1752.

ON the news of our victory, 3000 Marattas joined us, commanded by Innis Cawn, the next in rank to Morarow, who, according to custom, swore fidelity to the Nabob, and we marched to Trivedy the 17th of September.

To improve the remaining part of the season, the monsoon * coming on, captain Clive was sent with a small detachment to take Covelong, a fort 16 miles to the southward of Madras, and Chengalaput, about 40. The last mentioned fort was exceeding strong, being almost encompassed by a morass, and surrounded with two walls, the ramparts of which are 16 feet thick, a wet ditch faced with stone 60 feet wide, quite round the outward fort, and another half round the inner. Chengalaput capitulated the 1st of October. It should be remarked, that the officer who commanded was then prisoner on parole.

HAVING performed this service, and the monsoon now approaching, I proposed returning to winter quarters, at Fort St. David, to give our men, who were sufficiently harrassed, the small refreshment of two months rest, and good quarters, during the rains, which fall heavily in this country; but I had orders to canton the troops at Trivedy: the Nabob did the same.

NOTWITHSTANDING these seeming advantages to the northward, our situation in general was very discouraging. The Nabob's money at this time began to fail, and what is a natural con-

* A season of heavy rains and storms which begin about this month, and generally continue to December.



1752. sequence, his troops left him. Besides, they had never been used to keep the field at this season of the year; Morarow, on a pretended dispute with the Maissoreans for want of pay, marched off to Pondichery, and declared for the French; Innis Cawn decamped also at the same time.

ALL this was a scheme concerted by Nanderauze, to see if he could not gain Trichinopoly. He would not break openly with the Nabob, for then all his hopes were gone; but if he could create us such a number of enemies, he concluded neither the Nabob nor the English could possibly support the war. He thought therefore, in such distress, he might make his own terms for the assistance we should want, and which he alone could give us. This, in reality, was the intention of his pretended quarrel with Morarow.

THE Maissorean, to save appearances, and act with some show of justice, said he would return to his own country, if the Nabob would pay him his expences in ready money. The sum he asked was as impossible for the Nabob to raise, as for us to advance, which he very well knew. Countries were offered as securities; but nothing less than ready money would satisfy, or what he chose rather, the being put in possession of Trichinopoly, which he had attempted to surprise in the following manner.

A NEAPOLITAN named Clement Poverio, who had been a long time in India, and knew the country language very well, had taken service with the Nabob, and commanded a company of Topasses. This man served as interpreter between captain Dalton and Nanderauze, who thinking it not difficult to bribe such a person, offered him a considerable sum of money, if he would be instrumental in lending him assistance to get possession of the town. The man desired some time to consider of it, and on his return honestly discovered the whole to captain Dalton, who, after returning him thanks for his fidelity, and promising a reward, ordered him to carry on the scheme with Nanderauze, and on his next visit to assure him he was ready to obey his orders. The fellow returned with his lesson, and acted his part naturally, so as to avoid the appearance of double dealing. The scheme concerted between Nanderauze and Morarow was, that Poverio, with part of his Topass company, should secure a gate for the entrance of the troops. The French prisoners that
we



we had taken at Samiaveram and Volconda, were to be armed, and set at liberty, by the remainder of his company, who¹⁸ were to attack the guard over them. Six resolute fellows undertook to dispatch captain Dalton on his first appearance, after the alarm given. Every thing, in short, was settled, and the night appointed for the execution. Captain Dalton apprised of this, to screen Poverio from suspicion, made the necessary dispositions for his defence, with the greatest secrecy, till the evening came, on which the plot was to take place. He then informed the Nabob's brother-in-law, the governor of Trichinopoly, of their designs, and the plan he had laid to defeat them. Terrified at the thoughts of an attempt, and consulting nothing but his fears, to prevent all risque, the governor sent a messenger to Nanderauze, informing him of the discovery of the whole plot, and our having taken proper measures to prevent its execution; adding to it all the circumstances that Dalton had told him, that the Maissorean might not doubt in the least, the truth of the discovery. When he had done this, he acquainted captain Dalton with it, not a little pleased with himself, and thinking he had acted with uncommon discretion in the affair to prevent the Maissorean's designs by such a prudent step. Nanderauze wisely desisted from the attempt, but offered large sums for Poverio, dead or alive. It was on the discovery of this, that I proposed Dalton should seize on the Maissorean and Morarow, which he might easily have done, by a surprise, as he often had conferences with them; and I must own, I thought in justice it would have been right to have done it: but the Presidency were of another opinion. Before we close the year 1752, it will be necessary to say what was doing by Sallabatzing and Mr. Buffy to the northward.

1752.

AT the end of the year 1751, we left the French with the Viceroy of their own appointing, Salabatzing marching to Aurengabad: they were soon after disturbed by Ballazerow the chief of the Marattas, who came down with a large army against them.

THE war continued till October 1752, when Gawzedy Cawn, the elder brother of Salabatzing, whom the Mogul had appointed Prince of the Deckan, marched to take possession of his government; but he died in fourteen days after his arrival at Aurengabad, poisoned by his own sister. After his death, Salabatzing concluded a treaty at Hydrabad with Ballazerow; but the Mogul, on the death of
Gaw-



1753. Gawzedy Cawn, appointed his son Shaw Abadin Cawn to succeed. He accordingly informed the Nabob, Mr. Saunders, and Mr. Dupleix of the Mogul's appointment, and raised a large army to come and take possession: but he was soon obliged to drop that design, the Mogul's affairs requiring his presence with the army at Delly. Sallabatzing now left at large, at the earnest solicitation of Mr. Dupleix, gave all our settlements to the northward to the French, who, however, for the present, did not attempt to take possession, except of Divi Island. Mr. Buffy frequently quarrelled with Salabatzing, and as often again assisted him with his Europeans in collecting his revenues; by which conduct he sometimes promoted the interest of the company, always his own, and is thereby become one of the richest subjects in Europe.

BEFORE the beginning of the new year the Maissoreans had declared against us, and being in possession of Seringam Pagodas, captain Dalton beat up their camp in the night, and killed some people.

Two days after this, the Maissoreans recovering themselves, attacked his advanced post, on the other side the Cauvery, within cannon-shot of the fort. It was defended by a redoubt, in which he had posted sixty Europeans, and some sepoy. The enemy came on with extraordinary resolution, through the fire of our musquetry to the very parapet. A panick seized our people, and instead of trusting to the redoubt, and waiting for a reinforcement from the town, they abandoned the post, and attempted to cross the river. The cavalry seeing their confusion, followed them into the Cauvery, and there cut every man to pieces. This obliged captain Dalton to keep within his garrison, which was still very sufficient; and as we apprehended no scarcity of provisions, we were not concerned on his account, being determined our efforts should still be exerted in this part of the province.

IN consequence of our resolution, and hearing the French were marched with Morarow from * Waldore, towards Trivedy; we set out from Fort St. David the 6th of January, with 350 Europeans, 700 sepoy, and joined the Nabob and our other forces at Trivedy.

A fort 12 miles west of Pondichery.

Our



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

41

Our army consisted of about 700 Europeans, 2000 sepoy, 1000 of the Nabob's cavalry, and our own little troop of 20. The Nabob had neither money nor allies, except the King of Tanjore, who promised very fairly, but never sent any assistance. The French, consisting of 500 Europeans, 2000 sepoy, a troop of horse commanded by Mr. Maiffin, and 4000 Marattas, intrenched themselves on the banks of the river Paniar in sight of Trivedy. Morarow, with his Maratta horse, ravaged and destroyed the country, attacking our convoys, and obliging us to march our whole force, to bring our provisions and stores from Fort St. David.

1753.

ON the ninth of January, in the morning, the Marattas, who had a train of artillery, and two companies of Topasses, brought down three pieces of cannon, and begun to cannonade the village of Trivedy. I ordered the grenadiers and some sepoy to attack their battery, and followed with our whole body to support them. The party pushed on briskly, and got possession of their artillery before they had time to fire a second round. As the cavalry still kept their distance but within cannon shot, we followed them with some field-pieces about two miles, and were preparing to return when they surrounded and attacked us on every side. Our cannon did great execution with grape-shot, and our men kept their fire admirably well. Finding they could not succeed, they left us to pursue our march to camp, with the three pieces of cannon our grenadiers had taken in the morning.

THE King of Tanjore having promised us a body of cavalry, I sent a party of infantry, with two pieces of cannon to favour their junction. They came on some part of the way, but thinking us in a bad condition, and fearing the Marattas, they amused us only with promises, and obliged our party to return to the army without them.

THE enemy were so superior to us in cavalry, that we were obliged often to march our whole body to escort stores and provisions from St. David's to our camp; always harassed more or less by the Marattas. On the 1st of April in particular, returning from St. David's, they attacked us in small parties the whole day, till within three miles of Trivedy, and there a large body attacked our front with great briskness, but they were repulsed with the same spirit. We then perceived



1753. perceived the whole body of the enemy on the right of the road, within a mile of Trivedy. Our convoy very luckily marched on the left flank, near the bed of a river. The enemy advancing, we came presently near enough for cannon, and kept advancing, and firing, with a seeming resolution on both sides to come to an action. They had a hollow way in their front, which they imagined we could not pass; but as soon as we came to a proper distance to make a push, I ordered my sepoy and artillery to halt, and keep the cavalry clear of my convoy. Then marching on briskly with the main body of Europeans, we crossed the hollow way, so much to the surprise of the French, that they gave us only one fire, and ran away. We were too well satisfied with our victory to pursue, as we had the convoy to take care of: our men, besides, were almost exhausted with fatigue, having been under arms from 3 o'clock in the morning, and the day so excessively hot, that some of our Europeans dropt down dead on the march, with the heat and want of water. The Marattas hovered about us till the close of day. We killed a great many of them, and in particular Budgerow, Morarow's brother.

THE same day, on our march, we were joined by captain Polier and his company of Swiss. With this reinforcement I determined to try if it was possible or warrantable to attack the enemy, who could not be brought out of their entrenchments to an engagement. In consequence of this resolution, I made a march nearer them.

IN the front of their camp was a village where lay an advanced party. Our grenadiers and 100 of the battalion were ordered to attack it; they succeeded, and drove the enemy out, who returned to their main body. A little beyond this village, within 700 yards of their camp, was a convenient and safe post to make a battery. We had brought with us two 24 pounders, which we mounted, and began to cannonade their camp, which was surrounded with a parapet cannon proof, and with redoubts at proper distances, mounted with 30 pieces of cannon, and a very broad and deep ditch, with a good glacis. We continued cannonading for some time; but to so little purpose, that we thought proper to desist; besides, our march from Trivedy increased our difficulties with regard to provisions. The Marattas were indefatigable, who being joined by a small party from Pondichery, surprized a fort called Bonnagery, from whence we drew our supplies of grain. Finding I could not bring them to an



an engagement, and that an assault was impracticable, from their numbers, which in Europeans were almost equal to our little army; we returned to Trivedy, and captain Killpatrick marched with a detachment to retake Bonnagery, which the enemy abandoned in the night.

1753.

CAPTAIN Dalton, ever since the loss of his party, had been shut up in the fort. The main body of the enemy was at Seringam, and their cavalry continually scouring the plain, prevented any provisions from coming in. The inhabitants and garrison were supplied from the magazines which were under the care of the Nabob's brother, who had always declared there was sufficient for a long time. Though there was no appearance of scarcity, captain Dalton thought it necessary to know the real quantity in store; and making an examination, to his great surprize, it appeared there was only sufficient for three weeks, and no hope of a supply from the country, a party lately sent into Tondeman's districts not being able to get any, or even to return. He immediately dispatched a messenger with an account of his situation, who reached me late at night, the 20th of April, at Trivedy. Astonished at this intelligence, we saw the necessity of an immediate march to Trichinopoly, which we began the 22d instant in the morning, leaving captain Chase with 150 Europeans and 500 sepoy for the defence of Trivedy; and as I intended passing through the Tanjore country, letters were dispatched by the Nabob and me to the King, acquainting him with our march, and inviting him to join us on our approach, to his capital. Though we proceeded as expeditiously as possible, we were obliged to halt every third or fourth day, on account of the hot winds, which were so powerful at this season, that notwithstanding all our care, our little army was greatly diminished. We marched by Chillambrum, a strong Pagoda, in which we had a serjeant, and a few gunners. A place of so much consequence for preserving our communication by land between St. David's and the Tanjore country, should have been reinforced; instead of that, our men were withdrawn, and it fell into the enemy's hands soon after our departure. On our entering the Tanjore country, the King sent his prime minister Succogee, to compliment the Nabob and his allies. He received our force, and promised very fairly on the part of his master, to whom he soon returned. We pursued our march to Condore the 3d of May. On our arrival, the King desired to meet the Na-



1753.

bob and me half-way. I set out the 4th, in company with the Nabob and Mr. Palk, who had been with me from my leaving Madras. The King met us at the place appointed, attended by his whole court, who on the occasion made a very magnificent and splendid appearance. He was escorted by 3000 horse, well mounted, and a great many elephants in silver trappings. After ceremoniously passing each other in our Palankeens, we were conducted to a pleasant garden, and there received by the King, under a pavilion, supported by pillars of silver, elegantly covered, and furnished. There we renewed our assurances of friendship and protection, and all our former engagements; and it was determined that the King should support the Nabob, and join him the next day with 3000 horse, and a like number of sepoy. After a refreshment of fruits, a shower of rose-water, and being anointed with oil of roses, we were dismissed with presents of elephants, horses and * sirpahs, and escorted to our camp by a brilliant party of the Rajah's cavalry.

ON the 5th, the horse and sepoy joined us, according to agreement; but, as we soon after experienced, only to make a parade, for they left us the same day. We remonstrated, and very warmly pressed their junction, but they excused themselves with promises of returning. Unwilling therefore to lose time, and suspecting that they wanted only to amuse the Nabob and us, we marched, and arrived the 6th of May at Trichinopoly, much decreased in numbers through fatigue; and notwithstanding we frequently sent the sick back to our settlements, the hospitals were filled at our arrival. We had even left our tents behind, and took only with us what baggage was absolutely necessary, that nothing might retard our relieving Trichinopoly, which indeed was of so great consequence, that every thing was to be risked for it. The enemy made a show of opposition when we approached the fort. The whole plain was covered with their cavalry and sepoy, but a few shot from our field-pieces soon determined them to retreat to Seringam. As we sent 100 men to the hospital upon our arrival at Trichinopoly, the remainder of my force, with what the garrison could spare, when mustered, amounted to no more than 500 men in battalion, and 2000 sepoy. Nanderauze was on the island, and had with him 10,000

A rich dress of that country.



cavalry, 6000 Black infantry, and about 100 Europeans, with a good train of artillery. After giving the men two days refreshment, I crossed the Cauvery to the island together with the Nabob, intending to attack the enemy if we found a favourable opportunity; but their superiority, and the advantage of their situation, made it impracticable. It was as much as we could do, by a very brisk fire of our artillery, to keep our flanks clear from the cavalry that surrounded us, and at every motion we made were ready to charge. Nor were the enemy's cannon silent; so that after a very fatiguing day, I was obliged at night to retreat, and repass the river. In this attempt we had two officers killed, and three wounded, and but very few men in proportion; the enemy's cavalry suffered greatly.

1753.

WE then encamped on the plain, about four miles south-west of the fort, at a place called the Fakeers's Tope, to keep our communication open with Tondeman's country. This Polygar still remained a friend to the Nabob. He sometimes sent his troops, and all our provisions came from his country. Besides what was necessary for our daily consumption, our design was, if possible, to lay up a year's stock of grain in Trichinopoly; as without this supply our military operations must entirely be confined to this spot; but all our endeavours to this purpose were ineffectual. The King of Tanjore, or Tondeman, could easily have supplied us with the quantity wanted, if they had been willing; but they were apprehensive, that if once Trichinopoly was well supplied, we might think an army needless there, and march towards the coast, and by that means leave their country exposed to the insults of the enemy. In vain were all our promises, that the safety of their countries should be our first care: In vain did the Nabob and I represent to them the advantage it would be for the common cause to have an army at liberty to move where we pleased, which was not possible, while the magazines remained unfurnished with grain. All these reasons were to very little purpose; they judged of the English by themselves, apprehending that if once we could carry a point, promises made to gain it would be no longer in force. By these means we were kept in Trichinopoly above a year, never able to get three months provisions into the fort; I mean for the garrison only without considering the inhabitants, who were now obliged to leave their dwellings and settle in Tanjore, and other places: by this means the



1758.

the town, lately so populous, became almost uninhabited. About this time I was commissioned with Mr. Palk to treat with the King of Maiffore. We accordingly wrote to him, and desired an interview, which his French allies would not permit him to give us. He only recapitulated in a letter, six feet long, the agreement between the Nabob and him, the many injuries he had received from us by being kept out of the fort, and insisted on Trichinopoly or his expences.

THE day we left Trivedy the enemy came out of their entrenchments, and encamped near the fort. A party of the garrison made a sally, and, flushed with their first success, they imprudently pursued too far : the enemy getting between them and the town, cut off their retreat ; and after some resistance, the whole party, which consisted of two officers, 60 Europeans, and two companies of sepoys, was either put to the sword, or made prisoners of war.

THE French now erected a battery, and began to cannonade the place. The garrison was still sufficient to make a good defence, had not a mutiny arose, in which the men got possession of the Arrack in the garrison, and, mad with liquor, obliged the commanding officer to capitulate, by which means he and all the rest of the garrison were made prisoners of war. This gallant young man, whose lenity, in not putting a stop to the first appearance of the mutiny, had been attended with such bad consequences, was so sensibly affected with his misfortune, that it threw him into a fever, of which he died soon after at Pondichery.

CHILLAMBRUM and Trivedy being reduced, the Marattas, French, and Maifforeans all joined at Seringam, and being also reinforced from other parts, their battalion outnumbered ours. With this superiority they crossed the Cauvery, and encamped to the westward of us, on the plain.

I WAS obliged, a little before that, to go into the fort on account of my health ; and by a mistake of the gentleman who commanded, and to whom I had given directions for securing a post in his front at the Five Rocks, which he neglected, the enemy posted themselves between us and Tondeman's country. That our communication might not be quite cut off, I sent orders to secure the Golden
den



den Rock, which was accordingly done by two companies of sepoy. The enemy resolving to gain that post also, sent a party early in the morning, June 26th, to attack it; and had almost begun their attack before we perceived their motion, it being scarce day-light. As soon as ever we discovered the fire, I came out of the town, having dispatched a messenger first with orders to the commanding officer to detach the picquet, and endeavour to support the sepoy. The enemy moved at the same time, but before either had got half-way, the party which had attacked our sepoy in the morning had carried their point, and drove them from their post. It was expedient immediately to attempt regaining it; we therefore moved our whole body: the enemy did the same. Being come near enough, as I imagined, to make my push, I ordered the first division of the grenadiers, and the picquet sent in the morning, (who had halted for my coming up) to march on briskly, and attack the party on the Rock, while I followed slowly with the remainder to support them. The enemy had sent a reinforcement to those on the Rock, and with their remainder were drawn up on the right of it. As soon as our first division was engaged, I advanced, and attacked their battalion; the first division had gained their point almost instantly, so that the enemy found themselves between two fires; in which situation they did not long remain, but retreated, or rather ran away as fast as they could, leaving us masters of the post, and three pieces of cannon.

1753.

WHILE we were pursuing our success, the whole body of Marattas and Maissoreans rode in between us and them, so that our attention was afterwards sufficiently taken up in securing our return to camp, which we effected without difficulty, though they made two or three brisk attacks; but our men had been long accustomed to preserve their fire: and as our cannon were well served, the cavalry thought proper to retire. Their loss on this occasion was not inconsiderable; amongst the rest a nephew of Morarow, called Ballapa, was killed. He commanded the Marattas, as their chief was yet in the Arcot province. I had known this young man when he was on our side; a youth of great spirit and courage, and an excellent horseman. His body being found in the field, was sent back in my pallankeen to his friends: a respect I thought justly due to so gallant an officer; and they were very thankful for the favour. He was shot by one of our grenadiers, being advanced so
near



1753. near us that he cut one of our men in the ranks, tho' accompanied by only four horsemen. Had all the rest behaved with the like resolution, we should have found much more difficulty in our return to camp. Thus was this great object of the war again saved by our success, but the numbers of the enemy were so great, that a victory or two more would have left all my men on the plains of Trichinopoly. I therefore thought in earnest of a reinforcement, especially as the neighbourhood of the enemy, with their large body of cavalry, began to make my stay on the plain very inconvenient, without horse to oppose them. The Nabob and I determined to move towards Tanjore, to try what our presence would do with the King, and if possible, persuade him to send the troops he so often promised, to our assistance. We marched the 2d of July, and encamped at a place called Conandercoile, half-way between Trichinopoly and Tanjore. I chose this road rather for security, than shortness; it being most of the way through thick woods, and safe from the cavalry. There we halted till we received intelligence from Mr. Palk, that he had prevailed on the King to send out Monagee his general, at the head of 3000 horse, and 2000 sepoy, to join us, which was completed in ten days.

SOME of our ships at this time being arrived on the coast from England with recruits, a detachment of 170 men, and some sepoy were ordered to march and reinforce us, under the command of lieutenant Repington, who joined us on the 3d of August, and on the 5th we set out for Trichinopoly in company with the King's horse, commanded by Monagee. The enemy at this time also received a reinforcement, and were in battalion superior; however, as Trichinopoly was ill supplied and distressed, we were obliged to march. On the 7th we arrived at Dolaways* Choultry, about ten miles east of the town. A heavy rain falling kept us there the next day; but the ninth, in the morning, we began our march, with a convoy of some thousands of bullocks, laden with provisions. By the signals made from the Observatory, on the top of the rock of Trichinopoly, we were given to understand that the enemy seemed de-

* An open house for all travellers, the same as a Turkish Caravanferai. A Bramin resides always in, or near it, who keeps it clean, and provides water. He is maintained by an

endowment from the founder of the charity. On most publick roads there is a Choultry every five or six miles.



terminated to oppose us; and by the same signals we were enabled to judge of their disposition, which we soon discovered more plainly as we advanced. They had extended themselves from the French Rock to the Golden Rock; at each of which some of their infantry was posted. At the Sugar Loaf, as between both, and readiest to oppose us, if we attempted to pass, was their battalion, with the artillery planted to advantage. All the cavalry was between these rocks, and in different parties, forming a chain, and waiting our motions. In consequence of this disposition of the enemy, I ordered our march. Our provisions and baggage on the left flank with the Nabob, Monagee, and the Tanjore troops. Half our sepoy in front, and after them, a party of Europeans, and an advanced guard to the first division of artillery. After them followed the battalion, and in their rear my second division of guns, supported by a piquet; the other half of our sepoy brought up the rear of the whole.

1753.

As my intention was to avoid an engagement, if possible, having so large a convoy under my care, I directed the march so as to be out of the reach of their guns, intending to go round by the Golden Rock. This put their whole body in motion; they detached a party of their battalion to reinforce that post, where they had a great many sepoy, their main body also made a motion to support them, and attack us as we came round. Finding it impossible to avoid an action, I resolved to prevent that party's reinforcing the other on the rock; and since we were obliged to engage, I resolved to dispossess the enemy, as the gaining of that post would give me an advantage. I therefore ordered the grenadiers, the piquet, and our advanced sepoy to push for it; their party did the same to support it, but not with the same vigour or spirit, for we out-marched them, and drove off the party which were in possession. On this, their advanced party halted, and presently after the whole body, which had moved but a little way from the Sugar-Loaf Rock to support them. When our whole force had reached the Golden Rock, I ordered our baggage in the rear of it, unwilling to expose them to the cannonade, and our cavalry to stay by, and secure it; being determined to attack the enemy, and if possible, to drive them out of the field, for without it we could not finish our march. As I have said before, the first party of the enemy had halted between the two rocks, but imprudently, nearer to us a good deal than to their own body. So favourable an opportunity was not to

H

be



1753.

be lost. The picquet, grenadiers, and four platoons were immediately ordered to attack them, and according to their success, I was ready to move with the remainder, either to support, if repulsed, or to join, and push the advantage to their main body, by driving on them their beaten party. Our artillery was posted clear of the flanks of the party, as they marched, to keep the cavalry at a distance. The officer who was ordered for the attack, instead of following my orders, sent me word, he could not execute them without cannon, and that he was halted, waiting for it. The least delay was sufficient for the enemy to see their blunder, and in consequence to repair it, by moving up to their party, which would oblige me to do the same; and by this means, the affair might become more equal, and indeed with more advantage on their side, as they were superior. On this message I left the main body, and galloped to the head of the party, and there ordered him back to the post I had left, desiring him to leave this with me. Captain Kirk, at the head of the grenadiers, captain Killpatrick with the picquet, and myself at the head of four platoons, marched on, the line keeping in admirable order, in spite of a very smart fire from the enemy's artillery, which cost us some men, and in particular captain Kirk, who was killed at the head of his favourite grenadiers. The brave fellows, by whom he was much beloved, could not see his death without some emotion. Captain Killpatrick, who saw him fall, and his men at a stand, immediately put himself at their head, and desired them, if they loved their captain, to follow him, and revenge his death. These things on the spot have generally a very great effect, when delivered from a person, whose spirit and courage is known: the fellows, roused in an instant, swore after their manner, they would follow him to ; and in that disposition attacked the enemy, who were unable to stand the shock. The main body seeing our success, (according to the directions I had left) marched to support us, and pursued the blow. The enemy at last moved to the assistance of their party; but too late. The briskness of the attack gave no time for rallying, but on the contrary, the pannick spreading through the whole, the battalion did not even stay to give or receive a fire, but ran off in great confusion, round the Golden Rock, and away to the Five Rocks. To increase their distress, our rear division of guns which we had left at that post, with most of our sepoys, and cavalry, to secure our baggage and provisions, cannonaded them severely in their retreat; and had the



the Tanjore horse done their duty, few could have escaped. The Tanjore chief alledged that he was afraid to leave the convoy, exposed to their large body of cavalry, which remained in good order, and constantly near us; but this was but a bad excuse, for orders had been sent him, on the enemy's retreat, to pursue, and we were marching back to secure the convoy. The enemy, who were encamped almost in the order in which they drew up to oppose my march struck their tents at the beginning of the attack, and left us little else on the field of battle besides their killed and wounded, with three pieces of cannon. We had not more than 40 men killed and wounded; the enemy above an hundred.

1753.

I CANNOT help mentioning one particular circumstance in this affair, to shew the extraordinary behaviour of the French; the boys with my palankeen had straggled a little out of the line of march, and were picked up by the Marattas. It was the same in which I had sent back the body of Morarow's nephew: I therefore desired the Maratta chief to return it, and I would pay the price to the horsemen who had taken it; but the French had got it out of their hands, and would not suffer them to send it back, but carried it to Pondichery, where, by Mr. Dupleix's order, it was carried about the town in triumph. At the same time it was reported that I was killed, and that we had lost the victory, of which the palankeen was a trophy.

THE enemy retreated to Alletore, very near the head of the island. The two next days were employed in putting provisions into the fort; when that was done, we marched and encamped at the Five Rocks, which was in their rear; upon which they retreated to * Moutehille-nour, and in so great a hurry, that they left behind them a nine pounder, and some ammunition. Elmiseram surrendered the 11th to Monagee. The strength of the ground they occupied, made it impossible for us to attack them; besides, they received in the mean time a reinforcement of Europeans from Pondichery; and Morarow returned to them with all the rest of his cavalry. We then marched to cover our convoys from Tanjore, which their superior numbers of cavalry made it difficult to bring in. Several of our parties were attacked; in particular one on the 28th, by a large body of Marat-

Situated upon the river, about seven or eight miles from Trichiaopoly.



1753. tas, and Maiffore horse. They came so near the picquet, which was sent to the support of the convoy, that the soldiers in the front rank wounded some of the horse with their bayonets, and yet, by not parting with their fire, brought in the convoy safe.

A NUMBER of our men falling sick, by the badness of the water, we moved our camp to the French Rock the 1st of September. The enemy made a motion also upon this and camped with the Sugar Loaf on their right, and the Golden Rock on their left. We were joined in this camp by another reinforcement from the settlement, commanded by captain Ridge, with some men and officers from Europe, about 150 Europeans, and 300 sepoy. This gave us great spirits, and determined us to attack the enemy. Our necessities indeed obliged us to it. We had a scarcity of every thing in camp, not above three days provisions, and no convoys could come without the risque of an engagement. I thought it more advisable, therefore, by attacking them, to engage while I could be master of my own disposition. Having refreshed the troops with two or three days rest, we moved nearer the enemy; and in order that they might imagine the motion was made only to try if they would decamp on my approach, I sent to Trichinopoly for an 18 pounder, and with it cannonaded their camp, as if we meant no more than to make them uneasy.

THE following was the enemy's disposition, and my order of attack for the next morning. As I have said before, they were encamped with the Sugar-Loaf Rock on their right, having thrown up intrenchments in their front and rear, but none on the left, where were posted the Maifforeans and Marattas, extending almost to the Golden Rock, on which they had a party of 1500 sepoy, 100 Europeans, and two guns. Our battalion of 600 rank and file was ordered into three divisions; to march in the rear of each other, just at a proper distance to form the line when necessary. Our sepoy followed in the rear, to the right and left of the divisions, and the Nabob and Monagee with the cavalry brought up the whole our cannon being divided on our flanks.

SEPTEMBER 21st at four in the morning, we marched directly forward to the Golden Rock. Our front division, which was according to custom, composed of the grenadiers, picquet, and two platoons



toons were ordered to attack it briskly. The enemy were so much surprized, that they even forgot to fire their two pieces of cannon, which were loaded with grape; and their infantry, so great was their pannick, fired without any order, little to our prejudice. We got possession of the rock in an instant. No time was lost to increase the confusion these runaways must create. After dismounting the two pieces of cannon, and our front division again being formed, we marched on in the same order for the French battalion. As I wished and expected the beaten party carried their confusion to the black troops in camp, who in crowds ran for safety towards the French, and increased their disorder. The enemy soon perceived by the runaways where they might expect our attack, and in consequence also found out that their intrenchments were of no use, which obliged them to form opposite to where we were marching. In this situation we passed the Black camp easily, and were with the French in less than half an hour. The day then began to dawn: Their cannon fired very briskly, as we approached; but, I suppose, in the hurry, they forgot to point them, so little damage did we receive. We found them drawn up rather on our right, and still inclining that way, with an intention, I supposed, to fall on the flanks of our divisions. As a large body of their sepoys were posted on their left, I sent orders to ours on the right in my rear, to move up equal with the right of my first division to oppose theirs, and secure that flank. We formed our line as we marched, and attacked as we formed. Our right soon drove their left, and our center and rear divisions, the right and center of their line. Another body of their sepoys, in possession of the Sugar-Loaf Rock were routed by our division of sepoys, on the left of my last division. In short the affair was soon decided every where: they attempted to rally, and make a stand again, near a little breast-work, but were quickly obliged to abandon it, leaving behind them their camp standing, all their artillery, (eleven pieces of cannon, with their commandant Mr. Astruc) and nine officers prisoners, and about 100 men killed and wounded on the field of battle, and almost as many prisoners. In this action we had 70 men and six officers killed and wounded. I received a slight wound in my arm, and captain Killpatrick a shot through his body; concluding it must be mortal, he would not permit any of his people to stay by him, but sent them on to join their company in the pursuit of the enemy. Some straggling Maratta horse came up in the mean time, and according to custom,

1753.



NARRATIVE OF THE WAR

1753.

custom, cut him with their sabres as they passed, which would have been repeated by others, but the surgeon by accident seeing him in that danger, staid and protected him, till the success of the day cleared the field of the enemy. The garrison made a sally, and picked up several prisoners, who were making their escape over the river to the island, where they at last collected their scattered army, leaving us masters of the plain, and an open communication. The Nabob's cavalry were few; but had our Tanjore horse behaved as they ought, we must have destroyed many more of the French battalion. Nor had they now any excuse as formerly, the enemy's horse having kept their distance on our first attack in the morning; but the Tanjoreans were too busy in plundering the camp to think of a pursuit. We had not sufficient force to follow the blow on the island, but were obliged to rest contented with our success, and endeavour to persuade the King of Tanjore and Tondeman, to make use of this favourable opportunity to throw in provisions.

THE enemy had left a party at Weyaconda, which we were obliged to attack, and batter in breach. The breach was scarce practicable, when our sepoys perceiving the enemy stealing off by another gate, clambered up as well as they could, and cut the garrison to pieces; it consisted of two hundred Black infantry. Upon this we marched and encamped at the French Rock, and dispatched an officer to the King of Tanjore, to hasten the important article of provisions, who succeeded in part, and we got stores for three months into the place.

THE monsoon season coming on, it was high time to think of cantoning our troops. The Nabob and I therefore fixed upon Koiladdy, about 15 miles east of Trichinopoly, as it commands the pass on the island. We should have remained nearer Trichinopoly, or perhaps in the town itself, but that would have occasioned a very great consumption of provisions. Therefore after leaving a sufficient garrison in Trichinopoly and the fort of Elmisseram, we marched for Koiladdy, and provided against the severe rains which generally fall about this season of the year. In our cantonments we were very sickly: we lost six officers in as many weeks, and a great many soldiers. The Nabob continued with us, but Monagee and the Tanjore troops returned home. Being pretty well acquainted with the nature of the people, notwithstanding their promises.



mises of coming back ; I wrote to the presidency, to send Mr. Palk, who had before so well managed for us, to keep that court firm in our interest, I was the more solicitous because I knew the king's prime minister was our enemy, and constantly endeavouring to keep his master neuter or rather a seeming friend to both, and if at any time we were unsuccessful, Succojee was sure to be in the interest of the enemy. Nanderauze sent an ambassador to the king of Tanjore

1753.

king large promises if he would leave us, and threatening on the contrary if he did not, that the Marrattas should ravage and lay waste his country and punish him with fire and sword, and that the Nabob governor, meaning Dupleix, should also bring down Salabat-zing against us. Succojee the minister had been brought over to the French cause by a large bribe, and by his intrigues removed Monagee from his master's favour.

THE enemy remained seemingly very quiet on the island, and had received some reinforcements from Pondicherry, but none came to us from Madras, to put us on an equality. Mr. Dupleix generally obliged the inhabitants of Pondicherry to mount guard and do the duty of the garrison, but we could not in like manner trust Fort St. George without regular troops. On the 28th in the morning, our out-guards reported that in the night they had heard a great firing towards Trichinopoly. We remained in suspense till the evening, when the following account came from captain Killpatrick, who succeeded captain Dalton in that command.

THE enemy's whole army under Mr. Maiffin crossed the river the 27th at night. Their forces were distributed agreeable to the different false attacks they were to make. The real one was to be made by the French battalion, on that battery, which is in the center of the West face; and as I observed before was called Dalton's battery. They had 800 men, 600 were to escalate, and Mr. Maiffin with 200 more and a body of sepoy to wait the event, prepared to second, and join the first party, when they had got over the wall. At three in the morning they passed the ditch which was almost dry. They placed their ladders, and mounted to the Number of 600 on the battery, without interruption, or the least alarm in the garrison. The guard appointed for the battery was of 50 sepoy, with their officers and two European gunners. The rounds had gone at twelve o'clock, and found them present, and alert. However when the French



1753. French came they were mostly absent or with the two European gunners asleep. By this time, two or three shot were fired, which alarmed our piquet. The French, persuaded that firing alone would frighten the garrison, turned two of our twelve-pounders on the battery, against the town, and discharged them with a volley of small arms, their drums beating, and the soldiers crying out, *Vive le Roy*.

CAPTAIN Killpatrick was then ill of his wounds. The ~~new~~ officer in command came to him for his order. ~~He~~ bid him march instantly with the picquet, reserve, and what sepoys were not posted, to the place where the attack was made, and to order every man also to their respective Alarm Posts, and not to stir from them on pain of death. The French after their discharge, came down from the battery; and were between the two walls. There was a slight gate in the inner wall, which led into the town. The man who was their guide knew where it was, they had two petards ready to clap to it, and at the same time to amuse us, another party was to escalade the inner wall. The scheme was well laid, and had not the French petulance, made them too soon discover themselves, they perhaps might have had time to execute their designs, and have entered the town. When our officer came to the place attacked, it was not easy for him to discover the situation of the enemy: but however in the hurry and confusion, he did not forget the gate, on the flanks of which he posted a number of men, with plenty of ammunition, to fire from thence incessantly, whether they heard or saw any thing of the enemy or not. And luckily he did, for the guide and petardier were found killed within ten yards of the gate. The escaladers had so far succeeded in their design as to have fixed ladders against the inner wall, and began to mount. The commanding officer of this party, preceded by his drummer were the first persons who attempted to enter, in which the latter lost his life, and the officer receiving a shot and cut at the same time, was pulled within the town. The frequent flashes of fire, occasioned by the briskness of the attack and defence, were the only guide our artillery officer had to direct the pointing of his guns; with which he so well succeeded, having loaded them with grape, as to shatter the ladders, kill a number of men and entirely disappoint their well concerted scheme. They now only thought of making their escape, or screening themselves from our fire. This first was impracticable. their
ladders



ladders being mostly destroyed, and they within the first wall: yet some attempted leaping off the battery, into the ditch, but the greater number lay hid under the parapet. The long wished for day at last came and discovered where the enemy were, who made use also of the light to beg for quarter, which was granted them. They lost in that affair *364 Europeans taken prisoners, 65 of which were wounded. Eight officers also prisoners, and most of them wounded, besides forty private, and one officer killed, and they acknowledged themselves that more were wounded, or lamed, who were carried off to the island. We found two petards, one as I said before, with the petardier within ten yards of the gate, the other at a little distance from it.

1753.

I GAVE orders for marching the next day, but first sent a reinforcement to captain Killpatrick, as the number of his prisoners was much greater than his European garrison, and the enemy threatened the place with another general assault. We arrived at the French Rock without opposition, the enemy keeping close to the island.

THE king of Tanjore after a great many difficulties, sent out some of his troops to Tricatapolly; eighteen miles from Trichinopoly, and made no small merit of what he had done, for the Nabob. But the truth was, he had certain intelligence, that the enemy were forming a party of Marrattas, to enter his country, and he therefore prepared to oppose them. Succogee had so effectually irritated the king against Monagee, that the command of the troops was given to Gauderow, an officer of no skill or judgment, but a creature of Succogee's, and uncle to the king. We desired that Monagee might be sent, well knowing his merit as a soldier, and his strong attachments to the common cause, which he always thought his master's interest. On our writing pressingly for him, Succogee represented to the king that Monagee was too much in our interest not to be suspected, and that it was possible, with our assistance, he might endeavour to make himself too powerful. Being acquainted with this, I was obliged to desist even from mentioning Monagee's name, or the consequence might have been fatal to him. Not to drive things therefore to extremities, I wrote to the king that he might send whom he pleased to command his troops, I was satisfied.

* It may serve as a specimen of Mr. Dupleix's manner of relating these affairs, both in his Memoire and the little History which he caused to be published in the year 1757, to cite

the following words from the Memoire, where speaking of this loss of so large a party of Europeans, he says, Il fallut donc se retirer et meme avec perte.

THUS



1754.

THUS ended the year 1753, in which had we been able to pursue our fortune, our advantages would have been real: but instead of it our successes were only a respite, and we soon had the same to go over again, having, however, the consolation to think we had done all we could against so great a superiority. A superiority indeed which I am often ashamed to mention, for fear my veracity should be called in question.

MR. BUSSY with his army was still attending and supporting Salabatzing to the northward. Shaw Abadin Cawn the son of Gauzedy Cawn, who had been appointed by the Mogul prince of the Deckan, had too much employment on his hands, as chief Bucshee of the empire, to think at that time of making good his pretensions.

THE latter end of this year the Mogul Shaw Hamet was deposed, and succeeded by Allum Geer. This change was occasioned by the following event. The Mogul sent Shaw Abadin Cawn, the Bucshee, at the head of 90,000 horse, to suppress an irruption of the Rashpoots, who are reckoned the best soldiers in Indostan. In this expedition he succeeded, but on his return to Delly, an uncle of his taking the advantage of his absence, persuaded the Mogul that he had always been his enemy, and intended making use of his army to dethrone him. The Mogul was the easier persuaded, as the Bucshee had obtained the post he enjoyed, more through power than favour, and had ever spoke freely of the Mogul's dissolute way of life, which was generally spent in debauchery. It was therefore agreed, that Shaw Abadin Cawn should be put to death, but as they rightly judged it could not be done openly, the following scheme was laid for the execution of their design.

THE Mogul went out of Delly, at the head of 25,000 horse, in order as he said to do honour to Shaw Abadin Cawn, and reward him for his services. At their meeting, the blow was to have been struck. The Buchshee having intelligence of all that passed, came readily to meet the Mogul, but brought with him 30,000 Marattas; who in case of any attempt were to protect him. The Mogul's par hearing that such precautions were taken, not knowing what might be the consequence, and afraid to offend a man so powerfully supported, disbanded and returned to Delly, leaving their sovereign almost without attendants: who therefore immediately followed his troops.



troops. Whether Shaw Abadin Cawn thought this a favourable opportunity to dethrone a man who was a scandal to the dignity of the throne; or whether it was the result of a premeditated design, he followed the Mogul, entered Delly, and went immediately to the palace, where after making his obeisance, and sitting down a little while at the Durbar with the Mogul, he ordered his people to seize on and imprison him; he then assembled the Omrahs*, placed on the throne Allum Gee a near relation to the late Mogul. The deposed Prince, according to the cruel policy of their government was immediately deprived of his sight. 1754.

THE Marrattas as they had threatened, slipped by Gauderow, who was encamped on the frontiers, entered the Tanjore country, and began according to custom to plunder and burn the villages, cut the grain, and drive off the cattle. The king pressed by necessity, found at last, that no body but Monagee, could put a stop to the mischief. He applied also to me, but the violent rains had so swelled the rivers between us, and the roads were so bad that it was impossible for us to move. Monagee came out of Tanjore, with what troops he could raise, and Gauderow had orders to join him, and give up the command. Monagee came up with the Marrattas on the 4th of January, drew them into an ambuscade, took from them 800 horse, and made a great many prisoners, and cut to pieces the remainder of the party. I flattered myself such a piece of service, might reinstate our friend Monagee, and restore him to favour, and that after so much success, perhaps he would join me, but I was greatly mistaken. On his return to Tanjore, he was very graciously received, but told at the same time, that the enemy being now subdued, there was no further occasion for his service; and consequently the troops were disbanded. All this was the effect of Succogee's envy, which increased in proportion with the other's merit. He persuaded the king, that keeping up troops was too heavy an expence; that the English would do the rest, that it was our business to fight and not his, who had just gained a glorious victory, with which he might sit down in safety and content.

* Privy counsellors, men of the first dignity and family in the empire. They are under the Vizir, but are mostly concerned in

all the revolutions of the state: and commonly their interest elects and disposes the Moguls.



1754.

DURING this time the two governors, Mr. Saunders and Dupleix were endeavouring to negotiate. After many altercations, and a tedious correspondence, it was agreed on between them to send commissaries from each nation, and hold a congress at Sadrafs *, at which place matters might more easily be adjusted. Accordingly commissaries were appointed. Those on our side were Mr. Palk and Mr. Vansittart; on theirs the father L'Avaux, superior general of the Jesuits in India, and Messieurs De Kerjean and De Bauffe, who assembled at Sadrafs in January.

WE proposed for the basis of the treaty, the Nabob being acknowledged, and the King of Tanjore to remain in peaceable possession of his country. But their proposals in answer to ours were as follows :

1st, THE restitution of the French prisoners.

2dly, THAT Madrafs, which used to pay to the Duan of Arcot, 4000 pagodas yearly, should be independent, and all our arrears forgiven.

3dly, THAT the company should be lawfully entitled to Ponnalmy and all its dependencies.

4thly, THAT the Nabob should have some establishment elsewhere, if the preliminaries were received, and that his differences with the Maissoreans, with regard to Trichinopoly, should be reconciled.

5thly, THAT the English should evacuate all the places taken from the French, to whom they belonged, whether by grant or conquest, as well as all the places in the Carnatick, without opposing the disposition and arrangement of Salabatting, who had an undoubted right, and who had associated the Marquis Dupleix in the government of the Deckan. Such were Mr. Dupleix's proposal

It has been before said, that Mr. Dupleix would willingly make the world believe he had received grants from the Mogul and Sa-

A Dutch settlement situated between Madrafs and Pondichery.



labatzing appointing him governor from the river Kristna to Cape Comorin, and as such he was proclaimed in the usual form. In consequence of this pretended authority, these articles were made. But an unlucky mistake proved it all to be a forgery. The French commissaries came equipped with what they called Des pieces authentiques from the Mogul, and other officers under him, constituting and appointing Mr. Dupleix governor general from the river Kristna to the sea, and the French commissaries agreed (lest our gentlemen should doubt it) that they should examine, and take copies of these grants. 1754.

A PERSIAN interpreter was sent for, from whom they learned that the seven first saneds or grants were only copies, though produced as originals: to which the French commissaries answered, that Mr. Dupleix kept the originals at Pondichery, and if required, they should be sent for; but that these papers, attested by a Cady*, were of equal validity. This caused some dispute, but our gentlemen dropt it; and on further examination it appeared to Mr. Vansittart (who understood enough of the Persian language) to be a false seal fixed to the saned, called the Mogul's, the first having no date†. On that the French immediately objected to our proceeding any further; for unless we could produce Nazirzing's saneds to the Nabob, they could not admit of theirs being copied. We told them, that Nazirzing supporting him, was a sufficient saned in his favour. That it was their first proposal, as well as Mr. Dupleix's, all along to Mr. Saunders, to begin with an examination of their own saneds, and we could not help being surprized at their declining it, after some copies had been taken. That pieces of so publick a nature, we apprehended, might be exposed to all the world. But we could not help remarking, that the first of those saneds was without date; and the only original they produced, *et le plus authentique*, as it is termed, was a manifest forgery; for it had no ‡ chop of the Mogul or his Vizier; it had no sign manual, and from other manifest tokens, it was evident that it had been borrowed from some old saned, especially as the number 3 is annexed to it, which was the third year of the reign of the last Mogul.

* Cady, a person who administers justice, and by whom copies of all public papers are attested.

† Mr. Dupleix is silent on this subject in his Memoire.

‡ A smaller seal on which is engraved the name of the Mogul. Every grant is generally authenticated, not only with this seal of the Mogul, but also that of his Viziers.



1754.

I HAVE dwelt so long on this affair, only to give an idea of what shuffling conduct Mr. Dupleix was capable, in order to carry a point, and shew a real cause why the congress came to nothing. The commissaries were recalled on each side, and the war as likely to continue as ever.

WE remained near Trichinopoly, and the enemy on the island, but they were well situated, having a large body of cavalry, and the river fordable every where to incommode us very much. All the country round, after being the seat of war for so many years, was ruined; our provisions coming mostly from Tanjore, we were obliged to send large parties to escort them, for the merchants with grain would not come within 18 miles of us without a party to protect them. We were obliged also to send five or six miles for firewood, while the enemy's cavalry were continually in motion on every side. At that time we had troops enough on the coast, which might have joined us, with whose assistance we should have been able, at least, to have protected our convoys with less fatigue and risque, as the event too fatally shewed.

IN the month of February we sent a party for provisions and stores, and for fear the enemy might at last be tempted to attack them, I made it stronger than any I before had sent. It consisted of two captains, six officers, and 180 men rank and file, four pieces of cannon, and 800 sepoy. The commanding officer had orders, if he saw or heard any of the enemy coming to attack him, to take post immediately and defend himself, till we could come to his assistance. * It will be needless to enter on the particulars of this affair as one can hardly do it without blaming, at least pitying the commanding officer, who is since dead, and who certainly, from his misconduct, lost his party; and what still added to the misfortune, our brave company of grenadiers, who had ever behaved well, and successfully, were amongst them. They were either taken, or cut to pieces, and both their officers killed. In this

* They were attacked on their march from Killicottah, and within a mile of that place. There was a village before them called Coutapara, a little below Elmiseram. The men who were at that post, on the attack, secured the

village for our people with some sepoy; and had they been in a body, and pushed for it, agreeable to their orders, the enemy could not have hurt them.



unhappy affair, 134 men were prisoners, 100 of which were wounded. Of the eight officers four were killed, and three wounded, one only escaping; our four pieces of cannon, and about 7000 l. in money, with a large convoy of provisions fell into the hands of the enemy. The party was attacked by 120 French infantry, two companies of deserters about the same number, the French troop of about 80, 6000 sepoys, all the Maillore cavalry, and the Marattas, who came in at the latter end of the fray, in all about 10,000, and seven pieces of cannon. 1754.

WE began our march to their relief, but too late, as they had not followed the proposed disposition, and particularly had not taken post agreeable to their orders, but endeavoured to march on, covering their convoys with their force so divided and separated, that they were not able to support each other, so that the cavalry, who saw their confusion, had an easy conquest, and not much more than the business of a minute to cut them to pieces, which was the fate of every man, except those whom the French troops saved, and even of these there were few who did not bear marks of their defeat. This was a most heavy stroke upon our little handful of men, above a third, and I cannot help repeating it, our best troops, for so with reason I reckoned our grenadiers, who had always behaved so well on every occasion where bravery and resolution were to be shewn.

Soon after this misfortune we received intelligence, that one of the Nabob's brothers, Mauphus Cawn, was in the Arcot province, and marching to our assistance with 2000 horse, which determined me to try every method to maintain my ground some time longer, and to leave a party of 180 men, which was at Davecotah, to strengthen Mauphus Cawn, who wanted some Europeans to escort him to camp. We therefore opened our communication with Tondeman's country for provisions, as no merchant could be persuaded to venture the other way with grain from Tanjore. The enemy continued on the island, not yet chusing to encamp on the plain; besides, they had suffered as well as we in the last affair. Their whole attention was taken up in schemes to surprize our parties, but we so often changed our roads, and the time for bringing in our provisions, that they never succeeded. We were greatly assisted in this



1754. this by a Moorman, who for his deserved merit was made commander of our sepoy.

MAHOMED ISOUF CAWN, commonly called the Nelloure Subadar, from the place whence he came, had first a company of sepoy in our service, which were raised by himself. He is an excellent partizan, knows the country well, is brave and resolute, but cool and wary in action. He was never sparing of himself, but out upon all parties, and by his good intelligence brought in provisions to keep us tolerably well supplied. He is born a soldier, and better of his colour I never saw in the country.

MR. PALK, who was now at Tanjore, found affairs just as I had represented them: Monagee a prisoner, the King difficult of access, and his minister strong in the Maissore interest, opposing all our measures, and ever throwing in obstacles to prevent Mr. Palk's seeing his master; and when, after some days, he was admitted to an audience, he found the King wavering and irresolute, one hour seemingly convinced by his arguments, the next listening to, and approving of Succogee, and upon the whole determining nothing. Add to all these difficulties another, which as we did not suspect it, was the most dangerous. It was no less than the treachery of our linguist, who of course was acquainted, and knew all our designs and motions. This man being in treaty with Nanderauze, discovered to him all he knew of our affairs. It was a most intricate piece of villany, and with no small difficulty traced to the bottom, so carefully had the fellow laid his schemes. When the fact was proved against him, he was blown away from the mouth of a cannon, the common punishment of traitors.

IN this situation did we remain till some time in May, still waiting for Mauphus Cawn, and in hopes that his coming would determine the King of Tanjore to return to our alliance; but another accident helped to bring it about more effectually. On the 12th of May, I sent a party out in the morning to take post on the plain, and wait for a convoy of provisions from Tondeman's country. The party was commanded by a discreet and gallant officer, captain Cailaud, who with 120 men, two guns, and 500 sepoy marched from camp about four o'clock in the morning. The Nelloure Subadar, who was in the front of his advanced party, on getting over a
little



little rising ground, was surprised by his horse neighing, who was immediately answered by many others. When he got to the top of the bank, he discovered a part of the enemy posted; the French troop in particular, who mounted on his appearing, first discharging their carbines, on hearing which captain Caillaud halted, formed his party, and rode up to his advanced guard. He met the Nellore Subadar, who told him, the enemy were on the road, and had posted themselves, as well as he could distinguish, in the same place where it was intended to wait for the provisions. The enemy had a bank in their front, which formed a parapet, and it was agreed to attack them, immediately on their flank, with the Europeans on one side, and the sepoys on the other. They quickly drove the enemy, and obliged them to leave a tumbril of ammunition behind, and some of their men. The post was immediately taken, and there the party waited agreeable to their orders. By this time it was broad day-light, when we discovered the number of the enemy, which was much superior to our party, even in infantry, besides all the Maiffore cavalry. Captain Caillaud therefore employed a black fellow to slip through the enemy that had surrounded him, and order the provisions to return. The enemy continued at a little distance from the post, and contented themselves with a cannonade. The moment the firing was heard in the camp, the little army being under arms, marched to support the party. The whole body of the enemy were seen likewise on the plain. Captain Polier commanded (I being much indisposed at the time, and scarce able to move out of bed.) As our distance was less than that of the enemy, we were first joined. Captain Caillaud having reported what he had done with regard to the provisions, it was agreed to return to camp, and, if possible, to avoid the enemy, then hastening to cut off our retreat.

1754.

IN the morning, one of the gun-carriages was rendered useless, by the enemy's cannonade. The same accident also happened to captain Polier, who not caring to leave the cannon behind, spent some little time in fixing them on spare carriages, to bring them off; this being done, they began to move, the sepoys divided in front and rear. The enemy had now also joined, and were marching down in very good order, and so near, that it was impossible to avoid an engagement. The French battalion, as our people marched by files,

K

was



1754. was on their right flank, the sepoys in our rear, and the cavalry ready to charge on the right, and in front.

OUR army marched on very quick to gain a more advantageous piece of ground a little way before them, which the moment they were in possession of, the men were halted, and faced the French; the sepoys in the rear were drawn up fronting those of the enemy, to keep them off our right flank, so that our little body was formed in half a square. The sepoys on the left, with one piece of cannon, had orders to keep off the cavalry. Our two remaining pieces (for we carried out but five in all), were in the front of the battalion opposite the French. Never, I believe, were two pieces better served: they were of the short six pounders, that take in a large quantity of grape, so that when they were near enough, every shot took place in the French battalion. The enemy were so much galled by the briskness of this cannonade, that they began to give way, which we saw, in spite of all the efforts of their officers to keep them up. The lucky minute was improved, by our men advancing and giving them a fire, which compleated what the cannon had begun, and left us at liberty to finish our retreat. We suffered mostly from their sepoys, who, though they fired at a great distance, annoyed us very much in wounding our men, and most of our officers; captain Polier received two wounds, and was obliged to give up the command to the next officer, captain Caillaud, who began the march on the retreat of the French, and brought the party home with the two dismounted pieces of cannon.

OUR forces, that day, when joined, consisted of 12 platoons in battalion 360 men, 1500 sepoys; and as to our cavalry, we had our troop of about 11 men, and a few of the Nabob's horse: our artillery five pieces of cannon, two of which were rendered unserviceable by the accidents before related. The French had 500 Europeans, their two companies of deserters, their troop of about 50, near 5000 sepoys, and all the Maissore cavalry. About 6000 of the Marattas the day before luckily crossed the Coleroon, on some dispute between them and the Maissoreans.

OUR loss in battalion was six officers wounded out of nine, 59 private men killed and wounded, and about 200 sepoys. The enemy's loss was much more considerable.



I EXPECTED the French would have encamped where we had fought, which, had they done, we must have run the chance of another battle, either to have marched away towards Tanjore, or to have convoyed in provisions; but they luckily for us chose to return to the island, and our communication being open, the provisions came in that night. I now determined to march towards Tanjore, and there wait for Mauphus Cawn; besides, I was in hopes my presence with an army might do something in favour of Mr. Palk's negociations. I wrote to him, however, to apprize the King of my intentions, and to see how he took it. While I was waiting for his answer, an event happened which made our army as welcome as we could wish. The enemy, the second night after our engagement, took all their Europeans, 3000 sepoy, and 2000 horse, and marched away for Tondeman's country, with an intention to burn and destroy every thing they could, to deter that Polygar from sending any more provisions. 1754.

THE country people alarmed, drove all their cattle and valuable effects into the woods, where it was impossible to follow them; and this expedition of the enemy's ended in nothing, but burning a few empty villages, and taking a gun of ours in the woods, which the sepoy had to protect our convoys. After three days they returned, but vexed at their disappointment, and finding the King of Tanjore would not declare, they lost patience, and fell furiously upon the frontiers of his country, took Killycottah, a fort on the borders, and marched to Koiladdy, which they also took, and by that means made themselves masters of the bank on the island, which carries the water into the Tanjore country, and began to cut it in three or four places.

IN these circumstances, without waiting for Mr. Palk's answer, for I knew the King would be glad to see us in his country to defend it, we marched immediately to Tanjore, through Tondeman's woods, dividing our force, and leaving half with captain Killpatrick in Trichinopoly. I wrote also for the party from Davecotah to march, and meet us at Tanjore, for I found that Mauphus Cawn, for whom we waited, was not moved from Arcot. On my first day's march, as I expected, I had a letter from the King, begging me to come, and wishing me joy on the late victory. Mr. Palk also wrote to me, that things were much altered in our favour since



1754. this expedition of the enemy's, and that the King had ordered his horse out under Gauderow. Mr. Palk advised him to send his cavalry to meet us, that when joined, we might soon drive the enemy out of his kingdom. Instead of that, he ordered 1200 horse to go to Tricatapolly, to punish the enemy, as he said.

MORAROW, who still remembered the shame of his defeat, some months before, thought it now a good time to be revenged of the Tanjore troops, especially when Monagee was not at their head. He therefore crossed the Cauvery, and at day-break fell upon Gauderow's party, who made as little resistance as surprised troops commonly do: Gauderow and 200 of his men only escaped, the rest were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. We arrived two days after this fray near Tanjore, and there met the party from Davecottah, and 500 sepoy. The King came out of his fort to meet me, but I was so ill, that I was obliged to send captain Caillaud to make my apology.

THE next grand point we had for Mr. Palk to endeavour at, was the removal of Succogee from the King, and Monagee to be restored to favour and power. The circumstances were favourable for us, and Mr. Palk and captain Caillaud managed so successfully, that they convinced the Tanjorean, that to his minister, and his bad counsels must be attributed all his misfortunes; and that, had he continued steady to the Nabob and the English, the war might have been happily finished, and the enemy could not have dared to enter and lay waste his country, nor the bank have been destroyed. But still it was not too late; every thing might be recovered if Succogee was removed from his person and councils, and Monagee restored to his former rank, who had given so many convincing proofs of his strong attachments to his master's interest. The King was deeply concerned: he would fain employ both; he was unwilling to part with his favourite; but when he was convinced that our friendship depended on it, Succogee was removed, and Monagee invested with the sole and full management of his kingdom, and appointed once more commander in chief of his forces. New troops were raised to make up for their late loss, and every thing promised well from so lucky a change in our favour.



AT this time we were acquainted from Madrafs, of the arrival of a detachment sent us from Bombay, by that presidency, at the request of our governor and council; and indeed I must do governor Bouchier the justice to say, that he was always inclined to give us any assistance in his power. Some ships from Europe arrived also with recruits. 1754.

MAUPHUS CAWN was then at Conjeveram, 60 miles west of Madrafs, but he wanted money and some Europeans to enable him to join us. My opinion was asked, what should be done in this affair. I gave it for advancing him the sum required, a lack of roupees, and that a party of 500 Europeans, consisting of the Bombay detachment and the recruits lately arrived, should immediately march and take Mauphus Cawn under their escort. All this was agreed to, and the party marched accordingly.

MORAROW, on some dispute between him and the Maissoreans, had crossed the Coleroon before the 12th of May, as I have before observed. He repassed it to perform that exploit against the Tanjore troops; and having struck the severe blow aforementioned, he returned to the other side of the Coleroon again, and continued at a distance from the Maissore camp. He then proposed to the Nabob, that if the payment of three lack of roupees could be secured to him, he would return to his own country, and never more be an enemy to him, the English, or the Tanjoreans. The Nabob having no money, applied to the King of Tanjore, and after a great many meetings, it was agreed to, and the articles drawn up and signed. In the mean time Morarow gave Nanderauze to understand, that he was in treaty with the Nabob, but that if he would pay him the money then due, he would return to his assistance. Nanderauze sent him all the money he could spare; and Morarow finding there was no chance for more from that quarter, agreeable to his treaty with the Nabob, marched off. Part of the money was paid by the King of Tanjore on his going, the rest to be paid on his arrival in his own country.

ANOTHER detachment came from Davecottah, commanded by captain Zeigler, consisting of about 80 Europeans and Topasies, and 400 sepoy. As my health was much impaired, and therefore
my



1754. my continuing with the army very precarious, the governor and council, at my request, sent captain Killipatrick a major's commission, and consented to his succeeding to the command, if I should be obliged to leave it. I was not a little chagrined to find the Tanjore troops so long assembling, being anxious to march. The enemy were now again encamped on the plain, and had so closely beset Trichinopoly, that our communication was quite cut off. At last Monagee set up his standard, and joining us on the 21st, we marched. My intentions were to have proceeded directly to Trichinopoly; but in a council of war next day, I found Monagee unwilling to proceed, till we were joined by our other party, who were escorting Mauphus Cawn. With all the reasons I made use of, I could not convince him of the necessity of an immediate march. We were therefore obliged to wait; but on these conditions only, that he should in the interim collect a magazine of grain equal to the consumption in Trichinopoly, to enable us, on our arrival, to replace what had been spent in our absence.

MAUPHUS CAWN was then advanced as far as Fort St. David, where, contrary to his agreement, he wanted all his money before he passed the Coleroon, and even said that this would not be sufficient to pay his troops, insisting on a further sum. Finding he trifled with us, I ordered captain Forbes not to wait for him, but to join me with his Bombay detachment, and our recruits, as expeditiously as possible, which he completed on the 14th. The 15th I reviewed the army, which consisted of about 1200 men in battalion, 3000 sepoy, and 14 pieces of cannon. Monagee had with him 2500 horse, 3000 infantry, and some field pieces. On the 16th we marched, and the 17th reached Trichinopoly.

THE enemy had been joined the night before by 200 Europeans, and their whole body appeared on the plain in order of battle; their battalion and sepoy with the Sugar-Loaf Rock on their right, and the cavalry on their left. I ordered our advanced guard to take possession of a bank which commanded the entrance to the plain. As we advanced, the enemy began to cannonade. When I had passed the bank, we formed, and faced the enemy. Monagee's troops made up the second line, and covered our baggage and provisions. The enemy kept moving on; and we likewise, our cannon answering theirs. We expected nothing but an engagement,
and



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

71

and were not a little surprized, at once, to see their battalion go to the right about, their cannon drawing off, and the whole retreating very regularly. They killed us a captain and 15 men, and suffered themselves something more. The enemy had another party of Topasses and sepoy's marching to join them from the island, which when perceived by Major Killpatrick, he sallied out with part of his garrison, and obliged them, after a severe cannonade, to retire to the island.

1754.

WE halted next day to refresh our men, and to put our heavy baggage into the fort, resolving not to give the enemy rest, till they had quitted the plain. They had the first day gone to the Five Rocks, but on our marching to the Fakeer's Tope, they moved off, and encamped at Mootachillenour. We followed them, and in the night they thought proper to cross the river, and encamped behind their Pagodas on the island. We then retook our post off Elmiseram, and sent a detachment to cover the King of Tanjore's workmen, repairing the bank near Koiladdy, the enemy having also abandoned that place.

ABOUT this time our fleet, under the command of admiral Watson, arrived with colonel Adlercroon's regiment, and the French ships had brought Mr. Godeheu, commissary-general and governor-general of all their settlements, with 1500 Europeans. Upon his arrival he wrote to Mr. Saunders, to acquaint him with his inclination to pursue pacific measures, introducing his proposals for a suspension of arms, by sending back the troops which Mr. Dupleix had caused to be stopped in their passage from Madras to Fort St. David. The governor and council, pleased to find they had now to deal with a person who appeared to concur with them in pursuing the true interest of the two commercial companies, were not long in sending their answer, and both sincerely labouring to hasten the conclusion of an event so much to be wished. A Suspension of arms was agreed on, and actually took place on the 11th of October 1754.

THE articles were as follow.

ARTICLE I.

To begin from the 11th of October, the day on which THE SUSPENSION OF ARMS shall be published to all the

troops, in all the forts, and actual possessions of the two contracting nations in the Carnatick; all acts of hostility shall cease between the French and the English. II. During



NARRATIVE OF THE WAR

II. During the course of this suspension, which shall be for three months, their troops shall not act against each other, not only as principals, but even as auxiliaries.

III. The two nations shall oblige their allies to enter into the same agreement.

IV. If either of the two nations, French or English, shall commit any act of hostility, possess themselves of any place; or either occasion any damage to the other after the day of the publication of the said suspension, both oblige themselves to make reparation proportionable to the damage, and to the entire restitution of whatever was taken.

V. If the allies or other troops in the pay of either nation, shall commit any act of hostility, or plunder the territories of which either nation is now in possession, it shall be lawful for both nations to repulse their insults by force; by which the injured nation shall not be deemed to have infringed the present agreement.

VI. If the allies or auxiliary troops of either nation, shall take arms or insult the countries of which the nation they were allied to is now in possession, the two nations shall succour each other in this case to oppose this enemy, who should become thereby a common enemy to both.

VII. The troops of the two nations shall be employed during this suspension of arms, to secure their settlements and present possessions; they may be transported freely, and without any difficulty, from one place to another at the pleasure of the governors generals, commanders, &c. of each nation; and all persons actually under the protection of either flag, may in like manner go and come where they think proper, without being disturbed either in their effects or persons.

VIII. There shall be a free commerce throughout the Carnatick, and in all the countries to the northward on the Coromandel coast, for the two contracting nations; they may bring goods from all the places in the dependencies of either nation or their allies, and transport them freely and without any duty whatever through the respective territories and * Jageers.

IX. As soon as the suspension is proclaimed, the mutual exchange of prisoners shall be set about, and the necessary measures taken in an amicable manner to soften the fate of those that shall remain, by putting them together into places where they may feel less of the rigour of a long captivity.

Jageers are lands granted by the Mogul or his representatives.



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

Mr. PALK and Mr. VANSITTART were sent to Pondichery, and returned with the following Treaty and the Truce.

ARTICLES of a provisional Treaty, concluded and agreed on between Thomas Saunders, Esq; President for the Honourable English Company on the coast of Coromandel and Orisa, Governor of Fort St. George, &c. and the Sieur Charles Robert Godeheu, Commissary for his most Christian Majesty; Commander General of all the settlements of the French Company on both sides the Cape of Good Hope, and at China; President of all the councils there established, and Director General of the India Company of France.

ARTICLE I.

The two companies, English and French, shall renounce for ever all Moorish government and dignity, and shall never interfere in any difference that may arise between the princes of the country.

All places, except those which shall be stipulated in the definitive treaty, to remain in the possession of the two aforesaid nations, French and English, shall be delivered up to the Moors.

II. In the Tanjore country, the English shall possess Davecottah, and the French Karical; each with their present districts.

III. On the Coromandel coast, the French shall possess Pondichery, the districts of which are to be specified in the definitive treaty. The English shall possess Fort St. George and Fort St. David, with the districts likewise to be specified.

The French shall form a limited settlement, the situation of which shall be chosen between Nizampatam, and the river of Gondecama exclusively; as an equivalent for the difference there is between Davecottah, and Fort St. David together, compared with Karical:

Or else,

The districts of Pondichery shall be made equal to those of Fort St. George and Fort St. David together, and in this case the French shall abandon the Point D'Appuy, proposed above. The alternative shall be left to the determination of the two companies.

IV. Mazulipatam and Divy shall be neuter, leaving to the two companies the choice of making a partition; each nation shall have a house for commerce at Mazulipatam, with an equal number of soldiers to guard it, in case the town should remain neuter. Divy shall be delivered to the English, if the French reserve Mazulipatam. And if the French keep Divy, the English shall have Mazulipatam. In these two last cases, equal districts shall be annexed to the possessions.

V. The navigation of Narzapore river shall be free; the English may carry their settlement upon the banks of the said river, or keep Bandermaalanka; but they shall possess only one of those two places; the French shall have a settlement on the same river. The districts shall be equal between the two nations.

VI. The entrance of Ingeram river shall be free, neither the French nor the English



NARRATIVE OF THE WAR

lish shall possess the islands of Coringe and Yellacatippa. The English shall have their factory at Suncrapollam, with its districts, and a warehouse at Nellepely, the fortifications of which shall be razed. The French shall have their factory at Yanam, with districts equal to those of Suncrapollam, and they shall be at liberty to have a ware-house on the Terra Firma in case they judge it necessary, for the convenience and ease of their trading business.

VII. In the Chickakul country, as the English have Vizagapatam, the French may settle a factory where they please, to the southward of Pondemarka, or the northward of Bimlepatam, whether at Ganjam or Masoubunder, on an equality with Vizagapatam.

VIII. These conditions accepted on both sides, although they are not to be a law for a definitive treaty in Europe, they shall nevertheless produce a truce between the two nations and their allies, until news is received in India of the answers made in Europe concerning this agreement; which answers we promise bonâ fide to commu-

nicate to each other as soon as they shall be arrived by the ships of either nation.

IX. Neither nation shall be allowed to procure, during the truce, any new grant or cession, or to build forts for the defence of new establishments. It shall only be lawful to rebuild and repair the fortifications now subsisting in the establishments they possess at this time, in order to prevent their entire ruin.

X. Until the arrival of answers from Europe to these articles, which shall be dispatched thither by the first ships, to be submitted to the decision of the two companies, under the pleasure and approbation of the two crowns, the two nations shall not proceed to any cession, retrocession, or evacuation of what they now possess, every thing being to remain on the footing of *uti possidetis*.

XI. With regard to the indemnification, the two nations may expect for the expenses of the war; this article shall be amicably adjusted in the definitive treaty.

Done at Fort St. George, 31 Decemb. 1754.

(L. S.) (Signed) THOMAS SAUNDERS.

(In English and French) (Under the English)

(L. S.) (Signé) GODEHEU.

(Under the French)

Examined with the original, and
attested to be a true copy,

Dated at Pondichery,
26 Dec. 1754.

HENRY VANSITTART, } Secretaries.
JOS. DU PRÉ,



ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

75

ARTICLES and Stipulations of a Truce, concluded between us Thomas Saunders, Esq; President, &c. &c. &c. and the Sieur Charles Robert Godeheu, Commissary, &c. &c. &c. in virtue of a provisional treaty which we have signed the same day, to promote the re-establishment of tranquillity in this part of India.

ARTICLE I.

To take place on the 11th of January, 1755; the day of the expiration of the suspension of arms, proclaimed the 11th of October, 1754; all hostilities shall cease between the English and French.

II. During this truce, which shall be in force until we are informed in India of the answers made in Europe concerning the said provisional treaty; the troops of the two nations, French and English, shall not act against each other, either as principals or auxiliaries.

III. The two nations, English and French, engage to oblige their allies to observe all that is stipulated for the accomplishment of the truce by virtue of the treaty; and whoever shall dare to infringe it shall be reputed a common enemy, and shall be reduced to good order by the force of arms.

IV. If either of the two nations, French or English, or either auxiliary troops or allies, shall commit any act of hostility, possess themselves of any place, or any one shall cause any damage to another during the said truce; both oblige themselves to make reparation proportionable to the damage, and to the entire restitution of whatever shall be taken.

V. If the allies or other troops in pay of either nation, shall be guilty of any act

of hostility, or commit any pillages in the territories whereof either nation is now in possession, it shall be lawful for both nations to repulse their insults by force, by which the injured nation shall not be deemed to have infringed the present agreement.

VI. If the allies or auxiliary troops of either nation, shall take up arms and insult the countries of which the nation they are allied to is now in possession; in this case, the two nations shall assist each other against this enemy, who shall thereby become the common enemy of both.

VII. The troops of the two nations shall be employed, during this truce, in the care of their present establishments and possessions; they may be transported freely, and without any difficulty, from one place to another, at the pleasure of the governor, generals, commanders, &c. of each nation; and all persons actually under the protection of either flag, may likewise go and come at pleasure, without being molested either in their effects or persons.

VIII. Trade shall be free throughout the Carnatick, and in all the countries to the northward of the Coromandel coast, for the two contracting nations; they may fetch merchandizes from all the places in the dependence of each other, and transport them freely, without any restraint, through the respective jagheers and territories.

L 2

IX. All



NARRATIVE OF THE WAR, &c.

IX. All common enemies, or the particular enemies of either nation, who shall come to attack the English and French in their present possessions, and trouble the tranquillity which is to reign in India, shall be repulsed by the united force of the two nations, French and English.

X. As soon as the truce is proclaimed, the mutual exchange of prisoners shall be set about, man for man; and means shall be resolved on for the ease of those which shall not be exchanged.

XI. Commissaries shall be appointed on both sides, to examine into the infringements committed by each party, or their auxiliary troops or allies, and settle the restitution to be made of all the places taken, during the truce, against the tenour of the suspension of arms; as likewise of

all that may have been taken from them by the said auxiliary troops, in merchandizes, effects, money, &c. and farther, to settle in a fixed method, for a guide, during the whole time of the truce, all the names, and the extent of every country, *paragana and village, under the power, and in the possession of the two nations, English and French.

XII. It is agreed, that whenever, in the course of the truce, any complaint shall be made by either of the said nations of an infringement of the 4th article, the said commissaries on each side appointed, shall certify and examine the fact, that justice may be done accordingly to the injured nation, either by restitution or reparation, according to the nature of the injury received.

Done at Fort St. George, 31 Dec. 1754. Signed as before.

Dated at Pondichery,
26 Dec. 1754.

Additional Articles and Stipulations to the foregoing Truce.

ARTICLE I.

If any nation should attempt to erect a settlement within the bounds of the present possessions of either of the two companies; both English and French shall jointly oppose and hinder any such undertaking.

II. The custom-houses and † juncans shall remain on the same footing as before the war; and no alteration shall be made in the duties paid on the importation and exportation of goods of the produce or manufacture of the coast.

Done at Fort St. George, 31 Dec. 1754. Signed as before.

Dated at Pondichery,
4 Jan. 1755.

* A Paragana is any district of country.

† A Juncan is a toll or duty on every thing that passes.



TRANSACTIONS
ON THE
COAST of COROMANDEL,
In the Year 1755.

THE SUSPENSION OF ARMS was accompanied with another ^{1755.} event of great importance to the tranquillity of India, the departure of Mr. Dupleix, who being removed from the government, returned with the next ships for Europe.

HERE it may be proper to take a view of the several provinces and governments of the Deckan, their present interests and designs. This will not be a mere recapitulation of what has been said in the Narrative; for as the Princes of that country are continually agitated by the passions of avarice, ambition and jealousy; they are every moment prompted by suspicion or the love of intrigue, to enter into new quarrels, form different connexions, and by their restless and uncertain spirit, create the utmost perplexities to their allies. Fond of compliments, ceremonial and repeated professions of friendship, they have little regard for truth or gratitude; nor have they any consideration for the future more than the past, solely occupied with what they imagine will advance their present views. This character of the Asiatics in general will be exemplified by a review of the present situation and designs of the several powers of the Deckan, as they appeared in the year 1755.

SALA



1755. SALABATZING was induced by his incapacity and sloth, to submit himself entirely to the councils of the French for the sake of their protection and assistance. Bound by no ties of affection, he was now meditating the removal of those very persons with whom he had so lately been sharing the greatest power and wealth, without the least regard to their having assisted him in that usurpation.

THE KING OF TANJORE, a subtle Prince, lived in a continual jealousy of the English and French, who had both settlements in his dominions, well knowing that either of these singly was able to give law to him, and always apprehending most from the side to which the balance of power seemed to incline. From a diffidence of the French, and a better opinion of the English faith, he had, for the most part, shewn a regard for our alliance, but it required great address to manage his irresolution, to divert his partiality for a treacherous favourite, and keep him firm to his engagements. His most dangerous neighbours were the Maissoreans, a rich people, and formidable from their being undisturbed at home. He knew they had long formed designs against Trichinopoly, and at this very time, were in treaty with the French for that end. The knowledge of this determined him to enter into the strictest bands of friendship with us, and yet, at the same time, his suspicion of our entering into any alliance with the governor of Marava, (a country bordering on his dominions to the south), threw him into the most precipitate resolution of carrying fire and sword into that country. It was in vain to remonstrate to him, that so rash a proceeding would only facilitate the designs of the Maissorean, by leaving Trichinopoly defenceless. The Maravar was the present object of his jealousy.

TONDEMAN a Polygar, whose woods, adjoining to Tanjore, had been an useful protection to our convoys during the war, was also uneasy at our supposed intentions of alliance with the Maravar.

THE KING OF MAISSORE, young, and in a manner confined to his seraglio, gave up the direction of affairs to his uncle, who was prime minister and brother to Nanderauze. They were both, at this time, pursuing their scheme on Trichinopoly, in which they suffered so many repulses, and saw their extravagant projects so often defeated, that they were ready to seize any pretext for abandoning their



THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

their enterprize. They soon relinquished it on good reasons, and from thenceforth became less formidable neighbours to the King of Tanjore. 1755.

MOOTIS ALLEE CAWN, governor of * Velloure, a powerful and designing man, had the address to murder two Nabobs with impunity; and during this long war, to keep himself clear of its calamities. Mr. Dupleix used to call him his deputy in his province. Though no confidence could be placed in the friendship of this artful man, it was imprudent to have him for an enemy; therefore his offers to acknowledge the Nabob were gladly accepted, but there was little sincerity in his professions of submission.

THE MARATTAS have always had so considerable a share in the disturbances, and were at this time taking so large a part in the politics of these countries, that it is requisite, for the explanation of the affairs of the peninsula, to give as many particulars of this extensive people as can be ascertained: for as they have no written history, and scarce any tradition, that we know, of their former state, it is impossible to procure a full and satisfactory account of so numerous a nation, once settled, then dispersed, and now re-establishing themselves throughout all parts of the Mogul's empire: a people who have had, from time immemorial, settlements to the north of Delly, great part of which they still possess, though so great were the numbers that were driven out from thence, by Aurenzeeb, that he employed above twenty years in fruitless endeavours to reduce them in their new settlements in the mountainous parts of the Deckan.

THEY have had continued wars ever since, with all the Moguls, Subahs and governors, and made innumerable treaties of peace with them, which they never observe any longer than they think it their interest. They have themselves had strange internal revolutions; and what is most strange, the present governing men among them are Bramins or priests, hated by the true Marattas, but followed by them for pay.

* Within twelve miles of Arcot, the strongest fort in all that district.



1755. THEIR Raja or Prince is sacred : and they hold that he ought to be a kind of idol, shut up and fed at the publick expence, and the executive power lodged in some other branch of his family, at least, such has been the establishment on the Malabar coast : but this was subverted by the usurpation of the two Bramins, the one called Peelagee, and the other Budgerow. Peelagee governed Guzarat, and Budgerow the country to the southward. His son, who succeeded him, is known by his name Balazerow, on the Coromandel coast : On the Malabar he is called the Nanna, for that is the title by which the acting head of the government and general of the forces is distinguished. The nominal Prince, or the idol, as he has been described, is stiled Ram Raja and Saha Raja. All these names, indiscriminately used and strangely spelt, occasion no small difficulty to the reader, who is here also desired to take notice, that though all writers speak of Sattaarah as the capital of the Maratta's country, the residence of the Bramin their sovereign is * Poona, where all the business of the government is carried on.

WHAT proves that they have formerly been powerful over all the Mogul's empire, though now disunited, is the universal acknowledgment of the *Cbout*, or tribute paid to them of a fourth of the revenues of every Raja or governor. This they still collect in all parts, taking what they can get of it in ready money, and leaving the ballance in arrear, which will serve them at least as a pretence for another incursion, whenever they want employment for their troops.

IT may seem strange that these Marattas, who are Bramins, and so strict observers of the Gentou religion, and the tenets of the Transmigration of souls, that they will never kill the most offensive animals that crawl about them, should, without any scruple, eagerly employ their sabres to the destruction of their fellow-creatures. The salvo for this extraordinary contradiction, is a device of their priests, who, by the sacrifice of a Buffalo, with many mysterious and enthusiastick ceremonies, absolve their warriors from the restrictions which bind the vulgar.

* Poona is about a hundred miles east-south-east of Bombay. D'Anville says, the situation

of Sattaarah is not ascertained, and therefore he has not put it in his map.



THE COAST OF COROMANDEI.

It should be here observed that the Marattas mentioned so often in the Narrative, were only a body of horse, freebooters, who alternately took the pay of the highest bidder. They were such as Morarow had picked up to follow his fortunes, and till he attempted to make himself independent, they had no settled habitation, and no profession but war, if it may be called a profession: where they have neither art nor discipline, and yet they are formidable to the Moors, who carrying such numerous and incumbered armies to the field, are the easier harraſſed, and even starved by them. For these pillagers, continually galloping round the country, cut off the convoys, and as most of their parties carry with them neither baggage, nor provisions, they easily elude all pursuit, and in an instant retire to their fastnesses, or even, if occasion requires, to their own country. They ride a hardy horse inured to fatigue, and for the most part fed with standing corn. The common men have no cloathing but a turban on their head, and a sash round their waist: instead of a saddle they use such a kind of pad as is recommended by Marshal Saxe. Truly formidable with their sabres, they are fatal to troops that are once broke.

1755.

THE Marattas, though not without trade and manufactures, have principally enriched themselves, by obliging the wealthy and more respectable powers their neighbours to be tributary to them. It will naturally be asked, why do the opulent states submit to be tributary? and what security have they that these licentious plunderers will abide by their agreements, and not continually encroach upon them, and raise their demands? The reason is plain: it is less expensive, and a lighter tax upon trade, to agree to some certain payment, than to engage in the unknown expence of armies, to free themselves from so irregular a foe: and as to greater exactions, if the Chief has once settled the *Chout*, he will hardly venture to struggle for more, as the money agreed on goes into his own pocket; and were he to proceed to the more violent method of compulsion, by invading the country, the spoil would all become the property of his troops, under the article of plunder, and his own share would come very short of the sum stipulated; besides, they have the prudence to consider, that a country ravaged by their troops, will produce neither tribute nor plunder again for some time.

They are a destructive foe and an unserviceable friend. They ruin their enemies by burning their country, and their allies by their



TRANSACTIONS ON

1755. their avaricious demands for money. Instead of meriting their pay, which they might easily do after a defeat, by cutting off all the broken troops, they fly to the camp, where every man procures a good burden for his horse, and walking on foot, drives him away loaded with the spoil.

SUCH has been, in a great measure, the state of the Maratta people; but about this time it will appear, that they entertained various designs of extending their territories in several parts of the country, and also on the sea coast. They took large districts from the Viceroy of the Deckan, marched to Delly and made a Mogul, and after driving out Angria by our strength, beat the Portuguese by their own. They had generals who set up for themselves in the remote countries that they had conquered, and were giving some other indications of their return from a vagabond life of rapine and disorder, to a more settled system of policy.

OF all the Princes of the Deckan, there are none so free from the faults of the country as the Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn; having always experienced the invariable friendship of the English, he has been taught the true value of honour and constancy, and throughout his conduct, manifested uncommon gratitude and fidelity to his engagements. The sums we had expended in the support of his cause, instead of raising in him the expectation of being farther burthensome to us, lay like a heavy weight upon his mind; and the distress he was in for money, with the impossibility of paying any considerable part of his debt to the Company, visibly affected his health: his brothers who accompanied him, having a separate command, would each of them keep up as many attendants, and as large an expence as the Nabob himself. Exhausted by this unnecessary profusion, he was not able to furnish the workmen and materials with which he had engaged to supply our engineers for completing their fortifications, nor even to find money for his own troops to prevent them from disbanding. Upon consideration of this state of the Nabob's affairs, it was prudently determined to take an exact account of his revenues, which were mortgaged to the Company, in order to judge what sums might be actually forthcoming for their use, after a due proportion should be allotted for the maintenance of himself, and the support of his dignity.



THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

It was at the same time recommended to him, to settle as soon as possible at Arcot, his capital, with all his family, as well to save expence, by reducing their several retinues to one household, as for the credit of his government. But it was of great consequence to his revenues, before he left the countries of Madura and Tinnevely, which used to produce an immense income, to collect the tribute which had not been paid during the troubles, and also to induce the several Polygars, and the subordinate governors to acknowledge the Nabob's right, by receiving grants from him for the countries they held under his government. 1755.

It was necessary on this, as on all other occasions, to have at hand a sufficient force; for in this country, we are to look upon an army as a proper formality usually attending a message to a friend, a subject, or an enemy. From these considerations, an expedition was ordered into the Madura and Tinnevely countries to collect the revenues, under the command of Alexander Heron, lieutenant colonel in his Majesty's service, and major of the Company's forces, attended by Mr. Maunfell, to act together with the Nabob's Vakeel, (or agent) as commissaries for the administration of the monies received. Colonel Heron, the latter end of January 1755, marched to Manapar, a village about thirty miles from Trichinopoly. Soon after his arrival, he was joined by the Vakeels of four neighbouring Polygars, who came to settle their accounts, promising soon to pay the ballances that were due; they also signed a paper, acknowledging themselves under the Nabob's government, independent of any other power whatsoever; and that they enjoyed their lands in right of his grants only. At the same time the Nabob received letters of the like purport from the three principal men in the Madura and Tinnevely countries. But upon the return of the officers, one of the four Polygars, by name Lachynaig, who had paid part of his tribute, and given a bill for the rest, refused to pay the remainder; wherefore, at the instance of the Nabob, colonel Heron, on the 10th of February, moved with the army close to a fort, which was one of the barriers of his country. All that day and the next he endeavoured, both by fair means and threats, to make him comply, but could get no satisfactory answer. He then determined to attack the fort the next morning, in which he succeeded with little loss: and also the same day took another fort, which gave him possession of all the country of that Polygar, except the tops of the hills, where



TRANSACTIONS ON

1755. the inhabitants had taken shelter. In these two affairs he lost fourteen sepoy and some few * colleries.

HERE the Nabob left colonel Heron, and his brother Mauphus Cawn accompanied him in the expedition. The roads were excessive bad through the woods for the carriage of the heavy cannon. Some breast-works thrown up in the narrow passes, were abandoned on the army's nearer approach, though not till part of the sepoy had given their fire, which was returned, but without any effect. Beyond the woods was a stone-fort, which, had it been quite finished, would have been of considerable strength for that part of the country. The Madura people who were fortifying it, abandoned it immediately. There was found in this fort some grain, ammunition, and four pieces of cannon. The colonel left some troops in possession, and advanced toward the town of Madura; upon which the garrison retired a little farther into the country, to a small fort, whither they carried their most valuable effects, and military stores. The greater part of the inhabitants remained, and seemed very well satisfied with the change of government. Being then the season for gathering in the grain, and collecting the revenues, it was resolved to quarter the army there. Madura is a strong Indian town, encompassed with a wall like Trichinopoly, but being of much greater extent, would require a very large garrison to defend it.

COLONEL Heron, having wrote circular letters to all the neighbouring Polygars, as well as to the people of Tinnevelly, marched for the fort to which Myana the late governor of Madura had retired. It was a strong Pagoda, which he had fortified in the best manner he could, but on the expectation of an attack, he and all his horse secured themselves by a timely retreat, and carried with him his elephants, camels, treasure, and the greatest part of his valuable effects; he left a few sepoy to defend the fort, who fired very briskly for some time, but on our returning it with cannon and small arms, they surrendered. Here were found three brass and iron cannon, a number of Malabar guns, and a great quantity of ammunition. After taking two other small forts, the army marched for Tinnevelly, and arrived the 25th; some of the Polygars came in, others sent their Vakeels to settle every thing amicably.



THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

THE greatest difficulty arose from the good inclinations of the Polygar of * Marava. He offered a free passage through his country for the English troops, employed his interest with the other Polygars, and sent his brother, who advanced within five miles of the army, with three thousand men and some pieces of cannon, tendering his service, and pressing us to make settlements in his country. The news of this caused so great jealousy, and worked upon the King of Tanjore and Tondeman, in such a manner, that they sent a protest against our treating with the Maravar, and even raised forces, and were actually marching into his country; Monagee, it seems, while out of favour, had received some personal affronts from the Maravar: this might be in fact the insuperable difficulty; but the reason given out was the friendship that had subsisted between the Maravar and the Maissoreans; but at this critical time, the very fear of the Maissorean was a reason for letting all present jealousies subside: therefore all endeavours to mollify the King of Tanjore and Tondeman being vain, orders were dispatched to colonel Heron, to break off all further treaty with the Maravar.

1755.

AT the same time, advice being received of the approach of Salabatzing, with Mr. Buffy, the army was ordered to return as soon as possible to Trichinopoly. The news of Salabatzing's march was true, but it had not the consequence that was apprehended; for he entered Maissore, where he levied the revenues of that rich province, and returned, carrying with him fifty-two Lack of roupees. Messrs. Buffy and Law were both with him; the latter made a demand in the name of the French Company for seven lack for the loss he had sustained when he was taken in Seringam. The money was refused, and at Mr. Buffy's request, Law desisted from his demand.

COLONEL Heron had very little advanced the company's affairs by his conduct at Madura and Tinevelly. The monies he collected did not amount to the charges of the expedition, and the terror of his arms was so little respected in the country, that Myana, the late governor of Madura, having cut off a party that was sent to surprize him, had the boldness to come to the very gates of Tinevelly while the army was there, and plunder the villages round. The colonel having re-

* Marava is a large country on the sea-coast to the south of our settlements, and to the east of Madura.

ceived



TRANSACTIONS ON

1755. ceived his orders, set out the 22d of May, and in his way, at the desire of Mauphus Cawn, invested a fort, which for want of heavy cannon, he was obliged to leave and continue his march to Madura, where he arrived the 21st of May. He left it the 28th, and calling at Colguddy Pagoda, seized a large number of religious images, and demanded five thousand roupees for their ransom, which being refused, he put them into his tumbrils, and was carrying them off. The Col-leries were easily instigated by the Bramins to rescue their gods; and taking the opportunity when the baggage was passing some strong densils in the Natam woods, they rushed from the thicket in great numbers, recovered their idols, destroyed several carriages, stabbed a hundred bullocks, killed some men, and carried off a quantity of baggage. The army pursued their march, without any thing farther to be remarked, till they reached Trichinopoly the 6th of June. Colonel Heron was tried by a court martial for misconduct in this expedition. It was proved that he had given in false accounts, had secreted part of the money received, and for this purpose, instead of collecting the revenues in concert with Mr. Maun-sel, had entered into a private agreement with the Nabob's brother, Mauphus Cawn, and farmed out the countries to him at half their value, not paying a regard to the instructions sent him by the Nabob himself.

TRICHINOPOLY being looked upon as the main security for the Nabob's debt, colonel Heron was ordered to leave there a garrison of five hundred men, under the command of major Killpatrick. Nanderauze, the Maissorean general, who lay encamped near the town, was continually practising every kind of stratagem, and contriving the most chimerical designs to make himself master of it. He employed a Bramin in the town, who constantly sent him intelligence, and gained him some friends in the place, and having prepared four hundred ladders, and concerted every thing for an escalade in the night, he made a proposal to Mr. De Sauflay, commander of the French at Seringam, to join him in the attempt. Mr. De Sauflay, expressing his sense of so treacherous a proceeding in the time of a suspension of arms, Nanderauze urged him with repeated solicitations, and even offered him three lack of roupees, provided he would feign a quarrel, march off, and thereby leave him at liberty to pursue his designs. Mr. De Sauflay having rejected these offers with disdain, was soon after informed by a friend he had in that general's coun-
cils,



c is, that in case of his refusal, the next project was to fortify the French, and endeavour to cut them off. He wrote to major Kilpatrick to send him a trusty person, to whom he communicated the whole, and moreover assured him, that in case the Maissore made any motion towards the town, he would immediately attack his rear, and make a signal on the sight of which the major might rally, and put the enemy between two fires.

1755.

WHILE the French and English chiefs were interchanging their assurances of mutual assistance against this Indian politician, he suddenly decamped and hastened his march home, not altogether, as some imagined, from disappointment, but rather from having received accounts of the march of Salabatzing towards his country. Soon after his return, he stirred up a rebellion, which threw the kingdom of Maissore into confusion.

THE enemy being removed, and no farther obstacle remaining to delay the necessary measure of conducting the Nabob to his capital, a proper escort was ordered: and captain Polier having prepared every thing for that purpose, they began their march the 9th of July, and proceeding in the slow manner which the burthensome pomp of eastern state must always occasion, arrived at Condor, and forded the Cauvery on the 16th. They halted the next day, and Monagee, with a numerous train, paid the Nabob a visit. At this interview, the strongest protestations of an inviolable friendship were made on both sides. Monagee assured the Nabob, most particularly, from the King of Tanjore, that he would never forsake him, and had five thousand horse ready at his order, if he needed them in the Arcot country. The Nabob having thanked Monagee for the promised aids and for his love and friendship, which he always relied on, at the same time whispered captain Polier in English, *'Tis all a lie.* The captain took up the discourse, assuring Monagee that the English, as they had hitherto constantly supported the Nabob, would continue their protection to him, as also their friendship inviolably with the King of Tanjore, so long as he remained firm to the Nabob. Monagee declared the King of Maissore had offered his King sixty lack of roupees, provided he would forsake the Nabob, but he rejected the proposal. With a few more civilities, and some useful orders about provision, Monagee concluded his visit.

THE



1755. THE Nabob continuing his march, arrived within a mile of Arcot the 19th of August, where he resolved to wait for a lucky day to make his entry into the city. Here he was met by colonel Lawrence, Mr. Palk, and Mr. Walsh, deputed to invite him to Madraſs. He readily conſented, and at the ſame time deſired thoſe gentlemen to mention aloud at his Durbar, that now the army was arrived there, the Polygars and his other tributaries ſhould be firſt invited to ſettle accounts, and pay off their arrears, but that if they did not comply without delay, they ſhould be forced to it. As they were ſenſible this muſt have a good effect, they took an opportunity of doing it at a full aſſembly, on which, among the reſt, Abdiel Vahob Cawn, and the governor of Velloure's Vakeel were preſent.

ON the 21ſt the Nabob made his entry into Arcot in a very ſplendid manner, and the 30th he viſited Madraſs, and was received at the Company's garden-houſe by the governor, the admirals Watſon and Pocock, and moſt of the gentlemen of the place. During his ſtay there, the proper meaſures were concerted for collecting his revenues, and towards the latter end of October he ſet out for that purpoſe, accompanied by major Killpatrick with a detachment of three hundred Europeans, and fifteen hundred ſepoys, together with Mr. Perceval, who was appointed commiſſary general for the Company. He was alſo to be preſent at every tranſaction, it being agreed with the Nabob, that half the money to be collected from the ſeveral Polygars ſhould be paid to himſelf, and the other half to the Company.

To enter into an exact detail of their proceedings with the ſeveral petty Polygars would be very tireſome and uninterſting to moſt readers. Therefore, not to take up their time with a catalogue of uncouth names, which will never occur again in the ſubſequent relation of theſe affairs, it ſhall ſuffice to ſay, that from the 20th of October to the end of the year 1755, the army was either encamped or in motion about the diſtrict of Arcot; and that the Polygars and governors, in proportion, to the remoteneſs or ſtrength of their little forts, were more or leſs backward in ſettling their accounts, and all dealt evaſively. No hoſtilities were however committed againſt any of them, although it was a conſiderable time before ſome of them came to ſuch terms as the Nabob would accept,
and



and several held out beyond the end of the year; but those being the least able to continue their opposition, were left to be reduced by the forces of the Nabob. 1755.

MOOTIS ALLEE CAWN having been mentioned in the narrative, and his character display'd within a few pages, a particular detail of his conduct shall here be given; as it will fully serve to convey a general idea of the chicanery of all Asiatic governors, as well Moors as Indians, when called upon for the arrears of their tribute.

THIS crafty politician having the mortification to find himself outwitted by Mr. Dupleix, addressed himself to the Nabob, who was then, it is to be observed, at a distance, acknowledging his right, and offering to settle the tribute due from him for the district of Vellore. He attested the sincerity of his intentions with his hand on the Alcoran, calling God and the Prophet to witness to his truth. But when the Nabob, upon his arrival at Arcot, sent to claim the performance of these solemn engagements, it too plainly appeared, that they were meant only to amuse and deceive him: it was therefore thought necessary to strike a terror into him for an example, as, both in riches and power, he was the most considerable of all the chiefs in the province. Accordingly, on the 19th of January 1756, the army was reinforced with the grenadiers; and another company, with two eighteen-pounders, was detached after them. Major Killpatrick advanced within five miles of Vellore the 30th; and found it to be, as it had been reported, the strongest fort in the province.

THE next day the Governor of Madras received a letter from Mr. De Leyrit, disputing the Nabob's right to Vellore, and threatening to oppose all our proceedings; and intelligence came, at the same time, that a party of three hundred French and three hundred Sepoys, were actually marching from Pondichery. These advices were dispatched the same night to Major Killpatrick, with directions to continue negotiations with Mootis Allee Cawn; and, in case the French should actually approach, to send a message to the commanding officer to retire, and if he should pay no regard to the message, but proceed to succour Vellore, or commit any disturbance in the Nabob's districts, then to oppose him by force. Major Killpatrick had advanced within cannon shot of the fort when these dispatches reached him; and, during several days that he remained in his encampment

N


treating




1755. treating with the Governor, different advices came of parties moving from Pondichery and Villanour to Gingee, and from thence, by the Chetteput road, towards Villoure. It was, therefore, to be apprehended, that the Governor might be prevailed on by the French to admit their troops, for the defence of his fort; and these, if once admitted, it was foreseen, would not be withdrawn again from so valuable a possession. The Governor had sent his Vakeel to Madrafs, where he was at this very time, to desire that some English gentleman might be sent to Velloure, with power to settle affairs amiably.

THE reduction of the fort was now, by the interposition of the French, rendered impracticable, and the stay of the army, with any other object but that of an accommodation, a useless expence: it was therefore resolved to accede to the proposal of the Vakeel, and a proper person was accordingly deputed. While this measure was prudently concerting at Madrafs, Mootis Allee Cawn, finding that our army remained close to his walls, notwithstanding all the motions of the French, agreed with Major Killpatrick to pay one hundred thousand pagodas, and twenty-five thousand roupees, for the removal of our troops, desired to enter into friendship with us; and, by way of earnest, sent out twenty thousand roupees.

No sooner was this money paid, than Mootis Allee Cawn (informed by his Vakeel that a deputation was ordered on that very day) withdrew from his engagements; and, persuaded that he might compound for less than he agreed the day before to pay to Major Killpatrick, refused the next day to comply with the terms. Whatever Major Killpatrick could urge, he would only answer, that, as a deputation was sent from Madrafs, he should not do business in any other way; and not only persisted obstinately in his refusal, but flatly denied his agreement made on the 9th of February. The collected army of the French lay, during all this time, encamped between Gingee and Chetteput, at the distance of about thirty-five miles from Velloure; it consisted, according to the best intelligence, of about seven hundred French and fifteen hundred Sepoys. It was therefore thought advisable to wait for an opportunity when the Governor might be in a more complying humour: and the event justified this prudent determination. Major Killpatrick having remained near Velloure with the army till the 24th, and receiving no offers that he could accept, without





The Attack of Severndroog by Commodore James, 2 April 1755.

P. Canot Sculp.



the yards, they fastened to the flag-staves their garments, quilts, and even their turbans extended to catch every breath of air. By this manœuvre they gained their point, and drew the Commodore so far from his station, that he was obliged to give over the chase and return to Severndroog. 1755.

THE fortress, which bore that name, was situated on an island within musket-shot of the main land, with no more than two fathom and a half in the frith. It is strongly, but not regularly fortified; the greatest part of the works being cut out of the solid rock, and the rest built with stones ten or twelve feet square; on the bastions were fifty-four guns. The largest of the forts on the main land is called fort Goa, built in the same manner, with large square stones, and mounting forty guns. The other two mounting above twenty guns each, were constructed in a less artificial manner, with stones of an irregular shape.

On the second of April, the Commodore began to cannonade and bombard the island fort; but finding the walls on the side where he first made his attack, of extraordinary strength, for they were fifty feet high and eighteen thick, he moved his station so as to reach fort Goa with his lower deck guns, while he plyed Severndroog with his upper tier. About noon, the north-east bastion of the latter, and part of the parapet were laid in ruins, when a shell set fire to the houses, which the garrison were prevented from extinguishing by the incessant fire from the round tops. The wind being northerly, communicated the fire all over the fort; one of their magazines blew up, and a general conflagration ensued. A multitude of men, women, and children, running out on the farther side of the island, embarked in boats, but were most of them taken by the Swallow, who was stationed to the southward to prevent any succours from being thrown into the island on that side. The Commodore then turned all his fire on fort Goa; and after a severe cannonade, the enemy hung out a flag of truce; but the Governor, with some chosen Sepoys, crossed over to Severndroog, which was entirely evacuated upon the blowing up of their second and grand magazine. The Governor was now in possession of the island fort, and the Commodore of the other three; from whence he kept a smart fire on Severndroog. The Governor trusting to the natural strength of the place, was resolved to maintain it till he should receive succours from Dabul. As this appeared




EXPEDITION AGAINST ANGRIA.

1755. appeared from all his answers to the summons and messages that were sent him, a number of seamen were landed, under cover of the fire from the ships and the shore, who resolutely ran up to the gates, and being determined to carry their point, with their axes cut open the gate of the sally port, and procured an entrance with very little loss.

On the 8th of April, the Commodore anchored off Bancote (now called fort Victoria) the most northern port of any consequence of all Angria's dominions, which surrendered the next day upon a summons. This place the East-India Company, having the free consent of the Marattas, have since taken into their hands, as it is a good harbour, and there is a great trade for salt and other goods, which are sent to that port from Bombay; and what is still more essential, the country about it abounds with cattle, which are much wanted for the use of the garrison and squadron at Bombay. Of all provisions, beef is the most difficult to be procured from any part of the continent; for, excepting Rajapore, which joins to Bancote, and is possessed by Mahometans (being the port of the Seedee) the coast is all inhabited by Gentoos, who never kill any living creature; and as they worship the cow, are particularly forbid by their religion to suffer the death of any kind of cattle. As all other places were by treaty to be given up to the Marattas, the Commodore caused the English flag, which had been hoisted on all the forts for a few days, to be struck on the 11th, and delivered them to be garrisoned by the Marattas. On the 14th he anchored at Dabul, with an intention to attack that place; but next morning received orders to return to Bombay, as the season was thought to be too far advanced for him to attempt any thing farther.

THE squadron under the command of rear Admiral Watson, arrived at Bombay in November following: While they were cleaning and repairing, Commodore James in the Protector, and the Revenge and Bombay frigates under his command, was sent to reconnoitre Geriah, the capital of Angria's dominions, and to sound the depths of water at the entrance of the harbour; which service he performed, and returned to Bombay the last of December. The Admiral then sent the Bridgewater and King-fisher sloop, and some of the company's armed ships, to cruize off that port, who were joined on the 27th of January, 1756, by Commodore James in the





EXPEDITION AGAINST ANGRIA.

97

the Protector, and Guardian frigate, and remained on this station till the 11th of February, when the Admiral and the whole squadron arrived. 1755.

UPON the appearance of the English fleet, Angria, who had flattered himself that he should never see so large a force upon the coast, was terrified to so great a degree, that he abandoned his fort in hopes of purchasing his peace with the Marattas. They knew how to make their advantage of his present situation and perturbation of mind, and immediately turned their thoughts to the riches of their prisoner; for as such they then considered him; and that they might solely possess the plunder of the place, insisted on his sending an order to his brother, who was left in command, to put them in possession of the fort. The Admiral having information of these clandestine proceedings, sent a summons the next morning to the fort; and receiving no answer, he weighed in the afternoon, and stood in to the harbour in two divisions, the Bridgewater leading that of his Majesty's ships in the following order: Bridgewater, Tyger, Kent, Cumberland and Salisbury, with the Protector of forty guns, belonging to the East India Company. The King's-fisher led those of the Company, consisting of the Revenge, Bombay, Grab, and Guardian frigates; the Drake, Warren, Triumph, and Viper bomb-ketches. As soon as the ships were properly placed, they began such a fire as soon silenced both the batteries and the grabs. About four o'clock a shell was thrown into the Restoration, an armed ship taken by Angria some time ago from the East India Company, which set her on fire; and very soon after his whole fleet shared the same fate. In the night the Admiral landed all the troops, under the command of Colonel Clive, suspecting the enemy would endeavour to let in the Marattas; which supposition was verified by a deserter, who informed Mr. Watson, that Angria had sent orders to his brother, who commanded the garrison, on no account to suffer the English to come in. The next morning the Admiral sent a message to the Commandant, declaring, that if he did not, in an hour's time, deliver up the place, and let the English march in, the attack should be renewed, and he must then expect no quarter. In answer to this, he desired a cessation 'till the next morning; giving for a reason, that it was not in his power to deliver up the place without Angria's permission, he waiting for.

O

THESE



1755.

THESE were apparently trifling pretences to gain time, and to wait for an opportunity of giving the Marattas possession of the place; therefore the Admiral renewed the attack about four in the afternoon, and in less than half an hour the garrison flung out a flag of truce. It was then expected that their colours should be hauled down, and our troops admitted: but as they did not comply with this demand, the Admiral repeated the attack with so terrible a fire, that the garrison cried out for mercy, which our troops were then near enough to hear distinctly; and soon after they took possession of the fort.

THE loss on both sides was very inconsiderable: our people found their safety in their own bravery and spirit, and by driving the enemy from their works with the briskness of their fire. The garrison, having once abandoned the batteries, were safe in the extraordinary height and thickness of their walls; for all their ramparts which were not hewn out of the solid rock, were built of massy stone, at least ten feet in length, laid endways; so that the greatest weight of metal made no impression, and would never have effected a breach. It is evident, therefore, that the garrison was subdued by the very terror of so unusual a fire.


THERE were found in the place upwards of two hundred guns, six brass mortars, and a very large quantity of ammunition of all kinds, and, in money and effects, above one hundred and twenty thousand pounds. The grabs, which were burnt, consisted of eight ketches, and one ship, besides two others which were building (one of which was to carry forty guns) and a considerable number of small vessels called gallivats.

COLONEL CLIVE, with his troops on shore, blockaded the fort; and, at the same time, by his position, prevented the Marattas from getting possession of the place in a clandestine manner; this was proved to be their design, by an offer they made to the Captains Buchanan and Forbes, of fifty thousand roupees, if they would suffer them to pass their guard; but they, rejecting the offer with indignation, disclosed it to Colonel Clive: after which, the Marattas found it as impossible to elude the vigilance of the commander, as to corrupt the integrity of his officers.

Soon



Plate XI.



A View of the Attack made on the Fort of Geriah by Admiral Watson, 13 February 1756.

P. Canot sculp.



Soon after the suspension of arms was agreed on and published, Mr. Saunders made a complaint to Mr. Godeheu, desiring redress, on advice that Nanderauze, the Maissore General, had taken Tinnevely, was attacking Madura, and had stopped a quantity of our cloth. Mr. Godeheu immediately wrote to Nanderauze, requiring him forthwith to cease from all hostilities, and warning him, withal, that, unless he readily consented to restore every thing that he had taken, he must expect to be compelled to it by every power that had any sense of justice; and that none of his allies could think it consistent with their honour to support him in disturbing the present tranquility. 1755

At the same time the King of Tanjore, insisting on the restitution of some countries which the Polygar of Marava had taken from him at the beginning of the war, was on the point of proceeding to hostilities; but, by our intervention, the Polygar delivered up the countries, and satisfied the King.

He then demanded of Tondeman two small districts, which he thought were unjustly dislevered from his kingdom; for his minister Monagee, in consideration of his having been assisted in a favourite enterprize by this Polygar, had formally made them over to him in the name of the King his master, without his consent or knowledge. Captain Caillaud was sent to learn the truth of this matter; and also, if possible, to reconcile the difference. He had first an interview with Monagee, who confessed to him, that he had privately made use of the seal and authority of the King, and had, for a long time, contrived to conceal this affair from him; but, upon being disgraced some years since, he had taken refuge with Tondeman, and then it was discovered: that, since he had been restored to favour, his master had been perpetually urging him to endeavour to regain these countries; and therefore, while the King's jealousy of Tondeman subsisted, tho he knew the distress of the country in maintaining the troops he now kept on foot, it was unsafe for him to dismiss them. He then entreated, with tears in his eyes, that the English would not forsake him, declaring, that his ruin was inevitable, unless they would find some way, for the present at least, to quiet the King's impatience.

This mediation, dextrously managed by Captain Caillaud, who soon after had an interview with the King, served to prevent hosti-



1756. lities for a time; but all endeavours for an accommodation would have proved ineffectual, had not the want of money to equip the army for the field had the desired effect of maintaining peace.

THE Danes, some time ago, asked from the King of Tanjore an enlargement of their bounds, as part of their fort was washed down with the sea. Being refused their request, they marched with two hundred Europeans, five pieces of cannon, and some Peons, and attacked two pagodas belonging to the King of Tanjore, about three miles from Tranquebar. They took one, and attempted the other without success; for a detachment of horse and Sepoys having arrived there from Tanjore, had attacked the Danes, killed them about forty men, and wounded an hundred more; the rest escaped to the other pagoda, which they were fortifying. These differences were also referred to, and accommodated by, the Governor and Council of Madrafs.

THE tranquility on one side of the country, was no security to our extensive concerns and interests in other parts. A letter from Mr. De Leyrit, successor to Mr. Godeheu, gave great concern to all who had at heart the true commercial interests of the settlements, and the duration of the late treaty: but if the letters of Mr. De Leyrit were alarming, how much more was to be apprehended from the conduct of M. De Buffy, who was every day enlarging the valuable and extensive possessions which the French held in the north. It was now apparent, that the use they had been endeavouring to make of their influence over the Viceroy, ever since the truce, was to acquire to themselves the dominion of all the provinces of the Deckan. They began to manifest these intentions, by making such exorbitant demands of possessions from Salabatzing as might well alarm him. One among others, was, that they should be put in possession of the fort of Golconda.

IN order to shew by what means this important fortress was saved from falling into the hands of the French, who seldom give up a point of this nature which they have once attempted, it will be necessary to give a short account of one of those rebellions which are so frequent in this country, that they are seldom taken notice of but for their consequences.



THE COAST OF COROMANDEI

101

IT was about this time that Morarow, the Maratta freebooter, attempted to make himself independent, and to strengthen himself in the fort of Savanore, by the concurrence of the Nabob of that district. Ballazerow, the chief of the Marattas, prepared to reduce him, as a rebel to that state, and applied to the Governor of Madras for some English gunners. Before he could receive an answer to his letter, Salabatzing, considering also the Nabob of Savanore as a rebel, made it a common cause; and, joining Ballazerow, they soon obliged Morarow to come out of the fort and make his submissions; not forgetting, at the same time, to call the Nabob of Savanore to account, for the protection he had given him in his fort.

1756

THE French accompanied the Viceroy in this expedition, and their assuming behaviour did not escape the discerning eyes of Ballazerow; who looking upon the French as a disgrace to the Viceroy, and a great obstruction to all his own views, remonstrated to Salabatzing the danger and shame which the influence of a handful of Europeans, thus arrogantly giving law to a great Prince, must bring on his character and government.

THE good council of Ballazerow, as it came very opportunely for the preservation of the fort of Golconda, was not thrown away. Salabatzing represented the unreasonableness of such a demand: he told M. De Buffy, that the countries which had been already given him were more than sufficient for the pay and expences of his troops, and desired to entertain them no longer upon such extravagant terms. M. De Buffy replied in a haughty stile to this expostulation, and only grew more pressing in his demands, till Salabatzing was obliged to order him immediately to return to Pondichery. M. De Buffy was now under a necessity of withdrawing his forces; and he began his march, as he pretended, for Maßulipatam, by the way of Hydrabad, the capital of Golconda.

UPON the departure of M. De Buffy, Salabatzing wrote to the Governor of Madras, requesting some troops, to prevent the French from insulting him in his government. In the mean time, the French having committed some disorders in the countries they were passing thro', the Viceroy detached a party of Maratta horse to keep near them on the road, and prevent further disturbances. M. De Buffy, however, arrived safe at Hydrabad, and took post with his troops in

a



1756. a large house in the town, where he had mounted some guns, and prepared to defend himself against an attack.

M. DE BUSSY had secured a good stock of provisions of all sorts, by plundering the Bazars: his force consisted of four hundred Europeans, and three or four hundred Sepoys, and the French had embarked from Pondichery four or five hundred men, to be landed at Massulipatam, and to march from thence to succour M. De Buffy. The march from Massulapatam to Hydrabad may be reckoned about fifteen days.

As the French had made so large a draft from Pondichery, there was the less danger to our settlements of any enterprize from thence; therefore it was agreed, that about four hundred Europeans, including the train of artillery, and four hundred Sepoys, might be sent with safety to the assistance of Salabatzing: for altho' M. De Buffy, if he should be joined by all the detachments sent from Pondichery, would have near one thousand men, yet, as he had no black troops, he would be liable to be continually harrassed and starved, while our party, joined by fifty thousand horse, had no such difficulties to apprehend. Salabatzing had himself pointed out the road by which our detachment should march, and sent orders to all the Polygars and other officers residing in the adjacent countries, to furnish sufficient provisions.

EVERY thing being thus settled, the necessary preparations were making for the march of the troops, when the news came of the surrender of Cossimbuzar and the danger of Calcutta. Immediately upon this advice, Major Killpatrick was sent with two hundred and fifty men for Bengal. Fresh applications came from Salabatzing and it was resolved, notwithstanding the detachment to Bengal, to continue the expedition to Golconda, when the account came of the loss of Calcutta and all the subordinate factories. The necessity of re-establishing the settlements in Bengal superceded every other consideration: therefore it was resolved, in this most critical juncture, to send six hundred Europeans, and a thousand Sepoys, under the command of Colonel Clive, for that important service, which was so happily effected.

As the English were thus prevented from supporting the Viceroy in his measures, he was obliged to alter his resolutions, and finding
that



that M. De Bussy was joined by five hundred Europeans under Mr. Law, he soon hearkened to terms of accommodation; and the French were again admitted into the service of Salabatzing. 1757.

IN consequence of this, about the beginning of the next year, the factories of Ingeram, Bandermaalanka, and Vizagapatam, were taken by the enemy. As these events were not unforeseen, immediately upon the re-commencement of hostilities, the greatest part of the Company's effects were shipped off, particularly from the two former places. The latter was by no means provided to resist so large a force as M. De Bussy brought against it: For he passed the Chicacole the 20th of June with six hundred Europeans and six thousand Sepoys, and thirty pieces of cannon. He had also obliged the Raja to furnish him with four thousand pikemen. The garrison consisted of one hundred and forty Europeans, and four hundred and twenty Sepoys and Topasses.

ON the 24th, about three in the afternoon, a large party of horse being the van of the army, approached the town, in order to take a view of some of the out-works; but being fired at from the Black-Rock battery, retired to a great distance. Next morning the whole army was come up within two miles, and a considerable party encamped very near the town. In the afternoon M. De Bussy sent the following summons to the Chief of the factory.

S I R,

French Camp, June 25, 1757.

“ IT is, I believe, needless to tell you what brings me before
“ your place; but I think it necessary to acquaint you of it, by
“ summoning you to surrender it up, and not expose yourself and
“ our garrison by a mistaken bravery, to all the fury which follows
“ an assault or escalade; an evil which I should not be able to
“ put a stop to, having in my army barbarous and undisciplined
“ nations.

“ You will avoid this in surrendering, and may depend upon all
“ the good treatment and generosity, on which my nation piques
“ itself in such a case, and particularly, Sir,

“ Your most humble and most obedient servant,

“ D E B U S S Y.”

A



1756.

A CAPITULATION was accepted, in which it was agreed to deliver up the place, the fortifications, the artillery, marine, and military stores, arms, ship stores, &c. to the Company of France; as also all that should be found in the different magazines belonging to the English Company.

THE Chief, the Council, and all those employed in the English Company's service, the officers and all others, both civil and military, to be prisoners of war on their parole.


ALL the soldiers, sailors, and other Europeans, to be prisoners, as long as the war should continue between the King of France and the King of England, or till they should be exchanged.

THE Capture of this place gave the French the entire possession of the coast from Ganjam to Massulapatam.

WHILE the affairs in the north took this unfavourable turn, the Company received very little benefit from the southern provinces, which were thought to have been peaceably established.

IN March, 1756, advice was received from the Nabob, that the Polygars, who were united against his brother Mauphus Cawn, had obtained several advantages over his troops, and had blocked up a large party in a strong fort, between Madura and Tinnevelly. He requested that an European force might be sent to support his brother. It being thought imprudent at that time to part with any number of Europeans from Fort St. George, or to give the French a pretence for marching to the assistance of those factious Polygars Mahomed Isouf Cawn, the Nellore Subadar (who had a commission as commander over all the Company's Sepoys) was sent with a thousand Sepoys and the Coffree Company from Trichinopoly.

THE day before he began his march, advice was received that Mauphus Cawn had obtained a compleat victory over the rebels, killed the General, and two thousand Colleries, and taken three hundred horse, with all the baggage, guns, and some elephants: the battle was fought within seven miles of Tinnevelly. This victory was so far from producing the quiet which might naturally be expected from it, that it served only to enable Mauphus Cawn to put in execution



PLAN OF MADURA.

References.

- 1. Pagoda.
- 2. Mosque.
- 3. Choultry.
- 4. Tank.
- 5. Palace.
- 6. Town.

South



tion the design he had all along entertained, of making himself independent of his brother and his allies. He accordingly began to stir in the Tinnevelly province; having already, under false and frivolous pretences, obliged our Sepoys to leave the fortrefs of Madura. He could then no longer conceal his intentions, and therefore, without pretending to disguise them, he put himself at the head of his troops, resolving to oblige Isouf Cawn entirely to quit the country, as he had already driven him out of Madura.

1757.

IN the beginning of the year 1757, Captain Caillaud, who then commanded in Trichinopoly, was ordered to march from thence to the assistance of Isouf Cawn, with one hundred and twenty Europeans, five hundred Sepoys, and two pieces of cannon. As Madura was now in the possession of the enemy, he was obliged to take a large circuit to get into the Tinnevelly province by another road. Mauphus Cawn did all in his power to oppose his march, but to no purpose; for, on the 17th of March, Captain Caillaud reached Tinnevelly, and joined Isouf Cawn. His army then consisted of a few more Europeans and Sepoys, three additional pieces of artillery, and about five or six hundred cavalry. With this force he marched in quest of Mauphus Cawn, whose troops consisting of cavalry, easily made their escape among the woods. Captain Caillaud, knowing it was in vain to pursue them in that country, employed himself more usefully, in settling accounts with the renter, and remitting some money to the Company after he had provided for the payment of the army.

HAVING finished this necessary preliminary, he marched the beginning of May for Madura, the conquest of which was of the greatest consequence to the affairs of the two provinces, and arrived before it the twelfth of May. It is a large town, fortified in the old way, with two walls, and round towers at proper distances for flanking (as may be seen in the plan) and a ditch.

Mauphus Cawn had a garrison there, and on hearing of the march of our troops, he threw in another reinforcement; so that, in all, they had eight or nine hundred cavalry, and about three thousand black infantry, most of them with fire-arms, fourteen pieces of cannon, with powder and ammunition in plenty. Captain Caillaud had no artillery with him; he therefore sent to Trichinopoly for some

P

battering



1757. battering cannon; and, in the mean time, was making all the necessary preparations for the attack, when he received a letter from the Presidency of Madras, acquainting him that the French were in motion, their intentions not known, but suspected to be against Trichinopoly; that, if this was confirmed to him, he was, before all things, to consult the safety of that place.

He did not, however, think it necessary, upon a mere report, to abandon his enterprize, but resolved to wait; and, in the mean time, made his dispositions for the worst that could happen; but as the call for his forces might be sudden, he took a resolution to make himself master of Madura by surprise: he was the rather encouraged to it, by observing a place which seemed to him, on reconnoitring, very fit for an escalade. The ditch was dry, the first wall very low, and, by intelligence from within, he knew it was thinly guarded; he therefore made all necessary preparations for the attempt.

EVERY thing went on at first with extraordinary success; the advanced party, with their ladders, had got over the first wall unperceived and unheard, and were pulling over the longer ladders, to mount the inner wall. The unavoidable noise of their arms and implements, the grating of the ladders against the walls, together with the breaking of one of them, alarmed the centry, who immediately challenged and fired. The guard which was nearest hoisted some blue lights (a composition they make in that country, of sulphur and antimony, which throws an exceeding clear light all around) by which they saw the assailants close under the wall, preparing for the escalade, and many more on the glacis, ready to support them; the main body was in a hollow way, out of their sight, but within two hundred yards of the wall. The alarm was given in an instant, and they began to fire very smartly from the walls; none of the troops lay far from their posts, so that the fire increased every minute, therefore the retreat was ordered, and performed with a very inconsiderable loss; which was the more extraordinary, as the men were so much exposed.

CAPTAIN CAILLAUD received a letter that very day from the Presidency, to inform him, that they did not imagine the French had designs on Trichinopoly, from the late intelligence received of
thir



their motions; and that they had sent from Fort St. George a small reinforcement to that garrison: he therefore thought he might have time to finish the siege, when the heavy cannon should arrive, and had given directions to the officer who commanded in his absence at Trichinopoly, to spare no money nor pains for good intelligence, that he might be in time apprized of the enemy's designs and motions: but, notwithstanding these precautions, the first intelligence he received was, that the French were in sight of Trichinopoly: however, as his orders obliged him to hold his troops in readiness against all events, his dispositions were made accordingly, and he began his march immediately on receiving the news. He left behind him a good part of his army to blockade the place, taking with him all the Europeans, and one thousand of the best Sepoys, with four days provisions in their knapsacks.

1757.

MADURA is an hundred miles from Trichinopoly, and the French, under the command of M. D'Auteuil, had then invested the place. They had nine hundred men in battalion, three or four thousand Sepoys, about one hundred European cavalry and hussars, and a much greater number of the country horse. It was no small difficulty to get into the town, as the enemy knew of his march, and made, as they thought, a disposition that could not fail of preventing him. Captain Caillaud was aware, that, if any misfortune should befall his party, Trichinopoly must inevitably be lost; but he had an advantage in his knowledge of the country, and also of the proper methods of procuring intelligence. He had by this means a true account of the dispositions of the French.

THEY had formed themselves in four divisions which made a chain quite a-cross the plain, in the front of which their cavalry was advanced, and divided into small parties, to possess the roads and posts all round. One part they had neglected, as thinking it impracticable for troops to march that way: it was a tract of land extending about nine miles to the west of the town, wholly consisting of plantations of rice. As the grain will not grow in this country, unless the soil be overflowed with water, the fields must of consequence be one continued slough, thro' which it is impossible to march without being above the knee in mud at each step. Captain Caillaud finding, as has been said, every other avenue stopped, resolved to take his rout by this difficult, and therefore unsuspected, way. About



1757. two in the afternoon he set out on the direct plain road, and continued to pursue the same course for some miles : this he did to deceive the enemy, and prevent the danger of a discovery, if it should have happened that they had any spies among our people. At the close of the evening he struck out of the road, and about ten o'clock got into the rice fields, and, for the next seven hours, the troops pursued their fatiguing march, till the long wish'd-for day appeared; they were then within cannon shot of the fort, which they soon reached, with no small joy and satisfaction. Captain Caillaud had previously detached two companies of Sepoys to the right, in order to give the enemy an alarm that way, and still keep up their attention on that side. Those two companies executed their orders perfectly well, set the enemy in motion, and then retired to the woods, from whence they easily found their way into the town the following night.

THE French could not at first believe the party was got in, but were soon convinced of it, and that very night repass'd the river, and went on the island of Seringham. M. D'Auteuil was greatly blamed for his bad manœuvre, and ordered to return to Pondichery : upon his arrival there the command of the army was taken from him.

THE manner in which the French came so unexpectedly upon Trichinopoly is too artful to be pass'd over unnoticed.

THE declaration of war in Europe had to this time produced very little alteration in the affairs of the Coast; for, after parting with so considerable a portion of our strength for the Bengal expedition, which reduced us to an equality with Pondichery, we could not hope to obtain, by a commencement of hostilities, any advantage equivalent to the expence of taking the field; and therefore our endeavours had been to preserve the tranquility of the province, to the end that the collection of the revenues, in which the Company had now so great a concern, might not be interrupted, and the French receiving no supplies from Europe to render them greatly superior to us, had remained also quiet; reasoning, no doubt, upon the same principles. At last, upon the arrival of two ships, which landed at most two hundred men, they grew impatient of repose, and tho' not daring to avow their designs, they found it no difficult matter to form a pretext for taking the field: for while the two companies, for fear of giving each other alarm, forbore to quell the irregularities of the party



petty Governors by force of arms, those turbulent chiefs, who knew 1757.
no other law than the sword, had made continual invasions on the
countries adjacent to their little forts, and grievously oppressed the
inhabitants with their depredations and exactions.

THEY had practised these outrages, with impunity, for the reasons abovementioned, and might still have continued the same, but that the French, to conceal their intended surprize of Trichinopoly, chose to give out that M. D'Auteuil, who marched first with only two hundred men, had no other purpose than to demand satisfaction of Meer Saib, the Governor of Ellavanasore, for ravages he had committed on some of their neighbouring villages. The more effectually to disguise their real designs, they actually advanced near the fort of Ellavanasore, and being repulsed by Meer Saib, might have paid dear for their attempt, had not that resolute Chief received a wound, of which he died a few days after. The consternation his death occasioned, being encreased by a reinforcement which M. D'Auteuil received from Pondichery, determined Meer Saib's brother to abandon the fort, and the French took possession of it the 13th of April. For the same purpose, also, they pretended disputes with Worriarpollam, and other places lying on that road.

M. DAUTEUIL, leaving a small garrison at Ellavanasore, moved with the body of the army, first, to Verdachilum, where being joined by a reinforcement from Pondichery, Karical, and all their other garrisons, he marched the 4th of May and encamped near Worriarpollam, and on the 7th made an attack upon one of the passes of the woods, but was repulsed. He then accommodated matters with the Polygars, who were masters of those passes, on the promise of a sum of money; and moved on with such expedition, that an advanced party encamped near Seringham the 12th; and on the 13th M. D'Auteuil crossed the river with the whole army, and took post at Worriour, a pagoda two miles and a half west of Trichinopoly.

THE designs of the French, which had been suggested by private intelligence, were now too apparent; therefore, on the 11th of April, a reinforcement of fifty men was ordered from Fort St. David, to march with all speed to Trichinopoly.



1757.

THE great consequence of that place, from the strength of the fortification, the large tract of country it commands, as it may be called the key to Madura and Tinnevelly, and, above all, the number of four hundred French prisoners which were there confined, determined the Presidency of Madras, upon the first news of the march of the enemy from Worriarpollam, to make all the efforts in their power for its safety. They could take their measures with the less risk, since the French had drained all their garrisons so far, that Pondichery itself was left with very few Europeans fit for duty: therefore, having already sent a detachment from Fort St. David to Trichinopoly, in order to cause a diversion they prepared three hundred Europeans to march from Madras, with five hundred Sepoys, to be joined by a party under Colonel Forde. The Colonel had been sent, at the request of the Nabob, against his * brother, Nazeabulla Cawn, Governor of Nelloure; who having refused to be accountable for his arrears, had entered into a correspondence with the French Chief at Massulipatam, and procured from him an assistance of seventy or eighty military, and some Sepoys. Abdul Vahab Cawn, who was left there with the Nabob's troops, not being able to collect money to pay them, was obliged to come away, so that Nazeabulla Cawn had the entire possession of the country. He had not admitted the French party into the fort, but kept them with his army, which he then employed in subduing the neighbouring Polygars. It was to be feared they would find an opportunity of taking possession of the fort, unless we took some steps to prevent them; for Nazeabulla Cawn, in return for the assistance received from the French, had already made over to them some share of his country, and particularly the ports of Ramahatam and Kistnapatam; places with which the Madras merchants have a considerable commerce.

COLONEL FORDE was ordered to Nelloure with a detachment of one hundred Europeans, fifty Coffrees, and three hundred Sepoys; with two field-pieces, one eighteen-pounder, and three royals. The Sepoys were sent over-land to Kistnapatam, and Colonel Forde proceeded by sea, with the rest of the detachment, for the same place, where he disembarked the troops, and was joined by the Sepoys, and Abdul Vahab Cawn; who, after the usual delays of those people, supplied him at last, with bullocks and other necessaries for his march.

He was a natural son of the Nabob's father.

THE



THE COAST OF COROMANDEI

III

THE fort of Nellour, which is twelve miles from Kistnapatam, is about twice as large as Madrafs. It has five gates, two large and three small ones, and is surrounded by a mud wall, which is very broad at the bottom, and about three feet thick on the top of the rampart. It is almost surrounded by a dry ditch, except on the north side, where is a river, which in the rainy season only, has water in it.

1757.

COLONEL FORDE having battered the fort three days, at length made a practicable breach on the 5th of May, and began the assault at break of day, in the following order: The Coffrees, Ensign Elliott at their head, marched with great resolution to the foot of the breach, three companies of Sepoys followed them very close till they came within sixty paces of the breach, and then lay down in a ditch, and could not be got to advance a step farther, so that the Europeans were obliged to march over them to the breach; where joining the Coffrees, they advanced to the top of it; but were so warmly received by the people in the fort, with pikes, firelocks, and stones, that it was impossible for them to get over. In this situation the fight was continued three quarters of an hour, and then the Sepoys ran away as fast as they could towards our battery. The Colonel, now convinced that nothing could be done with his force, deserted by the Sepoys, against so gallant a defence, ordered a retreat, which was conducted with such good order, that not a man was hurt after they had left the attack; but, while they continued in the breach, the action was uncommonly brisk. Our people behaved with great resolution, and had forty killed and wounded, with about fifty Coffrees and Sepoys: all their men were wounded in such a manner as to be rendered unfit for present action; but there were scarce any of the assailants who came off without bruises and contusions, from stones, pikes, or clubs; for, with such weapons, numbers of the people in the place opposed and greatly incommoded them.

COLONEL FORDE, having no dependance on any but his own people, and those being greatly reduced, and also great part of the ammunition expended, he stopped all farther proceedings till he heard from the Presidency of Madrafs, whom he immediately acquainted with the foregoing particulars. At the time these advices arrived at Madrafs, the French were encamped nearer to that place than our troops would be when before Nellour; therefore it was judged more prudent



1757. prudent to give up that undertaking, than to hazard a detachment to the northward; whereas, by marching to the southward, they could at once prevent the designs of the enemy on Trichinopoly, and serve as a barrier between them and Fort St. George; therefore they sent out three hundred Europeans to the southward, and dispatched orders to Colonel Forde to join them with all his force.

WHILE the necessary preparations were making for the march of the forces from Madraís, Captain Polier was ordered from Chengalaput and Carangoly, to endeavour to reduce Outremalour, a fort possessed by the French, situate about fifteen miles from Chengalaput, and eight from Carangoly. On the approach of the party from Carangoly, the French garrison, which consisted only of Sepoys, abandoned the fort before Captain Polier's arrival: he left about forty Sepoys in charge of it, and then returned towards Chengalaput, near to which he encamped, in readiness to join the army from Fort St. George. By this time the French garrison of Allumparva, being reinforced by sea from Pondichery, so as to make up about one hundred Europeans and Topasses, and three hundred Sepoys, marched from thence, and retook Outremalour.

COLONEL ADLERCRON resolving to command in person the intended expedition for the relief of Trichinopoly, marched from Fort St. George the 26th; and, lest the French redoubts of Waldour and Villenour should cause any delay in his passing by the direct road to Fort St. David, he took the rout of Chengalaput and Wandewash; and as he judged it necessary to halt at some place for Colonel Forde to come up with his party, it was recommended to him to employ that spare time in a second reduction of Outremalour, and in demolishing that fort. It was hoped that they might then be able to garrison Chengalaput and Carangoly, in such manner as to cover all those districts; which, thus protected, would bring a considerable revenue to the Company. On the approach of Colonel Adlercron, the garrison evacuated the place, and threw themselves into Wandewash.

WHILE the Colonel was detained at Outremalour, in destroying the fortifications of that place, he received letters from the Presidency, to acquaint him, that, since Capt. Caillaud had succeeded in throwing succours into Trichinopoly, they were no longer in pain for that, and therefore requested him immediately to invest the fortress
Wandewash



Wandewash, and to push the attack with the utmost vigour, that he might get possession of it before the French army could come to its relief. They were urgent for this undertaking, on account of the Governor's behaviour, who had paid the Nabob no tribute since the year 1752; and also, during that time, had been a constant favourer of the French, who, under cover of that fort, had been enabled to make the most sudden incursions into all the districts of the Arcot province. The reduction of this fortress would not only have prevented this inconvenience for the future, but the place itself would have been of the utmost consequence to the Nabob and his allies, as being productive of large revenues, and also capable of serving as a barrier for the neighbouring countries.

1757.

COLONEL ADLERCRON marched with the army on the 5th of June to Wandewash, and the next day entered the town; but, before the heavy cannon could come up, the greatest part of the French army from Trichinopoly reached Pondichery, and marched out again to the relief of Wandewash: whereupon Colonel Adlercron, judging it impracticable to execute the plan which had been concerted at Madrafs, resolved to wait for directions from thence; and, in the mean time, withdrew from the town, and encamped a few miles off. The Presidency, being sensible that the collected force of the French would exceed our numbers, could not reasonably hope to obtain any considerable advantage by keeping the field, and were therefore desirous of putting an end to the expence; accordingly, they wrote to Colonel Adlercron to return with the army to Madrafs. They imagined that the French would also consider, that our force was sufficient to obstruct any attempt on their side, and would therefore recall their troops to Pondichery.

BEFORE Colonel Adlercron began his march for Madrafs the enemy's army had reached Wandewash; and, a very few hours after he left Outremalour, a party of French took possession of it. Notwithstanding the enemy moved so close after him, Colonel Adlercron neither advised the Presidency of their proceedings, nor waited to stop their progress, but continued his march towards Madrafs: the consequence of which was, that, on the very day he left Chengalaput, they made a forced march from Outremalour to Conjeveram, plundered the town, and attacked the fort, or walled pago a; which was, however, so well defended by a Serjeant and two companies of
 O Sepoys,



Sepoys, that they were repulsed, with the loss of an officer and six Europeans killed, and about ten wounded. When this news reached Madraſs the army was arrived within fix miles of that place. The Governor and Council thought it highly neceſſary they ſhould immediately march again, to protect their poſſeſſions from further deſtroyations.

COLONEL LAWRENCE, who on every occaſion ſhewed the moſt earneſt diſpoſition to contribute in any ſhape to the advancement of all military operations, offered to join the army as a volunteer; and, when it was imagined Trichinopoly would have been the ſcene of action, his intention was to proceed with the troops from Fort St. David for the defence of that place. Afterwards, when the French army returned from Trichinopoly and were collected at Wandewaſh, he offered to embark with all the men that could be ſpared from Fort St. David, and to land at Sadraſs, in order to join the army in the moſt expeditious manner. Being ſenſible how much his abilities and experience would contribute to the regulation and good conduct of the army, and judging Fort St. David to be free from all danger, as the whole French force was on the other ſide, the Preſidency approved of this propoſal, and Colonel Lawrence accordingly landed near Sadraſs, with about one hundred men, the 22d of June, three days after the march of the army; which he joined on the other ſide of Chen-galaput

THE army then advanced towards the enemy, and took poſt the 10th of July within four miles of them. The French were ſtrongly intrenched about a mile from Wandewaſh. As their troops were manifeſtly diſcontented, which appeared by their frequent deſertion, and our men were all in good ſpirits and eager for an engagement, all poſſible endeavours were uſed to induce the enemy to come out of their entrenchments. On the 17th ſome of the Nabob's horſe, ſupported by a ſmall party of Europeans, were ſent within cannon ſhot of their camp, in hopes that a detachment would be ſent out againſt them, and a general action brought on by that means, but all was in vain; and, as their entrenchments were defended by ſeveral batteries, and they had a great ſuperiority alſo in the number of their troops, it was judged that they could not be attacked in ſuch a poſt without too great hazard. The continuance of the army in their encampment in this ſtate of inaction, was only a uſeleſs expence; therefore, to reduce it



it as far as prudence would admit, Colonel Adlercron was desired to send part of the army to Chengalaput and Carangoly, and the remainder to Conjeveram. This place, being situated in the center of our possessions, was a convenient station for the troops to move from, which ever way the enterprizes of the enemy might make it necessary.

1757.

THE enemy remained about Wandewash till the 20th of September, when they moved against Chetteput with a body of eighteen hundred Europeans. Nizar Mahomed Cawn, assisted with a Serjeant and sixteen men from Fort St. George, defended the place to the last extremity, and even after the enemy had got possession of the fort he fought them in the streets till he was killed with a musket ball; his family then destroyed themselves, and a vast slaughter was made among his troops. This obstinate defence cost the besiegers also a great number of men.

THE French withdrawing from the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, left Captain Caillaud at liberty to proceed for the reduction of Madura; but, as the enemy found employment for all the troops that could be spared from Madras, it was impossible to reinforce him with such a strength as should secure him success. Without waiting for farther supplies, he took with him such a force as he thought might be spared from Trichinopoly without weakening the garrison too much, and marched the 27th of June, with ninety military, four hundred Sepoys, and two twenty-four pounders; with these he joined Lieutenant Rumbold, who had maintained his post before Madura with the Coiffrees and Sepoys left under his command. It took up some days to make the necessary preparations for erecting a battery, which was opened on the 9th, and a breach made before noon. Captain Caillaud thought it advisable to assault the breach without delay, lest the besieged should throw up some works within during the night.

THE disposition being made, he began the attack at two in the afternoon; but the breach was so vigorously defended, that the best of his troops were either killed or disabled in the attempt; the rest fell back, and it was impossible to prevent a general retreat, or to persuade the remains of the army to a second attack: neither was it advisable, at a time when the besieged were elated with having killed



1757. and wounded, upon this occasion, between thirty and forty Europeans and Coffrees, and a hundred Sepoys.

CAPTAIN CAILLAUD resolving to wait for an opportunity to renew his attempt, in the mean time, made the proper dispositions for reducing the place by famine; but as this method might take up so much time as to prolong his stay till the arrival of the French fleet, he eagerly caught at the first opening for a treaty, and though the proposals of Mauphus Cawn's people were most exorbitant, he did not rashly reject them, but by degrees abating the terms, reduced them at length to a hundred and seventy thousand roupes. He then concluded the bargain, and Madura was delivered up to him just at the time that the French fleet arrived. This event making it necessary to provide for the defence of all the garrisons; orders were sent to withdraw the troops from the Tinnevely country, and Captain Caillaud returned to Trichinopoly; leaving a large garrison of Sepoys at Madura, under the command of Isouf Cawn.

MAUPHUS CAWN being now master of all the revenue of Tinnevely, the districts of Madura alone were not sufficient to defray the expence of maintaining the fort.

THE COAST was at this time in danger of being disturbed by other powers as well as the French.

THE Marattas, who are continually traversing these immense countries with their vast bodies of horse, in a most incredible manner, having, within the last two years, conquered large districts in many distant parts of the Deckan, had also entered the kingdom of Maissere, and at each time carried away upwards of thirty lack of roupes. The Nanna Balazerow, in his return, possessed himself of the fort and country of Serah, the next province to Cadapah. He left Balaventerow, his General, with about eight thousand horse, at Cadanattam, a place about eighty miles from Arcot. His orders were to demand the Chout of the Arcot and Trichinopoly countries, which had been unpaid for some years past. For this purpose he sent a Vakeel to the Nabob, and another to Pondichery. Balazerow made a demand of forty lack of roupes; but, upon the representation of the Nabob, who described to the Vakeel the state of his country for some years past, and assured him that not only the whole revenues of the



M A R A T T A S

the districts in his possession, but every roupée he could borrow besides, had been spent in opposing the designs of the French, who would otherwise have subdued the whole Carnatick, the Vakeel reduced the demand to three lack; and, upon the Nabob's further instances, to two lack and a half, one half to be paid immediately, the other in one month. The Nabob thought this a more reasonable accommodation than could have been expected; but not being able to raise that sum himself, recommended to the Presidency to consent to these terms, and advance the money. The low state of their treasury put it out of their power to comply with this request; nor could they, at any time, with prudence, pay such a sum upon a mere demand, without making some agreement, or terms of alliance, for the good of their affairs. In hopes to gain time, as ships from Europe were every day expected, they wrote to the Maratta Vakeel at Arcot, desiring him to come and settle the affair in dispute at Madras; and, at the same time, recommended to the Nabob to accompany him.

ALTHOUGH the Vakeel had told the Nabob that the French had offered four lack of roupées to the Maratta General, to engage him in their alliance, and hinted, that the consequence of our not complying immediately with the terms offered, would be the ruin of the countries in our possession, yet it was not apprehended that the Nanna had empowered this officer to proceed to such extremities: neither could it be supposed that the French were able to make good so large an offer as four lack, having reduced their own finances to as low an ebb as those of their neighbours; but it is natural to the Moors, in all their transactions, to mix a proportion of falsehood, and, if they fancy they can carry their point by it, they pride themselves in the conceit of their art and cunning.

THE Nabob arrived at Madras the 8th of August 1757, with Amoortarow, the Maratta Vakeel, and some days were employed in representing to Amoortarow the vast expence which the Nabob and the Company had been at to preserve the country from the entire dominion of the French; but the endeavours of the Presidency, by that argument, to avoid the payment he demanded, were fruitless, and all their remonstrances of very little weight, the Nabob having absolutely engaged with Amoortarow, before he left Arcot, to pay the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand roupées. Whenever it was proposed to Amoortarow to abate in his demand, his answer was,



1757. was, constantly, that he had the Nabob's promise, and should get the money from him. The Maratta seemed determined, in case it was not paid, to lay waste the countries in the possession of the Nabob and the Company, which was certainly in the power of an army of eight thousand horse. Such a force was then within eighty miles of Arcot, and might have seized a sum far exceeding their demand, as it was the time of the * Tripety feast, during which solemnity the greatest part of the revenues are usually collected at the pagoda. The Presidency therefore agreed, upon these considerations, to enable the Nabob to pay the sum in question, by allowing it to be deducted out of the second half of his assignment of eight lack to the Company.

NOTWITHSTANDING the power of the Marattas was so well known, and had been of late so universally felt, such is the restless spirit of all the Indian as well as Moorish Chiefs, that Morarow, who had, not long since, brought himself and the Nabob of Savanore to the necessity of imploring pardon from the Nanna, was now proposing a league, between himself, the Nabobs of Cadapah and Canoul, and the King of Maissore, with intent to retake Serah from the Nanna, and prevent his getting any footing in the Carnatick. Could this treaty have been accomplished with any prospect of success, it must be granted, that it might have been a glorious barrier against the inroads of that destructive power. The proposal was specious, and would have had the approbation, and, possibly, the concurrence of the English, could it have been considered as a system of cool and lasting policy; but it was rather to be suspected of having its foundation in ambition or revenge, and as it proved, was only a means of provoking the Marattas to make those countries the seat of war, and of throwing them the sooner into their hands. Upon the first advice of this intended confederacy, Balaventarow marched against the Nabob of Cadapah, and killing him in a battle, took the greatest part of the country into his own hands; but Abdul Mahomed Cawn, with some of the relations and troops of the late Nabob, throwing themselves

* Tripety is a pagoda situated upon a hill about one hundred and fifty miles N. N. W. of Madras. It is held in the same veneration by the Gentoes, as Mecca is by the Mahometans. An annual feast is held at Tripety, in the month of September, at which time a great number of devotees resort to the pagoda; and from the presents made by such a multitude of votaries, the revenue accrues to the Nabob. None but Gentoes, of different tribes, are permitted to ascend the sacred hill on which the pagoda stands.

into



M A R A T T A S.

into Sydoat fort, maintained themselves for a time ; but were at last obliged to accommodate with the besiegers for a sum of money, and the delivery of half the country to the Marattas.

DURING the time these transactions were on foot, Amoortarow the Vakeel, with a part of the Maratta troops, went against Trepilour, which is also in the dependency of Cadapan; but he was less successful than his master, for having attempted an assault, he met with so vigorous a repulse that great part of his forces were cut off, and himself mortally wounded and carried prisoner to the fort, where he died a few days after. The Marattas, during their stay in those parts, collected several sums of money from the different Polygars to the northward; and then went off towards Poona, to join Balazerow.

FROM these, and many more instances, it has been shewn how great a check the Marattas have been upon the Moorish Government, and that it is owing to their arms alone that the Mahometans have been prevented from the usurpation of the whole peninsula.

As the Moors are a luxurious people, in a few years of peace they grow enervated by their debaucheries, and soon degenerate into sloth and effeminacy. It may also be added, that a general corruption of manners, and treachery to one another, would greatly conduce to render them an easy prey to the Marattas, whenever they should take the resolution to expel them the country. And though there is not a Governor, in the highest rank of power and independency, but what stiles himself, a thousand times in the ordinary transactions of the day, THE SLAVE OF THE MOGUL, there is not one of them in the whole empire that pays the least regard to the most solemn orders of that monarch, or that will march his troops to quell any dangerous commotion, or stir for the preservation of the life or throne of his master.

THE only balance to the power of the Marattas is a race of northern people, inhabiting the mountains of Candahar, commonly known in India by the name of Pattans, though they are more generally called Agwans on the other side of the country; and under that name conquered Ispahan in the year 1722. They are Mahometans, yet no less enemies to the Moorish government than the Marattas, or other Indians. They are said to have been descended from an ancient colony



1757. colony of Arabians, who entered the country four hundred years before Tamerlane, and built the city of Maſſulipatam; from thence extending their conquests northward, they founded Patna in Bengal, and at laſt over-ran the whole country to the weſt, and were maſters of Delli when Tamerlane firſt appeared in India. As they were always reckoned good ſoldiers, they are now conſidered as the very beſt infantry in the whole empire; and it is natural to ſuppoſe they ſhould be ſuch, ſince they have been inhabitants of the northern mountains.

THIS warlike nation made themſelves formidable to Nadir Shaw, in his march; and after that conqueror had left the Mogul empire in the weak and indefenſible ſtate to which he had reduced it, the Pattans invaded it, on a ſuppoſition that it was then in too low a condition to be able to reſiſt the force which he at that time thought was ſufficient to bring againſt it.

As ſoon as the Emperor was apprized of their march, he aſſembled his council, and, ſitting on his throne, ſurrounded by his Generals and twenty-two principal Omrahs, held in his hand a betel, which, according to the cuſtom of the country, he offered to that chief who ſhould immediately engage to take the command of the army and repulſe the enemies of his country. So univerſal was the effeminacy or treachery of the courtiers, that not one of them advanced to take the betel as a pledge of their fidelity; which the young Prince, being then about eighteen, obſerving with extreme concern, preſented himſelf to his father, with earneſt entreaties that he might be permitted to receive it.

HIS father reſuſed it him, repreſenting to him, that it was not proper for the heir of the empire to expoſe himſelf in ſo perilous an enterprize, while there were ſo many experienced Generals more fit for that ſervice. On the other hand, the Omrahs all maintained, that, as his ſon had offered to take the betel, he alone ſhould put himſelf at the head of the troops; and joining with the Prince in ſollicitations, prevailed at length upon the Emperor, who immediately gave his orders for the raiſing of three hundred thouſand men.

THE Omrahs, withdrawing from court, entered into a conſpiracy, and gaining the Chiefs of the ſeveral corps which compoſed the
army.



army, so hastily assembled, concerted with them to betray the Prince.

1757.

THE young hero, being informed of the plot that was laid against his life, a little before he gave battle to the Pattans, had the address privately to secure the persons of those treacherous commanders; he then attacked the enemy, and, gaining a compleat victory, obliged them to quit the country by a precipitate flight. While the Prince was thus gloriously delivering his country from the Pattans, the conspirators in the capital caused it to be reported, that he was fallen in battle, and, entering the palace, seized on the Emperor, and strangled him, giving out that he had poisoned himself in a fit of despair, occasioned by the loss of the battle and the death of his son. This horrible assassination could not be concealed from the Prince, who was now returning in triumph to Delli. He was sensible of the danger that threatened his own life from so formidable a conspiracy, and, to avoid it, adopted the stratagem which his great grandfather Aurenzeh practised on another occasion. He appeared inconsolable for the loss of his father, pretending to believe that he died a natural death: he tore off his garments, and took the habit of a Fakeer, declaring publicly, that he renounced the world, and that he would never more have concern in the government.

A COURT of justice for a state criminal is a thing unheard of in these lawless governments; and there is no way of punishing a traitor, but by turning against him his own arts of treachery and deceit.

THE Prince acted his part so well, that he deceived the conspirators, who went out to meet him, with assurances of their readiness to acknowledge him for their master and King. He received them with a declaration of his intentions to give up the crown, and even to retire from the world. He told them, that, as it was necessary to vast an empire should not be destitute of a head, he must entreat their assistance to direct him in the choice of an emperor, desiring that they would assemble in his palace that evening, to deliberate on this important affair. The Omrahs retired, flattering themselves that they should now have an opportunity of setting up a creature of their own; while Amet Shaw, for that was the name of the young Emperor, entered the royal palace, and prepared a number of traity persons,

R

whom



1757.

whom he placed on each side of the doors of the several avenues which led to his inner court.

THE entrance to the apartments of Eastern Princes is so disposed, with a view to prevent the sudden irruption of assassins, that there is no approaching the presence chamber but through long oblique passages, wherein, at intervals, there are recesses for the posting of guards. This contrivance at once secures the monarch from the attempts of the most determined villains; and, at the same time, affords him an opportunity for executing his purposes on those who have incurred his displeasure.

EVERY thing being disposed for the reception of the Omrahs, they were each introduced, as they arrived, to these fatal avenues; and, as they stooped to pass the curtains, which are generally kept lowered, they were seized by the guards, and immediately received the just reward of their crimes.

THUS the Emperor Amet Shaw established himself, for a while, in the quiet possession of the throne, by triumphing at once over his foreign and domestick enemies. But it was not long before the peace of Delli was more fatally disturbed; for the Pattan Chief retiring to Lahore, in a little time assembled a much more formidable army, and entering Delli, gave up the town to be plundered three days by his soldiers. In the mean time, he took to himself all that was to be found in the royal treasury, and required of the collectors of the public revenues, that they should be accountable to him for all they had received. He then marched home, being supposed to have taken away more riches, except jewels, than Nadir Shaw carried out of the country. He made no revolution, and, it is said, no alteration in the government of Indostan, and yet he assumed a kind of sovereignty over it; but when he returned to Lahore, he drew a line from north to south, assuming to himself a vast extent of country to the west of that line, which was before, at least nominally, dependent on the empire of Indostan; there he left his son Timar as Governor of his new dominions, and gave no further disturbance to Indostan till the year 1757.

BEFORE



NAVAL OPERATIONS.

123

BEFORE we enter on the most important of all the military operations on the Coromandel coast, it may be useful to take a view of the strength of the respective Companies.

1758.

THE French had nineteen hundred Europeans on the coast, exclusive of those with M. De Buffy, before the arrival of their squadron in September. This fleet brought a reinforcement of one thousand military, which, added to a number of sailors that were landed, nearly completed three thousand five hundred men. The English having no more than one thousand three hundred of the Company's troops, had increased them by enlisting three hundred and thirty-four of Colonel Adlercron's regiment, when that officer, with his corps, was ordered home; and as the China ships brought them only eighty-four soldiers, their whole force amounted to no more than one thousand six hundred and eighteen men.

IN consideration of this vast superiority on the part of the enemy, the Presidency judged it necessary to suspend all operations of the field, and keep the troops collected in the several garrisons. Conformably to this plan, they drew the army from Conjeveram into Madras, ordered back Major Polier, who was marched to the northward, to protect Tripety against the threatened attack of Nazeabulla Cawn from Nellore; and directed Captain Caillaud (who having taken possession of the fort of Madura, was preparing to march for Tinnevely) to return to Trichinopoly with all his Europeans, and as many Sepoys as he should think necessary; leaving Isouf Cawn, with the rest of the Sepoys, to protect Madura and Tinnevely.

WHILE we continued thus waiting the motions of the French, and surprized that they should remain inactive for so many months after the taking of Chetteput, a fleet of eleven sail, commanded by M. D'Ache, appeared off Fort St. David early in the morning of the 28th of April: two of them proceeding to Pondichery, landed M. Lally, while seven anchored in Fort St. David's road, and two farther off to the eastward. The Bridgewater and Triton being surrounded in St. David's road, were obliged to run ashore, in order to save their crews and stores. Next morning a large detachment from Pondichery entered the bounds of Fort St. David, and were to have been joined by the troops from the ships; but the unexpected appearance



1758 of the English squadron to the southward at the same instant, putting them into confusion, prevented the disembarkation.

ADMIRAL POCOCK being joined by Commodore Stevens, who arrived in Madras road on the 24th of March, with the *Elizabeth*, *Yarmouth*, *Weymouth*, and *Newcastle*, on the 28th hoisted his flag on board the *Yarmouth*, and, after having put the squadron in the best condition possible for the sea, sailed on the 17th of April, in order to get to windward of Fort St. David, to intercept the French squadron, which, by intelligence, he had reason to expect.

HIS whole force now consisted of the *Yarmouth*, sixty-four guns, five hundred and forty men, Capt. John Harrison; the *Elizabeth*, sixty-four guns, four hundred ninety-five men, Commodore Steevens, Capt. Kempenfelt, his Captain; the *Cumberland*, sixty-six guns, five hundred and twenty men, Capt. Brereton; the *Weymouth*, sixty guns, four hundred and twenty men, Captain Nicholas Vincent; the *Tyger*, sixty guns, four hundred men, Captain Thomas Latham; the *Newcastle*, fifty guns, three hundred and fifty men, Captain George Legge; and the *Salisbury*, fifty guns and three hundred men, Captain John Somerset; with the *Queenborough* and *Protector* storeships.

THE 28th at noon the Admiral made Negapatam, and the next morning, at half an hour past nine o'clock, in running down to St. David's, saw seven ships in that road getting under sail, and two cruising in the offing, which, by their not answering his signal, he concluded were enemies, and made the signal for a general chase. They then stood off shore to the eastward, under top-sails, with the wind at south; and at noon, being joined by the two ships in the offing, and forming the line of battle a-head, with the starboard tacks on board, the Admiral found it necessary to make the signal to form his line also; and when all his ships came up and got into their station, which was a little before three o'clock in the afternoon, and nearly within random shot of the enemy, who continued under their topsails, he bore down upon the *Zodiaque*, on board of which ship M. D'Achè wore a cornette at the mizen-topmast head, keeping a little a-head of him. The French began to fire upon him as he approached them; notwithstanding which, he forbore to throw out the signal for engaging till he came within half musket shot of the
Zodiaque



Zodiaque. A little after three, perceiving the ships were not all got near enough to the enemy, the Admiral made the signal for a closer engagement; which was immediately complied with by the ships in the van. At half an hour past four, observing the rear of the French line had drawn up pretty close to the Zodiaque, he made the Cumberland, Newcastle, and Weymouth's signals to make sail up, and engage close. A few minutes after M. D'Achè broke the line, and shot up under the lee quarter of his second a-head, and then put before the wind: his second a-stern, who kept on the Yarmouth's quarter most part of the action, then came up along-side, gave his fire, and bore away; the two other ships in the rear came up in like manner, and then bore away. The Admiral observing the enemy's van to bear away also, hauled down the signal for the line, and made the signal for a general chase. At six, the enemy joined two ships about four miles to leeward, and at the same time hauled their wind, and stood to the westward, with the larboard tacks on board.

1758.

THE Yarmouth's masts, yards, sails, and rigging, as well as the Elizabeth, Tyger, and Salisbury, were damaged so as to prevent their keeping up with the other ships that were in the rear during the action, and had suffered but little. From the condition of these ships, and, more especially, as the night approached, the Admiral thought it necessary to haul close upon a wind, and stand to the south-west, in order, if possible, to keep to windward of the enemy, in hopes of being able to engage them next morning, if he could be so fortunate as to prevent their weathering him in the night. He ordered the Queenborough a-head to observe their motions, and continued endeavouring to work up after them till six in the morning of the first of May; when finding he lost ground considerably, for the enemy had received little damage in their rigging, he came to an anchor about three leagues to the northward of Sadrafs, and sent an officer to the Chief of that settlement for intelligence. From thence he was informed, that the Bien-aimé, of seventy-four guns, had received so much damage in the action, that the enemy was obliged to run her on shore a little to the southward of Alamparvey, where the French squadron was then at an anchor. The action was about seven leagues west by north of that place.

ADMIRAL Pocock, in his letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty observed, that Commodore Steevens and Capt. Kempenfelt,
Capt.



1758. Capt. Latham, and Capt. Somerset, who were in the van, and also his own Captain, Capt. Harrison, and all the officers and men belonging to the Yarmouth, by their endeavours to come to an engagement with the enemy, and their conduct in action, gave him a sensible satisfaction.

It was confessed by several French officers, that they had six hundred men killed in the action, and many wounded. Our loss was only twenty-nine men killed and thirty wounded; which disparity can only be accounted for by the enemy's endeavouring to dismast our ships, while we fired at their hulls: and this will also account for the destruction of the *Bien-aime*, and the escape of all the rest, who got safe to Pondichery the 5th of May. The French had in the engagement eight ships of the line and a frigate. The *Zodiaque* of seventy-four guns, on board of which M. D'Achè, as it has been said, wore a cornette on the mizen-top-mast head: *Le Bien-aime*, also of seventy-four guns, *Le Vengeur*, and *Le St. Louis* of sixty-four, *Le Duc d'Orleans* and *Le Duc de Bourgogne* of sixty, *Le Condè* and *Le Moras* of fifty, and *Le Sylphide* a frigate of thirty-six guns. After the engagement they were joined by the two ships which had been at Pondichery to land M. Lally: they were *Le Compte de Provence* of seventy-four guns, and *Le Diligent* of twenty-four.

ADMIRAL POCOCK having received one hundred and twenty recovered men from the hospital, and above fourscore Lascars from the Governor of Madras, and having fished his masts, and repaired his most material damages, tried for some days to work up shore, but without success. He then put off the land; and on the 10th of May stretched as far to the southward as the latitude of nine degrees and thirty minutes north, by which he hoped to fetch to windward of Fort St. David; but upon standing in again, he met with such strong westerly winds, and the *Cumberland's* leak increased so as to prevent her keeping the wind, therefore being able to reach no higher than Alamparvey, he anchored off that place the 26th of May. The 30th he got up in sight of Pondichery; and the 1st of June in the morning the French squadron weighed, and stood out of the road, consisting of ten sail. Admiral Pocock being considerably to leeward, expected that they would bear down and engage him; but they kept close to the wind, and plyed away from him, notwithstanding his endeavours to get up with them, which was prevented
in



in a great measure by the Cumberland's bad sailing. The second and third day, the current setting strongly to leeward, our squadron, not having any land nor sea winds, lost ground considerably. The 6th, the Admiral received a letter from the select committee of Fort St. George, acquainting him, that St. David's surrendered the 2d, and that it was probable Fort St. George would soon be invested, which would put it out of his power to supply the fleet with water. The Admiral finding this reasoning to be just, returned and anchored in Madra's road, where he supplied his squadron with water and other necessaries.

1758.

HAVING related the whole progress of the fleet to their return to Madra's, it is now time to shew by what steps the French became masters of Fort St. David.

THE 29th of April the French horse came into the bounds of Fort St. David and presently after them five hundred men of the regiment of Lorrain, and about two hundred of the Company's troops, with a number of Sepoys, artillery-men and eight pieces of cannon. They cut off and dispersed several of our Sepoys, and plundered the villages. Their motions were so sudden, they very much alarmed the inhabitants of Fort St. David, so that many of the Lascars, Sepoys, and most of the artificers left the place. The enemy having summoned Cuddalore, it was surrendered on the 3d of May, on condition that the garrison shall have liberty to retreat, with their arms, to Fort St. David the next morning.

THE enemy having withdrawn almost every man from their garrisons, to make themselves as strong as possible for the siege of Fort St. David, formed a very considerable army, amounting to three thousand five hundred Europeans, and began to fire upon the place with two guns from Cuddalore the 16th, and with five mortars from the new town the 17th. On the 26th they opened a battery of seven guns and five mortars to the westward, at the distance of about eight or nine hundred yards; and on the 30th one to the north, of nine guns, and three mortars at the distance of seven or eight hundred yards, and another to the north-east of four guns, at about the same distance.



1758.

THE besieged had lost the greatest part of their black forces by desertion, when they imprudently defended the out-posts ; which, considering the weakness of their garrison, should have been abandoned and destroyed. Those who remained in the place, as well Europeans as others, were little disposed to the observance of discipline and regularity ; for having too free access to the several storehouses of arrack and other strong liquors, they were never in a condition properly to do their duty.

THE enemy had not yet made any breach, but had dismounted and disabled thirty guns and carriages, and ruined several of the works, so that many of the parapets and platforms were destroyed by the shot and shells. The tanks, or reservoirs, had suffered by the bombardment, so that there was no water to be had fit for use, but what came out of the covered way ; from which they could only be supplied by night ; and the best well there was likewise destroyed by a bomb. They were also short of ammunition, having expended a great deal in firing away inconsiderately, before the enemy had begun to make their approaches.

THIS being the state of the place on the 1st of June, at the request of Major Polier, the Deputy Governor called a council of war ; and it was unanimously agreed to surrender upon the following articles of capitulation.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION.

By which Alexander Wynch, Esq; acting Deputy Governor, and the Gentlemen of the Council at Fort St. David, in behalf of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, are willing to surrender the Fort of St. David to M. Lally, Lieutenant-General in his most Christian Majesty's Service, and Commander in Chief of the French forces in India.

I. That all acts of hostility shall
cease, until the articles of capitulation
are agreed upon and signed.

I. Accordè.



II. THAT the Deputy Governor shall march, at the head of the garrison, drums beating, colours flying, out of the barrier into the advanced covered way, where the garrison shall ground their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners of war, on condition of being immediately exchanged for an equal number of his Most Christian Majesty's subjects, now prisoners in our garrisons on the coast of Coromandel; and, as soon as the exchange takes place, the garrison to be transported to such of our settlements as our President and Council of Fort St. George may think proper.

III. That Fort St. David, and its out-works, shall not be demolished; but remain in their present state, until the conclusion of a peace.

IV. That all the garrison, including all the subjects of his Britannick Majesty, as well civil as military, shall have all their baggage and effects secured, with liberty of removing and disposing of them as they shall think proper; and that they be supplied with boats, or proper conveyances for that purpose.

V. That the Deputy Governor and Council, and the Com-
S

II. Accorde pour la partie des honneurs, mais la garnison sera conduite prisonnier a Pondichery, ou elle restera jusques a ce quelle soit changée contre pareil nombre d'officiers et soldats de S. M. T. C. actuellement au Trichinopoly, et quand les dits soldats de S. M. T. C. seront arrivez a Pondichery, la ditte garnison de Fort St. David, sera conduite a Madras ou a Devicota a mon choix.

1758.

III. Je ne m'engage a rien sur cet article c'est le sort de la guerre qui en decidera, et non celuy de la paix.

IV. La garnison, et les sujets de sa Majeste Britannique n'emporteront avec eux que leur vaisselle, chevaux, hardes ou meubles domestiques, et il leur sera fourni des batteaux pour les transporter a Pondichery, bien entendu que les dits batteaux seront visite par un commissaire de nos troupes, en presence d'un commissaire Anglois nommez a cet effet.

V. Accorde, quoy que je n'aye pas lieu d'etre content de M^r pany's



1758. pany's servants be exchanged against an equal number of the French East India Company's servants made prisoners by Admiral Watson at Chandernagore; and, until the exchange takes place, that they be permitted to go on their parole to Fort St. George.

VI. That the sick in the hospital which cannot be removed, have liberty to remain, under the care of their own surgeons; and that they be supplied with proper provisions and necessaries on paying for the same.

VII. That a Captain and fifty of the English troops shall remain in the fort, to deliver it up, and that strict discipline be observed, that no irregularities be committed; and, after the surrender, to take the fate of the rest of the garrison.

VIII. That two commissaries shall remain, to deliver up all the magazines, ammunition, cannon, mortars, and goods, and point out to the engineers all the mines and subterraneous works.

IX. That no Company's servant, civil or military, be removed from the coast of Coromandel, until the exchange shall take place.

AR. WYNCH.

P. POLIER DE BOTTENS,
RICH. FAIRFIELD.

Fort St. Da. Id.,
23 June 1758.

Wynch, qui a manqué à ce qu'il me devoit aussi qu'aux regles de la guerre.

VI. Accordé.

VII. Un officier, et dix hommes, suffiront à cette operation parceque je ne feray entrer qu'une compagnie de grenadiers dans le fort jusqu'es à ce qu'il soit évacué.

VIII. Accordé.

IX. Accordé mais ceux qui s'en absenteront sans un passeport de moy, seront traittez comme espions.

LALLY.

Seperate



Separate article.

That the deserters which were in the English service at the time of the cartel settled between the Governors of Fort St. George and Pondichery, shall be deemed as prisoners; and those which have deserted since the present war, be pardoned, and return to their colours.

AR. WYNCH,

P. POLIER DE BOTTENS.

RICH. FAIRFIELD.

Fort St. David,
26 June 1758.

Accorde.

La garnison sortira a cinque heures a pres midy par la porte de L'Ouvrage á corne ou elle déposera ses armes et il sera permis aux officiers militaires et civils, de rester jusques a demain dans le fort, la compagnie des grenadiers de seconde bataillon de Lorraine prendra possession de la porte de L'Ouvrage a corne, et de celle du fort qui y communique et s'y tiendra jusques a nouvel ordre.

1758.

LALAY

THE loss of St. David's gave a great and just alarm to the government of Madras; as a much more resolute and obstinate defence had been expected, from the known bravery of Major Polier, who commanded the troops there: but it appeared, that very little care or œconomy was used in the management of their artillery and ammunition, as one officer only of that department was in the place; the men who composed the garrison were drunk and disorderly, and fully sensible of the little discipline they were under.

A COURT of enquiry was ordered at Madras, to examine and report facts: Lieutenant-colonel Draper, the Majors Brereton and Caillaud composed this court.—They reported, That Major Polier's personal behaviour was much to be commended, but that he was injudicious in defending two out-posts at some distance from the town, as his numbers were but weak, having only two hundred Europeans and eighty invalids, and about thirty of the artillery, whom he could properly call his garrison; the seamen from two frigates which had been run on shore and burnt, made the majority of his troops: the black forces deserted in great numbers. However, it was judged that the place might have held out much longer, and that the terms on which it surrendered were shameful, as the French were not masters even of the outward covered way, had made no breach, had a wet ditch to fill up and pass, before the town could possibly be assaulted. The want of ammunition and water were



1758. urged as the principal excuses for its surrender; and that the powder with which all the mines were loaded were supposed to be spoiled by the dampness.

MAJOR POLIER, to wipe off the disgrace, was from that moment for fighting upon every occasion, whether proper or not; and, like other men in such situations, ran from one extreme to the other.

HE desired to go a volunteer with Colonel Draper in the first sally made during the siege of Madrafs, and was mortally wounded. He was a brave man, but very hasty, passionate, and suspicious, which oftentimes occasioned much uneasiness both to himself and every one else. He had served the company on several occasions with much reputation and conduct; and, it is thought, the ill opinion he entertained of his garrison was his motive for consenting to the giving up of St. David's.

M. LALLY's answer to the third article of the capitulation too plainly implied the inevitable destruction of the fortifications of St. David's. The works have since been blown up, and the whole reduced to an heap of ruins. The prejudice and partiality of the conquered, however they may complain, cannot justly condemn a General for an act of this nature; for, surely, the destruction of an enemy's fortress is one of the great ends of war. But the ruin of villas, and the injury done to many beautiful structures in the neighbouring country, will be a lasting reproach of wanton barbarity to the French. As for the devastations they committed in their march from St. David's, by plundering and burning the villages they passed through, they were immediately resented by the people of the country. The sufferers on this occasion had it in their power to take their revenge, and, by cutting off the supplies of the army, soon reduced them to such a state that they were almost exhausted by famine as they lay before Tanjore.

On the 25th of July Admiral Pocock sailed with the squadron under his command, and stood to the southward, along shore, with the sea and land breezes, and anchored on the evening of the 26th off Alamparvey; and seeing a snow and seven chelingas near the fort, close in shore, sent the boats manned and armed, who burnt and sunk the chelingas, and brought off the snow; the chelingas were all empty, and had been sent from Pondichery with cannon and ordnance



ordnance stores, which were all landed the day before; the snow was loaded with firewood for Pondichery.

1757.

THE 27th in the evening the squadron got up within three leagues of Pondichery road, where the French fleet was at anchor, consisting of eight ships of the line and a frigate. Our fleet consisted of only seven ships, being the same that were engaged in the last action, but some of them now differently commanded: Captain Martin, who had before been left ill at Madrafs, now took the command of the Cumberland. Captain John Stukley Somerset was advanced from the Salisbury to the Weymouth, Captain Colville had the Newcastle, and Captain Brereton the Salisbury. Next morning, about ten o'clock, the enemy got under sail, and stood to the southward with the land breeze. Admiral Pocock made the signal to chase, in hopes of being able to get up with, or weather them if possible, that being the most probable means of bringing them to action; but they kept to windward, and the next morning anchored to the southward of Porto Novo. They then weighed and stood to windward with the land breeze, and about eight o'clock were out of sight. At four o'clock in the afternoon, the Admiral discovering a ship in the south-east quarter, gave chase; at five she hoisted French colours, and stood for the land; he soon after run her on shore about two leagues to the northward of Porto Novo, and sent the boats on board to endeavour to get her off, but finding it impracticable without losing too much time, set her on fire. She proved to be the *Restitution*, bound to Pondichery from Carical, where she had been sent with ordnance stores and other materials for M. Lally's army. This ship had been sent from Bengal last October with French prisoners, who mutinied, and taking the command of the ship from the master, carried her to Mañulipatam, from whence she was sent to Pondichery; where the Governor and Council, contrary to the law of nations, made a prize of her.

ON the 1st of August, at ten o'clock in the forenoon, the Admiral came in sight of the French squadron, as they were getting under sail off Tranquebar, and soon after they formed the line of battle a-head, with the starboard tacks on board, and seemed to edge down towards him; but when he made sail and stood for them, they hauled upon a wind till one o'clock, when they formed the line of battle a-breast, and bore down upon him with an easy sail. At half an hour past one



1758 he made the signal, and formed the line of battle a-head with the starboard tacks on board, and stood to the eastward under his topsails, sometimes the main-topsails square, as the ships stations required in the line, waiting for the enemy. At five the enemy's van was a-breast of our center, at about two miles distance; they stood on till their van was a-breast of ours, and kept about the same distance till half an hour past six, when they hoisted their topsails, set their courses, hauled close upon a wind, and stood to the south east. The Admiral then made the signal for our van to fill and stand on, and make sail to the southward, keeping in a line till twelve o'clock; and judging by the enemy's signal guns that they had tacked, made the signal to wear, and stood to the westward after them, but at daylight saw nothing of them.

In the evening he descried four ships in shore to the north-west, and on the 3d at five in the morning, saw the enemy off Negapatam, about a league to windward, formed in the line of battle a-head with their starboard tacks on board. He made the signal and formed his line a-head, with the starboard tacks on board, and stood to the southward with an easy sail. At seven o'clock, observing the enemy kept their wind, he made the signal for making more sail, in order to get to windward, for that was the only probable means of bringing them soon to action, as they sailed better in general than our squadron. At half an hour past eight they began to edge down upon him, and at nine were at about three miles distance. He then made the signal for the Elizabeth and Tyger to change places in the line, apprehending the enemy's leading ship in the van might be an overmatch for the Tyger. At ten the enemy bore away, and steer'd for our rear, by which means on the sea breeze setting in about noon, our squadron got the weather gage of them; and at twenty minutes after the Admiral made the signal for the leading ship to steer six points from the wind, and at one o'clock got near, within random shot of them; their line being then in the form of a half moon, their van and rear being to windward of their center. About twenty minutes after, observing the enemies ships in the van begin to fire on the Elizabeth, who was within musket shot of her, the Admiral made the signal for battle, and began the engagement with the whole squadron. Mr. D'Aché, who was then under his topsails, in about ten minutes after set his foresail, and kept more away; his squadron at the same, and continued a running fight in a very irregular line till two o'clock, when the Comte de Provence, the Enemies leading ship,



NAVAL OPERATIONS

135

Ship put before the wind, having cut away her mizen-mast on account of taking fire in the mizen top eight minutes after; the *Zodiaque* and the ships a-head of her kept more away, and were immediately followed by the ships in the rear, which continued in an irregular line a-breast, and increased their distance a little from us; on which Admiral Pocock made the signal for a closer engagement, in order for all his line to bear down as soon as possible and rake them, which was immediately obeyed; and we were able to keep within gun shot of them till three o'clock, when observing they began to make more sail, the Admiral hauled down the signal for the line, and closer engagement, and made the general signal to chase; on which the enemy cut away their boats, and made all the sail they could, and stood about north north west; our Squadron pursued them with all the sail they could croud till near dark, when the enemy got off by outfailing us, and we were obliged to leave off chase, and at eight o'clock anchored off Carical.

1758.

THE damage we received was, chiefly in our masts and rigging, for the enemy's endeavours were (as in the former action) to dismast us. They did not appear to have suffered much in their rigging, but they had about five hundred and forty men killed and wounded; among the latter were Mr. D'Aché and his Captain. There were no more than one and thirty English killed, and one hundred and sixteen wounded. Commodore Stevens received a musquet ball in his shoulder, Captain Martin a wound in his leg by a splinter.

THE Admiral had the pleasure, on this occasion, of writing to the board of Admiralty, that the behaviour of all his officers and men was, in this action, entirely to his satisfaction.

ON the 5th the *Queenborough* intercepted a French snow, named the *Ruby*, of about one hundred and twenty tons. She sailed from the islands the 1st of July, and was bound to Pondichery, loaded chiefly with shot and medicines.

THE French Squadron continued in Pondichery road from the last action till the 3d of September, when they sailed and proceeded directly to the islands. Upon advice of their being sailed, the Admiral sent the *Queenborough* off Ceylon; for as it was very early in the season, it was probable they might have been gone to cruize thereabouts. She returned the 17th without seeing them.

THE



1738.

THE French were at this time driven to such shifts for want of money, that on the 7th of August they seized and carried into Pondichery a large Dutch ship from Batavia, bound to Negapatam, and having taken for their own use all the money, to the amount of seven or eight lack of roupies; they unloaded the cargo and detained the ship. It is said M. Duplex did the same last war.

THE Squadron having embarked Major Caillaud, with two hundred and fifty men (from Trichinopoly) at Negapatam, landed them at Madras the 25th of September. They remained there, taking in their water and stores, till the season called upon them to proceed to Bombay. The Admiral, before his departure, in consequence of an application from the select committee, landed a Captain and Lieutenant, with a hundred and three marines, as a farther strength to the garrison.

THE French had withdrawn their whole garrison from Seringham, except a few Sepeys, who were left to deliver the place to the Malabarans: but Capt. Caillaud, before his departure from Trichinopoly, had made a disposition for attacking it before the troops arrived from Madras; and the French Sepeys, upon his approach, abandoning the place, he took possession of it without any loss.

UPON the news of the surrender of Fort St. David, the troops which garrisoned Arcot, Chengalapat and Carangoly, were ordered into Madras; for it was expected the enemy would attack that place next; but in case they should go to the southward, and invest Davecotah, which proved to be their design, the Chief there had orders to abandon the place; and if the squadron should be near him, to go on board with his garrison, in order to come to Madras, if not, to retire to Trichinopoly; which last he effected without any difficulty, by passing through the Tanjore country. The French took possession of Davecotah; and soon after M. Lally crossed the Ocean with his whole army, except seven or eight hundred men, which he left with M. St. John; a part of the latterwards were sent to the southward. M. Lally, marched by Tranquebar, and the Dutch supplied him with some ammunition and field pieces. He then encamped in the bounds of Negapatam, and demanded of the Dutch a loan of money, and also of cannon, ammunition and powder; but the Dutch denied that they assisted him with anything, except provisions, of which they



they sent him continual supplies during the expedition to Tanjore. The first act of hostility committed by the French against the Tanjoreans, was the taking possession of Nagore, their sea port, and selling to Mr. Fisher, Colonel of Hussars in their service, for two lack and a half of roupees, all the effects that were found there belonging to the country merchants from all parts of India, to the value, as was computed, of twice that sum.

1758.

FROM Negapatam they marched to Trivalour, a pagoda, about fifteen miles on the road to Tanjore; there they established a magazine, and from thence sent deputies to demand of the King of Tanjore the payment of a note forced from him by the French army, and Chunda Saib, in the year * 1749, for seventy lack of roupees; and also a free passage through his country, for the army to march against Trichinopoly. Capt. Caillaud, who commanded in that place, being directed by the Presidency of Madras to use all his endeavours to prevent the King of Tanjore from being frightened into a compliance with their demands, had the satisfaction to find that the behaviour of the French at Nagore had provoked the King's resentment, and he had already ordered Monagee with his troops to oppose the march of the French. One thousand Sepoys, and five hundred Colliers, were ordered to reinforce the Tanjoreans from Trichinopoly; but as it was not safe to part with any Europeans from that garrison, Monagee, with his country forces alone, was obliged to retreat before so large a body of regulars. It was then to be feared that they would be reduced to the necessity of an accommodation; but such was the opinion they had formed of the French, that they chose rather to stand a siege, than enter into a treaty with them. M. Lally, presuming that the constancy of their resolutions might be staggered by their late repulse, sent an embassy to Tanjore of two officers and a priest, to demand a passage for his army, by the nearest road to Trichinopoly; desiring at the same time the assistance of his troops. The King consented to a passage through his country, but not by the road which was desired. He also offered some money, but indeed a very small part of the sum demanded. As for the assistance of his troops, he absolutely refused it. With this answer the officers returned to camp, leaving behind them the priest, who some time after asked a second audience; at which, he not only insisted on the two former articles, but added to them the immediate payment of



1758. five lack of rousees. The King expressed great surprize at the presumption of the priest, but consented to give four lack; out of which he required some deduction should be made for the damage done at Nagore; and as to the other articles, he gave the same answer as before. While they were treating, the army still kept advancing; which justly increasing the suspicions of the King, he ordered the priest to be dismissed. At night the advanced guard of the French army fired some shot against the town, from two pieces of cannon, which of consequence put an end to all negotiation.

THE French lost every day some Europeans, by the frequent sallies from the town; at length they brought up their whole force against it, which amounted to two thousand three hundred and seventy regulars, and a great number of disciplined Sepoys. The artillery which was already brought up, consisted of fourteen field pieces, and three of heavy cannon, and they had fourteen more at Trivalour. All this was not yet sufficient to deject the Tanjoreans. At this very time they had sent out a body of horse, joined with the Polygars of the country, to cut off the communication of the French with Carical; and had already destroyed some convoys of provisions. Captain Caillaud having had the good fortune to keep the King of Tanjore steady to his true interests, had also prevailed on Tondeman to assist with all his people on this important occasion. A large body of his Peons entered Trichinopoly to reinforce that garrison, while a considerable party adapted for that service, were employed to harass the enemy and intercept their supplies. For these, and his former services, the Governor and Council thought proper to reward Captain Caillaud with a Major's commission.

M. LALLY finding that he did not advance his affairs by hostilities, and being in great want of provisions, and other necessaries, attempted once more to persuade the King of his sincerity, by sending him an officer of some rank and quality, and also a priest, who were at once appointed to conclude an agreement, and to remain as hostages. By this step he prevailed so far, as to receive in hand fifty thousand rousees, and a promise of four lack, as also of a supply of three hundred horse, and one thousand Colleries; and on his part he engaged immediately to remove the army from before the town. M. Lally making no motions towards the performance of this part of his agreement, the King of Tanjore refused to let the two hostages return; and



and declared they should not leave the town till the French army broke up from before it. This produced several messages, and, at length, it was agreed that the King should forthwith send him the three hundred horse and Colliers; and for his own security he might detain the gentlemen till the army was moved three days march from the place. The advantages of this treaty were all overthrown by the hasty temper of M. Lally, who seeing only fifty of the three hundred horsemen arrive in camp, ordered them all into confinement; declaring aloud, that as the King had not kept his word in sending the full number engaged for, he would keep those he had prisoners till he should receive the whole.

1758.

THE King upon this confined the two hostages, and would not send any more men till his people were released. On the other hand M. Lally, pleasing himself with the thoughts of his having brought up all his heavy cannon, and erected batteries, while he was amusing the King with a negotiation, began to fire upon the town, and had even made a considerable breach, when the Tanjoreans, determined on a general sally. This they executed on the 9th of August, with a surprizing success: for it will appear surprizing that a body of country troops, although their number in horse, Sepoys and Colliers was exceeding large, should make any impression upon so strong an army of Europeans, and disciplined Sepoys, as M. Lally had under his command, supported by a large train of artillery. They attacked at once the French camp and batteries, killed about one hundred Europeans, took one gun, one tumbril of ammunition, two elephants, and some horses; blew up four tumbrils of ammunition, and then returned into the town.

M. LALLY quitting at once all his designs, retreated towards Carical, leaving his guns spiked upon the batteries. The Tanjoreans did not pursue him till the morning, when they came up with him upon his march, cut off fifty more of his men, and took two pieces of cannon and two mortars. The rest made their retreat to Trivalour, and from thence to Carical; and about the end of the month, the greatest part of the troops, and M. Lally himself, returned to Pondichery. M. Soupire arrived there a few days before, after making a march towards Wandewash, and back by the way of Alamparvey.



1758.

THEY moved again about the beginning of October, and took possession of Arcot; they then returned, and having taken Tripassore, continued some time at Conjeveram, collecting ammunition and stores, till they were joined by M. De Buffy, with a body of three or four hundred foot and as many horse, from Golconda. Having also retaken Trinomalay, they shewed by their motions a design upon Chennagalaput; advancing towards that place with three or four hundred Europeans, five hundred Sepoys, and five pieces of cannon; but were prevented by the arrival of four companies of Sepoys. This reinforcement came very opportunely for the preservation of a post of so much consequence, as it covered all the countries on this side the Pollar; and, when in possession of the enemy, would expose even our own limits to incursion, be a harbour for deserters from our own garrison, and prevent supplies of firewood, grain, and other provisions, from coming into the town. For these reasons it was resolved, that the present garrison of nine companies of Sepoys, with a serjeant, corporal, and twelve gunners, should be reinforced by a detachment of seventy Europeans. This was the more readily determined, as there would be no expence of transporting stores, the pay of the Sepoys would be no more there than at Madrais, and yet their force would be sufficient to resist any sudden assault. The enemy, if they resolved to take the place, must have been under a necessity of bringing up their whole army, or at least a considerable part of it, and also a train of battering cannon, with proportionable stores: all which would be attended with such an expence and loss of time as they would probably think more than equal to the benefits arising from the conquest of the place. The justness of these conclusions appeared in the end; for the enemy, influenced by the same reasons, waved their designs upon the place, which, it is to be supposed, they heartily repented during the siege of Madrais. Captain Preston was ordered to take the command of the fort, and to repair the works: he soon put it into such a state as made it defensible against a coup de main, and by that means secured it till such time as M. Lally heard of the arrival of Colonel Draper's regiment on the Malabar coast, and then he hastened every thing for the immediate attack of Madrais.

COLONEL DRAPER himself arrived in September, with part of his regiment; and about the middle of October it was determined that he should march with a battalion of our troops as far as Wandeur, while Colonel Lawrence took post with another at the Mount,



to be in readiness to support the former. This was done to make the enemy cautious of bringing a heavy train on this side the river; and, by the check it gave to their motions, secured an opportunity of supplying the garrison of Chengalaput with the needful stores. 1758.

IN the mean time Isouf Cawn was ordered to march towards them from Trichinopoly; and he accordingly set out the 20th of November with two thousand well disciplined Sepoys, and two light field-pieces. In his way he took Eilavanasore.

THE Nabob having recommended to the Governor the engaging a party of Marattas, as the most effectual method of preventing the enemy from transporting their artillery by land for the siege of Fort St. George, a proposal was sent to Morarow soon after the loss of St David's; with which he complied, and engaged to send his Vakeel to Madrafs to settle the terms. According to their dilatory way of proceeding the Vakeel did not arrive till October; it was then agreed that Morarow should send two thousand horse to our assistance; that five thousand roupees should be advanced at Royal Cherow, a place near Tripety, for the expence of five hundred horse, which were to march upon the first notice, so as to arrive at Chengalaput in twenty-five days from the time the Vakeel should leave Madrafs.

THAT ten thousand roupees, for the expence of the other fifteen hundred horse, should be paid at Guttey, from which place they were to set out, and arrive at Chengalaput in forty-five days from the time the Vakeel should leave Madrafs; and that ten thousand roupees should be paid on the arrival of the said two thousand horse at Chengalaput. The twenty-five thousand roupees advanced as above to be deducted out of the allowance to the troops of half a roupee per day each horseman; which was to commence from the day of their arrival at Chengalaput.

THE Vakeel further desired an allowance might be settled to the Sardars (or Commanders of the troops) and also for each horse which should be killed in our service in the time of action; and it was accordingly agreed that an allowance of thirty roupees per day should be made for all the Sardars and Jemidars; and that for a Sardar's horse killed in battle one thousand roupees should be allowed



1758. lowed, and four hundred roupces for each horse belonging to the rest of the troops.

INTELLIGENCE being received that M. Lally had been reinforced by the daily junction of considerable parties, it was thought no longer advisable to trust a part of our force at so great a distance as Wandelour; therefore Colonel Draper was desired to return to the Mount as soon as he should hear that the stores, for the protection of which he remained till then in those parts, were safely arrived. Colonel Draper accordingly moved from Wandelour the 11th of November, and joined the other battalion at the Mount.

THIS place, of which mention has been already made, and which will hereafter frequently be spoken of, is an eminence, properly called St. Thomas's Mount, from an ancient tradition, that the Apostle St. Thomas had preached the gospel to the Indians on that spot. He has always been considered as the tutelar saint of the place, and at this day a Portuguese priest officiates in a chapel dedicated to him, which stands on the top of the mount. It is justly esteemed for the goodness of the air, and the pleasantness of the situation, on which account a number of villas have been built by the gentlemen of Madras, with gardens all surrounded with brick walls breast-high. In this station, which is about nine miles from Fort St. George, the two battalions remained till the 6th of December; when Colonel Lawrence receiving intelligence of a great augmentation of the enemy's force at Wandelour, sent his Aid de Camp to Fort St. George, to desire he might be reinforced with as many more men as possible. Accordingly a party was ordered, and marched that afternoon at five o'clock; but at the same time the Governor was desired to write to Colonel Lawrence, to remind him that the utmost caution was necessary at this important crisis; and that it would be too hazardous to venture an action, unless upon terms of the highest advantage.

COLONEL LAWRENCE having received the Governor's letter, and at the same time hearing the enemy was in motion, and considering the weak state of the garrison, ordered three companies of infantry to march to the little Mount with the two twelve pounders, as if to reinforce the party cantoned there; but at the same time they were directed to march to Madras. These motions were made the 7th, and now the danger of Chengalapat being removed, and that fort having received
all



all its supplies, the reasons for maintaining the post at the Mount no longer subsisted: therefore it was determined to draw the whole force nearer to the garrison; and accordingly the enemy having advanced within sight of the Mount in the afternoon of the 9th, our army retired that evening to the Choultry-plain, and there encamped.

1758.

THE French army under the command of M. Lally, encamped at the Mount, and their advanced guard took post at Marmelan.

THE enemy having marched from the Mount, the 12th in the morning, appeared about day-break upon Choultry-plain. Our army after about two hours cannonading, retired into the garrison, and the enemy encamped upon the spot which our troops abandoned, about a mile and a half to the southward. At the same time their advanced guards took possession of the Garden-house, and the neighbouring village, in order to invest the town. The whole force of the enemy was three thousand five hundred Europeans, two thousand Sepoys, and as many horse.

NOTHING of any consequence passed the next day, which was chiefly spent in reconnoitring; this occasioned a few shot to be fired, but without much effect.

THREE posts which we held in the Black Town were reinforced, not with a design to make an obstinate resistance, but to retard their progress as much as possible, and then retreat towards the Fort in such a manner, as to run no risque of being cut off.

EARLY in the morning of the 14th of December, M. Lally marched in two columns to attack, and take possession of the Black Town, whose large extent made it impossible for our small force to dispute it with the enemy; there had been posted only two or three picquets in such parts as were nearest to Fort St. George. Upon M. Lally's approach, they made a hasty retreat towards the Fort, and increased the general confusion, which at first was but too visible; occasioned by the numbers of black people, women and children, who came thronging towards the Fort for protection. It appeared necessary to do something immediately, to restore the spirits of the garrison; and to convince the enemy that we were not to be taken so easily as they had been taught to believe. Colonel Draper imagining that the most probable



1758. probable means of producing this effect might be by making a sally, and dislodging the enemy, whilst they were yet unsettled, and perhaps plundering; for indeed their apparent contempt of the garrison, and known want of discipline, seemed to invite to the undertaking, resolved to offer himself to command a party for that service. He communicated his thoughts to the Governor and Colonel Laurence, to whose superior authority, and great judgment, he paid the utmost deference. They were both of his opinion; and, according to his request, gave him five hundred men and two field pieces. At the same time one hundred and fifty men under Major Brereton, marched at some distance upon Colonel Draper's right flank, to observe Lally's brigade, and prevent their coming upon them from the north part of the Black Town, by which they had entered.

THE men marched out of the garrison with great resolution; and had their regularity and obedience to orders been equal to their spirits, much might have been done; for the French suffered our people to form upon their left flank, mistaking them for Lally's brigade. The fire of our artillery loaded with grape, soon convinced them of their error; they immediately fell into the greatest confusion, abandoned their cannon, and thought of nothing but saving themselves. Had a proper advantage been made of this critical moment, the consequence might have been fatal to the enemy. Colonel Draper's exhortations to the soldiery, to cease firing, and push the broken remains of the French with fixed bayonets, were quite ineffectual; though he himself advanced forwards to set them the example. But as he was followed only by four grenadiers, being unsupported, he was obliged to retire; for of the four brave fellows who went on with him, two were killed, the other two dangerously wounded.

COLONEL DRAPER'S march, positions, and retreat, are represented by a dotted line in the plan of Madraſs. The Colonel proceeded through the street by the line (1) till he came to (3) where he perceived some of the enemy, and received a scattering fire. To check them he left two platoons, and marched on with the rest to the position (6), where he had a fair view of the Lorraine regiment and Indian battalions in the park (4), for they expected him in another street a little higher up (2), and had pointed four guns in that direction. Our cannon (6) began to play briskly with grape, and with the musketry made



COAST OF COROMANDEL.

145

made such havock among the enemy, that they soon fell into confusion, and ran a-cross the street under cover of some huts.

1758.

COLONEL DRAPER then advanced towards their guns (from which they had only fired three shot) and exchanged a pistol with the officer, who offered to surrender them; and had there been any men to bring them off, they would have been taken. but our troops having, like the French, thrown themselves in among some old walls, and under cover of houses, gave the enemy time to rally; and confusion became so visible among our people, that Colonel Draper thought it most prudent to retreat, which he began by marching down the street, as the dotted line (8) shews; but unfortunately about eighty of his men not paying a due regard to the motions of the rest, (which might be owing to the black drummers having run away, who should have beat the retreat,) were shut up by the enemy in the square (7), and taken prisoners: Colonel Draper being joined by Major Brereton at (6), who had marched to support him by the line (9), continued his retreat with little loss to the Fort, notwithstanding the regiment of Lally came from the Armenian church to the little bridge (10), and, with two pieces, fired grape at our troops passing along (8) but they mostly fell short.

COULD regularity and obedience to the officers orders have been preserved among the men in this sally, it might in all probability have prevented the siege of Madras, and have ended in the total overthrow of the Lorraine regiment, and the two battalions of India; as it was, they had thirty officers or more killed and wounded, and near three hundred men. The Count D'Estaing, a Brigadier General, was taken prisoner in the beginning of the action. Our loss was Major Polier mortally wounded; Captain Pascall shot through the body; Captain Hume mortally wounded and taken; Captain Lieutenant Bilhock killed; Lieutenant Elliot shot through the body; Lieutenant Smith wounded and taken; Lieutenant Blair wounded and taken; Ensign Cook wounded and taken; and Ensign Chase mortally wounded and taken. Our loss of men was one hundred and three taken, of which nineteen were wounded, about fifty were left dead on the spot, and the same number came in wounded; so that we suffered a diminution of more than two hundred men, and nine officers.



1758.

IN the beginning of December Major Caillaud, from his known interest and influence with the country powers, was sent with letters from the Presidency to the King of Tanjore, Tondeman, and the other Polygars in that part of the country, in order to procure assistance from them, with which the Major was to join Captain Preston and Houf Cawn, and take the command of that party.

THE danger both from the enemy and the season were no small objections to this undertaking; for as it was extremely difficult to guard against the former, the danger of the latter was not less to be apprehended, since it was the very height of the Monsoon; and there was no way of going to the southward but by sea in an open boat, within reach of many garrisons which the enemy now possessed on the coast. The Presidency having duly weighed all these difficulties, were determined at length to hazard them on account of the uncertain state of affairs at the court of Tanjore, and the danger of its falling under the absolute influence of the French. Major Caillaud was therefore ordered to proceed, which he did in the manner aforementioned; and having overcome all the difficulties which of consequence attended such a voyage at that season, he landed at the Danish Fort of Tranquebar; from whence as soon as the rains abated, which was about the middle of December, he reached Tanjore. He found, at his arrival, the face of that court strangely altered. Monagee, the Prime Minister, and all his adherents had been turned out, and a new set placed at the head of affairs. When he spoke to the King, he found him ready to consent to every thing he asked; but as soon as his back was turned, the new council overruled it all, by persuading the King it was better to wait and see the event, and then side with the strongest, according to the policy of eastern courts. This did not absolutely discourage the Major, who persevered till he was promised a body of five hundred horse, which were to be got ready as soon as possible. While this was in agitation, the Major received the first advices that the enemy had invested Madrais, and were in possession of the Black Town. The King had also received the account; and as it is natural to suppose, the example of Fort St. David, which had been so soon given up, and his fears for the fate of the only settlement we had left, created new doubts and new delays. Major Caillaud was put off from day to day, but at last he carried his point, though for no more than three hundred horse, which the company was to pay.



pay. He had collected about the same number of Sepoys, all chosen men, well disciplined and active, and so they proved; for in eleven days they marched two hundred and fifty miles, and got to Chengalaput. There he heard the party he was to command was at the Mount. Upon this intelligence, the Major, leaving his men who were too much fatigued to follow him at that time, took fresh horses and arrived at the Mount about two in the morning.

1759.

HERE he found that Isouf Cawn, (who after several encounters had still fifteen hundred Sepoys, and two thousand horse) had been joined by Captain Preston, with part of the garrison of Chengalaput, consisting of about six hundred Sepoys, sixty Europeans, and six three pounders. There were also added to this party, Captain Vassierot, with ten of his troopers. The occasion of his coming was the immediate necessity of supplying this little army with money, which being indispensibly urgent, Captain Vassierot offered himself to lead ten of his troopers, who should each carry a bag of a thousand pagodas to the camp, and this he most gallantly effected.

WITH this body of troops Captain Preston had frequently cut off the enemy's supplies by land, and surprized one convoy with a number of spare arms and tents for three thousand men, which he took. He kept M. Lally in constant alarms, by continually moving about, but still keeping so near him, as greatly to disturb and harass him. Captain Preston had repulsed several detachments from the French army; and, in one action, which had been very severe, had the good fortune to disperse great part of the black forces, which obliged the enemy to move off towards Arcot to recruit; from whence they had returned with an augmentation of the country troops three days before Major Caillaud joined the army.

CAPTAIN PRESTON'S activity, as it merited all the acknowledgments which were bestowed on it by the garrison, was in effect, the greatest interruption to the besiegers. At length Mr. Lally, thoroughly sensible of the check this flying camp could at all times give to his designs, resolved to send such a force against them as would crush them effectually. He used to say they were like the flies, no sooner beat off from one part, but they came to another. For this purpose he ordered a detachment of six hundred Europeans, fifteen hundred Se-



1759 } poys, all his cavalry, (which consisted of near three hundred European dragoons, and about one hundred Hussars, with a thousand Marattas,) and ten pieces of cannon, to attack them. Notice being received before day that a large body of the enemy were advancing, Major Caillaud prepared to receive them, by posting his troops to the best advantage. It has already been said, that round the bottom of the Mount, many inclosures had been made, and gardens laid out, surrounded with brick walls parapet high not to intercept the prospect. On the Mount, and behind these garden walls, the Major had made the best disposition he could of his infantry. His cavalry were all drawn up on the right, being the best spot where they could act. As the day broke the enemy appeared in sight, and the cannonade began. Their cavalry was inclining very fast to the right, about three hundred paces from the front of our left. It was mostly their Europeans who pushed on that side, while their Sepoys endeavoured to occupy all the banks and places on our left, for there they could be under cover. Their cavalry made a stand as soon as they came opposite to ours, to whom orders were immediately sent to charge. They readily obeyed, and moved on with a good countenance for about one hundred yards; but finding the enemy were advancing upon them with the same intention, they were seized with a pannick, and fled with the utmost precipitation.

THE French cavalry who were foremost, pursued a little too eagerly a large body that were pressing through an interval, which is between the village and the foot of the Mount. They were soon stopped by a discharge from a party of foot, which had been posted there. Upon this they retreated, not without loss. Things went on a little better on the left. The village was well defended, and two or three times taken and re-taken, till at length, after three hours dispute, it was lost by the rashness of the officer who commanded that post; who seeing the enemy retreat in some confusion, indiscreetly pursued, not observing a party that was ready to support them. This party stopped him, and drove him out of the village which he never after could recover.

THUS stood affairs about ten o'clock in the morning, when the enemy, tired of attacking, contented themselves with cannonading us severely, in hopes, by that means, they might dislodge us: but though our people suffered a good deal, they could not prevail; there-
fore



fore about four they made another attack; but the garden walls were so lined with musquetry, that it quite dispirited them, and they began to think of a retreat. At the close of the evening they moved off their artillery, and soon after their whole body, and left us masters of the field of battle, where we remained about two hours, which was all the time that Major Caillaud thought proper to stay, having no ammunition left for his artillery, and very little for the musquetry: he therefore moved off in the night towards Chengalaput, the only place from whence he could be supplied. The loss of the enemy in this affair was about one hundred and seventy Europeans killed and wounded, and near three hundred Sepoys. 1759.

IN the beginning of the siege, M. Lally, who had made very free with the Dutch ever since his arrival in the country, was pleased to give them another proof of what little respect he paid to their neutrality, by seizing the Fort of Sadras, a settlement of theirs on the coast, equally distant from Pondichery and Madras. Being resolved to make a magazine of this place, he turned out the Dutch soldiers and garrisoned it with French; giving for a reason, that he did it to prevent our taking it, which he pretended was our design.

WHEN it had passed into the hands of our enemy, Major Caillaud thought proper to lay a plan for surprizing it, and disposed his march so as to be there about four o'clock in the morning. The darkness of the night deceiving the guides, he could not reach Sadras, which is twenty miles from Chengalaput till late next day, which effectually disappointed his scheme, as he was not strong enough to attempt it by open force. An accident, however, made him amends for his disappointment. At night his patrols brought him one of M. Lally's messengers, with a letter directed to the Governor of Pondichery; which is so extraordinary, that it would be unpardonable not to insert it with the other occurrences relative to the siege of Fort St. George; especially as it is a most authentic proof that the garrison owed their deliverance to their own bravery and conduct, and not to the arrival of the ships, since they did not appear till after the writing of this letter.



1759.

Au camp devant Madras le 14 Fevrier, 1759.

MONSIEUR,

“ IL auroit un beau coup a faire ici, il y a un Vaisseau en cette rade de vingt pieces de canon chargé de toutes les richesses de Madras et qu'on dit y devoir rester jusqu'au vingtieme: l'Expedition vient d'arriver mais M. Gorlin n'est point homme a l'attaquer, puis qu'il l'a déjà fait fuir une fois. Le Bristol d'un autre coté a peine a paru a St. Thome que sur la nouvelle vague des treize Vaisseaux de Portonove il a pris l'epouvante et après avoir débarqué les munitions dont il étoit chargé, il n'a seulement pas voulu se donner le tems de reprendre douze pieces de son canon qu'il nous avoit prêté pendant le siege; si j'étois juge du point d'honneur des officiers de la compagnie, je le casserois comme un verre, ainsi que quelques autres: or la Fidelle ou ce même Bristol, avec ses douze canons de plus, suffiroit pour se rendre maître du bâtiment Anglois, s'il pouvoit parvenir a gagner le vent sur luy dans l'obscurité de la nuit. Maugendre et Tremillier sont, dit on, très bons et ne dussent ils servir qu'au transport de deux cens blessés que nous avons ici, le service seroit d'importance.

“ Nous sommes toujours dans la même position: la breche faite depuis quinze jours, toujours a quinze toises du mur de la place, et jamais ne levant la tête pour la regarder. Je compte qu'en arrivant à Pondichery nous chercherons tous a apprendre quelque autre metier, car celui de la guerre exige trop de patience.

“ DE quinze mille Cipayes dont l'armée est censée composée, j'en compte a peu près huit cens sur la route de Pondichery, chargé de sucre et de poivre et autres marchandises, quant aux Coulis, ils sont tous employés pour le même objet depuis le jour que nous sommes arrivés ici.

“ JE prendrai mes mesures des aujourd'huy pour embraser la ville noire et faire sauter la Poudriere, vous n'imaginerez jamais que ce sont cinquante déserteurs François et une centaine de Suisses qui tiennent en arret deux mille hommes des troupes du Roy et de la Compagnie qui sont encore ici existant, malgré les états surchargés que chacun fait ici a sa guise de la boucherie qu'on en a fait, et vous serez encore plus surpris si je vous disois, que sans les deux combats et les quatre batailles que nous avons eues, et sans les deux batteries qui ont été manquées ou faites de travers, pour parler plus clairement, nous n'au-
rions



rions pas perdu cinquantes hommes depuis le commencement du siege, jusques aujourd'huy. J'ay escrit a M. de Larche, s'il persiste a ne point venir ici, tirera de l'argent qui voudra des Poleagáres, ce ne fera pas moy, et je renonce, comme je vous en ai deja prevenu il y a plus d'un mois, a me meler directement ni indirectement de tout ce qui peut avoir raport a vôtre administration, soit civile soit militaire; l'irai plus tôt commander les Cafres de Madagascar que de rester dans cette Sodome, qu'il n'est pas possible que le feu des Anglois ne detruise tôt ou tard au defaut de celuy du Ciel.

1759.

J'ay l'honneur d'être, &c.

L A L L Y."

" Je suis obligé de vous prevenir que Mr De Soupire ayant refuse de prendre le commandement de cette armée que je luy ai offert, et auquel il est autorisé par le double de mes expéditions que la cour luy avoit remis, il faudra que malgré vous, avec le conseil, vous vous en chargiez. Je m'engage seulement a vous la ramener soit a Arcatte, soit a Sadrafs, envoyez y vos ordres, ou portez vous y vous même pour la Commander, car je la quite en y arrivant."

TRANSLATION of an intercepted letter from M. LALLY to
M. DE LEYRIT.

From the camp before Madrafs, the 14th of
February 1759.

" A GOOD blow might be struck here: there is a ship in the road, of twenty guns, laden with all the riches of Madrafs, which it is said will remain there till the 20th. The Expedition is just arrived, but M. Gorlin is not a man to attack her; for she has made him run away once before. The Bristol, on the other hand, did but just make her appearance before St. Thomas, and on the vague report of thirteen ships coming from Porto Novo, she took fright; and after landing the provisions with which she was laden, she would not stay long enough, even to take on board twelve of her own guns, which she had lent us for the siege."

" IF I was the judge of the point of honour of the Company's officers, I would break him like glass, as well as some others of hem.

" THE



1759. “ THE *Fidelle*, or the *Harlem*, or even the aforesaid *Bristol*, with her twelve guns restored to her, would be sufficient to make themselves masters of the English ship, if they could manage so as to get to windward of her in the night. *Maugendre* and *Tremillier* are said to be good men; and were they employed only to transport two hundred wounded men, that we have here, their service would be of importance.

WE remain still in the same position: the breach made these fifteen days; all the time within fifteen toises of the wall of the place; and never holding up our heads to look at it.

I RECKON we shall, at our arrival at *Pondichery*, endeavour to learn some other trade; for this of war requires too much patience.

“ OF fifteen hundred *Sepoys* which attended our army, I reckon near eight hundred are employed upon the road to *Pondichery*, laden with sugar, pepper, and other goods; and as for the *Coulis*, they are all employed for the same purpose, from the first day we came here.

“ I AM taking my measures from this day to set fire to the *Blacktown*, and to blow up the powder-mills.

“ YOU will never imagine, that fifty French deserters, and one hundred *Swiss*, are actually stopping the progress of two thousand men of the King's and Company's troops, which are still here existing, notwithstanding the exaggerated accounts that every one makes here, according to his own fancy, of the slaughter that has been made of them; and you will be still more surprized, if I tell you, that, were it not for the two combats and four battles we sustained, and for the batteries which failed, or, to speak more properly, which were unskillfully made, we should not have lost fifty men, from the commencement of the siege to this day.

“ I HAVE wrote to *M. de Larche*, that if he persists in not coming here, let who will raise money upon the *Polygars* for me, I will not do it: and I renounce (as I informed you a month ago I would do) meddling, directly or indirectly, with any thing whatever that may have relation to your administration, whether civil or military. For I had rather go and command the *Caffres* of *Madagascar*,
than



than remain in this Sodom; which it is impossible but the fire of the English must destroy, sooner or later, even though that from Heaven 1759.
should not.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

Signed,

L A L L Y

P. S. I THINK it necessary to apprize you, that, as M. de Soupire has refused to take upon him the command of this army, which I have offered to him, and which he is impowered to accept, by having received from the court a duplicate of my commission, you must of necessity, together with the council, take it upon you. For my part, I undertake only to bring it back, either to Arcot or Madrafs. Send therefore, your orders, or come yourselves to command it; for I shall quit it upon my arrival there.

UPON the receipt of this letter, which was immediately sent to Madrafs, Major Caillaud marched back again, to be near the fort, and to be ready for what service might be required of him. M. Lally had not time to execute his intentions of burning the Black-town, for on the 16th in the evening, at length arrived our long expected reinforcement: on their first appearance he got ready for his march, and the next morning he was near out of sight. He left behind him all his heavy cannon, about forty pieces, and a large quantity of stores. And thus Madrafs was saved, after a siege of nine weeks, to the great honour of all those who were concerned in its defence. Colonel Lawrence, who commanded, had the satisfaction to see all his services in the country crowned by a most honourable defence of the capital. His judgement and experience were nobly seconded by the spirited conduct and bravery of Colonel Draper and Major Brereton. The Governor, Mr. Pigot, contributed also greatly to their success, by his prudent management of the stores, and the regularity which he enforced: he frequently visited all the posts, and was very liberal to those who distinguished themselves upon the works.

THE sum of fifty thousand roupes had been promised, as an encouragement and reward to the garrison for their good behaviour, in case they should, by their resistance, oblige the enemy to raise the



1759. siege. Immediately upon the going off of the French the money was issued, and two thirds distributed among the Europeans, and one third to the Sepoys and Lascars.

A SIEGE which occasioned the exertion of so much judgment, skill, and indefatigable activity, as were shewn by the Governor and military officers, deserves to be recorded in the most circumstantial manner; especially as the minute operations for the defence of the works will be instructive to all who either practice or delight in the art of fortification. It is very fortunate that a particular detail of all the operations has been delivered, in a journal taken upon the spot by the principal engineer: such a curiosity must be the more acceptable, as it is certainly rare; there having been few instances, of late years, of any place which has been so seriously attacked, and so obstinately and successfully defended.

JOURNAL



A

JOURNAL

OF THE

Siege of Fort St. George,

Begun the 12th of December, 1758 ;

Ended the 17th of February, 1759.

By J. CALL, CHIEF ENGINEER.

DURING the fall, the enemy fired several shot from some field-pieces into the fort, but did no damage; they were quiet the remaining part of the day, and we only fired a few cannon on those places where we imagined they were at work. No Europeans were to be had this day for a working party; but I luckily collected a few Cooleys, bricklayers, and other artificers, and set them to make a dam in the gut at (c), to shut up the communication between the water in the river and ditch, lest the enemy should cut the dam (d), which kept up the water two feet or more, and thereby drain so much off. This was a piece of work on which much depended, and which, with difficulty, I got finished before night. I also set up a pallisadoe in an opening under the south flank of the royal bastion (e), and removed some gabions, fascines, and other materials, which were in the way on the ramparts.

1758.

Thursday
Dec. 14.



1753.
Dec. 15. SEVERAL deserters have come in from the enemy this day and yesterday; who all agree in their reports, that the enemy lost many men and officers in yesterday's action. The enemy fired not a shot this day from cannon or small arms, nor have they been perceived any where at work; though we have many informations of their erecting batteries, and fire now and then at the suspected places. By the enemy's reconnoitring and situation, it seems as if they intended to attack the north front by the north-east angle; I therefore considered what was most necessary to be done to oppose them, and resolved to compleat the blind which I intended before the old north-east bastion, and to erect a fascine battery on the glacis, before the shoulder of the east face of the north-east bastion; which battery is to reach quite down to the surf, and intended to sweep under the bank of the glacis, which had been cut down by the sea, and afforded good cover for an enemy. It was also determined to set up a pallisadoe before the sea gate, and to close up with stones the small gate on each side the large one. A Captain, two subalterns, and one hundred men, besides all the blacks I could collect, were ordered on the above services, with Mess. Leigh, Eiser, and Stevenson, engineers.

16. A PARTY of forty volunteers, and forty Sepoys, were this night ordered out, about eleven o'clock, to give the enemy an alert, and, if possible, nail up some pieces of cannon which it was said were in the Black town; but they had not proceeded much beyond the glacis, before the enemy's advanced centinels gave their fire, and alarmed their whole force; so that our party, on hearing the drum beat to arms, retired. A party of one hundred soldiers, and sixty-five Sepoys, were this morning paraded for working, and distributed chiefly to the works mentioned yesterday, which were nearly finished by night; and the pallisadoe round the sea gate Viranda entirely compleated. Fascines were also laid round, to form a parapet on that part of the sea gate battery which had none; and some sand bags laid for the same purpose in part of the barbet battery towards the sea: earth was also laid on the arch over the magazine under the old west curtain, and over part of the hospital adjoining.

17. LAST night, about eight o'clock, the enemy gave an alarm, by a few men coming near the glacis and giving their fire: nothing remarkable happened afterwards. This day one hundred men, two Serjeants, and



and one corporal, were on a working party, but the weather being very rainy, little was done; they, and about two hundred blacks, were chiefly employed on the two batteries mentioned the 15th, to the north-east; in thickening the parapets of the old north-east bastion, completing the barbet battery with sand-bags, laying earth on the hospital arches, fixing a pallisade to close the communication from the covered way on each side to the north ravelin, and repairing some cheeks of the embrasures on the demi-bastion, besides other trifling repairs. The enemy was not for certain perceived to be any where at work, though single guns (by way of security in the night, I suppose) were perceived in some of the streets. Very few shot were fired by us, and fewer shells, during this day. Several deserters came in last night and this evening; from whom we learnt the enemy had some mortars arrived at St. Thomé. The Governor this day gave it out publickly, that he would distribute fifty thousand roupees among the garrison five days after the siege was raised, or the French beat off.

1758.

THIS morning it was perceived that the enemy had thrown up a breast-work (A) from the houses on the beach near the Old-town, to the sea side; but whether intended for a battery, or to prevent any attempt of ours on their flank, cannot be said, though I believe the latter; because the trench from whence the sand has been taken is on the side of the enemy, contrary to the method of making batteries; something of the same kind was perceived in the streets next the sea, but no guns or mortars have yet been fired, or appeared ready for that purpose. On our side, a very few shot or shells were thrown. The gentlemen of the squadron, and marines, who had been on board a Dutch snow the 12th, with an intent to go and take the French ship which is coming up with their stores, were this morning landed, being very unwilling to undertake the expedition; and having been detained by bad weather so long in the road that it was supposed they were discovered. Captain Jasper, who was to have commanded them, appeared much chagrined at his disappointment; and indeed with reason, for had he succeeded (and I think he had great reason to expect success) nothing could have done us more service, or the enemy greater prejudice. A great many people were perceived to-day moving from the Mount towards the Black-town, which we apprehended were bringing up the enemy's stores. It is very remarkable, that thirty-three deserters have come in from the enemy since their
arrival,

Dec. 18.



1758. arrival, and not one man has deserted from the garrison, or been seen in liquor.

Dec. 18. A PEON came in and informed us, that Captain Preston had sent out a party, under Lieutenant Airey, from Chengalaput, which had intercepted a convoy of the enemy's stores, consisting of tents sufficient for the covering of three thousand men, a large mortar, which he spiked up, and burnt the bed; two guns, which he also spiked, and burnt the carriages; and some ammunition, which he carried off, with all the bullocks. No deserters last night; which is owing, I suppose, to some extraordinary care or orders of M. Lally's. The working party was this day about one hundred men, without officers; they, and the black artificers, were chiefly employed in fixing a pallisadoe before the new battery by the sea side; opening another embrasure in that battery; cutting down the high bank which the surf had made by washing away the glacis; thickening the parapets of the old north-east bastion; repairing the embrasures with palmeiras, which had been blown away by our own guns; laying earth on the hospital; fixing a pallisadoe on the gorge of the north ravelin, and repairing a dam (c), which had been made in the gut to the north-west to keep the water in the ditch; but the water had rose so high by the last four day's rain, that half the dam was destroyed, and the water considerably sunk.

19. THIS morning we perceived that the enemy had thrown up another breast-work, about sixty feet in length, and one hundred yards, or more, advanced before that thrown up the preceding night; both these retrenchments terminate on the surf, the latter at the distance of about five hundred yards from the north-east salient angle of the covered way, and seem rather intended to cover a guard posted there to prevent a surprize, or desertion, than for any annoyance to the fort; however, from the proceeding of the enemy it appears as if they intended to advance along the beach, and attack the demi and north-east bastions; it is therefore resolved that platforms should be raised in the covered way, sufficiently high for field-pieces, on covered way carriages, to fire over the parapet. It is further resolved to raise a parapet of the demi-bastion, near the salient angle, two or three feet higher than the rest, and to erect a traverse on the east wing, to prevent an enfilade; to raise the blind before the north-east bastion, so high as will just admit the guns to fire over it at the enemy's works; that



that the passage between the upper and lower flank of the demi-bastion should be closed in the securest manner; and that the north-ravelin should be put in the best condition of defence we might have time or workmen to do. The working party, of about one hundred men, with such Cooleys, Pallankeen boys and others, as I could collect, were set about the several articles abovementioned. The firing on our side was little to-day, except from wall pieces; and not even a musket shot came from the enemy. Five Chelingas were seen this morning going out of St. Thome bar, and sailed to the southward, as we apprehended for stores.

1758

LAST night the subaltern on duty in the north-east angle of the covered way, with twenty-one men and some Sepoys, was ordered to sally on the retrenchment and works which we supposed the enemy was carrying on; but it being rather too light they were discovered, and the Sepoys taking a pannick at a party of six horse which appeared, ran away, which intimidated the Europeans, and they, after giving their fire, retreated also. We had one European killed and two dangerously wounded: the Sepoys suffered in the same manner. The Commandant of Sepoys, Jemaul Saib, being desirous of attacking St. Thomè last night, was sent out with ten companies of Sepoys; but taking the direct road over the Long-bridge, he was discovered by a few French Sepoys at Mr. Powney's house, who gave him their fire; upon which most of his people threw down their arms, which induced him to return. The enemy, we could perceive this morning, had been at work last night, and, to appearance, had drawn about fifty yards of a parallel westward from their most advanced breast-work. They also had got a gun behind their first breast-work, and from thence fired several shot at the snow which lay in the road under Dutch colours: the shot mostly fell short, one or two entered and killed a Lascar; the vessel therefore weighed and stood a little farther off, as well to avoid any annoyance from thence, as to prevent a surprize. A boat appearing off St. Thomè, a party of marines was sent in three mollulas to fetch her in, which they effected, and found her to be a boat going from Sadra's to Pulliacat. The working party was this day one hundred men, and employed, as yesterday, except on the old north-east bastion, the parapets of which were finished. This afternoon the artillery serjeant on the north-east bastion, intending to fire a discharge of grape at some of the enemy which appeared at their breast-works, unfortunately some scattering shot

Dec. 20.



1758. shot fell into the covered way, and miserably wounded three Cooleys who were rolling gabions upon the work there carrying on.

Dec. 21. LAST night we fired shot or shells every eight or ten minutes, on the place where we suspected the enemy would work, and by that means prevented them from doing any thing more than throwing up an imperfect communication from the first to the second breast-work. Advice being brought in last night, that the enemy had two guns at Trivelcane, and very few troops at St. Thome; about ten o'clock in the morning near one thousand Sepoys, with twenty Europeans, commanded by Town-Major Bannatyne and Ensign Crawley, went along the beach to the southward, crossed the bar, and marched through the village beyond the Governor's gardens, where they surprized two or three small Sepoy guards, intercepted some letters, took a trooper's horse and arms, and one soldier prisoner; but on advancing down the road towards Mr. Turing's house, they perceived a body of Europeans and blacks which they were not a match for, and therefore returned by the way they went. From the fort-house we perceived, in the mean time, two guns, perhaps eighteen or twenty-four pounders, the one drawn by bullocks, fifteen or eighteen yoke, and the other by bullocks and Cooleys, passing from Chindadree pagoda a-cross the plain towards the Potters village; but being near enough for our great guns to reach them, some shot were immediately fired from the Nabob's bastion, and Lawrence's, which soon made the Cooleys and bullocks halt, and one of the guns sinking almost to the axle-tree at the same time, it was proposed to send a party of three hundred Sepoys, with a promise of a great reward, to nail up the cannon; they were accordingly sent out at the western gate, on the sight of which, and our firing, the bullocks were cast off from the guns, and the Cooleys ran away, leaving the guns alone. Our firing, and the motions of the Sepoys, alarmed the enemy in the Black-town, so that about two hundred European horse were sent in all haste towards the guns, and their foot marched to the west side of the Black-town to support them; this we perceived, and fearing the Sepoys might be cut to pieces, sent orders for them not to advance beyond the little bridge leading from the island to Egmore. The enemy, by these motions, were entirely alarmed, and we had an opportunity of firing many shot at their horse and foot, but the execution was uncertain. About four or five in the evening more Cooleys and bullocks were sent to fetch their guns, and, in spite of our fire carried



carried them off towards Mr. Turner's garden-house; where, I believe, they were left for that night. The working party the same number, and employ, as yesterday. M. Lally, by a letter to Count D'Etlain yesterday, complained that Ifoûf Cawn was committing great devastations to the southward, near Pondichery; and that he should, in consequence, be obliged to make reprisals round Madrafs. As to that, he cannot well depopulate the country more than he has; for, though he may be obliged to retreat, it will be long e'er Madrafs recovers its inhabitants and becomes a place of trade.

1758.

THE Nabob and his family were last night sent on board the snow in the road, with Mr. Norris, a counsellor, and sailed this morning for Negapatam, where it is proposed the Nabob shall land, and proceed to Trichinopoly, from whence he may have an opportunity of disturbing the enemy.

LAST night the fire of shot and shells on the enemy was as the preceding nights; the working party was one hundred men, and employed, in general, as before, except those on the demi bastion, where the traverse being finished, they were set to repair some part of the face and front of two merlons, which had fallen down in the late rains. Dec. 22.

THE cannon or mortars fired last night every ten minutes on the enemy, in order to disturb their workmen, who by morning had deepened and lengthened their parallel a few feet; they had also been at work on their line of communication between Mutall Pettah and Peda Naigues; but had not finished either that, or the work they had been on elsewhere. About eight or nine in the morning a sail appeared to the northward, and anchored about eleven o'clock; she saluted with nine guns, which we answered with nine shot into the Black-town. This ship was the Thames, from Vizagapatam in four days; and brings us advice of Colonel Forde having given the Marquis de Conflans, and the French forces under him, an entire defeat; the further particulars of which must be deferred till the letters are landed, the wind blew so fresh, and the surf ran so high, that no boat could get off. However, that the enemy might not wait so long, we had all the troops in the covered way, and gave them a Feu de Joye from our musketry, and three times seven twenty-four pounders with shot into the

2



1758. the Black-town. The working party consisted of one hundred men, and were employed on the blind before the old north-east bastion, and on raising the faces of the royal to the distance of forty feet on each side the salient angle, to prevent the effect of shot en ricochet; for which purpose the first embrasures on each side were closed. The black artificers and Cooleys were employed on the north lunette, raising the parapets, lining the embrasures with Palmeira trees, and closing the communication with the covered way by a traverse on each side.

Dec. 24. THE wind blowing very hard last night, it was apprehended the Thames, which had only one anchor and cable, and drove, would have been obliged to quit the road, however, she rode it out; but on seeing the vessel to the northward weigh, and stand towards the road, she weighed also, and stretched off to sea; in the afternoon she attempted to fetch in again, but by the evening was out of sight to the southward. The French vessel came opposite the north end of the Black-town and anchored. The fire of shot and shells last night, on such places as the enemy was suspected to be working at, was somewhat more frequent than the preceding evening; and, by what we could discover, they had only enlarged their parallel a little, and placed a few timbers within to keep up the earth. The working party was about one hundred men, and was employed on the blind before the old north-east bastion, and in raising the parapets of the royal bastion. The blacks, in facing the embrasures of the northern works, and finishing the traverses of the north ravelin. This evening a soldier was executed for attempting or threatening to shoot his Serjeant. Finding that the soldiers on the working parties were somewhat unruly, the Governor gave out immediate orders, that all people so employed should strictly obey my own, or assistant's orders, and, in case of neglect, be severely punished. Mr. Catsford, a Company's servant, was appointed a practitioner, and to rank as Ensign.

25. THE fire from our cannon and mortars was kept up last night as in the preceding. The enemy, as far as we could perceive, had done very little work, and that only in deepening and thickening their parallel. Our working party was one hundred men, besides some few Lascars, about thirty Cooleys, and fifty or sixty Sepoys: they were in general employed as yesterday, except in removing the fascine parapet on the sea gate redoubt, and making another of gabions. The traverses of the north lunette were this day finished, and the plat-
forms



forms of the demi bastion were lengthened eight feet with sleepers and plank. The Governor, Colonel Lawrence, and the principal officers having assembled this evening, and considered some intelligence they had received of the enemy's erecting batteries, agreed that the most necessary work at present was finishing the traverses on the royal bastion, and then closing the opening between the north-west curtain and the blind before the Mint Sally-port; also erecting a traverse in the covered way, before the north face of the royal bastion. Last night, as a Corporal was patrolling on the glacis to the northward, a Sepoy fired at him, and shot him dead. In the forenoon a sloop appeared to the northward, standing this way; but the French ship hoisting her colours when the sloop came a-breast, and firing two guns, the sloop anchored, and soon after stood in under the ship's stern; she had white colours, but appeared to be a Moors sloop.

1758

THE fire of our artillery and mortars was last night pretty smart, Dec. 26. and we could not perceive that the enemy had done any thing on the north-east; on the west, in the street near the old hospital, we perceived they had placed some green gabions, and made a work; but it appeared to be rather a retrenchment across the street than a battery. The working party was one hundred soldiers and about three hundred Sepoys, who, with the Lascars and Cooleys, were employed on the works determined on yesterday, and on those in hand before.

LAST night a pretty brisk fire was made from the cannon and mortars on the north front, on such places as it was imagined the enemy were at work in. The working party was one hundred Europeans and two hundred and fifty Sepoys, employed as yesterday.

27.

IN the morning we discovered that they had thrown up some earth among the ruins of the houses a little to the north of the old hospital, and that they had thickened and heightened their work to the north so much, that it had more the appearance of a battery than a parallel. The working party, of one hundred Europeans and three hundred Sepoys, was employed on the works already mentioned.

28.

THE fire of shot and shells, to the north and west, was pretty brisk in the night; however, the enemy had been hard at work, for in the morning we perceived they had formed a stout parapet to the

29.



1758. westward, and, to appearance, had three embrasures in it, though they were not opened; the intent seems to be to fire on St. George's lunette, the bridge of communication to it, and on the bridge leading to the island. Their work to the northward appeared now very plainly to be intended for a battery, in which I observed five rows of pickets, placed at equal distances as centers of embrasures, and by the length of the work there might be room for four more; the direction seems to be against the north face of the old north-east bastion, and the north face of the demi bastion. About ten in the morning we perceived a red flag on the Mount, instead of the white there before; so that we concluded Captain Preston had possession of that post. The enemy this afternoon appeared to be working on their battery to the northward, and several pieces of timber and plank were seen carrying thither for platforms towards the evening; I also discovered a large mortar placed in the communication between the two breast-works first begun by the enemy near the sea side, from which it is to be supposed they will soon salute us. About sun-set a deserter came in from the enemy's works to the northward. The working party of Europeans was one hundred men, and about three hundred Sepoys, employed as yesterday.

Dec. 30. THE fire of our artillery and mortars was last night pretty brisk, and, I believe, prevented the enemy from working much; for I could not perceive any great addition to the northern battery. To the westward I observed they had thrown up a good deal of earth behind some old walls, which seems to be intended as a battery to enfilade the north face of the royal bastion, and the covered way before it; but the form is as yet very incompleat. In the night a boat came from Sadrafs, and brought some letters of the 18th from the French army to Pondichery, which Captain Preston had intercepted. From these we learn, that the enemy lost by our sally of the 14th two hundred and twenty men and thirty officers, killed or wounded. In short, they acknowledge themselves to have been thrown into the greatest confusion, and that they must have been entirely ruined had our party advanced more regularly on them, and been supported by another body to the northward. A letter from one of M. Lally's Aid de Camps to the council of Pondichery, complains much for want of money, and desires they would supply him with some, if it be but one hundred roupees, and that too chearfully; for their affairs were in a fair way, and the conquest of Madrafs cer-
tain.



tain. In the morning we perceived a great smoke at the Mount, from whence we concluded Capt. Preston and Houf Cawn, with their whole force, were there. This was confirmed by an Hircar coming in at noon, with advice that there had been a skirmish, and some French troopers taken. A great number of black troops, horse and foot, with large herds of cattle, were observed to come from the Mount and St. Thomé to Egmore, and two guns were sent from the Black-town thither. Another deserter came in this afternoon, and in the evening a flag of truce with a letter from M. Lally, complaining of our firing at his head-quarters, and threatening to burn the Black-town in return: but of this he had no right to complain, because he is the first General, perhaps, that fixed his head-quarters within point-blank shot of the fort, and lodged a regiment, and his ammunition, at the same place. The working party, of one hundred men and three hundred Sepoys, employed as before, except on the blind before the old north-east bastion, which which was finished yesterday.

1759.

LAST night, and towards the morning particularly, the fire from the cannon and mortars was rather smarter than before. At day-break a large body of Sepoys, the first company of grenadiers, and the troop of horse, went over the bar to the southward, and into Trivelcane village, where they surprized a small guard or two of Sepoys, and intercepted several letters; from which we learn, that a frigate was arrived from the islands to Pondichery, and had brought about two hundred thousand dollars; but no mention was made of any forces. The going out of our Sepoys gave M. Lally the alarm, so that three or four piquets of Europeans, and some European horse, with guns, were seen marching from the Black-town to Egmore. A party of forty Europeans and as many Sepoys, in eight boats, were sent off in the night to stretch a chain out to the eastward, lest the boats to the southward, which had brought the enemy ammunition, should slip by and land it to the northward. Letters came in, about ten o'clock in the evening, from Captain Preston, acquainting us, that in the morning the enemy, in number about one thousand, black and white, under Colonel Kenelly, had about day-break advanced four guns near the Mount, and cannonaded him, which our people answered so briskly that the French retreated; afterwards they came on with two guns, which our people made a push at and took, killing

Dec. 31.



1758. killing fifteen of the French on the spot, and wounding Colonel Kenelly, one Captain, and twenty-five men.

AN artillery man and hussar came in last night. In the afternoon a large ship appeared to the north-east, and by sun-set was near east of the fort, with her hull just appearing. The French ship hoisted first English colours, then French, and fired two guns; but the other ship stood on to the southward, and shewed some colours which had a white field, perhaps Portuguese. The enemy's works to the northward appeared to have received no addition this morning, but that to the westward plainly appeared to be designed for two batteries; one, in which three or four embrasures were formed, apparently to fire in the north-west lunette, and the other, of five or six embrasures, not yet traced, to inflade the face of the royal bastion, and covered way before it. The working party consisted of one hundred Europeans, about forty Cooleys, thirty Lascars, ten Peons, the Mestry bricklayers, and about sixty Sepoys; who were all employed on the several works before-mentioned.

1759. LAST night, about ten o'clock, came in two deserters, and in-
January 1 formed us that M. Lally proposed to usher in the new year by a bombardment; however, the night and morning passed without any fire but what was on our side. The enemy having made large detachments to oppose Captain Preston and Isouf Cawn, was the reason, I suppose, of their working very little last night; for I could not perceive in the morning any material alteration in their works to the north or west. Letters last night from Sadras inform us, that a Moors vessel, from the Nicabars to Porto Novo, brought advice of twelve English ships being at those islands, and ready to sail for this place. The ship which appeared in the offing was from Macao, had touched at Massulipatam, where a ship of ours (the Hardwick) had prevented her from selling any thing; so that she intends to break bulk at Negapatam, and come up the coast. Isouf Cawn, we hear, has left the Mount, and is gone to Trevambore, about a league south of St. Thome; and the French, apprehensive of that post, have sent all their black troops from Egmore and a strong body of Europeans to support them. The working party was one hundred Europeans, one hundred Sepoys, and the same Cooleys and Lascars as mentioned yesterday



yesterday : they were employed as before, except in making traverses before the magazine doors of the Nabob's bastion.

1759.

Jan. 2

OUR fire of artillery and mortars was last night very brisk; but as soon as the light appeared, the enemy began to fire from four or five pieces of cannon on their western battery (D), and one mortar; they also threw twelve inch shells from four or five large mortars placed near the west end of their battery (C) to the northward. This early salute surprized us, but as we had ten or twelve heavy cannon which bore on the enemy's battery to the westward, two of their guns were soon knocked to pieces, and their merlons so much damaged that they withdrew their guns before eight o'clock. From their mortars they threw shells till past seven at night, commonly four in a flight, which were in general aimed at the fort-house, and so well thrown, that two fell on the top and pierced the first and second roof; many others fell within the square, and ruined some of the rooms; other houses were also much damaged: but, what is most remarkable, not one European or Sepoy was wounded by shot or shell, nor any other person hurt but a Dubash and a child or two. By letters from Captain Preston, and also by five deserters which came into us in the evening, we learnt, that, early in the morning, M. Soupire, Major-general, who commanded at St. Thomé, had marched a strong body and attacked him and Isouf Cawn, who lay near Trevambore, in three divisions; that the enemy had put our first division in some disorder, taken their two guns, and some prisoners; but that the broken troops, having joined the second division, fell on the enemy in their turn, and put them to flight, killing about fifty Europeans on the spot, with two officers, and, if we may believe the deserters, the troop of M. Aumont was very roughly handled, a troop of hussars cut to pieces, and three companies of grenadiers greatly disordered: our guns and prisoners were retaken. It was to favour this attack of M. Soupire that the enemy began their fire earlier by some days than they would otherwise have done, to withdraw our attention from what passed to the southward. We had advice to-day that M. La Tour, under pretence of a visit in marching from Pondichery this way, had seized on * Sadrafs, and put a garrison therein; and that M. Lally had given orders for the same finesse to be practised on * Pouliacat. His design on these places was the reason, we suppose, that, in a passport granted

Both belonging to the Dutch.

some



1759. some of our ladies, he excepted their going to Poullacat or Sadrafs; however, three boats, with several ladies in them; were sent off to Sadrafs without passports before this news arrived; so that we fear they will all be seized.

Jan. 3. LAST night we threw many shells, and fired many shot at the enemy's works, but they ceased firing after eight o'clock. In the morning we observed they had closed up the embrasures of their western battery, which was much disordered by our cannon; they had also added something in height and thickness to their northern battery, but did not fire from either cannon or mortars. We observed this day about sixty or seventy European horse returning in a straggling manner from the southward towards the Black-town, and among them thirty or forty led horses, which we imagine lost their riders in the action yesterday against Captain Preston and Isouf Cawn. The working party was one hundred men and about two hundred Sepoys, who were employed in finishing the work a-cross the gut to the northward, in making traverses before the doors of the Nabob's bastion, and a-cross the streets leading to the south curtain, where the guards are in future to parade.

4. OUR artillery and mortars made a brisk fire last night on the enemy's batteries, but neither shell nor shot was returned from them; however, in the morning I observed they had opened the epaulment of their northern battery, and let in fascines for the facing of the embrasures; they also had repaired part of the western battery, where we discovered two guns in the morning; but on our firing a few shot they were withdrawn, and the embrasures choaked with fascines. Yesterday I drew out the following instructions for my assistants, dividing them into two reliefs; and this morning Mess. Leigh and Cotsford went on duty, to be relieved by Lieutenants Eiser and Stevenson to-morrow. The working party was one hundred men and two hundred and fifty Sepoys, employed as yesterday.

“ THAT the business dependant on the engineers may be conducted with greater regularity and care, it is ordered,

“ THAT Captain-Lieutenant Lee, Engineer in ordinary, and Ensign Cotsford, practitioner, do attend on the front attacked, together; and Lieutenant Eiser, of his Majesty's sixty-fourth regiment,
Engineer



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

169

Engineer extraordinary, and Lieutenant Stevenson, Sub-engineer, do also attend the front attacked, together; and that these four gentlemen do relieve each other, two and two, every twenty-four hours, at the same time as the guard is relieved.

1759.

“ THAT the senior Engineer on duty, every twenty-four hours, do make a report to me if any very extraordinary occurrence happens; that he acquaint the senior Engineer who relieves him, with such observations as he has made while on duty, and with the nature of the work carrying on; and also reports to me, by writing, in general terms, what has been executed during his tour of duty.

“ THAT the senior Engineer going on duty every evening or morning, do attend the parade, and receive the working party, which he is to distribute according to the orders he has received; or, if he has none in particular, in such a manner as he thinks the service may require.

“ THAT the senior Engineer on duty, on application being made to him by any military or artillery officer, for the repairing or security of any work, do give them all the assistance he can; and he is to take care that the parapets, embrasures, platforms, and the works in general, are kept in the best condition possible. The master bricklayer, and master carpenter, have orders to follow the directions of the Engineers on duty, and give all the assistance they can in their branches.”

OUR artillery and mortars fired pretty briskly last night on the enemy's batteries, but they neither fired shot nor shell, in the night or to-day; they were not idle, however, having finished the facing and almost opened seven embrasures in their northern battery, where I perceived three guns in the evening, and in the morning three in the west battery, which were soon masked or removed. To-day I again proposed to the Governor and Colonel Lawrence erecting a battery behind the covered way in the salient place of arms before the demi bastion, and had permission about six in the evening, and a working party of one hundred fresh men; which I immediately set to work under Lieutenants Eifer and Stevenson. This battery, of at least five guns, I thought absolutely necessary to render our fire equal to the enemy's; for their battery of seven or eight guns, fronting directly

Jan. 5.



1759. the face of the old north-east bastion, will fire on the north face of the demi obliquely. To oppose this fire we have only three guns on the old north-east bastion, which bear direct; two in the north ravelin, fire in an oblique line; and three or four from the royal bastion, which also fire obliquely, and therefore have no great chance of ruining the enemy's guns. Now the new battery I propose will be a direct grazing fire, and can neither be enfiladed nor beaten down, because the glacis is the parapet, and the embrasures will be cut through it. The working party was one hundred men, besides two hundred Sepoys, employed as before.

Jan. 6. OUR fire from the cannon and mortars was not last night very brisk. The enemy, in the morning, as soon as they could well see, threw five shells into the town, as a signal for their other batteries to begin; and about seven began to fire from six guns and as many mortars from their north battery (B), and from their west battery (D), with three guns pointed on Pigot's bastion (g); and four (E) with an howitz firing on the flank of the demi bastion, and enfilading the covered way before the north face of the royal bastion; from these batteries they continued to fire till about five in the evening, and threw near one hundred and fifty shells, besides shot, chiefly into and over the town. The damage done the works is very trifling; but the damage done the houses in the town, where shells or shot fell, have suffered much. Our fire of artillery and mortars was much superior to the enemy's, and, to appearance, greatly disordered their merlons. We also learn by a deserter from the enemy's artillery, that our shells dismounted one of their mortars, and killed three men in the north battery. The working party was one hundred men, and chiefly employed in forwarding the battery in the north-east angle: as to Sepoys or blacks, we had little or no work from them.

LAST night the enemy threw but few shells, and we only a shot or shell now and then. About four in the morning we were surprised with the arrival of three boats, with a Frenchman in each: they were the boats which had been sent the third instant with the ladies to Sadras. The French having seized that place, also seized the boats, and loading them with one hundred and fifty shot of twenty-four pounds, one thousand empty cartridges, fifty steel caps, fifty barrels of powder, and fifteen hundred sand-bags, sent them back, with a soldier in each, to the Black-town. The boat-fellows,
towards



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

171

towards the morning, being opposite Madrafs, seized the arms of the sleeping soldiers, poured water on the locks, then tied the men, and landed the boats at our sea gate.

1759.

THE enemy's fire was very brisk, till five in the evening, from their cannon and mortars, and then they were silent; in order, I suppose, to repair their works. Our works, though not much damaged, bear, however, a rough aspect, and the demi bastion, as well as Pigot's, is stuck pretty full of shot. The shells the enemy threw have greatly damaged the houses in the town, but have not hurt many people; three Europeans only being killed this day. Our working party could do nothing in the day; a few indeed attempted to work in the north-east salient angle of the covered way; but the enemy having discovered them, fired so briskly, that Lieut. Stevenson, who directed them, was knocked down by the wind of a shot, but only slightly hurt on the cheek; so the party returned. The enemy opened a new battery near the burying-ground (F).

As I found the soldiers, unused to such duty, were in general extremely awkward in repairing the damaged works, I conceived that the service would be much better carried on by appointing a Pioneer company, composed of volunteers drawn from the several corps, and to do no other duty but repair the works; so that by constantly employing the same people, they might more readily execute the service they were set about. I accordingly made application, and succeeded. The company to consist of two officers, Lieutenant Meyers, and Ensign West, six serjeants, six corporals, and eighty-eight private. Two companies of Sepoys were also formed, with proper officers, on the same plan. The working party was this evening one hundred soldiers and as many Sepoys; employed in repairing the embrasures, platforms, and forwarding the battery in the covered way before the demi bastion.

Jan. 8.

THIS morning the enemy opened two embrasures more from their battery near the burying-ground, and some earth appeared to be cast up near a little upper room house beyond the Pettah bridge (h). In the night they threw a good many shot and shells after eleven o'clock. During the day their fire was very brisk from their cannon, tho' but few shells were thrown by them. Ten grenadiers were posted in the north-east angle of the covered way, to fire into the

9.



1759. enemy's embrasures; and two twelve-pounders were fired from the new battery. The working party, of one hundred men and one hundred Sepoys, with six artificers, were employed in repairing the embrasures, platforms, and other damages done the several works; also in cutting up a damaged stone platform on the old north-east bastion, and laying one of wood: a blind of twelve feet thick and seven feet and an half high, was begun thirty-five feet behind the flank of the demi bastion, to cover the people on that work from the enemy's shot which might come in at the embrasures of the flank, or en ricochet over it; the merlon next the shoulder was rose for the same purpose. In the evening two sail appeared to the southward, and anchored near St. Thomé, with white colours, being both of them ships.

Jan. 10. LAST night the enemy threw very few shells, and fired not many shot: on our side we were almost as silent. The two ships which appeared to the southward still remain at an anchor near St. Thomé, and, as far as we can discover, are French ships from Pondichery. Our working party was last night one hundred pioneers, and sixty grenadiers, besides one hundred and sixty Sepoys. They were employed in completing the covered way battery to four pieces of cannon, which were mounted before morning; in filling bags of earth at the foot of the demi bastion, and clearing what the enemy had beat down; in repairing the parapets of the demi, north-east, royal, and Pigot's bastions, and laying two wooden platforms on the first bastion, in the room of two stone ones, damaged. In the night the enemy carried on part of a zig-zag about one hundred feet long, nearly westward from their northern battery (k l), and taking a turn, carried another two hundred feet long, back towards the seaside, as marked in the plan (m n). They also drew part of a trench (L) from the little house in the Pettah towards the bridge; and repaired their shattered merlons with sand bags.

11. LAST night the enemy were almost wholly silent with their artillery and mortars, but were not idle with their shovels; for in the morning we discovered that they had deepened their zig-zags begun the preceding night to the northward, and lengthened that which stretched towards the sea almost to the beach (O): they had also drawn their trench from the house (h), quite to the Pettah bridge, and opened a battery of two guns from the kitchen of the new hospital



pital (G), which fired on the north-west curtain and the blind before the mint Sally port; but I suppose were intended to plunge into the royal bastion, and batter the east flank in reverse. Our working party was ninety men of the pioneer company, and sixty volunteers, grenadiers, besides one hundred and sixty Sepoys employed in repairing the damaged merlons, and platforms of the north front; dismantling some disabled guns, and making blinds before the doors and windows of the arched hospital under the old west curtain: also in filling sand bags at the foot of the demi bastion, and clearing the earth beat down. This afternoon I examined the works, as to their state, and observed that the parapets of the north face of the demi bastion are a good deal shattered; that the brick parapet of the north face of the old north-east bastion is wholly ruined; but the wall being well covered by the blind of gabions made before it, is not much hurt. The west face of the royal bastion is but little hurt below the cordon, and the right-hand face of Pigot's bastion being built to a great slope, the enemy's fire has had no other effect than beating the earth to its natural slope, which is from the extremity of the berm to the top of the parapet. The old curtain wall to the northward is a good deal shattered about the parapets, and most of the palisadoes of the caponniere broke, by the plunging shot from the enemy's west battery.

1759.

THE enemy having yesterday brought a field-piece or two near the bar (12) and fired a few shot on the people and bullocks which had taken shelter to the southward of the fort; and there appearing to be a breast-work and guard of the enemy near the sea side, it was determined to attack that post early this morning; accordingly, as soon as the moon was gone down, the grenadiers of the third battalion under Captain Campbell, and near one hundred men more, with three hundred Sepoys, all under Major Brereton, marched by the sea side to the bar, and there received the fire of the enemy's advanced post; by which we had one of the grenadiers killed and two wounded. Our people, without firing, marched on to the Governor's garden-house (13), and in a small lane or street on the south side of it found the enemy drawn up with two small field-pieces, and about fifty men. The enemy fired two discharges of grape on our party within fifty paces; but the gunners being killed they made no other use of their guns: on the contrary, the piquet broke, and ran each his own way. The guns were taken and brought in, one officer and six men were also taken prisoners, and about ten or fifteen killed or left wounded

Jan. 12.



1759. wounded on the spot. On our side we had one killed, one officer (Lieutenant Robison, of the grenadiers) mortally wounded, and nine men. This little affair has doubtless given our people great spirits, and damped those of the enemy. A party, with an officer, was also sent out in the night at St. George's gate, which advanced on the bridge leading to the Pettah, and fired into the enemy's trench, but could not perceive any people at work. About seven in the evening a party of the enemy advanced towards our north-east salient angle of the covered way, and gave a fire thereon. In the night also a party of our men, with an officer, was sent out to disturb the workmen of the enemy's zig-zags to the northward, who advanced to their work, fired on and killed their centinel, and took a stand or two of arms, without any loss. The fire of the enemy's cannon was pretty brisk yesterday, but they threw very few shells, and those not large. I could not perceive that they had done much to their approaches last night; but the merlons of their batteries seemed to be tolerably well repaired with sand bags. The working party was the pioneer company, and about one hundred and seventy Sepoys, who were employed in making a traverse on the north face of the demi bastion; carrying off the earth at the foot of it; fetching pallisadoes to set up in the dry ditch before the north face, and repairing the damaged platforms and parapets. On the royal bastion old north-east, and covered way battery, the parapet, the platforms and embrasures were repaired.

Jan. 13. LAST night about seven o' clock, the enemy advanced pretty near the covered way on the north-east, and gave a fire of musquetry on our people there at work. They also fired in the night, from their approaches, on a small party of ours, posted on the salient angle under cover of a boat, and wounded three men. From the covered way and north lunette we could plainly perceive the enemy at work near the sea-side, which we endeavoured to prevent by frequent discharges of grape, musquetry, and shells. Our working party was seventy-eight men of the pioneer company, and one hundred eighty Sepoys, who were chiefly employed in removing the earth at the foot of the demi bastion, and the rubbish before the old north-east bastion, which works I was determined to repair, and secure as much as possible, since the enemy seemed to bend most of their fire against them, and direct their attack that way. I therefore raised, and thickened the blind before the north-east bastion, whose parapet was much shattered, and begun a pallisadoe at the foot of the demi bastion



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE

175

bastion six feet within the lunette, which I propose to carry quite round the flank and north face. I also propose another, between the blind and north face of the old north-east bastion. The enemy, in the night, had covered the head of their zig-zag near the sea, by a small return or crochet (o p) beginning near the beach, and stretching westward parallel to the north front. To the westward, the enemy fired with four guns from the new hospital, but did nothing to their trench near the Pettah bridge. Their Sepoys, to the southward of the bar, were at work all day in raising a breast-work for their defence, in case we should make another attempt on that side.

1758

LAST night, as we imagined the enemy would be at work again at the crochet before their zig-zig, we began a pretty smart fire of musquetry from our covered way, and frequently gave them discharges of grape from the north lunette and covered way battery. From the royal and demi bastions we threw small and large shells into their approaches and batteries, so that they were prevented from doing much work. By the morning, however, they had run on their return about twenty yards, and compleated what they had roughly traced the night before. Our working party, besides seventy-five men of the pioneer company, was assisted by one hundred twenty men out of the two battalions, and one hundred seventy Sepoys. The earth, near the shoulder of the demi bastion, having formed an ascent almost practicable, about an hundred Europeans, and as many Sepoys, were set to carry it off in baskets or sand bags, to repair the parapet of the bastion above. The pallisadoe, begun at the foot of the bastion, was continued near an hundred feet more. The parapet of the north-east bastion being quite destroyed, and that work being of the greatest consequence to be kept in good repair, about one hundred sixty Europeans, and the rest of the Sepoys under Lieut. Stevenson, were set to clear away the ruined parapets, and erect others with sand bags, gabions, and fascines, two merlons of which were finished before the morning. An old sally port in the east curtain, near the south flank of the old north-east bastion, was opened for the more ready communication with the north-east part of the covered way, and a door placed in it.

Jan. 14.

LAST night a brisk fire of musquetry, cannon and mortars was kept up from our covered way and the works of the north front, on the enemy's

15.



1759. enemy's approaches, and prevented them from doing more than lengthening their crechet a little, and opening it in the middle (q), from whence they placed fifteen or twenty gabions in an oblique direction towards the sea side. Our working party consisted of the pioneer company, the first company of grenadiers, and ninety men of the two battalions, besides two companies of Sepoys. They were employed in finishing the parapet of the old north-east bastion, which was put in very good condition, and three guns mounted thereon; in clearing the earth from the face of the demi-bastion, repairing the parapet, and fixing pallisadoes at the foot of it. On the royal bastion a blind was begun to cover the three guns in the east flank next the curtain from the fire of the enemy's battery near the new hospital, which takes it in reverse. The embrasures of St. George's, and the north-west lunette, being much out of repair, a party of twenty men, and a serjeant, was set to repair them. The fire of the enemy's cannon was this day very brisk, and their north battery was augmented to ten pieces of cannon, with which they fired in salvos on the old north-east bastion, and soon dismounted two of the three guns.

16. LAST night a piquet of the enemy's advanced to the boats, and drove an advanced party of ours from thence. The fire of the musquetry from the covert way, and the cannon and mortars from the bastions and north lunette, was well kept up on the enemy's approaches. They, in return, threw a few shells, and fired a few shot into the town and works, by which one of the working party was wounded. Our working party, of sixty-four pioniers, sixty grenadiers of the second battalion, and one hundred and thirty Sepoys, were employed in repairing the parapet of the old north-east bastion, which was again compleated for three guns. In repairing, and covering by some gabions, the pallisado before the fascine battery near the sea; in clearing the earth from the foot of the demi-bastion, and therewith thickening the blind before the old north-east bastion; repairing the parapet and embrasures above, and carrying on the pallisado below. This day the enemy threw a great many shells into the town, particularly the north end, and killed or wounded us more men than in any preceding day; among the rest, two of the pioneer company were killed at their barrack door. The enemy last night had augmented their north battery to twelve embrasures, and fired from thence very briskly on the old north-east and demi-bastion. They



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

177

They also filled the gabions they had left empty the night before, and advanced their work in the same direction about twenty yards. (r) About ten in the morning a snow appeared to the north-east, and anchored, on which the French frigate chased, and all their ships threw out English colours.

1759.

LAST night an incessant fire was kept up with musquetry from the covered way, and about twelve o' clock, an officer with twelve men were sent out to fall on the enemy's workmen, which he fired on several times, but a large body advancing, he was killed himself, and three of his men wounded. Notwithstanding the interruption we gave them, the enemy carried on the remaining part of their zig-zag to (s), and covered it by a crotchet or boyau (t). Our working party was seventy-six of the pioneer company, the first company of grenadiers, and twenty-four serjeants and corporals off duty, besides one hundred thirty Sepoys. They were employed in repairing the parapet of the old north-east bastion, which was put in order, and a platform lengthened for three guns, the same number as at first. The blind below was thickened, and the rampart of it enlarged. The covered way battery being deemed no longer useful, the guns were drawn off in the afternoon, and the platforms taken up. In the night we closed the embrasures, and lowered the merlons into a regular slope. Many of the pallisadoes which were fixed in the dry ditch, having been destroyed by the enemy's shot and shells, were replaced, and others fixed round the flank of the demi-bastion; the embrasures of the demi-bastion next the salient angle were filled up, the merlons of the three embrasures next the shoulder were repaired, and the parapet strengthened. The earth at the foot of the face was entirely carried away.

Jan. 17.

LAST night, the enemy brought two guns down to the Bar, and fired a few shot at some Sepoys of ours posted on the opposite side. Yesterday and this night the enemy threw a great many shells into the town, and some into the works, which did us more damage than any they threw before. The enemy, yesterday in the afternoon, worked at thickening the sand-bank to the right of their battery close to the sea, and this morning they opened three embrasures through it, which in the afternoon fired on the north-east ace of the north lunette; so that their north battery now consists of fifteen embrasures. The enemy extended their parallel or crotchet (t) at the

18.

A a

foot



1759. foot of the glacis westward about fifteen yards, but in a rough unfinished manner, as indeed their whole work appears to be. Our working party last night consisted of seventy-six pioneers, the second company of grenadiers, and one hundred and thirty Sepoys, who were employed in clearing the earth at the foot of the demi bastion, finishing the pallisadoes in the dry ditch, levelling the earth in the north-east angle of the covered way, raising and thickening the blind before the old north-east bastion, and giving the parapets of that bastion an entire repair. To day the enemy did not fire from their battery near the old hospital, and the embrasures appeared closed up.

Jan. 19. NOTWITHSTANDING the fire which we kept up last night from our musquetry, cannon and mortars, the enemy advanced by a third zig-zag (v) across the salient angle of the glacis. In the forenoon, the enemy fired pretty smartly from their musquetry behind their first crotchet. They also brought two heavy guns (o) to the south of the Bar, and threw some shot into the town. Our working party last night was one officer, three serjeants, and fifty-six pioneers, the first company of grenadiers, and thirty-two serjeants and corporals, who were employed in levelling the earth raised for the guns in the north-east angle of the covered way, clearing the earth from the foot of the demi bastion, carrying a pallisadoe across the dry ditch before the east wing, thickening and raising the blind, and repairing the embrasures of the north-east bastion. The enemy's shells this day set fire to the sorting warehouse, to a warehouse in Gloucester lane, and to some salt-petre in Middle-gate street, so that the town was on fire in three places at once.

20. LAST night the enemy threw very few shells or shot into the works or town; nor did they advance their works more than by producing the third zig zag from the ridge of the glacis obliquely to the sea-side, where they crowned it by a small return of four or five gabions. In the afternoon, I observed a few Europeans working at a barbet parapet (o) near the fishers huts to the southward of the bar, where the enemy had brought two large cannon, or one cannon and one mortar; for such they appeared to me. Our working party was the pioneer company and one hundred and twenty Sepoys, employed in the same manner as yesterday, except driving rows of picquets in front of the fascine battery, and making a breast-work before the pallisadoe which separates the demi-bastion from the second curtain.

LAST



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

179

LAST night the enemy threw few or no shells, and fired less than in any night of the siege; nor did they make any apparent approach in their works. They thickened their second zig-zag and crotchet, and laid some sand-bags for their musquetry. Our working party consisted of the pioneer company, and one hundred and twenty Sepoys, who were employed in repairing the parapets and embrasures of the old north-east bastion; in finishing the blind for musquetry; in clearing the face of the demi bastions, and driving pickets in the front of, and laying fascines on the fascine battery; repairing the parapet and embrasures of the left face of the north bastion, and in clearing the sea gate of rubbish, and making a traverse before the gate of the redoubt. The enemy's batteries were this day very silent; but they fired pretty briskly from their trenches on such of our people as appeared at the embrasures or over the parapets. The enemy's method of proceeding, by simple sap, in so confined and unsupported a manner as their approaches are formed, giving great room to believe a sally might easily drive them from their works, and overset some of the gabions, it was determined to send out thirty soldiers and forty pioneers, to try what could be done. A little past five in the evening ten men and a Serjeant went out by the sea side, and an officer and twenty men went out by the barrier in the north-east angle of the covered way; an engineer, with the Captain of pioneers and forty men, followed. The soldiers were to possess the enemy's second crotchet, and cover the pioneers while they destroyed the lodgment forming on the ridge of the glacis. Every thing succeeded as we could wish; the enemy ran out of their sap in an instant, and our pioneers, for about eight minutes, worked hard at destroying gabions, and such things as they found. The enemy then began to collect in their first crotchet, and a signal was made for the return of our party. We lost two Serjeants killed, and three or four pioneers wounded: what the enemy (who had most'y Sepoys in their works) lost, we can't guess; but as our cannon, mortars, and small arms played briskly upon them, before and after the sally, they no doubt suffered. It was apprehended they were carrying a gallery under the glacis, in order to open the covered way by a mine; but nothing of that kind was discovered.

1759.
Jan. 21.

LAST night the enemy did not advance their approaches, but worked at thickening their second crotchet, third zig-zag, and raising the head of their sap (w) on the ridge of the glacis. They fired few shells,

22.



JOURNAL OF THE

1759. shells, and those chiefly into the works. During the day the enemy fired very few cannon, particularly from their northern battery, where most of the embrasures seem to be blinded. Our pioneer company having been out on the sally we could only get a Serjeant and twelve men to work in the night, who were employed in repairing the parapets of the old north-east bastion, and one hundred Sepoys, who worked at a traverse before the pallisadoe which serves as a barrier between the royal bastion and low curtain; they also carried pallisadoes down to the fascine battery.

Jan. 23. LAST night a brisk fire of musquetry was kept up on the enemy's approaches; however, they advanced a few gabions on the glacis (x), almost parallel to the east face of the covered way; and they opened a battery (II) of four embrasures in their third zig-zag, with an intent to fire on the right face of the north ravelin; but it did not answer their expectations in bearing well on that work. Our working party, of sixty-three pioneers and one hundred Sepoys, were employed in repairing the north-east bastion, in making a traverse before the gate leading into the caponniere from the low curtain; another before each of the gates which close the communication to the royal and demi bastions; also in filling sand-bags in the north-east angle of the covered way, and carrying them to the several works. Two embrasures were repaired, and one platform on the demi bastion; and one platform on the north ravelin.

24. LAST night the enemy attempted to push their gabions close to our covered way, but some of our men posted there overset many, which rolled into the sea, and pulled others in between the pallisadoe. A smart fire of musquetry commenced on this occasion, and continued two or three hours, in which we lost ten or twelve men, killed or wounded. From the north-east bastion and fascine battery the field-pieces fired grape in such plenty, that seventy discharges were made out of one gun; the enemy's loss, from such a fire, must doubtless have been great, and their work appeared this morning rough and incomplete. Our working party was sixty pioneers and one hundred Sepoys, who were employed in repairing the old north-east bastion; the embrasures of the north ravelin, and making a blind behind the flank of the royal bastion; but the pioneers being sent for to go and overset the enemy's gabions, little work was done. We lost of that party one killed and two wounded.

LAST



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

181

LAST night the enemy pushed on their approaches in a line parallel to the east face of the covered way, as far as the Palmeira pul-luadoc (y) which runs quite into the sea; parallel to which they made a return. In the night a small party of our pioneers went and pulled several of the enemy's gabions into the covered way, and a small party of grenadiers alarmed them in their trenches. Our working party consisted of fifty-three pioneers and one hundred Sepoys, who were employed in repairing the embrasures of the old north-east bastion, in repairing the parapets and embrasures of the north ravelin; filling in the shell holes in the caponniere, and making a banquet behind the traverse leading to it. About two o'clock in the afternoon it was determined to make a sally, with twenty men of the guard behind the blind, and twenty of the pioneer company, with an intent to destroy the work the enemy had done the preceding night: they accordingly went out and drove the enemy from their approach behind the stockade, and our pioneers endeavoured to demolish their work by oversetting the gabions, and throwing the tools they found into the sea, or our covered way. After maintaining their ground near fifteen minutes, the enemy began to grow very numerous in their crotchet on the ridge of the glacis; on which our people were ordered to retire. We had Captain Black, who commanded the twenty men, wounded through the leg, and Lieutenant Fitzpatrick of the grenadiers (of whom twenty went out) through both his arms, two or three men and one Serjeant killed. The enemy must have suffered considerably from our fire, which was kept up very briskly from the works above an hour.

1759
Jan. 25.

LAST night the enemy pushed on their approaches in a line almost parallel to the north face of the covered way before the demi bastion, and made a return (z) at the end of it, to cover their flank; so that by the work of this and the preceding night they wholly embraced the salient angle of our covered way, and consequently made it too hazardous for us to keep troops therein. Our working party last night consisted of fifty-three pioneers and eighty-eight Sepoys, who were employed in repairing the north-east bastion, the parapet and embrasures; in repairing the embrasures and parapets of the fascine battery, and lengthening it towards the sea; and at the sea gate redoubt, in shutting up the great gate which was damaged and very difficult to pass, by the falling of the viranda; and opening the small gate on the south side; also in clearing the rubbish from the north flank

26.



1750. flank of the battery, and filling the gabions placed on the face. To-day the enemy fired most of their shot from their several batteries into the town; but threw their shells chiefly towards the works on the north front.

Jan. 27. THE enemy, last night, did nothing but widen and raise the work of the preceding night; which we in some degree impute to the detachments they made to oppose Captain Preston and Ilouf Cawn, who we heard were at Ponamalle. Our working party consisted of forty-seven pioneers and ninety Sepoys, who were employed in repairing the north-east bastion; in repairing the embrasures of the flank of the royal bastion; and in repairing the parapets and embrasures of the north lunette: they also worked, during the day, at the sea gate redoubt, when the north flank was entirely repaired, and embrasures formed for four guns. In the afternoon Captain Preston's signal, of a great smoke, was seen west of Egmore, and an Hircar came in, with a report that the French had been entirely routed by our troops.

28. THE enemy did not last night, to appearance, work much at their approaches, owing, I suppose, to the extraordinary guards they were obliged to keep, on account of Ilouf Cawn, whose horse were yesterday very near Egmore. This morning, the French Black horse, foot, and their European cavalry, were drawn up in a line, between Egmore and Capt. Maskelyne's gardens, and by their motions to the right and left, we expected that Ilouf Cawn was near them, especially as several smokes were seen that way; however, nothing appeared. In the forenoon, we observed that the enemy, with several yoke of oxen, intended to draw off the guns they had to the southward of the bar; but on our firing a few shot, the bullock drivers and bullocks disappeared. The enemy having now surrounded our north-east salient angle, and probably intending to make a battery on the glacis, it was determined to try last night if we could push a mine from the counterescarp that way. An engineer and eight men were accordingly sent to open an arch, which had been turned in the counterescarp for that purpose. The rest of the working party, being thirty-two pioneers and eighty Sepoys, were employed in repairing the parapet, and embrasures of the right face of the north lunette, and making a ditch before the south flank of the sea-gate battery, in which a palliadoo was fixed.



LAST night the enemy drew off one of their guns to the southward, but we could not perceive that they had worked any thing at their approaches 'till two o' clock in the afternoon, when they were discovered throwing up earth through a small hole just within the banquet in the covered way opposite the stockade (y), which was placed on the eastern glacis; which makes me imagine they were working by covered sap, with an intent to open the counter-scarp under cover of the salient angle of the demi bastion, where they could not be seen from the flank of the royal, but having come too near the surface, the earth fell in, and they were discouraged. Some grenadiers were immediately sent out to fire into the hole, and throw grenades, which they did, and thereby stoped the enemy's working. Our working party was last night thirty-seven pioneers and sixty Sepoys, who were employed in carrying on the gallery and in raising the right side of the caponniere, to cover our people passing and repassing to the north ravelin. Twelve men and a sergeant, with some boatmen, worked in the day at the sea gate, in raising the south flank of the battery, and filling up the useless embrasures.

1759.
Jan 29.

THE enemy were last night quite silent in their trenches, but threw plenty of shells into the town, and at the north ravelin. By their silence, and other appearances, we concluded they were making a battery some where on the face of the covered way, or carrying on a gallery towards the blind. Our working party consisted of forty-five pioneers, and about seventy-five Sepoys, who were employed in pushing on the mine, completing the right side of the caponniere, and in repairing the parapet and embrasures of the right face of the north ravelin. A sail, which had been in sight to the southward all day, came into the road towards the evening, under English colours, and proved to be the Shaftsbury, from Bombay, having been left by the other four India-men, and two twenty-gun ships, which came as a convoy, the seventh instant off Ceilon, and expected to have found them here. This ship, being the worst sailer, had been an hospital-ship, and therefore brought us only the sick, and thereby added to our distress for room.

30

THE French frigate, last night, came near and received a broadside from the Shaftsbury, and then sailed to the southward, and to-day in the afternoon returned into the road again. A little before her return,

31.



1759.

return, several boats were seen going with men to the Haarlem, a Dutch Indiaman seized by the French, which ship immediately weighed and stood towards the Shaftsbury, who flipped her cable and stood quite under our guns. The Haarlem fired several shot at our ship, and followed her so close, that we tried to reach her with the guns from the sea line, but she was at too great a range to fire with any certainty. The enemy, from their battery of two guns to the southward (O), and one from the northward (H), struck the Shaftsbury several times, but night coming on, saved her from the damage she must otherwise have received. Early in the morning, the enemy opened four embrasures on the north face of the covered way before the demi bastion, and began to fire with three guns, but the earth in the cells of their embrasures was so high, and the battery so ill constructed, that, after firing twenty or thirty shot, none of which came within several feet of the top of our parapets, the battery was silent, not only from its inutility, but, I imagine, some of the guns were dismounted by the fire from our north-east bastion. The working party last night was forty-eight pioneers, twelve of which were employed in pushing on the mine, the rest in clearing the earth from the demi bastion, and repairing the fascine battery. It being also imagined that the enemy were pushing on a gallery behind the counterescarp under the narrow covered way to the eastward, with an intent to destroy our blind, or blow up the covered way, it was determined to open another gallery from the covered passage under the blind, and carry it on to meet the enemy, in case they should advance that way.

Feb. 1.

The enemy last night repaired the damaged merlons of their battery, and endeavoured to lower the cells of their embrasures, from whence in the morning they fired three guns, but with little effect, and were soon obliged to close their embrasures, as in the preceding day. The Haarlem, the enemy's battery to the southward, and one gun to the northward, fired on the Shaftsbury, at intervals, all day, and have sent several shot through her; we, in return, fired at the ship, and the enemy's southern guns; in the evening, a twenty-four pounder burst on St. Thome bastion, and wounded six men, of which four were mortally hurt. The Governor being there, very narrowly escaped with a slight scratch. The Cuddalore schooner came near the road in the evening, and then stood away to the northward again. Our working party last night was fifty-four pioneers and
thirty-



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE

185

thirty-five Sepoys, who were employed as follows: twenty-four pioneers, pushing on our gallery, relieved each other every six hours, the rest, with the Sepoys, were repairing the pallisadoe in the gorge of the north lunette, repairing the embrasures in the east flank of the royal bastion, and levelling the earth beat down on the banquetts of the lower curtain. The enemy threw but few shells last night or in this day.

1759.

LAST night the enemy worked at repairing the parapet, and lowered the embrasures of their battery on the crest of the glacis, in which they opened again this morning five embrasures, and fired with two guns on the angle of the demi bastion, which rarely struck the top of the parapet. Our working party was fifty-one pioneers, and a hundred Sepoys, who were employed in repairing the fascine battery, in setting up pallisadoes in the gorge of the north ravelin, and in repairing the parapets of the north-east bastion; twenty-seven men were employed in pushing the gallery under the north covered way, and under the covered way near the blind. The enemy's battery, which fired a shot now and then from one gun, was silent before noon. About three in the afternoon, Captain Preston, Hous Cawn, and the enemy, seemed to be engaged in some topos four or five miles north-west, and continued firing till five o'clock. The Haarlem and the French frigate drew off last night, and anchored to the northward, so that the Shaftsbury had only two guns from the southward and one from the northward to fire on her.

Feb. 2.

THIS morning, about day-break, the enemy sprung a mine behind the counterescarp of the ditch, opposite the east-end of the cuvette, and opened the wall about twenty or twenty-five feet, but did no other damage than wounding three or four men and an officer in the demi bastion with bricks. The intent of this opening is not very clear, because if it was designed as a descent into the ditch, it is so injudiciously made, that four guns from the flank of the royal bastion fire directly into it; but Colonel Lawrence is rather of opinion, it was intended to destroy the entrance to our mine, which was but twenty feet from theirs, or that they sprung it, thinking we were at work on the outside; for the engineer and people at work on our mine heard the enemy very distinctly at work within the counterescarp about two o'clock in the morning, and alarmed them by knocking, and calling out to bring the match that we might light our mine. Our working party, of fifty-four pioneers and

3.



1759. forty or fifty Sepoys was employed on the mine and countermine, and thickening the parapet of the demi bastion near the saliant angle, which part the enemy's battery seems to be intended against.

Feb. 4. LAST night, the enemy endeavoured to make their guns on the glacis bear on the demi and north-east bastions, by lowering the embrasures; but after firing a few shot in the morning, they closed them as before. In short, the fire from the flank of the royal bastion oblique, and three guns in the north-east direct, is so superior to the enemy's, that they cannot possibly stand that and our shells above an hour or two every morning. Our working party consisted last night of fifty-three pioneers and fifty or sixty sepoy, who were employed in thickening the parapet of the demi bastion, and carrying on the two galleries. The enemy's large shells being all expended, is the reason, we imagine, that they only throw from time to time those of eight or ten inch from two mortars in the crotchet at the foot of the glacis (K). The fire of their artillery from the several batteries, except that at the burying-ground of four guns, was also very slow. The two large guns at the bar were this morning withdrawn, and a field-piece brought thither.

5. THIS morning early we were surprized with the sight of six or seven vessels under sail, and concluded them at once to be our ships from Bombay, but the advance of the day soon discovered to our view the enemy's two ships, and five small vessels, going out of the road, and standing eastward, and as soon as the sea wind came in, they stood to the southward. This extraordinary motion we can no ways account for, but by supposing the enemy have had advice of our ships being somewhere on the coast, and fearful of theirs falling into our hands, have sent them to take shelter under Pondicherry. A red flag was seen at the great mount in the morning, and a great smoke, so that we conclude Captain Preston and Isouf Cawn are got thither, and hope they will soon get nearer to us. The enemy, last night, fired a good deal of musquetry, and this morning fired three or four rounds from two guns on their breaching battery, but were obliged to close it immediately, and scarce fired a musquet shot all day. The four guns at the new hospital were silent or withdrawn, and only two fired slowly at the old hospital. Our working party, of fifty-three pioneers and forty Sepoys, were employed on the demi bastion, north
ravelin,



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

187

ravelin and galleries: yesterday that under the north covered way fell in, and had like to have discovered us to the enemy, but being no further advanced than the banquet of our covered way, we turned to the right till we got into the center of the old town wall, and then advanced forward towards the enemy's battery. Indeed we imagined the gallery to have been under the parapet, and were surprized to see, by the face of the covered way, that we were not so far.

1759.

THIS morning six embrasures of the enemy's battery to the northward appeared to be repaired; and by their withdrawing the guns from the new hospital, it is supposed they intend to restore their first grand battery. Nothing else appeared to have been done as to their works, and their battery on the glacis was silent. Our working party, consisting of fifty pioneers and as many Sepoys, was employed in repairing the parapets of the demi bastion, and carrying on our two galleries; thirty sailors were landed from the Shaftsbury to assist the artillery; and the ship, no longer apprehensive of the enemy, went out into deeper water.

Feb. 6.

EARLY this morning the enemy saluted us with four guns and one mortar from their old grand battery, which cannot be much to the credit of the attack, thus to retreat, after having had four guns in battery five days on the glacis. The old north-east bastion, which with three guns has been maintained the whole siege, seems to be the object of their old (but once more new) battery. The angle of the demi bastion is also battered from these four guns, and as many from the burying-ground fire on the face: so that the enemy have now, as it were, gone back to the sixth of January, and have on us the following batteries: at the old hospital two guns plunging into and enfilading the whole north front; at the burying-ground four guns battering the face of the demi bastion; at the grand battery four guns, firing on the salient angle of the demi, and on the old north-east bastion, and one mortar, throwing shells of ten inches into the town. On the zig-zag which crosses the ridge of the glacis, three mortars, throwing eight and ten inch shells into the demi and north-east bastions, the blind and fascine battery. Our working party, of fifty pioneers and as many Sepoys, were employed in raising and repairing the left face of the north ravelin, repairing two embrasures on the north face of the royal bastion, and in carrying on the galleries.

7.



1759.
Feb. 8.

THE enemy this morning fired with four guns from their grand battery; but the greatest part of the shot from thence and the burying-ground go over our parapets. Nothing new appeared in their approaches. Captain Barker and myself this morning went off in a Mossula boat on board the Europe ship, and rowed from thence a little to the northward, with an intent to come back along shore, and take a view of the enemy's works in reverse. We got so far north, and so near, as to see plainly behind their grand battery, which at first appeared very ill manned; but in an instant it was filled, and a gun or two turned against us, with which they fired five rounds at the boat. This obliged us to make an hasty retreat, and prevented us from seeing so much of their works as we proposed. A deserter who had formerly been in our service came in from the enemy this evening; and informs us, that the reason they abandoned their battery on the glacis, was, because they lost many men from the superiority of our fire, had several guns disabled, and were constantly apprehensive of being blown up by our mine, which they heard we were making under it. He also assures us, that they are not making any mines on their part, as we apprehended. Our working party, of fifty pioneers and twenty-seven Sepoys, were employed in repairing the embrasures on the north face of the royal, which fire on the enemy's grand battery; and those of the old north-east bastion; also in pushing on our galleries, one of which is now under the enemy's battery, and the other so far advanced as to prevent any possibility of destroying the blind by a mine. We had certain advice this afternoon of Major Caillaud's arrival at the Mount, but no account of the forces with him. One of the enemy's ships anchored this afternoon in St. Thomé road, which it was determined the Europe ship should attack; for if she is loaded with heavy shells, as we apprehend, we ought to hazard greatly rather than let them be landed; because the damage they will do the works, now the enemy is so near, will be irreparable, and give them an opportunity of effectually establishing the battery on the glacis.

9. EARLY this morning we heard a smart cannonading towards the Mount, which continued at intervals all day, and was renewed very briskly towards the evening. The action was, no doubt, between a strong party of M. Lally's European forces, with his black army, and our troops under the command of Major Caillaud, who had just joined Captain Preston and Hout Cawn, from Tanjere; how it ended



ended is hard to say, but we hope, from the repeated reinforcements which the enemy sent out, that our people had the advantage. In the afternoon two companies of Sepoys were sent out to the bar, and from thence proceeded to the garden-house, which posts the enemy had abandoned; they found some ammunition, sand-bags, &c. which they brought away, and set fire to the enemy's gabions. It was intended that our Europe ship should make an attempt in the night on the ship which anchored off St. Thomé yesterday; however, it was not done, and to-day many stores were unloaded and carried to the Black-town. The enemy's fire was not very brisk to-day, and most of their shot flew over the town. Nothing appeared to have been done at their approaches. Our working party was last night fifty-one pioneers and twenty-seven Sepoys, employed in repairing the demi and north-east bastions, and carrying on the galleries.

1759.

THE enemy last night did nothing apparently to their approaches, and were pretty silent in their batteries. During the day they fired smartly from their northern battery, but most of the shot seemed to be directed for the houses in the town, among which they made great havock; they also threw all their shells into the town, so that the siege seems to be begun a-fresh, and the attack intended against the houses rather than the works. Our working party, of pioneers and forty-eight Sepoys, were employed in repairing the old north-east bastion, the demi bastion, clearing the earth below, and in carrying on the galleries. The enemy's ship went off in the night.

Feb. 10

THE enemy last night fired little musquetry, and did not, that we could discover, make any addition to their approaches. Our working party, of fifty-six pioneers and one hundred and thirty-three Sepoys, were employed in repairing two embrasures and thickening a traverse on the demi bastion; in clearing the rubbish from the mint bastion, in laying a platform and making another embrasure near the beach at the fascine battery. The gallery under the counterescarp being advanced about ninety-five feet, two chambers were made, and loaded with two hundred and fifty pounds of powder each; that before the blind was opened by a pit up through the glacis, and a branch carried on a parallel to the covered way, towards the enemy at the stockade.

11.



1750. Feb. 12. LAST night the enemy advanced, or rather repaired, a small breast-work they had at the end of the stockade, near the sea-side; but made no other alteration in their approaches. Our working party, of fifty-seven pioneers and thirty-three Sepoys, were employed in repairing the north-east bastion and the demi, and in lengthening out the fascine battery quite into the surf, by means of casks filled with sand; placing a barricade of palisadoe, cheveaux de frize, and trees in front, and raising the parapet. The pioneers employed under the north counterescarp continued to stop the mine, and the Blacks to advance the new shaft. A deserter came in this afternoon over the enemy's lodgement on the glacis, and assures us, that the enemy are making no mines, but are much afraid of ours. The fire of the besiegers artillery and mortars has not been so brisk to-day as it was yesterday.

13. THIS morning, between two and three o'clock, we were alarmed by an attempt of the enemy, with thirty Europeans and fifty Corsairs, to nail up our guns at the fascine battery: they advanced along the sea side from the stockade, to within thirty yards of our work; when being discovered, they made an halt, and after receiving a fire or two from a six-pounder placed near the beach, they went to the right about in some confusion, and returned within their works. The drums having beat to arms, the whole garrison repaired to their posts, and plenty of shells and grape-shot were thrown into the enemy's approaches. We had a Captain and one soldier wounded, and the enemy left five or six men dead on the beach; and in the morning a serjeant of the Lorraine regiment, being mortally wounded, crawled into our covered way, and died soon after: from him we learnt the force and intention of the enemy. Our working party consisted of fifty-seven pioneers and forty-eight Sepoys, who were employed in repairing the north-east bastion, and the demi bastion; clearing the rubbish from the north curtain, and clearing the earth from the right face of the north ravelin, with which banquets were made above. The stopping of the mine under the north counterescarp was completed to-day, and intended to destroy the enemy's battery, if ever they attempted to re-establish it. The fire of the enemy's north battery was to-day very brisk, and that at the old hospital silent.

14. HAVING observed that the enemy, before the rising of the moon last night, had placed some gabions near the sea side, a little advanced beyond



beyond the stockadoe, a brisk fire was kept thereon from the fascine battery, and a sally resolved to be made in the morning. Accordingly, about six o'clock, a subaltern and fifteen men were sent along the covered way till they got on the flank of the stockadoe; forty more, with two Captains, went directly in front of the stockadoe; and twenty, with an Engineer, went without arms. The enemy ran from their post immediately, and our people took possession, which they maintained till the gabions by the sea side were overturned and thrown into the surf, the earth levelled, and the enemy's tools gathered up; our party then returned, having only two men slightly wounded. The enemy being fired on by the north ravelin, royal bastion, demi bastion, and fascine battery, with grape, besides all the works with musketry, must have lost many men. We could have kept possession of the stockadoe if we pleased; but it was not thought necessary. The intent of the enemy advancing by the sea side, must be with a view to bring cannon against our fascine battery; or under cover of the beach, which is steep, to advance, by means of traverses, till they got beyond our place of arms, and then make an attempt on that and the fascine battery together. The enemy were remarkably quiet all night in their trenches and batteries, the only disturbance they gave us being by a shell or two now and then; thus they generally act when they are carrying on any work. Our working party consisted of twenty-four pioneers and thirty Sepoys, who were employed in clearing and repairing the embrasures of the north-east bastion, repairing the embrasures on the demi, and repairing the caponniere before the blind.

1759.

LAST night, before the rising of the moon, the enemy replaced Feb. 15. the gabions which had been overset yesterday morning, and endeavoured to compleat the traverse (N): but the fire of a twelve pounder from the fascine battery, and the shells from the demi bastion, made such destruction among their gabions, that they advanced their work but little. Our working party, of thirty-five pioneers and forty Sepoys, was employed in repairing the north-east bastion, the embrasures of the demi, one embrasure on the royal, the demi caponniere before the blind, and driving the pickets in front of the fascine battery. The mine being loaded, three pioneers attended it by turns, and were covered at night by ten grenadiers. The enemy's fire to-day was very brisk in the morning from six guns on their grand battery, three at the burying-ground, and two at the old hospital; but



1759. but at five in the evening they only fired from three at the grand battery and two at the burying-ground; a great quantity of artillery indeed to destroy defences! The French frigate having returned the 14th at night, and anchored in St. Thomé road, the sailors which we had on shore, and thirty marines, were sent on board the Shaftesbury, which failed to attack her about eleven at night; but the frigate was gone out of sight by the morning.

Feb. 16. **THOUGH** the enemy last night did not again attempt to push on their sap by the sea side, we kept a brisk fire till moon-light, and by their silence suspected them to be somewhere at work. Our people were employed in laying large timbers and sand-bags on the beach, to make a platform at the fascine battery for a short iron twelve-pounder of a new make, weighing eleven hundred weight, of which two came on board the Shaftesbury; in driving pickets in the front, and securing the flank of the fascine battery by trees laid in the surf. A party of Sepoys were sent to level the earth at the foot of the demi bastion; but, the moon rising early they were discovered and fired on by the enemy, who killed one man, and the rest thereon abandoned the work. The embrasures of the north-east and demi bastions were repaired. The enemy's fire to-day was very brisk from their artillery, but they threw very few shells. We got the platform ready on the beach for the iron twelve pounder by noon; so that we had two twelve and one six pounder to prevent the enemy's approach. About noon a small sloop anchored in the road, and acquainted us, that our ships were seen by her a few days before in the latitude of fourteen north, and about five in the evening we perceived six sail to the northward, which we concluded to be ours; and apprehending the enemy, on sight thereof, might attempt something, the whole garrison was ordered to lay on their arms at the several posts during the night.

17. **THE** whole garrison being at their posts last night, a brisk fire of musketry was kept up against the enemy's works. About ten o'clock the six ships seen in the evening anchored in our road, and were known to be those we expected from Bombay. A few pioneers only were employed to lay plank, with nails drove through them, in front of the fascine battery. About two in the morning the enemy fired pretty smartly from musketry, but their shot flew high; fires appeared at the same time in their trenches, and, by morning, we discovered that the approaches were evacuated, and the enemy were quitting



SIEGE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

123

quitting the Black-town, having nailed up all the guns they could fire from, and destroyed the carriages which they thought serviceable. The troops, about six hundred in number, were landed this morning.

1759.

Thus terminated the siege of Fort St. George, after the garrison had been shut up sixty-seven days, and the enemy's batteries had been open forty-six. The arrival of the ships from Bombay with succours, doubtless, hastened the enemy's retreat, and saved the Black-town.

As nothing very different from what is met with in all sieges, or laid down as general maxims, was practised in our defence, it will be unnecessary to enter into a particular recapitulation; but I cannot with justice omit the following circumstances. To the credit of our artillery let it be remarked, that two twelve-pounders from the north ravelin dismounted four twenty-four pounders opposed to them; and that, of thirty-two pieces of cannon found on the enemy's batteries, thirty-one were disabled by our shot, which are many more than we had hurt by the enemy, notwithstanding our works were enfiladed, plunged into, and taken in reverse. I must also mention, as a thing not common in sieges, that the works, by a few men, were kept in extraordinary good repair, and three guns, with a stout parapet, were maintained on the north-east bastion from the first to the last day of the siege. An addition was also made of a battery by the sea side, and two pieces more were fired the 16th of February than the 14th of December. Nor must I forget to observe, that a few raw men, taken from the pioneer company, greatly out-did the much boasted miners of the French, who were to blow whole bastions into the air: for, after the breaching battery was erected, those men, without having seen any thing of the kind before, and without any previous preparation of stantions or tools, were set to open the counterscarp, and, by continued hard labour, carried a shaft ninety-five feet in length under the enemy's battery, where two chambers were made, and loaded with two hundred and fifty pounds of powder each. This work was executed within a few feet of the enemy, and in sight of their lodgement on the glacis. They saw, and dreaded, but could not interrupt it, though we lost many men. Whoever considers the nature of the soil, and that the shaft was carried on under the explosion of the enemy's guns, which every day made the earth fall in, must allow this to have been a most laborious and hazardous undertaking.



1759.

I WILL now proceed to a particular view of the enemy's approaches and batteries, as they were the day the siege was raised; beginning with that on the crest of the glacis.

THIS battery opened with five embrasures; three of which were intended to breach the salient angle of the demi bastion, and two to fire against the blind and north-east; but the construction and position was so ill contrived, that the enemy were obliged to close the embrasures every day, after firing a few shot, which in general flew over. The havoc made in this battery by our shells and shot, must certainly have been very great; for seven guns, eighteen and twenty-four pounders, with their carriages, lay disabled.

THE lodgment on the east side of the covered way, and behind the stockade, instead of being raised with a thick parapet well faced with fascines, and banquetts made below, was nothing more than a little loose earth, thrown up into some gabions placed without order. Nor were the crotchets or demi parallels, which ought to have been capacious and well made works, formed in any other manner than the common zig-zags, which were a kind of flying sap about four feet broad; so that, undoubtedly, had it ever been necessary to resolve on attacking the enemy's trenches with a body of four or five hundred men, we could not have failed to drive them from their grand battery, and nail up all their guns.

NEAR the foot of the glacis, on the face of a zig-zag, was a battery of four embrasures, intended to ruin the parapet and dismount the guns of the right face of our north ravelin; but the allignment of the parapet was so far from parallel to its object, that it was hardly possible to twist the embrasures into an opening that the guns might see our work. Here lay four twenty-four pounders disabled.

ON that part of the second crotchet to the right of the zig-zag, the enemy had fired three eight and ten inch mortars, and left behind them two disabled beds.

IN the grand battery, which opened fifteen embrasures (of which three were directed to the north ravelin, and twelve on the demi and north-east bastions) were six guns mounted on their carriages; and though the enemy had fired from four of them the 16th in the evening,



evening, yet all but one had received considerable damage on the muzzles, and might, in fact, be reckoned disabled; there were, besides, five guns with their carriages, and some spare ones dismounted and ruined. Behind the right wing of this battery the enemy had six mortars of twelve French inches, but removed them, to make room for guns, leaving two disabled beds. 1759.

In the battery a little to the left of the burying-ground, which was tolerably well built, and opened four embrasures, were three guns mounted on their carriages, which had been fired the preceding evening, but were all damaged on their muzzles. Five guns in the battery, and one more, near, lay dismounted, and three carriages, by them ruined. This battery, to appearance, was built with a design to enfilade the right face of the north ravelin and the covered way before it; but it was placed a considerable distance to the left of the face produced, and consequently could not answer that purpose; its greatest execution was on the face of the demi bastion, near the shoulder, against which two guns constantly played.

On the side of the old town ditch, behind a steep bank opposite the Portuguese church, were the remains of four mortar platforms and two disabled beds; and from hence the enemy threw their heavy shells after they had made their lodgment on the crest of the glacis.

On the battery to the left of the old hospital, I could not discover any guns; but imagine some must have been disabled and buried, as that battery was silent several days before the enemy's retreat. It was built among the ruins of houses, and had six embrasures, from two of which the enemy for some days battered the left face of the royal; but afterwards with four only enfiladed the right face and the covered way before it, took the right flank in reverse, and plunged into the demi bastion. Adjoining to this battery, on the left was another, in a different direction, which opened four embrasures, and from whence three guns were fired on the right face of Pigot's bastion for a few days, after which it was silent; but with what view the enemy directed any fire on that work, no one ever could conceive, because that bastion could neither be attacked, nor offend them.

THE battery built in the front of the new hospital, near the place where the Company's garden-house formerly stood, had four embra-



1759. fures, and as many guns were constantly fired from thence, till a few days before the siege was raised. It was intended, I suppose, to ricochet and plunge into all the works of the north front; and indeed it might have proved the most troublesome battery to us of all which the enemy erected: but I do not think they had cannon enough on it, nor that those they had were managed with the greatest address. There were neither guns nor carriages found on this battery, and perhaps none were disabled on it; because, as the guns always fired en ricochet, the embrasures were choaked in front, and the guns not to be seen.

REFERENCES to the PLAN of the SIEGE.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. The march of the party under Colonel Draper, in the fall the 14th December | C. Six thirteen inch mortars, which play'd the 5th January in the morning |
| 2. A party of the enemy which fired down the street | D. A battery of three guns, opened 2d Jan. |
| 3. Two platoons left to check that party | E. A battery of four guns and two howitzers opened 6th Jan. in the morning |
| 4. The Lorraine regiment, with four guns, taken in flank | F. A battery of four guns, opened the 7th |
| 5. Battalions de l'Inde | G. A battery of four guns, which played en ricochet, opened 11th January |
| 6. Colonel Draper's party, with two guns playing on the Lorraine regiment | H. A battery of four guns, opened 23d January, against the north ravelin |
| 7. A party of our troops behind a mud wall, where eighty of them were taken | I. A battery of five guns, intended to breach the demi bastion, and destroy the blind and north-east, opened 31st Jan. in the morning |
| 8. Colonel Draper's retreat | K. Mortar batteries of the enemy |
| 9. The march of a party under Major Brereton, to support the other | L. Retrenchments, or barricadoes |
| 10. The regiment of Lally, marching to cut off our retreat | M. A Fougasse, sprung by the enemy the 3d February in the morning |
| 11. The march of a party which made a fall the 12th of January, under Major Brereton | N. The last attempt of the enemy to advance by traverses, 14th February |
| 12. A Trench | O. A battery of two guns, which fired into the town and at the Shaftsbury |
| 13. The Company's gardens, where the enemy had a picket and two guns, which were taken | P. The royal bastion |
| A. The opening of the trenches, begun the 17th of December at night | Q. The north-east bastion |
| B. The enemy's grand battery, begun 18th at night, and opened 6th January | R. The north ravelin |
| | S. The Demi bastion |
| | T. The fascine battery |
| | U. The blind before the north-east bastion |



W A R

ON THE

Coast of Coromandel.

THE enemy when they raised the siege the 17th of February, marched off with so much precipitation that the Black-town escaped the destruction with which it had been threatened by M. Lally. He marched directly to the Mount, where he left marks of his resentment unworthy of a soldier. Among the rest of his devastations, he ordered three barrels of gun powder to be lodged in Colonel Lawrence's country house, and blew it up.

1759

THE next morning he reached Conjeveram, and immediately began to fortify it against a sudden attack; but the want of bullocks, Cooleys and other necessaries, made it impracticable for our army to take the field till the beginning of March. We had then repossessed Poonomallay and Trepasfore, having about thirteen or fourteen hundred Europeans, for the reinforcement which arrived the 17th of February, amounted to six hundred men complete, and with these were the Black-army of Isouf Cawn and the Nabob's brother.

COLONEL LAWRENCE who commanded, being desirous of bringing on an action, marched towards Conjeveram, and moved round it, exposing his flank; but as he found nothing could provoke the enemy to fight, and being in a very bad state of health, he prudently resolved to quit the command rather than subject himself to certain fatigue (which he could not bear) without a prospect of performing the service he

was



1759. was desirous to accomplish, he there fore returned to England, leaving the command to Major Brereton, a gallant officer, and next in rank to Colonel Draper, whose ill state of health obliged him likewise to leave a climate which was so prejudicial to him, that he found it necessary to take the first opportunity of withdrawing himself from the bad effect of it. He accordingly took his passage in a China ship, and left the garrison full of regret for the loss of a brave officer who had endeared himself to them by every other part of his conduct and behaviour.

MAJOR BRERETON, to draw out the enemy if possible to an engagement, made a motion towards Wandewash, and opened ground before that place. The French marched to relieve it, and came within nine miles of our army, who advanced between three or four miles towards them, where they remained two days under arms. Major Brereton finding the enemy had taken a post which from its strength, it was not prudent for him to attack, and being informed that they had left but a small force in Conjeveram, made a forced march in the night of the 12th of April, and the day after entered the town. It was garrisoned by five hundred black troops commanded by Muttapha Beg, an enterprizing partizan, who left our service, withdrawing himself from Captain Preston, during the siege of Madrafs. Muttapha Beg retired with his party to the Pagoda, where he made an obstinate resistance till he was killed, with the greatest part of his followers; but not till they had made the besiegers suffer in their turn, by the loss of four officers, though scarce any men in proportion. Major Monton, as he was reconnoitring, received a wound which entered near his ear, passed through his cheek, and came out near his nose, but he never found any great inconvenience from it. Major Brereton, in the attack, received a contusion on his knee which laid him up for some time, and Major Cassland was wounded in the check.

These accidents lost them the critical time of action, for the enemy were never in a worse condition; being ready for a general mutiny for want of clothing and pay. The desertion of the infantry was very great, and fifty Maffirs coming over to us were an addition of a very useful corps, and of most particular benefit at this juncture, as they helped to overcome a very false prejudice which our people had been to entertain, that such troops were useless; whereas in fact though exceedingly expensive, they are absolutely necessary for some



some particular services, and the Sepoys are always in the greatest dread of them. Upon these considerations it was at length resolved to raise a body of between two and three hundred Hussars. 1759.

BEING in possession of Conjeveram we remained there a month, as did M. Lally at Cauvery-pauk, till having contrived to cloath his men, and persuading himself that they would be inclined for action, upon intelligence that Iloof Cawn was returned to Trichinopoly, and that the Nabob's brother had also left the army, he moved towards Conjeveram. About this time the regiment grew very sickly, and it being thought that a change might be of service to them, Major Brereton marched them towards the enemy at the same time that the French also had just put themselves in motion, so that the two armies unexpectedly found themselves near each other. Many of Draper's battalion being recruits unused to service, and strange to the climate, were so affected by it, that in a march of eight miles, six of them fell down dead, and ninety were taken ill, and by the inclement heat, rendered unfit for service.

THERE was no hesitating in a case of this nature, for M. Lally being informed of these extraordinary accidents, was in full march; therefore a retreat was immediately made to Conjeveram. M Lally advanced within three miles of the place, and the English could not reconcile it to their sense of honour to be shut up within walls. Major Brereton being greatly affected by the climate, they marched out under Major Monson, who though he was prevailed on not to risque a general action against eighteen hundred Europeans, had the good fortune to be successful in several skirmishes, sustained two small attacks which M. Lally made on him, in both which he repulsed the enemy; and having killed a Captain, a subaltern, and eighteen grenadiers, rendered his small force so respectable to the enemy that M. Lally, convinced that there was no real disposition in his army for an engagement, prudently decamped and marched in the night to Trivatoor, which is twenty miles distant. He then sent his army into cantonments and went himself to Pondichery, heartily tired of his command and of the country, as he would not scruple frequently to declare. The same complaints were universally made by all his officers, and most surprizing it is that they could so long keep together, unpaid, a body of troops continually clamouring for their arrears. At length the whole regiment of Lorraine mutined to a man, and taking



200 WAR ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL

1759. taking possession of four guns, marched out of the garrison with their colours to a considerable distance, where they declared their resolution to support themselves, and put the neighbouring country under contribution for their maintenance. The officers followed them and by entreaty and promises endeavoured to prevail with them to return to their duty. The intention of the soldiers was not to desert to the English ; but only to declare off from serving without pay ; therefore the officers were never able to get from them any other answer but that they would agree to return, provided their arrears were paid in three days, otherwise they would, from that moment, begin to subsist themselves in the country. Advice of this being dispatched to Pondichery, a supply of money was immediately sent out, and dispatched on the third day, with a promise that the remainder of their arrears should be paid in a week. Upon this the regiment returned to their quarters, and it is remarkable, that not a man of them deserted.

COLONEL



Colonel FORDE's EXPEDITION

T O

G O L C O N D A.

THE events which preceded, and which immediately followed ^{1758.} the siege of Fort St. George, being thus continued to the present state of inaction, the great and glorious undertakings, and providential success which blest the English arms in other parts of the country, may here find a place without impropriety or interruption.

M. LALLY, as soon as he resolved on the siege of Fort St. George, sent orders to Golconda for M. De Buffy and M. Moracin to join him with part of their forces, leaving the command of the army at Masulipatam, with the Marquis De Conflans. Soon after the departure of M. De Buffy, the country powers, heartily tired of the French yoke, embraced this opportunity to throw it off. The Raja of Visanapore collected an army of about three thousand men, marched to Vizagapatam, imprisoned the French chief, plucked down their colours, and hoisted English in their stead, and at the same time plundered the factory. The Marquis De Conflans, in order to punish this insult, marched his army from Masulipatam, purposing to reduce the Raja, and take his capital Visanapore. The Raja not being able to make head against the French army, applied to Colonel Clive at Calcutta, acquainting him with what he had done at Vizagapatam, and representing that M. De Buffy had taken most of the European forces out of the country. He assured him, that all the country powers were unanimous in desiring to be freed from the tyranny of the French; and that with a small assistance of Europeans, he would engage to drive them entirely out of those parts. Colonel Clive weighed every part of this precarious enterprize with that coolness and sound judgment, which few men possess in the deliberation on great and perilous undertakings. The council, to whom he communicated his plan,

D d

considered



1758. considered it in no other light than as hazardous in the execution, and subject to the most fatal consequences in case of ill success. These did not escape the attention of Colonel Clive, but he was at the same time justly prepossessed with the idea of what had been so familiar to him on the coast of Coromandel, where he had so often seen an army of French flying before an handful of English; and he knew that such an event, which he considered as more than probable, would greatly contribute to the preservation of Madrafs. Animated by the expectation which he with reason entertained, and confiding in his own experience, he took upon himself to influence the council in an affair of so great difficulty, and preferring the security of Madrafs to any honours or advantage he might acquire to himself by a larger command, chose rather to weaken his own army by detaching two-thirds of his force, than not prevent the Marquis De Conflans from reinforcing M. Lally at so critical a conjuncture.

If the dangers incident to the prosecution of this enterprize were so alarming, those also merited attention which threatened Calcutta, if this expedition had not been undertaken. For it should be remarked, that at this very time the Shaw Zadah was preparing to march against the Soubah, our ally; and it was necessary, for the preservation of all our settlements in those parts, to lead an European force to repulse him. Therefore it should be explained, that had M. Lally succeeded against Madrafs, the superiority of our fleet would have been no security to Bengal, and our victorious troops at Patna might have experienced a fatal reverse of fortune, by finding themselves cut off from all possibility of a return, it being nearer by land to Calcutta, from those parts of Golconda, which were possessed by the French, than it is from Patna to that settlement.

PREPERATIONS were made with the greatest expedition, and Colonel Forde was ordered for the command of the army, consisting of five hundred Europeans, including a company of artillery, and sixteen hundred Sepoys, with six short six-pounders, and a howitzer for the field artillery; four twenty-four pounders, four eighteen-pounders, one eight inch mortar, and two royal mortars, as a battering train.

THE troops embarked the 12th of October, and on the 20th arrived at Vizagapatam. Mr. Johnstone who was sent before to the Raja,
to



EXPEDITION TO GOLCONDA.

203

to inform him of their sailing, and prepare for their reception, waited on Colonel Forde, to acquaint him that the Raja's army, consisting of between three or four thousand men, were encamped about thirty miles distant, but that the French were much stronger than they were represented, and that the M. de Conflans, with his army, was on this side Rajamundry river, distant from Vizagapatam about one hundred and twenty miles; and that by the best intelligence he could procure, they amounted to near six hundred Europeans, five or six thousand Sepoys, and many country forces, who had joined them on their march. 1758.

THE remainder of this month was taken up in landing the troops, and providing bullocks, cooleys, and other requisites for their march; and on the first of November they moved from Vizagapatam towards the Raja's army, which they joined the third, and marched together for some days.

MR. ANDREWS, who was sent from Madras with orders from the governor and council to take charge of the factory at Vizagapatam, together with Captain Callinder, and some of the company's servants, joined the army the fifteenth. They paid their court to the Raja in form, introduced by Colonel Forde. Here the Colonel (while Mr. Andrews was present) settled articles of agreement between the company and the Raja.

I. THE Raja to pay the extra expence of our army during the time they should act together, allowing the officers double batty, which was to be paid when we should put him in possession of Rajamundry, (a large town and fort then in possession of the French.)

II. THE Raja to possess all the inland country that belongs to the country powers in the French interest, and at present in arms.

III. THE company to possess all the conquered sea coast from Vizagapatam to Masulipatam, &c.

THESE articles being agreed to and signed, Mr. Andrews took his leave of the Colonel, and returned to his settlement at Vizagapatam: Captain Callinder, as senior officer, commanded as second in camp.



1758. THE army marched for several days till they came within sight of the enemy's camp the third of December, which was near the village of Tallapool, strongly situated about forty miles on this side Rajamundry; they had upwards of five hundred Europeans, thirty-six pieces of cannon, and some mortars, eight thousand Sepoys, and a great many of the country powers. On the sixth, Colonel Forde marched nearer the enemy, and gained an eminence at about three miles distance from their camp. The French seemed not inclined to quit their station, and the Colonel did not approve of attacking them to so great a disadvantage, therefore determined either to draw them from their present situation, or march round them and get between their army and Rajamundry. About six o'clock in the evening the Colonel waited on the Raja to inform him of his intentions, and orders were given out late for the army to march at half an hour after four in the morning, no morning-gun to fire, and no beating of drums, but the greatest silence to be observed. The M. de Conflans expecting the Colonel would wait at his ground, and being informed by one of our deserters, that the troops were all raw, and unexperienced in discipline, determined to cannonade our camp, and the deserter undertook to shew the enemy where they might most annoy our people. Their whole troops were under arms at one o'clock in the morning, and a large party was detached with six pieces of cannon conducted by the deserter.

OUR army struck their tents, and marched at the hour appointed, not knowing of the enemy's intentions. The Raja's army being not so alert, was left on their ground. A little before day-break, the French began their cannonade, not being informed of our march; this greatly disconcerted the Raja, who dispatched a messenger after the Colonel, acquainting him with his distress. Our men were ordered to halt, and the Colonel returned and brought up the Raja's army. They then marched on together till they came to the village of Gola-pool, and there they halted on a small plain, about three miles from their encampment: In the mean time the M. de Conflans observing our army had moved, and perceiving our intentions of stealing a march round him, ordered his troops immediately in line of march, and proceeded towards us, keeping between our army and his own camp. We had not halted above half an hour before we discovered the enemy's Sepoys, and presently after their whole line, about ten or twelve hundred



EXPEDITION TO GOLCONDA.

205

hundred yards distant on our left flank: In a few minutes after they 1758.
closed, and moved down towards us in good order.

ABOUT nine our line was formed, but the Indian army not recovered of their morning fright, were all in confusion. The Raja, conscious of the ill behaviour of his troops, and also of his own neglect, upon Colonel Forde's remonstrances, submitted the disposal of them for the future entirely to him; upon which the Colonel ordered all the Indians, with fire arms, to form upon the right and left of our Sepoys on each wing, as the enemy's line extended much further than ours. Captain Bristol, a European in the Raja's service, commanding a small body of European deserters, with four pieces of cannon, was ordered to join our artillery on the left of the battalion.

THE enemy began a cannonade about ten o'clock, which was continued by a sharp fire from both armies for upwards of forty minutes, at which time we observed the enemy's battalion, and their right wing of Sepoys, with a body of horse moving up, in order to fall upon our left flank, for they mistook our battalion of Sepoys on the left wing for Europeans, being clothed in red cloth jackets. The French drawing near, poured in their whole fire upon them, which was returned by our Sepoys pretty smartly, though they were in some confusion, giving way at the same time, while the enemy kept advancing. On seeing this, Colonel Forde ordered the European battalion to make a quarter wheel as quick as possible. They had but just time to make their proper front, before the enemy's European battalion were advanced very close. Our people gave them their whole fire, which made a great slaughter, and giving two or three huzzas at the same time, advanced briskly in order to push bayonets. This motion being so sudden on the enemy, they had not time to recover their mistake; at the same time our cannon galled them greatly with grape shot.

As our troops advanced, their men gave way, and soon fell into disorder, going to the right about. Our Sepoys on the left wing, that had before given way, renewed their charge; and those on the right wing behaved with uncommon resolution, and soon made the enemy's Black forces on the left give ground, by which means about eleven o'clock the retreat became general. The Raja's troops, except the few Europeans commanded by Captain Bristol, all this time were idle
spectators



1758. spectators, only firing a few rockets. Had the Raja's horse, which were at most five hundred, pursued at this juncture, few or none of the French could have escaped; but there was no possibility of getting them to charge, or even advance beyond our European battalion. The other part of his army were more intent upon plunder than fighting. The enemy attempted to rally again at their camp, but were so closely pursued, that they were obliged to disperse in small bodies, making the best of their way for Rajamundry. We took possession of their camp, with all their ordnance, ammunition, stores, tents, and camp equipage; the enemy not having time to carry off any thing but four small field-pieces, and two camels loaded with money and papers, which the Marquis de Conflans had ordered away on the first disorder of their army to Rajamundry, there to wait his further orders. The Marquis, with the commandant of artillery, and their attendance, on finding we had got possession of their camp, made off without waiting for any of their scattered troops, and getting to Rajamundry that night, proceeded the next day to Mañalipatam.

OUR army being much fatigued, the Colonel halted in the French camp for the remainder of the day. After placing the proper guards of the camp, and securing our prisoners, all the pallankeens belonging to the officers, and the covered chairs (which they call dooleys) were sent back to the field of battle to bring the wounded of both armies. The French officers taken prisoners had their paroles given, and leave to go along with our sick and wounded to Cockanara, a Dutch settlement about twenty miles from the field of battle.

WE had forty-four Europeans killed and wounded, among which were two Captains and three Lieutenants; and the French, one hundred and fifty-six, officers included. Great numbers of the Black forces fell on both sides.

IT was a most compleat victory, for the enemy lost their whole camp, baggage, ammunition, and all their artillery, except the four field-pieces above mentioned. Our people took thirty-two pieces of cannon, and the Indian army also took some guns. Though the enemy had such a number of guns, they were ill manned, by which means, when their line advanced, the artillery became useless, being all left in the rear, while our guns moving with the battalion, were constantly in play.

CAPTAIN



EXPEDITION TO GOLCONDA

207

CAPTAIN KNOX, with the first battalion of Sepoys, was ordered ^{1758.} that evening to pursue the enemy as far as Rajamundry, and there wait the arrival of the army ; and the next day, upon receiving intelligence that the French were very strong at Rajamundry, having collected together most of the scattered parties of Europeans, and some Black forces, the Colonel detached Captain Maclean, with two battalions of Sepoys, to reinforce Captain Knox ; being joined, they marched, and came upon the enemy in the dusk of the evening, while they were crossing the river in boats. They killed some Europeans, and took fifteen prisoners ; as for the Sepoys, they threw down their arms and dispersed. Captain Knox took possession of the fort of Rajamundry, and from thence cannonaded the enemy across the river, which obliged them to abandon the four field-pieces left in the boats on the opposite side.

RAJAMUNDRY is a barrier and key to the Vizagapatam country ; the French held it as their own property, and always kept a governor, and a small body of troops to garrison it.

IN this fort were taken more artillery, ammunition, and stores, with about five hundred draught and carriage bullocks, some horses and camels, and a good deal of rich furniture. The Colonel reserved all the military stores for the company, and the remainder of the effects were sold by auction, and divided as a reward to the troops for their good behaviour. The army encamped without the town by the river's side ; one company of Sepoys doing duty in the fort, and another in the town, to prevent any disturbance.

COLONEL FORDE now called upon the Raja to fulfil the terms of agreement, and pay the extra expences ; but the Indian Chief, like all his countrymen, could not bear the thoughts of parting with money, and pleaded, as usual, the impossibility of doing it without going about the country to collect the revenues. As it was impracticable to carry on any military operations without money to pay the troops, and provide for their march, the Colonel was obliged to insist upon the Raja's complying with the articles which were so solemnly agreed to by him, who after many frivolous excuses, and even endeavouring to lay the blame on the interpreter, convinced at length by the justice, necessity, and interest he had in enabling the troops to take the field about the middle of January, he paid the money, and at the same time Colonel Forde



1759. Forde delivered up the fort of Rajamundry. The Raja appointed Captain Bristol, a European in his service, governor of this fortress; and under his care were left the sick and wounded, and also the spare artillery, and some baggage. Both armies now marched towards Massulipatam, Colonel Forde taking the direct road, arrived at Elore the sixth of February, where he waited for the Raja, who went out of the line of march to raise contributions.

THE French had a factory at Narsipore, about twenty miles from Elore, at which place there were a hundred Europeans, and some Sepoys; and M. Panneau the Chief seemed determined to defend it. Captain Knox, with the first battalion of Sepoys, was detached against him, and letters were sent by the Colonel's orders to the Raja of Narsipore and his brother, that in case they offered to molest Captain Knox's party, or give the French the least assistance, they might expect to see their whole country ruined; at the same time offering him proper encouragement to induce him to enter into our alliance. The Raja of Narsipore having received the Colonel's letter, met Captain Knox on the march, offering him assistance, and promising to join the army in a few days with what forces he could raise. On the approach of our party, M. Panneau sent away all the company's goods in boats to Massulipatam, and carried the garrison to join the army of observation, which was encamped about forty miles in our front, consisting of two hundred and fifty Europeans, two thousand Sepoys, and four pieces of cannon. This flying army always kept a day or two's march before us, observing our motions, and harassing the country in order to distress us, and retard our march.

THERE were found in Narsipore two four and twenty pounders, three twelve pounders, and some small guns, with several vessels, boats, and marine stores. All the ammunition M. Panneau had sunk in the river.

THE Raja's army coming up the eighteenth, and being joined the next day by the Raja of Narsipore, marched together with Colonel Forde, and encamped near a small fort, called Concale, on the twenty-sixth. Here the French had placed a serjeant, with thirteen Europeans, and two companies of Sepoys, giving him strict orders to maintain the place to the last extremity. Captain Maclean, with six companies of the second battalion of Sepoys, was detached against it. The French
com-



EXPEDITION TO GOLCONDA.

209

commandant of the army of observation had sent the serjeant word, 1759. that if he could maintain the fort till the following day, he would send him a large reinforcement. On the approach of our detachment the enemy fired smartly upon them from the cannon of the fort, however, by the help of a rising ground, and the adjacent houses of a village, our Sepoys invested it close round. Captain Maclean attempted to force the gate, but was twice repulsed with loss, having several of his men killed and wounded; and finding it impossible to gain an entrance without cannon, he wrote to the Colonel, acquainting him with what had been done, and requesting a small reinforcement, and two guns, which were immediately sent, with an officer of artillery, who advanced his guns close up to the gates, and blew them open. Our Sepoys entered, and made a great slaughter among the enemy's Sepoys: as for the Europeans, they hid themselves till our people ceased firing.

SOME few hours after we had been in possession of the fort, a country fellow brought intelligence of a party of forty Europeans, and some Sepoys, advancing to the relief of the place, upon which Captain Maclean marched his detachment out of the fort, on a small plain to the west of them; but the French party hearing that the fort was taken, returned back to their own army.

THE Marquis de Conflans was encamped in the Pettah, or village, distant about two miles from the walls of Maffulipatam. Here the army was supplied with water, for it is to be observed that there are no fresh springs in the garrison, and here they were posted to so great advantage, that it is surprising the Marquis de Conflans did not chuse to keep possession of that ground, from whence, if he had been obliged to retire, his retreat would have been covered by the guns in the garrison. However, he did not chuse to hazard an action at any rate; but when Colonel Forde appeared on the sixth of March, he moved into the fort, and our army encamped on the ground he quitted the same afternoon.

THE French had an army of observation, consisting of about two hundred and fifty Europeans, and two thousand Sepoys, who lay for some time between our army and Rajamundry, to cut off our supplies from thence: at length they summoned Captain Bristol, who was obliged to surrender, having first conveyed away by sea to Cockanara



1759. all the money which was sent him by Mr. Andrews from Vizagapatam, for the use of the army, and also the sick and wounded. The advantage which the enemy reaped from the taking of Rajamundry was the disappointing our army of the money, the seizing such baggage and effects of the officers as were left there, and making prisoners twenty Europeans, and forty Sepoys.

MASSULIPATAM was invested the seventh of March, the same day on which the news arrived that M. Lally had raised the siege of Fort St. George.

FROM the seventh of March, to the seventh of April, the besiegers were constantly employed in carrying on the usual and necessary approaches. They bombarded the town, and destroyed a great many houses: they battered and made several breaches in the bastions, which the besieged, by their numbers, very easily repaired. On the sixth of April, breaches being made in two bastions, great hopes were entertained of our being able to attack the next day, but notwithstanding our continual fire all night, by the morning of the seventh, the enemy had repaired them; and now the commander of artillery represented to the Colonel, that there was only two days ammunition remaining, having expended upwards of four hundred barrels of powder, with shot and shells in proportion, that with brisk firing all day, the breaches might be opened again as before, but that was all that could be done further by the batteries. Upon this report, Colonel Forde knowing the consequence which must unavoidably attend the raising the siege, determined to attempt it by storm the same evening. Accordingly the disposition was fixed, and the army ordered to be under arms at ten o'clock at night. Depending wholly upon his Europeans, he destined them for the effectual service: and to amuse the enemy with two false attacks, he ordered Captain Knox, with the first battalion of Sepoys, to march at dusk of the evening, round the town to the westward, with directions to draw as near the walls as possible, and begin his fire exactly at twelve o'clock. At the same time the Raja of Visanapore was to make another false attack by the gate way, and front of the detached ravelin, with orders to follow Captain Knox's fire, making as much noise as possible by firing of cannon, small arms, and rockets, and using every other means to alarm and perplex the garrison. The European battalion, with part of the gunnery taken from the batteries,
and



EXPEDITION TO GOLCONDA.

211

and some seamen from the *Hardwicke*, and the second battalion of ^{1759.} Sepoys, with two field-pieces, formed the main attack for the bastions, where the breaches had been made. The first battalion of Sepoys began their fire exactly at twelve o'clock, the hour appointed, which was followed by the army of the Raja according to his instructions.

IN the mean time the party for the grand attack crossed the Morass which surrounds the whole city, and came to the ditch before they were discovered. The grenadiers and two battalions of Sepoys, pushed for one of the bastions where the breach had been made, and the battalion of Europeans with the gunners and seamen made for the other. While the men were crossing the ditch, the enemy poured in upon them their small arms and grape-shot from the flanks of the bastions, which was soon returned by our musquetry. The enemy were driven from the breaches, but still kept up a smart fire from the other works. As the two field-pieces could not be got over the main ditch, the officer, and men belonging to the artillery, left them, and entered the town with the rest of the troops, where they were of great service by turning the enemy's own guns against them. In this manner they fought the enemy, gaining bastion after bastion, till they approached the gateway, and cut off their communication from the detached ravelin.

AT this time a French officer came to the Colonel, from the Marquis de Conflans, asking quarter for the Garrison. The Colonel sent a Captain with the French officer to the Marquis, with the following message, That he could not give quarter while resistance was made in any part, and that unless the besieged would immediately cease firing, and surrender themselves, he should be obliged for his own safety, to put the whole garrison to the sword.

THE Marquis De Conflans dispatched his orders for the troops to quit their arms, and repair to the Arsenal, and sent the same message to the out-posts. The firing ceased in about half an hour after, and the main body of our troops repaired to the Esplanade. A detachment of one hundred Europeans, two companies of Sepoys, and two guns, were posted over the prisoners that night: the next day the gentlemen gave their paroles, and had liberty to walk about the town, and the Colonel shewed them great lenity in granting all their effects, except private trade, which was secured for the captors.



1759. THE enemy suffered greatly, but it was never known exactly what numbers they lost, but by comparing their muster roles, with our number of prisoners, which were four hundred and nine, they must have had above a hundred Europeans killed during the siege, their wounded being included amongst the prisoners.

THE strength of the English in the grand attack was three hundred and twelve in battalion, thirty gunners, as many seamen, and seven hundred Sepoys. On the false attack of the gateway four thousand of the Raja's forces, and seven hundred on the other, but neither of these entered the town. The strength of the enemy in garrison according to their muster rolls the 6th of March, was five hundred and twenty-two Europeans, and two thousand and thirty nine Coffrees, Topasses, and Sepoys. There were taken above one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, one thirty-two, and five twenty-four pounders, and a great quantity of ammunition.

SALABATZING advanced with his army within about forty miles of Masulipatam, some days before it was taken, and there waited like a true Eastern Politician the event of the siege. Our success both there and at Madras, freed him from the slavish dread of the French, which had too long influenced his councils.

ABOUT the same time his brother Nizam Allee, who had set up a separate interest, marched from Aurengabad, and arrived at Hyderabad. This was another circumstance that induced Salabatzing to wish for the alliance of the English, and perhaps disposed him the more readily to sign the following treaty.

Treaty



EXPEDITION TO GOLCONDA.

213

Treaty with Salabatzing Souba, or Viceroy of the Deckan. 1759

(The seal of
Salabatzing.)

THE whole of the Circar of Maffulipatam, with eight districts as well as the Circar of Nizampatam, and the districts of Codaver and Wacalmannar, shall be given to the English Company, as an Enam, (or free Gift) and the Saneds granted to them in the same manner as was done to the French.

SALABATZING will oblige the French troops which are in this country, to pass the river Ganges within fifteen days, or send them to Pondicherry, or to any other place out of Deckan country, on the other side of the river Kristna. In future he will not suffer them to have a settlement in this country on any account whatsoever, nor keep them in his service, nor assist them, nor call them to his assistance.

THE Souba will not demand or call * Gauzapettyrauze to an account for what he has collected out of the Circars belonging to the French, nor for the computation of the revenues of his own country, in the present year, but let him remain peaceably in it in future, and according to the computation of revenues of his country, before the time of the French, agreeable to the custom of his grand-father and father, and as was then paid to the Circar, so he will now act and pay accordingly to the Circar, and if he (the Raja) does not agree to it then the Souba may do what he pleases. In all cases the Souba will not assist the enemies of the English, nor give them protection.

THE English on their part will not assist the Souba's enemies, or give them protection.

DATED Moon Ramadan, 16th Hegira, 1172, which is the 14th of May, 1759.

In the Souba's own hand.

•I **SWEAR** by God and his Prophet, and upon the Holy Alcoran, that I with pleasure agree to the requests specified in this paper, and shall not deviate from it even an hair's breadth.

The name of the Raja of Visanapore.

THE



1759. THE French shewed how greatly they valued this country, by detaching from Pondichery four hundred men to reinforce an army which before was almost double the number of Colonel Forde's. They sent this reinforcement on board the Harlem, which they took from the Dutch, and the Bristol. These ships arrived in the road of Massulipatam the 15th of April, a very few days after the town was in the hands of the English.

THE Hardwicke Indiaman, which was there at anchor, when she first saw the French colours, got under-way, and made ready for an engagement, which continued about an hour, during which time Mr. Samson the first mate (the Captain his brother being ashore) had the address to get to the windward of the French, and came to an anchor. One of them also came to an anchor, but the other continued beating up to windward about three hours, by which time Captain Samson came on board. He was determined to fight his way through them and make for Bengal, where he was to have carried a large number of prisoners, but had then only forty on board. The enemy's largest ship got under sail at the same time as the Hardwicke, and together with the other exchanged broadsides, till finding they were not able to come up with the Hardwicke, they returned and came to an anchor, and Mr. Moracin, who commanded the troops, not having heard the fate of the place, sent a boat ashore about midnight, with a letter to the Marquis De Conflans, to acquaint him that he had brought him succours, and that he should not disembark the men till he received his orders. The next morning discovering his mistake, he sailed for Ganjam, where he staid till the beginning of November, as it was not possible for them to return to Pondichery against the Monsoon. There he lost forty men in an attack made on him by Narraindu, a Raja of those parts, who projected every scheme he could devise to cut them off by the sword, by famine, or poison. Their numbers were greatly diminished by the above-mentioned distresses, and also by desertion, and when all their provisions and money were gone, the country people left them to the distance of a league all round.

MR. MORACIN then came away in a boat with his nephew and secretary, and arrived about the middle of December at Pouliacat, in his way to Pondichery. There were about two hundred men left,
who



EXPEDITION TO GOLCONDA.

215

who went to Cockanara, where some of them landed, and were en- 1759.
deavouring to get the people of the country to join them, but were ~~were~~
attacked by Captain Fischer, who took ten officers with one of the
Rajas who had joined them, and sixteen Europeans, and killed several
more, on which those that were in the vessels sailed for Pondichery,
and many of these were drowned.

S U R Á T!



S U R A T.

^{1759.} **I**T being the design of this work to treat of such events as have been brought about by the military expeditions of the English in India. The last revolution in the government of Surat, must be considered as a necessary part of this undertaking.

To give the history of the former state of this great commercial city, farther than it concerns the present change of government, would be here unnecessary, but without a representation of such alterations in the jurisdiction of the city and castle as have not only preceded, but conducted to bring about this revolution; neither the causes nor conduct of the transactions can be understood.


SURAT has for so many years been one of the most frequented cities in the East, that, from the concourse of Mahometan pilgrims, who make it their road from India to visit the tomb of their Prophet, it has been called the gate of Mecca. The castle has always been held by a governor, appointed by the Mogul, to keep the city under proper subiection, but not to interfere with the government of it.

THE Indian seas having been infested to an intolerable degree by pirates, the Mogul appointed the Siddee, who was chief of a colony of Coffrees to be his Admiral. It was a colony which, having been settled at Dundee-Rajapore, carried on a considerable trade there, and had likewise many vessels of force.

THE Mogul, being equally moved by zeal for the Mahometan religion, and a concern for the interests of commerce, in order to keep the seas open between Surat, and the Persian and Arabian gulphs, had been at the annual expence of a large ship, purposely fitted out to carry pilgrims to Judda, which is no great distance from Mecca. For the security of this vessel, as well as to protect the trade of Surat, which was then very flourishing, he granted his Admiral, the Siddee, a revenue called the Tanka, to the yearly value of three lack of roupces, at the time it was first settled; arising partly from some adjacent land, and partly from the revenues of Surat, which were paid him annually by




Plate XV.



A View of Surat.



by the governor, while his officers were allowed to collect his rents ; 1759. but he had not the least title to any power independent of the marine. 

THE usual endeavours of all Mahometan chiefs to defraud or circumvent each other, are continually producing revolutions. The government of Surat had for some time been backward in their payments, and with-held great part of the sum stipulated from the Siddee, who, to make himself amends, took occasion to send some of his cruisers into the river of Surat, at a time when the Monsoon was setting in, and then made a pretence of the season for their remaining there. Siddee Mussoot, the commander of that squadron, made use of this opportunity to get some kind of footing in the government, and to seize on the castle, which he held till his death, when he was succeeded by his son, in the year 1756.

MUSSOOT not only retained the government of the castle, but greatly encroached on that of the town, and appropriated to himself one third of its revenues ; another third has long since been annually paid to the Marattas, and by them farmed out to an officer who resides in Surat. The walls of the town, with the assistance of the Europeans who have factories there, are a sufficient defence against these plunderers ; but as they are at all times masters of the whole country up to the very gates, it has been thought expedient to pay them duly their allotment, rather than subject the inland trade to the many delays and difficulties with which it is in the power of the Marattas to clog and interrupt it. They are continually hovering about the place, and watching for invitations which through the inconstancy and fluctuation of the governing powers of the city and castle, they frequently receive, and though they know that their admission into the town would be the absolute loss of their revenue for the future, (for their government, wherever established, is fatal to trade) yet from their habitual passion for plunder, they are ever feeding themselves with hopes that some governor in the decline of his power will open the gates and invite them to a present booty, which no arguments of reason or policy can restrain them from seizing.

MEAH ATCHUND, had applied to them for their assistance, to turn out Novas Allee Cawn from the government, who himself also entertained a secret correspondence with some of the Maratta chiefs. Meah Atchund, was brought by a party of Marattas from Poona, to



1759. the walls of the town ; having so far availed himself of their assistance, he discarded them, for the Siddee preferring him to Novas Allee Cawn, whom he thought to be more dangerously connected with them, agreed to join Meah Atchund, and establish him in the city, upon condition that he would absolutely renounce their alliance : but as the government was continually weakened by the incroachments of the castle upon the town, it was daily expected that the Marattas, would take advantage of this state of anarchy, to which it was in a manner reduced, for the lawless behaviour of the Siddee's son filled the city with riot and murders, while new exactions and additional burthens upon trade grew to be intolerable.

IN the year 1758, earnest application was made to Mr. Ellis the English chief, by the principal merchants and inhabitants, desiring him to recommend it to the presidency of Bombay, to fit out an expedition for taking possession of the Castle and Tanka. They enforced their solicitations by entering into an obligation to become responsible for five years for any deficiency in the revenues of the Castle and Tanka, which were rated at two lack of roupees per annum.

PHARRASS CAWN, who had been Naib or deputy governor to Meah Atchund, and properly speaking the acting magistrate, had regulated the police to the satisfaction of the whole city ; therefore it was proposed to have him for Governor, since he had sufficiently shewn how well he was qualified for it by his conduct and behaviour while he acted as Second. These proposals were the more readily approved and accepted, as the English had been often grievously oppressed by frauds, extortions, and many impediments thrown purposely in the way of their business ; as also by frequent insults, violences, and even murders committed on their Servants, with a total disregard to the protection of the company. It was also a consideration of no small weight, that the possession of the castle would be a security against the apprehension of the Marattas. These were arguments for undertaking such an enterprize at any time, but what determined the presidency of Bombay to a decisive resolution, and at last caused the expedition to take place, was the weight and influence of the squadron which was at Bombay, in the year 1759. Mr. Ellis, as it has been already observed, had taken great pains to obtain a thorough knowledge of the state of affairs and interests of the several persons concerned in the government of the city and castle during his residence there, and had
with



with no less judgment concerted a plan for settling it upon a better 1759.
establishment.

MR. SPENCER, who succeeded Mr. Ellis, communicated to the governor and council of Bombay, the best information he could procure of the posture of affairs in Surat, in the beginning of the year 1759.

HE found Meah Atchund governor of the town, but with so little power that the Siddee did not so much as leave him the nomination of the officers properly belonging to him, and those of the Siddee's party, who had been most instrumental in lowering the authority of Atchund, were apprehensive of his entertaining a correspondence with the Marattas. The dread of those ravagers, and the frequent murders, which were committed with impunity, since the government of the city ceased to be respectable, had intimidated the inhabitants to so great a degree, that many considerable traders and people of substance had left the place, through apprehensions of being plundered in the contest between the two parties; and those who staid there were sincerely desirous that the castle should be in the hands of the Company, from the confidence they had in the English, and the opinion they entertained of the humanity and justice of their government, trusting that so long as they possessed the castle, they would have influence enough in the town to prevent the violence and oppressions which had too long raged without controul.

BESIDES the invitation from the whole mercantile interest, overtures were made to Mr. Spencer from two of the principal men in the government, Siddee Jaffier and Velley Ullah, who engaged to contribute all in their power towards securing the Castle and Tanka for the Company, on condition that they should agree to make Pharrafs Cawn governor of the town, or in case it should be found too great a difficulty to set Atchund aside, it should be determined for the company to bring Pharrafs Cawn to Surat with their forces, and place him in the government, by agreement, as Naib to Atchund. This was meant for a satisfaction to all parties, there being several who would be less jealous of Atchund while Pharrafs Cawn was thus placed as a check upon him.

THE principal motive of Siddee Jaffier, was the preservation of his large property, which he could not but apprehend to be in great danger



1759. under such a government, notwithstanding his influence with both parties. As for Velley Ullah, he acted upon very different principles. He had formerly been a dependant on Novas Allee Cawn, and had sacrificed him to Meah Atchund, with whom he held the same place, but with a greater degree of influence; and this he was supposed to use without any scruple, for the betraying his new master to the Siddee. Conscious of this, and aware of the distrust which Atchund must naturally have of him, from his known insincerity, he was for embracing any opportunity of securing himself by overthrowing or weakening that power which he had too just reason to fear.

FROM the character of these people, there was very little reliance to be had on their professions of friendship and promises of assistance, therefore it was of much greater consequence to the success of the design to examine into the force that was to oppose it, than to be vainly looking after that which was too precarious to be depended on for support.

IT was soon discovered that the Siddee had about two thousand men in pay, from which, after deducting such as were employed in domestic services, or kept merely for parade, there might remain a body of seventeen hundred, composed of various people, Moors, Gentoos, Arabs, Pattans, and others; but, they were allowed to be a better corps than Atchund's Sepoys, which amounted to four thousand. To this body were to be added such a number as they could be expected to raise upon the news of the preparations at Bombay for an intended attack. At the same time it was considered that a body of men so raised, could be no great addition of real strength, since they were not likely to behave themselves as soldiers, on the meer consideration of a few days pay, well knowing that they should be discharged as soon as ever the affair was decided. There seemed therefore to be but one thing to be apprehended, which was least Atchund, or even the Siddee, should in distrust of their own strength, fly to the desperate resource of calling in the Marattas.

THE presidency of Bombay, now fully apprized of all particulars, and being principally upon their guard against the last mentioned fatality, in order to secure themselves from any danger of that kind by sea, and in other respects to give weight to the enterprize, desired Admiral Pocock to accompany it with two ships of his squadron.

The



The Admiral consenting to their request, gave orders for the *Sunderland* and *Newcastle* to countenance the expedition, for it is to be ^{1759.} observed, that the *Siddee* who enjoyed the *Tanka* on condition of keeping up a Fleet for the *Mogul*, had so far fallen off in the performance of that condition that his marine was by no means capable of opposing the ships of the Company.

CAPTAIN MAITLAND, of the royal regiment of artillery, being appointed to take the command of eight hundred and fifty men, artillery and infantry, and fifteen hundred *Sepoys*, was sent on board the company's armed vessels, commanded by Captain *Watson*, who sailed on the ninth of February, and landed them the fifteenth.

WHEN Captain Maitland approached the town, he found some of the *Siddee's* people had taken post in the French garden, from whence he dislodged them after a hot dispute of four hours, in which he lost twenty men. He then directed the engineer, to look out for a proper place for a battery, which was erected in the night and the next day, and also the three following, a brisk fire was kept up from two four and twenty pounders, and a thirteen inch mortar. The enemy had taken possession of the English garden and *Siddee's* * Bunder, and had secured them with works and strong palisadoes. After this continued firing without any apparent effect, Captain Maitland, called a council of war, composed of military and marine officers, when they concerted a plan for a general attack, and resolved to carry it into execution the next morning. In pursuance of this plan the Company's grabs and bomb ketches warped up the river in the night, and anchored opposite the Bunder early in the morning, and then a general attack began from the vessels and a battery, with a design to drive the enemy from their batteries, and so facilitate the landing of the infantry, who were embarked on board the boats. The firing lasted till after eight, when upon a signal made, the boats put off, and landed under cover of the vessels, the military being greatly assisted by the conduct and gallant behaviour of Captain *Watson*. They soon put the enemy to flight, and took possession of all the outer town. There still remained the inner town and the castle. In order to attack them both at once, three mortars were planted at the distance of about seven hundred yards from the castle, and five hundred from the inner town.



1759. ABOUT six in the morning, the mortars began to play very briskly, and continued to do so till two the next morning. The cannonading and bombardment put the besieged into such a consternation that they never returned one gun.

SEVERAL messages past during the attack between the principal persons in the town, and Mr. Spencer, who used his utmost endeavours to place Pharras Cawn in the government; but it appeared that his friends, notwithstanding the hopes they had given, made not the least effort in his behalf, even after the English had been two days in possession of the outer town, but signified to Mr. Spencer, that they chose Pharras Cawn should be Naib, and that the government should be continued to Atchund. These considerations, the expence of stores, and loss of men by the casualties of war and desertion, made it imprudent to persist in bringing in Pharras Cawn against the inclination of his former partizans, and the interest of Atchund, who, should he be thereby provoked to unite with the Siddee, might frustrate the whole design. It was therefore agreed to propose this plan to Atchund and his party, offering to secure the government to him, on condition of making Pharras Cawn, Naib, and establishing the English in the possession of the Castle and Tanka. Mr. Spencer accordingly set on foot a treaty with Atchund, and the following agreement was ratified on both sides.

AGREEABLE to your desire, I sent a person to you, by whom you advised me verbally of your demands, and with sincerity of heart, I now write the particulars I can agree to, which are as follow.

(Atchund's
Seal.)

ARTICLE I. That Pharras Cawn shall be appointed to the office of Naib, in its greatest extent, as in the time of Suffdair Cawn, and no body but himself shall interfere in the said post.

(Coorbodeen's
Seal.)

ARTICLE I. Agreeable to this article, I fully consent to Pharra Cawn's appointment.

II. That



II. That whatever articles Pharrafs Cawn has given in writing, or promised to the honourable Company (the particulars of which cannot be drawn out at present, and must be deferred till we can meet) shall be fully complied with, without the least diminution.

III. That the Mecca gate shall be opened, and our troops admitted, and we shall join our forces to drive our enemy out of the town.

IV. The above articles a person in your behalf demanded, all which I agree to and will comply with, and the government shall be continued to me in full authority, and to the above I have put my own seal, and Meer Cootbodeen will sign and seal the same, after which you must send a counterpart of this writing with the honourable Company's seal affixed.

II. Whatever Pharrafs Cawn 1759. has wrote or promised to do for the honourable company, I will stand to without the least alterations.

III. The Mecca gate shall be opened, your troops admitted, and joined by mine to drive out the enemy.

IV. Agreed to, and that we shall act jointly in turning the enemy out of the town. Whatever the honourable Company have demanded I agree to.

A counterpart of the above articles were sealed with the honourable Company's seal, and sent to Atchund the fourth of March, 1759.

As soon as these articles were executed, Atchund immediately opened the inner town gate, and ordered a party of men to assist in bringing the Siddee to terms, who being acquainted with this junction, was convinced that it must be impossible for him to hold out against their combined force, and the general voice of the people. After many repeated messages, with a variety of proposals, it was at last granted, that the Siddee's people should have liberty to march out with their arms and accoutrements, and also be permitted to take away all their valuable effects, and even the common furniture of their houses. This was done with the greatest regularity, and the English were peaceably put in possession of the Castle and Tanka.

THE



1759. The guns, and ammunition found in the castle were secured for the company, as also the vessels and naval stores, till such time as the Mogul's pleasure was known. As soon as the grants arrived from Delli, appointing the Company Admiral to the Mogul, the ships and stores belonged to them of course as part of the Tanka. It should be remarked, that the above-mentioned grants, and all Phirmaunds hereafter inserted, were solicited and obtained before the murder of the Mogul, and the revolution at Delli; and arrived some time after the reduction of the castle.

THE number of killed and wounded did not amount to a hundred Europeans, but the loss by desertion was greater. Thus was accomplished a revolution of general benefit: peace and good government was restored to the city, and the English acquired a valuable and most necessary possession, to the universal satisfaction of the inhabitants, and also with the concurrence of the people in power. As the authentic papers hereunto annexed, will prove that this establishment had the sanction of the Mogul, that which immediately follows will shew that proper care was taken to have the assent also of the Marattas.

PROPOSALS from the NANNA PUNDIT PRADEN, Chief of the MARATTAS.

I. As the Siddee at Surat has not only become troublesome for many years to the honourable Company, the * Circar, merchants, &c. but has possessed himself of the castle, and usurped the government of the place, to the entire ruin of trade and the city of Surat. It is therefore agreed, between the Circar and honourable Company, to turn him out of Surat, that every body may be easy there, to pursue his own advantage, and for the general benefit of the place.

II. THAT the English shall have the sole power and authority to make any man † Nabob there, and the Circar shall approve such election without hesitation; and they (the English) shall have the same power and authority to turn him out, by informing the Circar, (who will not have any objection to it) should he prove a bad man, in any respect, towards the merchants, or any body else.

The Marattas's officers.

The Governor of the Town is called Nabob.

III. THAT



III. THAT the Nabob, &c. shall make no alterations in the customs on goods, &c. but let that article, and every thing else remain as at present. 1759.

IV. THAT the castle when taken, shall be possessed by the English, and they shall have the sole command of it for the safety of the place, and benefit of the government, and for which they shall receive the usual allowance.

V. THAT when the Siddee at Surat is turned out, the Tanka which he had for maintaining a fleet, shall be divided yearly in three shares, *viz.* The Circar, the Company, and the Nabob, each one-third.

VI. THAT the Circar, shall receive, as usual, from the government, what is justly due to them, and pay out of it what is due to Damojee, but both the Circar's and Damojee's officers and people are to give assistance, for the greater import and export of goods, &c. to and from Surat.

VII. THAT the Nabob or government of Surat shall receive, as usual what is due to him from the Circar and Damojee, for the country without Surat gates.

VIII. THAT should there be any quarrel or disturbance within the town, and there be an occasion for putting a stop to any thing any where out of the gates of Surat, the Circar's people are to do or desist from the same conformable to the desire of the English, and not otherwise, and those officers and people are not to offer to meddle in any affairs of the Surat government, or shew any molestation to the same.

AFTER these proposals it was extremely difficult to manage the Marattas, who were continually interfering. During the siege a body of their troops approached Surat, and desired to be admitted to act in concert with the English, but as such an affair would have disgusted the Moors in the town, Mr. Spencer managed so as to wave it without offence, using at the same time all possible precautions to prevent their having any intercourse with the Siddee or Atchund, with both of whom they had been tampering notwithstanding their professions to the Company. At last he found it necessary to declare that he would not allow of any force appearing before the place, while the English were carrying on their operations against it.



^{1759.} *P E R W A N N A **, under the seal of Nabob Vizier Ulma Malecb, Asof Shaw Nizamel Muluck, Bahadour, dated the ninth of Shurval, in the sixth year of the reign of his present Majesty, (seventh of June, 1759.)

BE peace and happiness with the renowned Mr. John Spencer, Captain of the factory in the city of Surat, by the hands of your vakeel, your present and arzee (or request) have been received, and the purport and particular thereof are understood, and your arzee (or request) to his Majesty, has been delivered. The pains you have taken, and the success you have met with in keeping open the Door of Mecca, and delivering our subjects from oppression, we are pleased and satisfied with. As to the Phirmaund for the government of the castle and saned for the fleet, which are requested in the name of the English company, I have given your Vakeel an answer, who will particularly advise you thereof. Let the Pischah on this account be quickly remitted, that it may be presented to his Majesty, and your request thereby granted. In the mean time it behoves you to carry on affairs with alacrity, and be assured that herein nothing on my part shall be wanting to countenance you.

A REPRESENTATION made to the Mogul by John Spencer, in behalf of the Honourable English East-India Company.

THAT by virtue of Royal Phirmaunds of your Majesty's Predecessors, the English hitherto enjoyed favour at Surat, and carried on their business in a reputable manner, till in these days that the Siddees usurping an undue authority in the town, used it to the ruin of the city in general, the lives and properties of your Majesty's subjects being made light of by them, and they even proceeded so far, as to take away the lives of our people, in direct breach of your Majesty's Phirmaund; and in short, instead of being the Protectors of the place,

A grant given, or paper signed by the Mogul, is called a Phirmaund.
By the Mogul's Son, a Nushawn.
By the Nabob, a Perwanna.
By the Vizier, a Housbul-hookum.

became



became the oppressors of it to such a degree, that the just orders of your Majesty, were no ways regarded in this city by their means, and things were come to this pass, that though in consideration of the Tanka, the Siddee was to protect the bar, yet so far was he from doing that, that for many months past, a large fleet of Sancrajee Punt's, Ballajee Row's Naib, entirely shut up the bar, as did a large land force by land, to the infinite detriment of the place, and inhabitants in general, without the Siddee's interfering therein, and there was the greatest reason to believe, that unless some speedy and rigorous measures had soon been pursued, your Majesty's famous city of Surat, the only port of good Mussellmen to the tomb of your Prophet, would have been brought to shame. In such circumstances, the eyes of the whole town were cast on us, as the only persons of force sufficient to save the city from the calamities that it then felt, and was still further threatened with, and in consequence of their solicitations to me, though our business in those parts of the world is only to trade and merchandize, and we are not desirous of taking, or governing cities or countries, yet as all the inhabitants of this place great and small, were earnestly desirous of it, and I saw it was for the good of the place, I wrote to the General of Bombay on the subject, in such manner, that at an immense expence, he sent hither in our King's ships, a great force of good and experienced men, with a large quantity of artillery, and other warlike stores, of all sorts, with which I have had the happiness to procure safety to the city, and ease to the inhabitants, and have procured an entire currency to your Majesty's orders in the place, and your Majesty's authority, by all ways in our power will be preserved in the place, as it used to be, and you will consider the English, as desirous of receiving your orders, such being the intention of the Governor of Bombay and myself, whose whole power will be used to maintain the castle, that we have possessed ourselves of, for your Majesty, and to preserve the bar and sea open against all opposers, on your behalf, for we shall not apply the Tanka you have granted for this purpose to others, as has hitherto been the case; and since our having done this, the enemies that surrounded the place both by sea and land, to its great prejudice, have been removed, we are always ready for the safety of the castle and city, with its inhabitants; and therefore hope for your Majesty's favour, in behalf of the Honourable English Company, for whose good services on this occasion I must refer your Majesty to the representation of the inhabitants of the place.

1759.
~~~~~

**N. B.** THERE accompanied this a letter to the Vizier, much to the same purpose, requesting his countenance; letters went also in the name of the Governor of Bombay on the occasion, to the King and Vizier, referring in general to the above, and the whole was attended with a representation of the town in general on our behalf, under the seals of the Nabob, Naib, the Head Siads, and Officers, and the Heads of the Merchants in general.

*P E R W A N N A under the Vizier's seal for \* Sciad Moynodeen Caun to act as Governor of Surat.*

**B**Y the advices received here from Surat, it has been made known unto his Majesty, that you with the consent, and at the desire of the inhabitants, are arrived there, and that afterwards the Honourable Mr. Spencer, Captain of the Factory at Surat, with the renowned Pharrafs Caun, came and turned out Siddee Amed, who had possessed himself of his Majesty's Castle, and greatly oppressed our subjects, and that thereby the city is now at ease, and the inhabitants satisfied. Therefore it behoves you to act as may be most conducive to the good of the city and his Majesty's affairs, that every body may follow their calling without fear, and the city flourish. Let this be implicitly obeyed, on the second of Shaban, and the sixth year of the reign of his present Majesty.

*H O O K U M or O R D E R, under the Vizier's seal, to Mr. Spencer, to assist and advise with Sciad Moynodeen Caun, in the Government of Surat.*

**B**E it known unto the Honourable Mr. Spencer, Captain of the Factory in Surat, that in these days advice has been received that with the consent, and at the desire of the inhabitants of the Burder of Surat, the renowned and brave Sciad Moynodeen Caun Bahadour came into the place, and that afterwards you, with the renowned Pharrafs Caun, came, and turning out the Siddee from the King's Castle, which he had possessed himself of, and given much trouble to the subjects by oppression and otherwise, gave ease and satisfaction to the inhabitants of the place, with which we are well satisfied, and it now behoves you to advise with, and in conjunction with the above re-

Anot. c: Name for Atchund.

nowned,





nowned, so to carry on matters, as may be most conducive to the good of the place, and the honour of his Majesty, by assisting one another. Let this be done on the second of Shaban, in the sixth year of the reign of his present Majesty. 1759.

*H O O K U M or O R D E R, under the Vizier's seal, to the subjects and inhabitants of Surat, to acknowledge and assist Sciad Moynodeen Caun, as Governor of Surat.*

**B**E it known unto all the principal Sciads, Shaiks, and otherwise, and old men of understanding, as also to all the merchants, and others our subjects, inhabitants of Surat, that his Majesty is made acquainted by advices from thence, that by your consent, and at your desire, the brave and renowned Sciad Moynodeen Caun, is come there, and after him Mr. Spencer, Captain of the Factory at Surat, with the renowned Pharrafs Caun, came and turned out Siddee Amed, who possessed himself of his Majesty's castle, and greatly oppressed our subjects, and that thereby the city is now at ease, and the inhabitants satisfied. Therefore it behoves you, in all respects, to assist and advise the said Moynodeen Caun, and with one accord to concur in every thing for the good of the place, which I would have implicitly obeyed on the second of Shaban, and the sixth year of the reign of his present Majesty.

*H O U S B U L-H O O K U M, under the great seal of the Nabob Vizier, Ulmah Maleck, Nizam al Muluck Bakadour.*

**B**E peace unto the high and renowned Mr. John Spencer. The courage and conduct you have shewn in his Majesty's service, for the good of our subjects the inhabitants of Surat, are made known to his Majesty, and their letter expressing their satisfaction therewith, has also been shewn, with which his Majesty is well satisfied, and praises you therefore upon this account. He has been pleased to order this Housbul-Hookum to be sent you, that you may take care of his Majesty's castle, and take the preservation of the trade of these seas particularly upon you, so that the inhabitants of Surat may carry on their business, and live in ease and quiet, and the ships and vessels going to and coming from the most remarkable ports, as well as others, be in no fear from rovers and pirates. The Fhirmaund for the government of the castle, and Perwannah for the fleet, being given in charge





1759. charge to the English Company, shall be sent you from Court, on the first of the month of Zickat, and the sixth year of the reign of his present Majesty, (the 24th of June, 1759.)

N. B. The Housbul-Hookum to the Governor, is in the same words as the above.

*PERWANN A, under the Coochuck, (or the small seal) of the Nabob Vizier Ulma Maleck, Nizam al Muluck Bahadour, to Mr. John Spencer.*

THE Arzee of the high and renowned, with the present, and letter expressing the merchant's satisfaction, have been received by the hands of Hadee Caun. The conduct and courage you have shewn for the good of the inhabitants of Surat, and his Majesty's service, have been in a particular manner made known to him, with which he is well pleased, and praises you therefore. It now behoves you with a satisfied mind particularly to look to the peace of the inhabitants, and the preservation of his Majesty's castle, and to take care that the trade of the seas is kept open and safe, that the Hadjees (or Pilgrims) and merchants meet with no trouble or impediment, and that the ships to and from the renowned and other ports, may be safe from any fear of violation from rovers and pirates. The Phirmaund for the government, and Perwannah for the fleets, being given in charge to the English Company, shall be sent you from Court.

*PERWANN A, under the Coochuck, (or the small seal) of the Nabob Vizier Ulma Maleck, Nizam al Muluck Bahadour, to Mr. John Spencer.*

HIGH and renowned, the sums usually remitted from Surat are now much wanted at Court, and his Majesty is pressing for them. As yet what money the renowned Moynodeen Caun may have sent, is not yet received, therefore Perwannah's have been wrote to hasten him in that respect; but it likewise behoves you to press him on this head, and procure the remittance of the Tohod by bills, as soon as possible. Look upon this as absolutely necessary.

P H I R-





# S U R A T.

231

*PHIRMAUND or ORDER, under the Great Mogul's seal, 1759.  
and under sealed by his Vizier, for the Honourable Company's holding the  
government of the castle of Surat.*

Verfes  
from the Koran,  
in Arabick.

The  
Great Seal of  
the King's  
Names in  
Persian.

**L**ET the renowned among the people, the English Company hope for his Majesty's favour, and be it known unto them, that in these happy and victorious times, his Majesty has been pleased, out of his great grace and favour, to grant unto them, the Killidaree, or government of the Castle of Surat, on its being taken from Muffoot Achmed Caun, it therefore is requisite, that they should be very grateful for this his Majesty's favour, and look particularly to the welfare of the castle, keeping proper order and discipline among the troops, and having provisions, stores, and ammunition always in readiness, as has been usual, which is strictly and especially required of them by his Majesty.

GIVEN on the eleventh day of Mohoram, and in the sixth year of his Majesty's reign, (or 4th of September, 1759.)

AT the back of the Phirmaund is the Grand Vizier's Seal, and all his titles wrote at length.

*DUSTUCK, or ORDER, under the Chan Sumaun, or Steward's seal, for the Honourable Company's holding the King's fleet.*

**T**HE Dustuck in the name of the noble and renowned English Company, is as follows. By his Majesty's Housbul-Hookum, the office of Deroga of the great fleet, belonging to the Bunder of Surat, vacant by the dismissal of Siddee Yacood Caun, is now delivered into your charge ; therefore it behoves you, to execute the said office, with great care and circumspection, and carry on the business

of





1759. of it justly, and with moderation. Look on this as absolutely required of you. Dated the second day of Mohoram, in the sixth year of his Majesty's reign, (the 26th of August, 1759.)

AT the back of this is the seal of Zecah al Doulat Tidaudin Caun Bahadour, who is Caun Samaun, or Steward to his Majesty, whose prerogative it is to grant this Order.

*Translation of an ORDER, under the Vizier's seal, to Sciad Moynodeen Caun, Governor of Surat, regarding the payment of the Tanka on account of the fleet, to the Honourable Company, &c.*

TO the brave, noble, renowned, and careful Sciad Moynodeen Caun Bahadour, on whom is his Majesty's favour. The Vakeel of the English Company having represented, that as the Deroga, or post of the great fleet, belonging to the Bunder of Surat, under the Subah of Amedabad, on the dismissal of Siddee Yacood Caun, Kildidar of Dunde Rajahpore, from the said post, had been granted his constituents, he hoped that a Perwannah or Order for the Tanka, and account of the troops of the fleet, as has been usual since the time of him, who is now in Heaven (meaning Aurungzebe) among the other charges of Surat, exclusive of what is sent to Court, might be given him, in your name, from the Archives of the Kingdom, it appears, that this office was in the hands of Siddee Yacood Caun, and that in the twenty-third year of the reign of Mamud Shaw, he procured an Order on Teg Beg Caun then Governor, for the annual payment of two lack, according to custom, besides what was sent to Court. Now in these days the office of Deroga of this fleet, on the dismissal of Siddee Yacood Caun, has been granted to the said Company, as has been usual, under the Dustuck, or Order of the Caun Samaun (or steward) and dated the second of Mohoram, and the sixth year of the present reign, therefore I now write to you that you may pay unto them, account charges, for the forces of the fleet, the usual Tanka of two Lack every year, agreeable to the hereafter Order, among the other charges, exclusive of what is sent to Court, and let the accounts and papers relative thereto be transmitted hither. Dated the twenty-fifth of Mohoram, and the sixth year of the reign of his present Majesty, (or 18th of September, 1759.)





ON the back of this Perwanna, is the Vizier's seal, and the zimra 1759. or certificate from the several officers and registers at court, setting forth, as is above related in the Perwannah, and that the Vizier had given orders for registering the several grants.

*HOUSBUL HOOKUM, under the seal of the Nabob Vizier, Ulma Maleck Bahadour, to the English company accompanying the Pbirmaund.*

**M**AY his Majesty's favour ever remain upon the brave and noble English company. It has pleased his Majesty, to grant unto you the office of Killedar (or castle governor) of the Bunder of Surat, vacant by the dismission of Hoffis Amud Cawn; as also the office of Deroga of the great fleet of the Vaid Bunder, vacant by the dismission of Siddee Yacood Cawn. Therefore, agreeable to his order, you are now directed to take particular care of the proper execution of the above offices, by looking well to the welfare of the castle, and preservation of the merchants, &c. on the high seas, keeping them clear of pirates and rovers, who may infest them. This is positively required of you.

*HOUSBUL HOOKUM, from the Vizier to Governor Bouchier.*

**I**T has pleased his Majesty, to grant unto the brave and noble English Company, the office of Killedar of the Bunder of Surat, vacant by the dismission of Hoffis Amud Cawn; as also the office of Deroga of the great fleet of the said Bunder, vacant by the dismission of Siddee Yacood Cawn; therefore agreeable to his order this is wrote to you, to direct, that according to the directions and advice of the said Company, you take all the care in your power for the proper execution of the said offices, by looking well to the welfare of the castle, and preservation of the trade and merchants on the high seas, from pirates, and other rovers.—Of this you are desired to be very careful.

*HOUSBUL HOOKUM, to Mr. Spencer, the same as above, except two or three words which are almost synonymous.*

*To Atchand the same, directing him to give the company all the assistance he can in the execution of these offices.*





---

---

# G O M B R O O N.

1759. **A**BOUT fifteen degrees west of Surat, the East-India company have a small settlement, called Gombroon, which being remote from the rest, and what is more, unfortified, could never have had a place in the account of the war in India, had not the French thought proper to beset this defenceless factory with all the parade of a siege, and to crown their hostilities with the pompous form of a capitulation.

**T**HE articles in this capitulation, which relate to the Count d'Estaing, have so greatly surprized the military gentlemen, before whom he gave his parole, that it is evident they will be new to all those who come from the coast of Coromandel: therefore to satisfy them of the truth of so extraordinary a proceeding, the capitulation is here published, together with the account of the whole transaction.

**G**OMBROON is an European name for the famous Bunder-Abbassi, which was built by Shaw Abbas when he ruined Ormus. Ormus, that jewel of the world, as it was called, is at this present time a rocky island, so entirely covered with salt, that there is scarce any part of it but what is cruusted over with it, at least two inches thick. In all places where they dig, is to be found rock salt, and consequently there are no pools, neither are there any springs of fresh water; notwithstanding which, the Portuguese, from its advantageous situation for trade, built a very elegant city there, with a strong fortification: but near two hundred years ago, the Persians, with the assistance of the English, expelled the Portuguese from it. The great Shaw Abbas Sophi of Persia, when he removed the trade to Gombroon, on the opposite shore, granted the English great privileges in commerce, and a proportion of the customs of that port, which amounted to near 4000*l. per annum*; but these advantages they have lost by the unhappy state of the country, which has long been in confusion and anarchy.





THE English established a factory here on account of the great demand for woollen goods from Persia, before that country was impoverished by the troubles. The air of Gombroon is so unhealthy from the hot winds, that even the natives themselves fly from it in the bad season, but knowing the time when the ships are to be expected; they come down with caravans, and carry off their lading. As there was therefore no occasion for large warehouses, the company never erected any fortifications, but only secured the house in which their Agent, or Chief, and his clerks lived, with a very small party of soldiers, scarcely sufficient to serve as a defence against robbers. 1759

THE Moorish governor of this place, is Moolah Allee Shaw, who ought to be subordinate to the governor of Lhor, as the governor of Lhor should himself be subject to the Sophi of Persia: but the troubles and total want of government throughout all Persia, have made them both in a manner independent. The remains of some strong fortifications at Ormus afford a secure retreat for the governor of Gombroon, when the adjacent part of the continent is disturbed; and when it is quiet he comes to Gombroon, collects the customs, and very often endeavours to extort loans from the Europeans, by laying difficulties in the way of their trade, and terrifying them with his Arabs. It was by such means that Moolah Allee Shaw very lately prevailed with the Dutch to comply with his request of a loan which they had at first refused. These Arabs are very ungovernable and insolent, and when they have been taken in the act of plundering, several of their tribe have run out of the fort and wounded our people who were carrying the delinquents before the governor; and though application has been made for redress to Moolah Allee Shaw, he never could be prevailed on to chastise them, but always excused himself, by alledging, that they were a tribe which no body dared to punish but Sheik Rama. Such instruments had Moolah Allee Shaw to employ for the gratification of his avarice; and from his own disposition he was glad of every opportunity to make use of them.

ON the 15th of October, 1759, the French, with four ships under Dutch colours, one of which was a vessel of sixty-four guns, and one of twenty-two, landed to the westward of Gombroon. They advanced with two mortars and four pieces of cannon, and began to batter the factory, which was not a fortification, but only a strong house.





1759. The Agent and his clerks, together with the crew of the Speedwell, which was burnt by the French, did not exceed the number of sixteen men, against whom the French brought at least a hundred and fifty Europeans, and as many Coffrees. The small number of English who were there, did what they could to defend it; as to the Topasses and Sepoys, few of them would stand to the guns.

ABOUT eleven o'clock, being high water, the twenty-two gun ship hauled within about a quarter of a mile of the factory, and began to fire: at the same time those who were ashore played upon it with their mortars and guns from the westward. At about three in the afternoon a summons was sent from the French camp. Upon a consultation held in the factory, the military gentlemen were of opinion that the house was not tenable; it was therefore unanimously agreed to surrender upon the best terms that could be procured, and thereupon the following capitulation was signed.

*Articles of capitulation for the East-India company's factory of Gombroon, between Alexander Douglas Esquire, chief of the said settlement and council, and Monsieur Des Essars, captain of his most Christian Majesty's ship Condè, and commander in chief of the present expedition, and Monsieur Charnyau, captain, commander of the land forces.*

ARTICLE I So soon as the present capitulation is signed, a detachment of French troops are to take possession of the factory; the keys are to be delivered to the commanding officer, and no person is to come in, or go out, without his permission, as he will take care to prevent disorders and thefts.

II. ALL effects of what kind soever contained in the factory, are to belong to the besiegers, and are to be delivered to the French commissary, with all books and papers in possession of the besieged; the besiegers are to be shewn the warehouses, that they may place the necessary centinels over them. The artillery, arms, ammunition, provisions, money, merchandize and slaves, in general every thing contained within the factory, are comprehended in this article.

III THE Chief, the Garrison-factors, writers, and all Europeans in the service of the English East-India company, in general all the subjects





subjects of his Britannick Majesty in the factory are to be prisoners of 1759.  
waru, under the following clauses only.

**IV. WHEREAS** Monsieur d'Estaing, brigadier of foot, and formerly a prisoner of his Britannick Majesty, is now on board the ship Condé, in his way to Europe, by the way of Bufforah, being desirous of rendering more secure the intelligence received of an exchange having been made in his behalf, between Mr. Pigot, governor of Madras, and Monsieur Lally, lieutenant-general; it is now agreed between the besiegers and besieged, that Alexander Douglas, Esquire, chief of the English East-India Company's factory at Gombroon, with William Nash, Ensign Johnston, Dymoke Lyfter, Lieutenant George Bembow, Lieutenant Richard Evans, and Richard Mainwaring, are lawfully exchanged for Monsieur d'Estaing; and they are at full liberty to go where and to what places they please, in consequence of which, Monsieur d'Estaing is under no other clause than what is specified in the sixth article.

**V. THOUGH** the present exchange of prisoners is an unnecessary precaution in behalf of Monsieur d'Estaing, yet all persons mentioned in the preceding article are absolutely free, but should Monsieur d'Estaing have been already exchanged, as he undoubtedly is in that case, for the seven persons already mentioned who now enjoy their liberty, a like number, and of equal station of his most Christian Majesty's subjects, are to be released whenever a cartel is made.

**VI. MONSIEUR D'ESTAING**, in order to fulfil with the greatest exactitude the promise he made governor Pigot, that he would not take up arms against the English on the Coromandel coast only, for the space of eighteen months, reckoning from the first of May, one thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine: desires it may be inserted in the present capitulation, that notwithstanding he is now exchanged, yet he will keep the promise he made governor Pigot, of not taking up arms against the English on the Coromandel coast only, for the space of eighteen months, but he is at free liberty in all other places to take arms.

**VII. IF** it is possible to agree about the re-purchasing of Gombroon factory, it will be looked on as a part of the present capitulation the besiegers reserving to themselves the liberty nevertheless to do • with





1759. as they may think fit, should no agreement be concluded with the besieged.

VIII. In consideration of the exchange of Monsieur d'Estaing, and at his particular request to Monsieur Des Effars, Alexander Douglas, Esquire, chief of the English East-India Company's settlements of Gombroon, and all others mentioned in the fourth article, have liberty, and may carry away all their own effects of what kind or sort soever, excepting ammunition, provisions, marine, military, or warlike stores.

DATED at Gombroon the fourteenth day of October, at six o'clock in the morning, and in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine.

*Des Effars  
Charnyau.*

*Alexander Douglas,*

*William Nash,*

*Richard Johnston.*

As it must appear very extraordinary that the Count d'Estaing should chuse to have his name so often mentioned in the capitulation, the impossibility of his having had the intelligence he pretends to have received, will make it still more surprising: for it is a certain fact, that there had not been even an attempt made towards his exchange. The parole he gave was in the usual form; not to serve directly or indirectly against the English, during the present war, or till he should be regularly exchanged.

On the twelfth, while the French were standing into the road, Moolah Allee Shaw came to the factory, and gave the agent all imaginable assurances of his affording him assistance, and that if the French attempted to land, he would do what was in his power to prevent it; but when the agent sent to him in the morning, acquainting him, that they were approaching the shore in order to land, instead of performing his promise he remained quiet in his fort, and though about ten o'clock, he desired to send a few men to our assistance, he absolutely refused. The reason he assigned for not fulfilling his offers was, that one of





of his ships (then at anchor in the road) was in the power of the French, and that if he assisted us with any men, they would carry her away. His fear and present interest governed him at that time, and soon after the French landed, he sent them such refreshments of greens and fruits as the season afforded, offering to supply them with whatever was in his power. 1759.

**THE** French during their stay paid little regard to the articles of capitulation. On the 30th of October, at about twelve o'clock at night, they went on board their ships, having first set fire to the factory. They dug mines in several parts thereof, some of which took effect; they had likewise fixed combustibles to the beams of the apartments and warehouses. The greatest part of the wall of the east-side of the factory was blown up, and the cieling and floor of the apartments of the west-side were burnt. Moolah Allee Shaw's people took away the beams, planks, and window-frames, and set fire to all the doors and other wood-work, for the sake of the iron that was in them.

**HAD** Moolah Allee Shaw acted a becoming part, many valuables might have been saved, after the French evacuated the factory; for they left upwards of thirty thousand maunds of copper, with several other goods, which they could neither carry away nor destroy: but notwithstanding all the applications that were made to him, instead of placing people to prevent thefts, and secure what remained, or even to extinguish the fire, he gave the factory up to a general pillage; and in a visit he made the agent, he had the assurance publicly to confess, he believed there was not a man in the town but had his share of plunder. What with the copper, and other goods the French gave Moolah Allee Shaw before their departure, and the copper which he clandestinely carried to Ormus, he was supposed to have got in the whole to the amount of sixty thousand rousees, (not reckoning the guns which the French left behind) and his whole gang of Arabs enriched themselves proportionably. As for such of the lower class of inhabitants as had got any booty of copper, Moolah Allee Shaw obliged them to sell it to him, at the rate of two rousees the maund: but the Arabs had the precaution to send their plunder to their different habitations.





1759. THE French and Moolah Allee Shaw, entered into articles of alliance, wherein it was agreed that there should be an everlasting friendship between them, that his ports and vessels should be secure, and that whosoever were Moolah Allee Shaw's enemies, should likewise be enemies of the French nation. The writing given by them was in the French language, signed by Mons. D'Estaing, the counterpart given by Moolah Allee Shaw was in the Persian language.





---

## REVOLUTIONS at DELLI.

**I**T has already been related by what means the Revolution at 1757.  
Delli was brought about in the year \* 1754.

IN the beginning of the year 1757, Ahmed Abdalla, the Pattan Chief, marched to Delli, and took Allum Geer, and all the Omrahs prisoners.

AFTER having kept possession of the capital for some time, he at length on the sixth of June, sent for the Mogul to his tent, where he received him with great honour, and replaced him on the throne, having first secured to himself as large a treasure as could be expected from the low state of the finances of the Empire. He then proceeded to Agra, and seizing the revenues of that district, marched to Lahore, from whence he issued his orders to all the neighbouring Nabobs and Rajas, that they should acknowledge themselves in subjection to his son Timur, whom he then proclaimed King of Lahore. Having thus invested his son with the dominion of a Country from whence he proposed that he should also superintend the affairs of Indostan, he returned to his own Country recommending to Timur to treat the Mogul with continued marks of regard and friendship.

SHAW ABADIN CAWN, the son of Gauzedy Cawn, and consequently the true Vice-Roy of the Deckan, chose rather to suffer his right to be usurped by Salabatzing than relinquish the office of Vizier, which gave him so great an ascendancy over the Mogul, and consequently an unbounded power in the Empire. But as all power is precarious, the sons of the Emperor became daily more formidable to the Vizier, and created him continual trouble and jealousy. At length about the end of the year 1759, to free himself from all solicitude of that kind, he resolved on the murder of his master, in order that he might place in his stead a more inconsiderable repre-





1759. *representative of the Royal Family, who should be less respectable in himself, and not so formidable by the support of his children or other relations. As these were the great obstacles to the ambition of the Vizier, they were no less so to the execution of his present design: therefore to remove them from the capital, he proposed a hunting-match, and took with him the sons of the Mogul, and the greatest part of his friends, to a great distance from Delli. The next difficulty was to overcome the suspicions of the Mogul, and the superstitious principles of the Moors, who though they are ready to execute any kind of villainy, can never be brought to murder their Sovereign in the sanctuary of his own palace.*

It was well known that Allum Geer had a most particular veneration for the Fakeers; and the Vizier was sensible that unless the Emperor could be prevailed on, by a motive of devotion, to come from under his roof, no other inducement could ever engage him to abandon what he would consider as his only protection in the absence of his friends. Every thing being concerted accordingly, before the departure of Shaw Abadin Cawn, the creatures of that Minister came to the Mogul, and informed him that a Fakeer of most eminent sanctity was in the garden, and though it was with great reluctance that the Emperor yielded to the dictates of his zeal, he was at length by their persuasions, prevailed on to go out and meet this holy person, whom he had long expressed a desire to see. He had not advanced many steps in the garden, when two Moors in the habit of Fakeers, came suddenly behind him, put a noose about his neck, and then stabbed him with spears till he died on the spot.

As soon as the Vizier was informed of the death of his master, he immediately confined his sons, and all the friends of Allum Geer, who were then with him, and placing on the throne one of the Royal Family, whom he thought the most convenient for his purposes, went himself directly to join an army of Marattas, who were waiting for him about thirty miles from Delli.

It was not long before the Pattans, equally displeased with the Vizier for his conduct, and the Marattas for interfering in the government of Delli, marched a considerable force against them, and coming up with them at a place called Paniput, near a hundred miles from Delli,





## REVOLUTIONS AT DELLI.

243

Delli they killed the Maratta General, and put the army to flight, 1759. which retreated till they were joined by another body of their own troops. They were pursued by the Pattans, and routed again in another engagement.

AHAMED ABDALLA then entered Delli, and placed his son Timur upon the throne; and orders were issued out to all the Rajas and Governors in the neighbourhood, to exert their utmost endeavours to prevent the Marattas from approaching the city.






---

# NAVAL OPERATIONS.

1759. **N**otwithstanding the attention of the reader has been long suspended from the Coast of Coromandel, the principal object of this work ; it is expedient here to give an account of the engagement at sea in 1759, and here conclude the Naval Operations. This will afford an opportunity of pursuing afterwards the affairs of the Coast without interruption, as far as they can be ascertained by the latest accounts.

**VICE ADMIRAL POCOCK** having refitted his squadron at Bombay, and made it ready for the sea by the seventh of April, 1759, sailed on that day for the Coast of Coromandel, using his utmost endeavours to get round Ceylon before the French fleet, which were expected soon to sail from the Islands of Mauritius and Bourbon.

**HAVING** gained this necessary point, he continued in the proper stations to intercept the Enemy, or protect our own trade, till the third of August, and then, as the season advanced, proceeded to cruise off Pondichery, in hourly expectation of the Enemy. The whole month being past without any advice of the French squadron, which had so long been expected, provisions and water grew short, and the Admiral was obliged while he continued to cruise for the Enemy, to proceed to Trincomalay the first of September to water the ships, as he found it very difficult to water them at Negapatam. He had dispatched the Company's frigate *Revenge* a few days before, with orders to proceed off Ceylon, and look out for the Enemy. The second, at ten in the forenoon, they saw from the mast-head fifteen sail in the S. E. quarter, standing to the N. E. which proved to be the Enemy's fleet, and soon after perceived the *Revenge* chased by one of their frigates, which fired several shot at her. Upon this the Admiral made the signal for a general chase, and stood towards them with all the sail he could make, which obliged the Enemy's frigate to give over chase, and rejoin her own squadron. The abatement of the wind prevented our getting near them when the day closed.

**THE** French line consisted of eleven sail of large ships. *Le Zouave*, 1. *D'Ache*, Lieutenant-General, seventy-four guns, and six hundred





hundred and sixty men. The Minotaur, M. L'Aguille, Chief D'Esca- 1759.  
dre, seventy-four guns, six hundred and sixty men. Le Comte de  
Provence, M. La Chaise, seventy-four guns, six hundred and sixty  
men. Le Centaur, M. Surville, seventy guns, six hundred and sixty  
men. L'Actif, M. Beauchaine, L'Illustre, M. De Ruis, and La For-  
tune, M. Lobry, all of sixty-four guns, and six hundred men. Le  
Vengeur, M. Palliere, sixty-four guns, and five hundred men. Le  
Duc D'Orleans, M. Surville le Cadet, Le St. Louis, M. Johannes,  
Le Duc de Bourgogne, M. Benvet, all of sixty guns, and five hun-  
dred men. They had two frigates, and two store-ships.

THIS extraordinary force, like which none had ever yet been seen  
in the Indian seas, was chased, invited, and in vain provoked to fight,  
by a much inferior strength; for the English squadron were no more  
than nine ships of the line, of which two were only fifty-gun ships,  
and the largest carried no more than sixty-eight guns. They were  
the Yarmouth, Vice-Admiral Pocock, Captain Harrison, sixty-six guns,  
five hundred and forty men. The Grafton, Rear-Admiral Stevens,  
Captain Kempenfelt, sixty-eight guns, five hundred and thirty eight  
men. The Elizabeth, Captain Tiddeman, sixty-four guns, four hun-  
dred and eighty men. The Tyger, Captain Brereton, the Sunderland,  
Honourable Captain Colville, the Weymouth, Sir William Baird, Ba-  
ronet; all of sixty guns, four hundred and twenty men. The \* Cum-  
berland, Captain Somerset, fifty-eight guns, five hundred and twenty  
men. The Newcastle, Captain Michie, and the Salisbury, Captain  
Dent, each of fifty guns, three hundred and fifty men. There were  
also three frigates and a fireship. From hence will appear, the dis-  
proportion of the two squadrons, which was so great that the French  
had a superiority of one hundred and ninety-two guns, and two thou-  
sand, three hundred and sixty-five men, besides the great advantage  
in the size of their ships.

NOTWITHSTANDING so apparent an inequality, the French en-  
deavoured by taking the opportunity of the dusk, and falling off of  
the wind, to steal away undiscovered, but were frustrated in this  
design by the Revenge, who having orders to make sail to the S. E.  
and try to keep in sight of them, about eleven at night, made a  
signal for discovering the Enemy, and then the whole fleet bore down  
towards them.

\* The Cumberland being weak and disabled was reduced from 66 guns to 58





1759. ABOUT one in the morning of the third, a heavy squall coming on, which continued till three, obliged us to bring to, and clew up our top-sails. At day-light we saw the Enemy's fleet bearing N. E. by N. about five or six leagues distant. The Admiral then made the signal for a general chace to the N. E. Point Pedro on the Island of Ceylon bearing West, distant six or seven leagues. At nine, the Enemy's fleet bore N. E. by E. and were formed in a line of battle, a-head on the starboard-tack, with the wind about W. N. W. A little after nine, the Admiral made the signal for the line of battle a-breast, and stood for the center of the Enemy's fleet, which kept under-way, and appeared to go from the wind; by which means we altered their bearings greatly, for by noon they bore S. E. by E. distant six or seven miles. The wind decreasing as the day advanced, we were not able to form our line till near Sun-set, two of our squadron the Tyger and Newcastle failing very ill, though they made all the sail they could croud.

ABOUT a quarter after five our squadron being nearly a-breast of the Enemy they wore, and came to the wind on the other tack, upon which our ships tackt, the rear first, and steered with the Enemy's squadron. We were now about four miles distant with very little wind, had scarcely steerage-way, and continued so till near ten, when a fresh breeze sprung up from the S. S. W. on which we hauled close to the wind under our top-sails, and formed the line a-head. This shift of wind, brought the Enemy a-stern, and a little upon the weather-quarter of our line, but soon after, it proving hazy, we lost sight of them. It is remarkable they made no signal in this or the preceding night, either with guns or lights. The Revenge was sent to look out a-stern, but not being able to discover them, was ordered to keep a-head with better success; for about eight next morning, the Revenge made the signal for seeing four sail to the N. E. A general chace was begun by the whole squadron, and continued till near two in the afternoon, at which time seeing no more than two ships, and finding he could not come up with those, the Admiral made the signal for the Revenge to come into the squadron, then stood to the northward, and made all the sail he could to get off Pondichery, justly concluding the French squadron was bound thither.





**THE** Admiral arrived off Pondichery on the eighth early in the <sup>1759.</sup> morning and saw no ships in the road, but at one o'clock in the afternoon discovered the enemy to the S. E. and by three, counted thirteen sail, he was then standing to the southward with the sea breeze, and to prevent their passing him kept a good look out the following night. At half an hour past six in the morning of the ninth, he saw part of the Enemy's squadron to the S. W. and by nine counted sixteen sail. At two in the afternoon, the wind springing up, the Admiral made the signal for a general chase, and at four, the Enemy appeared to be formed in a line of battle a-breast, and steered right down upon him. The *Revenge* was ordered to keep (during the night) between our squadron and the Enemy, to observe their motions. The tenth, at six in the morning, the body of the French squadron bore S. E. by S. distant eight or nine miles, and was formed in a line of battle a-head, on the starboard tack. We continued bearing down on them in a line of battle a-breast, with the wind about N. W. by W. At ten the Enemy wore and formed the line a-head upon the larboard tack. At eleven we did the same, and kept edging down upon them. At two in the afternoon, the *Yarmouth* being nearly a-breast of the French Admiral's second in the rear, and within musquet shot, M. D'Aché, made the signal for battle. The Admiral immediately did the same, on which both squadrons began to cannonade each other with great fury, and continued hotly engaged till four, when the Enemy's rear, and soon after their center, began to give way; the *Sunderland* having got up some time before, and engaged their stern-most ship. Their van made sail, stood on, and with their whole squadron bore away, and steered to the S. S. E. with all the sail they could make.

As four of our ships in the van had sustained a hot fire from six of the Enemy's largest ships during two hours: after so great a disadvantage, we were in no condition to pursue; for the *Tyger* having her mizen-mast and maintop-mast shot away, appeared in other respects to be greatly disabled: The *Newcastle* was much damaged in her masts, yards, and rigging; and the *Cumberland* and *Salisbury* in the rear, were not in a condition to make sail. The *Yarmouth* had her foretop-sail-yard shot away in the flings; and the *Grafton* and *Elizabeth* were greatly disabled in their masts, yards, and rigging. The *Weymouth* and *Sunderland*, the only ships that had not suffered, could not get properly into action, as M. D'Aché began to engage before they could close, and by that means those two were precluded from their share





1759. share in the engagement, so that only seven of our ships received the whole fire of the Enemy's fleet till near the conclusion, and then only eight.

THE Enemy continued retreating to the southward till dark, at which time the Admiral, ordering the Revenge, as usual, to keep between him and the Enemy, lay to, with the Squadron, on the larboard-tack; in order for the disabled ships to repair their damages. At day-light in the morning, we saw the Enemy to the S. S. E. lying to also on the larboard-tack about four leagues distant; the wind being about west. The Enemy upon seeing our Squadron, immediately wore and brought to on the other tack, and continued so till the evening, when their distance was so much increased that we could scarcely discern them from the main-top. At this time the wind coming to the eastward, the Admiral wore and stood under an easy sail to the N. W. the Sunderland having the Newcastle in tow, the Weymouth the Tyger, and the Elizabeth the Cumberland.

THE French having received less damage in their rigging (though they were very much shattered in their hulls, and suffered a loss of near fifteen hundred men killed and wounded) were enabled now to gain the only point they seemed to be solicitous of obtaining. They sailed directly for Pondichery, and landed four hundred European seamen, (for they brought no troops) two hundred Coffrees, about two or three lack of roupies, and the diamonds which they found in the Grantham Indiaman, for that ship had been taken by the French near the Cape, in her passage home. The value of the diamonds might be about two lack more.

OUR loss was very considerable, though greatly inferior to that of the Enemy. We had one hundred and eighteen men slain in action, and sixty-six died of their wounds. Besides these, a hundred and twenty-two were dangerously wounded, and two hundred and sixty-three slightly, so that our whole number killed and wounded, amounted to five hundred and sixty nine men. Amongst the slain was Captain Michie, who commanded the Newcastle, Captain Gore of the Marines, and Lieutenant Redshaw, both of the Newcastle. Lieutenant Elliot, and the Gunner of the Tyger, the Master of the Yarmouth, and Boatwain of the Elizabeth. Captain Somerset, who commanded the Cumberland, was wounded in one of his ankles, and Captain  
Barton





BURON received a contusion on his head. All the officers and seamen <sup>1759.</sup> in general behaved with the greatest bravery and spirit during the action, and by the vigour and constancy of their fire obliged the Enemy to retreat, notwithstanding their great superiority.

THE Admiral having lost all hopes of renewing the engagement, on the fifteenth stood into the road of Negapatam. There he anchored and continued repairing his damages, and refitting the squadron till the twenty-sixth, when having put the ships in as good condition for service (as the time permitted) he weighed and stood to the northward. He was joined by the Revenge, which he had sent with dispatches to Madras, who brought him sixty-three men belonging to the Bridgewater and Triton, who were taken in Fort St. David, and had been exchanged at Pondichery. These he ordered on board the Tyger and Newcastle, as those were the ships which had lost the greatest number of men in the late engagement.

By this frigate the Governor and Council sent a letter to the Admiral, of which the following is an extract.

SIR,

THE Revenge anchored here in the night of the fourteenth instant, and the next morning we received the honour of your letters, dated the eighth and twelfth instant, containing advice of your discovering the enemy's fleet on the second, and after much fatigue, bringing them to action the tenth. The warm fire you sustained for two hours with seven ships against eleven, and obliging them at last to make their retreat, will do immortal honour to you and Mr. Stevens, and all the brave officers who have the happiness to serve under you; and we feel much for the commanders of the Weymouth and Sunderland, who were deprived by the nature of the enemy's disposition, from coming in for an equal share of the glory of the day. We look upon this as the last effort of the enemy, and well might they boast of their superiority; but the check they have met will shew them that they are disappointed of the mighty effects they expected from this armament. It is fortunate that you found means to force them to an engagement before they reached Pondichery, as the troops they may have brought for landing, have, no doubt, had a share in the loss. As yet we have not heard of their arrival at Pondichery, but we suppose them there by this time, as the

K k

winds





1759. winds have been strong southerly. After they have landed <sup>our</sup> troops and stores, no great advantage can be hoped by engaging them again, and we would rather take the liberty to recommend the waiting until joined by the reinforcement expected from England, &c. &c.

*Fort St. George,  
16 Sept. 1759.*

THE French by their having been some time at Pondichery, must have had it in their power to come out from thence well prepared for action: but the Admiral, as he was obliged to pass them in his way from Negapatam to Madras, judged that his doing it in the night would be liable to misinterpretation, and that it would certainly give the enemy reason to conclude, that we had suffered so much in the late action as to be desirous of avoiding another engagement; therefore he determined not to pass the enemy's port without looking into it by day-light.

THE twenty-seventh at day-break our fleet were got close in with Pondichery road, where the French squadron was lying at anchor in a line of battle. The squadron was not in a condition to withstand the fire of both the ships and fort at once, therefore the Admiral drew into a line of battle a-head upon the starboard tack, and was then very near within random shot of their nearest ship. The wind being off shore, and about W. S. W. our ships lay with their main-top-sails to the mast, just keeping a proper steerage-way for the line to continue well formed. While our ships continued in this situation, the French Admiral made the signal at six o'clock to heave a peak, and an hour after to weigh, and by the time all their squadron, which consisted of eleven sail of the line, and two frigates, was under sail, it was near ten o'clock, at which time, as the wind was off shore, our ships were consequently driven to leeward of them, and lying as before-mentioned, expecting they would bear down directly and engage; but M. D'Aché made the signal for his squadron to keep close to the wind, and also to make sail, and stretched away to the southward in a line of battle a-head, by which manœuvre they increased their distance from about random shot at day-light, to near four leagues to windward at sun-set. Had they cut or slipped their cables on first discovering us, we must have come to action by seven o'clock, and after they got under sail, had they bore directly down, we might have been close along side by eleven.

THE





THE Admiral was now convinced that the Enemy. had no incli- 1759.  
nation to come to a second action ; and as their whole conduct mani-  
fested an intention to get off and make good their retreat to the Islands,  
he consulted the Rear-Admiral and Captains on their present situation,  
and the probable consequence of a further pursuit. They all agreed in  
opinion that the French officers being resolved to satisfy themselves  
with the very trifling service they had done the Company by stealing  
in those insufficient supplies to Pondichery, were now determined to  
avoid any farther engagement, and that if we pursued with any view  
of coming up with them, they would lead our shattered squadron  
quite to their Islands. But besides, that the condition of our ships  
would not permit us to follow them at all to the southward, upon so  
little prospect of service, there was a more cogent reason for their  
immediate return to Madraſs, for at that time there was not above  
two days bread on board the squadron, and but very little water.

It was expedient to repair to that port as soon as possible, in order  
to get a supply of provisions and water, for the voyage to Bombay,  
before the change of the \* Monsoon, which was near at hand, at which  
season it is dangerous to remain on the coast. Therefore the whole  
squadron anchored in Madraſs road on the twenty-eighth, and such  
expedition was used in victualling the ships, and administering to the  
recovery of the sick and wounded, that they were enabled to sail again  
the seventeenth of October ; and the next day they met Rear-Admi-  
ral Cornish with four ships of the line, and the Ajax, Stormont, and  
Houghton Indiamen, on board of which was Colonel Coote with  
the greatest part of his battalion.

\* On the Coast of Coromandel the wind changes from South to North-East most  
commonly between the fifteenth and thirtieth of October. It is best to leave the Coast  
between the fifteenth and twentieth, but it is full late to stay till the end of the month.  
In order to effect some very important service, it may be not altogether imprudent to  
risque the wintering a fleet in these seas, because in India, as in all other places, some  
winters are more, and some less tempestuous than others. In 1741 M. de la Bour-  
donnais remained on the Coast without any danger till the twenty-second of October,  
but in 1746 he was surprized with a storm, which sunk and damaged his whole  
squadron. In 1747, and 1748, the English fleets kept the Coast, and met with no  
violent winds during the whole season. And on the twenty-fourth of April, 1749,  
there was a tempest which destroyed fifty or sixty vessels of different nations. All that  
one can infer from hence is, that it is prudent to leave the Coast in the middle of  
October. *Memoire M. de la Bourdonnais.* See Appendix, page 9.





1759. ADMIRAL POCOCK ordered all the troops which were brought out in the ships of war to be put on board the *Queenborough*, and dispatched her, with the three Indiamen, for Madras, where they arrived the twenty-seventh. The whole squadron now sailed for the coast of Malabar, and in going round Ceylon, they met with such hard gales of wind, that the *Cumberland* and *Salisbury* made the signal to speak with the Admiral, being in great distress from leaks, which they could not keep under with all their pumps. The *Salisbury's* distress being the greatest, the Admiral ordered her to be assisted with eleven men and an officer from each ship, for their own people were over fatigued by being kept constantly to the pump; and notwithstanding this supply of fresh men, and their having thrown overboard thirty of their guns, at the end of two days they found the water still gain upon them, and were obliged again to make the signal of distress. Upon this, the Admiral ordered all the boats in the fleet to stay by the *Salisbury* to save the crew, in case of the ship's foundering; and sent Admiral Cornish and Captain Harrison on board, to examine into her situation before he would too hastily take the people out of her. They immediately ordered fresh men to the pumps, beginning with their own barge-crews, and by this means they soon cleared her, and by the help of a thrummed-sail put under her bottom where the principal leak was, they made it practicable to keep her free with half her pumps; and now judging her to be no longer in danger, they returned to their own ships, and the *Salisbury* made sail the next morning.

THE Admiral being desirous of sending Rear-Admiral Cornish to the Coast of Coromandel as soon as the season would permit, dispatched him with the *Lenox*, *Duke of Aquitain*, *York*, *Falmouth*, *Weymouth*, and *Sunderland*, for the Telichery, which was the general rendezvous. The weather becoming exceeding fine, and the Monsoon appearing to be set in, the Admiral suffered every ship to make the best of her way for the intended port, knowing that a single ship will always make a speedier passage than a fleet, and as they arrived they might begin to take in their water, and put their sick on shore. The twentieth of November the *Yarmouth* arrived at Telichery, as did the *Elizabeth* and *York*, and by the thirty-first the whole squadron came in.

THAT no time may be lost for refitting the ships at Bombay, and preparing them for their return to the Coast of Coromandel, the Admiral





miral gave orders to Rear-Admiral Stevens on the twenty-sixth, to 1759. proceed directly for Bombay, with the Grafton, Elizabeth, Tyger, and Salisbury, and followed himself the twenty-ninth, leaving orders with Admiral Cornish to sail with the six ships under his command to the Coast of Coromandel on the fifteenth of December, as it was to be hoped the season would then be favourable, and the sick and wounded recovered.

ADMIRAL POCOCK had received orders to return to England, nevertheless upon the news of fresh disturbances in Bengal, he determined to remain with the Yarmouth some time longer, and acted in pursuance of this resolution, till such time as advice was received of the entire re-establishment of the affairs of Bengal, and the signal victory obtained over the French on the Coast of Coromandel.

UPON so happy a turn in the affairs of the company, the Admiral 1760. thought it now adviseable to comply with the orders for his return, especially as he had the satisfaction to see the command devolve on so brave and experienced an officer as Rear-Admiral Stevens, whose worth had been proved by his behaviour in the three engagements, as well as by the constant harmony which had always subsisted between them, and his alacrity to concur in any service for the honour of his country.

THE Admiral had himself received from the three Presidencies the strongest expressions of their sense of the zeal which he had at all times shewn, and the actual services which he had so often performed for the benefit of the East-India Company, and the honour of the British flag. Having at length resumed his intention of returning to Europe, he dispatched Rear-Admiral Stevens for the coast of Coromandel on the twenty-first of March, with the Grafton, Elizabeth, Tyger, and Newcastle, and sailed himself the seventh of April in the Yarmouth, leaving at Bombay the Salisbury, which had had a thorough repair, and was then almost ready to sail, and the Cumberland, which was to be taken into the dock the first high tide.

ADMIRAL POCOCK anchored at Anjengo the seventeenth of April, and sailed from thence the twenty-first. He there received a letter from Admiral Stevens, dated the eleventh, on which day he sailed from that port, acquainting him with his proceedings, and that he had





1759. had retaken three small English vessels off the Vingorla Rocks, from the Malwan, a set of pirates who had taken them but a few hours before. There had been no account of the French squadron since the time of their departure from Pondichery on the second of October, 1759.

On the eighteenth of June, Admiral Pocock arrived at St. Helena, where he found the Colchester and Rippon waiting to convoy seventeen of the Company's ships, three of which were of extraordinary great value, having on board a large quantity of rich goods and diamonds from Bengal. For the security of so considerable an object, the Admiral thought proper to delay his voyage till the seventh of July, on which day the whole fleet being ready to sail, he took them under his command, and anchored in the Downs the twenty-second of September, with the richest convoy that ever arrived at one time in England.





---

---

# W A R

## ON THE

### Coast of COROMANDEL.

**T**HE China ships being arrived at Madrafs with three hundred <sup>1759.</sup> of Colonel Coote's battalion, in the beginning of September, Major Brereton, now commander in chief, being very sanguine for action upon the strength of this reinforcement, prevailed on the Governor and Council, though with difficulty, to consent to an attempt upon Wandewash. Both armies had lain some time inactive; the French in Gingee, Wandewash, Arcot and Chitteput, and our troops at Conjeveram. At Wandewash was a party of four or five hundred French, which Colonel Brereton, by a sudden march, proposed to shut up or drive from thence, and then take the place before the enemy could collect their force. Every thing was to be ready with great secrecy by the tenth, and all necessaries were accordingly prepared. The rains which fell about this time caused a delay till the sixteenth, when the news arriving of the engagement between the fleets, the Governor and Council wrote to Major Brereton, that they thought it would be better to make no motion till it was certain whether the enemy had received any reinforcements.

MAJOR BRERETON being unwilling to be with-held from a favourite project, by a supposition to which, did not give any weight, marched and took Trivitore the twenty-sixth, where he made prisoners one Captain and twenty-two men of the Lorrain Regiment, and eight Hussars. He then proceeded to Wandewash, and endeavoured, but in vain, to draw the enemy to an action out of the Pettah, (the town or village belonging to and commonly surrounding every Indian fort.) The French having some intelligence of our preparations,





1750. tions, by the delay from the tenth to the twenty-fifth, discovered our intentions, and had made themselves almost equal to our force, which was far short of seventeen hundred men, the number that had been at first proposed. Major Brereton gave out orders for an attack to be made upon Wandewash-Pettah at three o'clock in the morning of the first of October, by Majors Monson and Caillaud, with five hundred men at one end of it, and Major Gordon, with two hundred men between the fort and Pettah. Major Monson meeting with little resistance, entered without loss, and soon after Major Gordon attacked, but received so warm a fire from the fort and the Pettah, that his party broke, and only twenty men got in with him: however he joined Major Monson, and they advanced to the head of the Pettah, having driven the enemy quite out of it. But as our people were exposed to a great fire, and every street was enfiladed from the fort, they retreated towards the center of the Pettah, and there took post, detaching some pickets in the street to the right and left, which was all that could be done till day-light.

THE French having made a disposition for that purpose, at day-break attacked our parties on all sides, who after near two hours warm dispute, were obliged to abandon the Pettah, (leaving four guns behind them) with the loss of two hundred and two men in the action and retreat. The enemy suffered no less in point of numbers, but we had a most essential disadvantage in the loss of eleven officers of approved worth and bravery. The army was still in a condition to have undertaken something of consequence, but the advanced season, the scarcity of provisions, and the discouragement of an unsuccessful attack, were reasons that justly determined them to go into cantonment at Conjeveram.

IN the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, near Ellavanasore, is a strong place called Tagada, held by Kistnarauze, an ally to the Nabob, who had been very troublesome to the French, and frequently, with the assistance of the garrison of Trichinopoly, beat several of their parties. His little fort was by situation almost impregnable, but wanted ammunition to hold out against such a force as the French were now resolved to send against it.

CAPTAIN SMITH apprized of their designs, and having intelligence that a considerable party of the enemy were actually marching against it,





it, consisting of one hundred European Infantry, forty Hussars, five hundred Black Horse, fourteen hundred Sepoys and matchlocks, and five pieces of cannon. Captain Smith had the precaution to throw into the place three companies of Sepoys, under the command of Serjeant-Major Hunterman. Afterwards he detached Lieutenant Raillard with forty Europeans, six companies of Sepoys, three small guns, and a large supply of ammunition, with orders to proceed within a night's march of Tagada, and then to forward the ammunition with one company of Sepoys: and from the particular situation of Tagada, he had great hopes of throwing in this supply with safety. Before the party reached Volconda, the Nabob's horse, in number one thousand, marched and joined them. 1759.

THE Enemy having collected all their forces, made four several attacks on the town of Tagada. They brought two guns to each gate, and ordered two parties to escalate the walls. The attack continued a considerable time, till at length a party forced a passage at one of the gates, and brought four guns into the town, so that it was with great difficulty the garrison could gain the rock, where there were some provisions, ammunition, and water. They sent word to Lieutenant Raillard that they would hold out till he came to their relief, which they desired he would do as speedily as possible, as they had lost near one-third of their people in the late attack. The Enemy suffered much more, having thirty Europeans, and two hundred Sepoys killed and wounded. Kistnarauze, with all his Horse, and some Sepoys, marched in the night from Tagada, and the next day joined Lieut. Raillard, by whose advice it was determined the next morning early to attempt the relief of Tagada. They marched accordingly, till they came within two miles of the fort, where, upon the appearance of the enemy, they halted and began to cannonade. This gave time to the French to bring up their artillery. Upon the first discharge of the field-pieces, the Nabob's Horse fled with the utmost precipitation, nor could all the intreaties of Lieutenant Raillard and Kistnarauze bring them back. This happened before the Enemy's Infantry appeared. Soon after our Sepoys seeing themselves abandoned by the Horse, took a panic and fled likewise. About two hundred, chiefly officers, remained with the Europeans and Topasses, who guarded the guns, and were endeavouring to make good their retreat to a village about a mile in their rear; these being in some disorder, were hard pushed by the Enemy's European Cavalry and some Infantry, who





1759. having taken possession of the guns, our whole party was entirely routed, the Europeans and Topasses either killed or taken prisoners. Many of the Sepoys cut to pieces, and almost all disarmed. Lieutenant Raillard, who was on horseback during the engagement, escaped being made prisoner, but did not long survive the disgrace of his defeat, for it made such an impression on him as doubtless produced his unfortunate end. Having no cartridges to load his arms for his fatal design, he bruised himself so much with repeated strokes on the breast and head with his pistols, that he fell off his horse and expired about five miles from the scene of action. As he was found there with no other marks of violence, it is evident he destroyed himself in the manner above-mentioned.

THE miscarriage of this brave man was owing to his impatience at the cowardice of the Nabob's horse: for as soon as they broke, he left his own troops, who were in need of his presence and might have profited by it, and rode among the broken cavalry, vainly attempting to rally those who were alike insensible to his exhortations or reproaches. Soon after Serjeant Hunterman surrendered the Fort of Tagada upon honourable terms.

THE French to make a diversion to the southward, and also to have at hand a sufficient force to surprize Trichinopoly upon the first favourable occasion, marched a large body of men towards Seringam. An advanced party of them were discovered from the Golden Rock, near Trichinopoly, and a sally was made from that Garrison with some Europeans, Sepoys, and the Nabob's horse, who came upon them in the night and took one officer, thirty Europeans, forty Coffrees, and Sepoys, and killed or dispersed the remainder of the corps, taking also their arms, baggage, and ammunition, with two field-pieces. The main body of the French army, consisting of above a thousand Europeans, continuing their march to Seringam, attacked and carried it, there being only two companies of Sepoys to defend it. As this small body made a gallant resistance, the French, in resentment, most shamefully turned them out of the place, and then sent their horse after them to cut and mangle them, and fired grape shot on some that were then got to the Glacis, by which means above a hundred were killed. The French left two hundred Europeans at Seringam, and returned with the rest to join their army, since which, one of their  
convoys





convoys going to Seringam was surprized by Captain Smith who com-  
manded at Trichenopoly. 1759.

ON advice of an escort being at Utatore, Captain Smith detached a party of fifty Europeans and some Sepoys to intercept it. The French marched an equal force from Seringam for the protection of their convoy. Captain Smith, as soon as he found they had weakened their force at the Pagoda, attacked it with the remainder of his garrison from Trichinopoly. As he received a wound in the attempt, it had no other consequence than that of bringing back the French detachment. Our party in the mean time attackt the convoy in Utatore, took two officers, with thirty-eight Grenadiers, and disarmed three hundred Sepoys, carrying off or destroying all the ammunition and provisions.

AFTER this, Captain Smith, with the assistance of the King of Tanjore and Tondeman, retook several posts, and interrupted the communication with Seringam, till at length M. Lally, thinking the place in danger, reinforced it with a body of horse, and two hundred European infantry.

IT has been already related that three hundred of Colonel Coote's battalion were brought by the China ships in September, and that he arrived himself with the remainder of his corps in the Queenborough, and the three Indiamen on the twenty-seventh of October. As soon as Colonel Coote landed, the necessary preparations were set about for his regiment to take the field. It was in this interval that the enemy sent the large detachment afore-mentioned to the southward, and possessed themselves of Seringam. The Presidency apprehending they might extend their designs against Trichinopoly, recommended to Colonel Coote to proceed with all expedition to join the army at Conj veram, and to form an attack against some of the Enemy's possessions in that neighbourhood, in order to draw their troops from the southward. The army accordingly marched from Conjeveram the twenty-fifth of November, and the next day a detachment under Major Brereton invested Wandewash. Two batteries were erected with great expedition, they were opened the twenty-ninth, and a summons was then sent by Colonel Coote to Lieutenant Mahony, who commanded in the garrison, to surrender. He very properly returned for answer, that he would defend the fort to the last extremity.





1760. ON the thirtieth, a breach being made, the Killedar, or Moorish Governor, sent to treat with the Colonel, offering to pay a sum of money, and deliver up the French garrison, upon condition of his being continued in the government of the Fort; but before any agreement was perfected, the French soldiers, fearing the intrigues of the Killedar, got upon the walls and calling out to our people, declared they would deliver up the garrison. Five officers and sixty-three private men were made prisoners on this occasion, and a place of great note in this Country, which had been often threatened by our army, was at length taken without any loss on our side. There were five hundred Sepoys in the Fort, besides the European garrison.

FROM thence the army marched immediately to Carangoly, and on the sixth of December opened a battery against that Fort, which was defended by Colonel O'Kennely, and one hundred Europeans, and five hundred Sepoys. The breach was made the eighth, but there being yet a ditch, the passing of which might have been attended with loss of men, Colonel Coote thought it better to grant the garrison the terms of capitulation they demanded, which were, that the Europeans should not be made prisoners, but have leave to march to Pondichery, and accordingly the Fort was surrendered.

THE French troops which were assembled at Arcot, being joined by the detachment from the southward, the son of Chunda Saib, and the son of the Killedar of Wandewash, were sent with other emissaries to bring over a party of Morarow's Marattas. They had already a great number of Country troops brought in by M. De Buffy, who went with a few troopers as far as Cadapa, to pay a visit to Bafaletzing on his return to Golconda, and not being able to persuade that Prince to return with him, engaged one of his chiefs with a considerable number of Country horse and Sepoys, and brought him with great state to Arcot. These were joined the ninth of January by Innis Cawn, Morarow's chief officer, with three thousand Maratta horse, besides a number of foot who, followed them for plunder. The French force at Arcot consisted (according to the best intelligence) of near two thousand five hundred Europeans, and M. Lally himself resumed the command of the army upon this occasion.

COLONEL COOTE having posted his forces in a strong situation between Cauverypauk and Arcot, not more than three miles from the advanced





advanced guards of the Enemy, remained there in order to cover our 1760. districts in the best manner he could against the ravages of the Marattas, who were dispersed on all sides in small parties on purpose to drive off the cattle, plunder the inhabitants, and destroy the produce of the Country. The army with Colonel Coote consisted of two thousand one hundred Europeans, (including the artillery, the cavalry, and officers of all denominations) about four thousand Sepoys, and fifteen hundred Country horse. The great number of cavalry on the side of the Enemy rendered it indispensably necessary for us to take into the service as many of the best as could be procured, notwithstanding the immense expence, for without them the army would have been absolutely unable to keep the field, as it would have been impossible to have supplied it with provisions.

THE day after the junction of the Marattas, M. Lally moved with his whole force from Arcot by the road of Wandewash, but on the second day, a party turned towards Conjeveram, who ransacked the town, but could not get possession of the fort, being repulsed in the attempt, by an officer with two companies of Sepoys. Colonel Coote, upon this intelligence, marched with all expedition from Cauverypauk to Conjeveram. Upon his approach, all the Enemy's parties retired from that neighbourhood, and joined their main body at Papatangel, a town upon the road from Conjeveram to Wandewash.

THE Enemy's designs proved to be against the latter place, where Captain Sherlock commanded with one hundred and fifty Europeans, and eight companies of Sepoys. The sixteenth in the morning, the Enemy attacked the Pettah adjoining to the fort, and after a stout resistance from three companies of Sepoys, commanded by an Ensign of the Sepoy establishment, lodged themselves there, and set about erecting a battery. The twentieth they began to fire against the walls from one twenty-four pounder and three eighteen pounders.

WANDEWASH was thought a place of too much consequence to be suffered to fall without making some attempt to relieve it; therefore, though the Enemy might have some superiority in Europeans, besides their multitude of Blacks, it was determined to march the army towards them.





1760. It had long been debated at Madrafs, and was always matter of doubt with many members of the Council, whether it would be expedient to hazard an action at so critical a time, for till the arrival of the good news from Bengal, the affairs of the Coast bore a melancholy aspect. The Enemy had greatly the superiority in European horse, which would have led on the Marattas to destroy our army totally in case of a defeat. They had already plundered and destroyed the Country, and encreased the scarcity of provisions to so great a degree, that the cry for rice both at Madrafs and in the army, was exceedingly alarming. The army also made continual demands for their pay when the Country was entirely exhausted of cash. At length a vessel arrived from Bengal, with the welcome news of the establishment of peace and tranquility in that Province, and the long expected supply of money.

THIS was a great relief to the present anxiety, and gave spirit to our Counsels, as well as to the army and our allies, and must be supposed to have had some effect on an Enemy that was naturally presumptuous. But these circumstances did not cause the Governor and Council to act with less precaution. Still dubious of the event, they approved of Colonel Coote's march towards the Enemy, but at the same time strongly recommended to him to keep Chengalaput and Carangoly in his rear, that he might be supplied with provisions, and have his retreat to Madrafs secured, in case of any unfavourable event.

COLONEL COOTE being determined to march the army towards the French, took post at Outremaloor the seventeenth, and judging by his advice from Captain Sherlock, that the breach in the fort might be practicable, the twenty-second he resolved to make an effort to raise the siege that morning; for this purpose he marched with the whole army the twenty-first in the evening, and encamped at Trinborough, about ten miles from the Enemy, where he gave out the following orders.

Trinborough Village, January 21, 1760, seven o'Clock in the Evening.

THE army to march to-morrow at six o'Clock by the left upon the Taps beating, which is to be looked upon the same as the Generals beating, it is to form and be ready to march off immediately after.

All





All the cavalry and five companies of Sepoys to form the van of the army, except two hundred Black horse, who together with three companies of Sepoys are to cover the baggage in the rear. The army to observe the orders given out the twenty-seventh of December, which were, that the first line consist of Colonel Draper's regiment on the right, Colonel Coote's on the left, and the Company's in the centre; the artillery to be divided as follows; four pieces on the right, four on the left, and two pieces between each interval, making in all twelve in the first line. The second line to consist of the Grenadiers of Colonel Draper's, Colonel Coote's, and the Company's, with one piece of cannon upon each flank, who are to form two hundred paces in the rear of the first line: An eight inch Howitz to be between the two lines. Major Brereton to command the right of the first line, Major William Gordon the left, and Major Robert Gordon the centre. Major Monson to command the second line. The cavalry to be divided into five squadrons, the Europeans to make the centre squadron.

THE names of the Jemidars who are appointed to command, to be given into the commanders in chief to-night. When the line forms the cavalry, will have orders to form about fifty paces in the rear of the second line, having a proper interval between each squadron: at the same time the five companies of Sepoys who supported the cavalry are to form upon the right of Colonel Draper's regiment, and the five companies of Sepoys that were in the rear of the line of march, to form on the left of Colonel Coote's regiment, five companies who were on the left flank of the line of march, are to form in the following manner; two on the right of the second line, and two on the left, and one on the rear with the cavalry. The whole army, as well Europeans as Blacks, are to have a green branch of Tamarind Tree fixed on their hats and turbans, likewise on the tops of the colours, in order to distinguish them from the Enemy. The commanding officers of corps are to take particular care that their respective corps are properly told off, and that the men know their right and left hand men and file leaders. They are to be cautioned not to give their fire till they are ordered by their respective officers, &c. &c.

THE army marched at six o'Clock in the morning of the twenty-second, agreeable to the orders that had been given out the day before for that purpose. About seven o'Clock our advanced guard of horse and that of the Enemy began to fire at each other, upon which  
 Captain





1760. Captain Baron de Vasserot who commanded the cavalry, was ordered to form them in order of battle; he was supported by five companies of Sepoys and two pieces of cannon, and Col. Coote advancing himself with two companies of Sepoys, obliged the Enemy to retire to their main body of horse, which consisted of two hundred Europeans and three thousand Marattas on their left. As the whole of our cavalry advanced, that of the Enemy retreated in pretty good order till our cannon, which was extremely well served, obliged them to retire precipitately. The Major of the brigade was then sent to the army, which was about three quarters of a mile in the rear, with orders for them to form the line of battle, but not to advance till the Colonel had joined them, who soon after having taken possession of a Tank, which the Enemy's cavalry had occupied, returned to the line, which by that time was formed. After reviewing the whole, and finding the men alert and eager to engage, he ordered the army to move forwards. About nine o'Clock they arrived at the post they had driven the Enemy from, which was about two miles from their camp, and halted in their view near half an hour, during which time Colonel Coote went very near to them and reconnoitred their situation. Upon finding they were strongly posted, and his flanks exposed to the Enemy's cavalry, which was greatly superior to his own, he ordered the army to march by the right in order to gain the advantage of a hill about three miles distant, and near two miles from Wandewash fort, and the horse, which was then in the front, to wheel to the right and left and form behind the second line, in order to make the rear guard. Thus he covered his right flank with the hill, and had some villages in his rear, to which he sent his baggage, and this motion obliged the Enemy to alter their disposition. During all this time they cannonaded each other, and skirmished with their advanced posts and Maratta horse, but the latter soon disappeared and returned no more. The Enemy after making their second disposition, moved forwards under the cover of a bank. The cannonading then began to be smart on both sides, and the two armies advanced briskly towards each other.

At twelve o'Clock the Enemy's European cavalry pushed with a great deal of resolution in order to force our left; and come round upon our rear. The Colonel immediately ordered up some companies of Sepoys and two pieces of cannon, to sustain our cavalry, who had orders when the Enemy approached to open to the right and left, which





which gave room to pour in grape-shot upon the Enemy's horse from <sup>1760.</sup> the two pieces of cannon, the musquetry also galling their flank, while our cavalry wheeled and charged them in front. They were immediately thrown into confusion, and pushed back above a mile from our left, upon the rear of their own people. Our army now advanced upon the Enemy, who kept their flank well covered by a Tank, till we approached near enough to perceive the disposition of their army, which was formed in the following manner. The regiment of Lorraine on the right in line of battle, the regiment of Lally on the left with the marine formed into a column, and the brigade de L'Inde formed into another in the centre, with two Tanks covering their right and left, and some broken ground in front. By this time it was near one o'Clock, and both armies continued advancing till they came within the reach of musquetry, when a shot from our guns striking one of their tumbrils, it blew up, by which accident, five of their guns became useless to them: upon this Major Brereton wheeled Colonel Draper's regiment to the left, and charged their left flank, which was executed with great order and resolution, and much to the honour of that corps and their Commander; Colonel Coote seeing that regiment likely to suffer from a body of Black troops, together with their marines who were under cover, and fired very briskly upon them, and at the same time finding the Enemy had reinforced their left with a piquet from Lally's regiment, ordered the Grenadier Company of Draper's, which was on the right of the second line, to support their own regiment, and having likewise two pieces of cannon playing upon the Enemy's flank, compleated the rout of that wing, who abandoned their cannon and fell upon their own centre, which was by this time, together with their right, closely engaged with our left. He then ordered up Major Monson with the rest of the second line, and placed him so as to be able to support any part of our line, at the same time flanking the Enemy. About two o'Clock their whole army gave way, and ran towards their own camp, but finding that we pursued them, they quitted it, and left us entire masters of the field, together with all their artillery, except three small pieces, which they carried off. There were taken twenty pieces of cannon, three of which were twenty pounders, one twenty-four, and one thirty-two pounder.

THE French had eight hundred killed and wounded, two hundred of which we buried in the field, and we took two hundred and forty  
M m prisoners,





1760. prisoners, of which number two hundred were wounded. We lost only fifty-two Europeans, officers included, in the field of battle: there were besides one hundred and forty-one wounded, of which some died of their wounds: and among these was the gallant Major Brereton, who had the honour to have so great a share in the success of that glorious day.

THE French army consisted of two thousand two hundred Europeans, including artillery and cavalry; three hundred Coffrees, and between nine and ten thousand Black troops. They had twenty pieces of cannon in the field, and five in their batteries against the fort, where they blew up a large magazine of powder upon their retreat. Our army amounted to seventeen hundred Europeans, including artillery and cavalry, three thousand five hundred Black troops; and all our artillery were fourteen pieces of cannon and one howitz.

THE principal persons among the prisoners who were taken, were Brigadier General de Buffy, Le Chevalier Godeville, Quarter-master General. Of Lally's regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Murphy, two Captains and two Lieutenants. Of the Lorrain regiment, one Captain and one Lieutenant. Of the India Battalion, two Lieutenants and two Ensigns. Of the Marines, Le Chevalier de Poete, Knight of Malta, who died of his wounds. All the above-mentioned were wounded, except M. de Buffy, and an Ensign of the India battalion. Colonel Coote indulged these gentlemen together with M. Godeville, with leave to go to Pondichery on their parole: but when he learnt that several officers on parole had been in the action, he wrote to M. de Buffy and the other two officers, to repair to Madras according to the tenor of their parole. In answer to which, M. Lally sent to offer him their ransom in money.

So compleat a victory over a superior force could not have been obtained, but by the masterly conduct of Colonel Coote, and the universal good behaviour of all the officers and men, and it would be great injustice to pass over in silence the extraordinary diligence and skill of the officers of the artillery.





THE Enemy retreated as fast as possible to Chetteput, which is <sup>1760.</sup> eighteen miles from the field of battle, and the next day assembled the remains of their broken army at Gingee; but the twenty-sixth, M. Lally thought proper to retire within the walls of Pondichery. Our cavalry being fatigued were not able to pursue them the evening of their defeat, but the next day Colonel Coote sent out two detachments to harraßs the Enemy; and upon advice of M. Lally's retreat, he sent fresh orders to Captain De Vasserot, who commanded the horse, to destroy the French country round Pondichery, as M. Lally had done by the environs of Madrafs. To prevent his being interrupted in this expedition by the Marattas, who were then between Arcot and Chetteput, the Colonel wrote to Innis Cawn, to advertise him that, since he had shewn by his behaviour in the late action, as well as by the whole tenor of his conduct, that he came not into the country as a soldier, but only as a plunderer and marauder, he must now immediately quit the country, or he should be compelled to it, and if intercepted, he must expect no quarter for himself or his troops.

THE Maratta General, sensible of the small benefit he reaped from his alliance with the French, who were in no capacity to pay him, decamped without hesitation, and went off to his own country; and Captain De Vasserot proceeded without interruption to lay waste the bounds of Pondichery. This was not done as a mere act of retaliation, but as a very necessary step towards the reduction of that place, as it struck a terror into the inhabitants, promoted the disposition to desert, and alarming the Black people with the dread of a siege, caused them to move off, and deprived the garrison of the necessary assistance of the Cooleys. Besides this, Captain De Vasserot took four thousand head of cattle.

ON the twenty-eighth, Colonel Coote marched to Chetteput, and began to erect batteries, at the same time summoning the Chevalier De Tilly, who commanded there, to surrender, which he refused. The next day, after a breach was made, the garrison flung out a flag of truce, and surrendered prisoners of war. Here were four officers, fifty-four Europeans, besides seventy-three who had been wounded in the battle of Wandewash, and were at that time in the hospital; and three hundred Sepoys. In the fort were taken nine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition.

CAPTAIN





1760. CAPTAIN SMITH having been detached after a small party of French and Sepoys, with two brass eight pounders, returned with them the thirtieth, and also brought in a Captain of the Lorrain regiment and three French Commissaries. And Major Monson having thrown a few shells into the fort of Timmery, it soon surrendered, and twenty Europeans were made prisoners.

COLONEL COOTE immediately after the battle of Wandewash, sent orders to Captain Wood to invest Arcot. He soon got possession of the Pettah, having routed Zulapherzing's forces, and taken his whole camp. On the second of February he was joined by Colonel Coote, who marched with the whole army, and encamped within two miles of the place. The same day he began to erect batteries against the Fort. Two of five eighteen pounders against the curtain between the North-West corner tower and the gateway, one of two eighteen and one twenty-four pounder, against the tower and curtain West of the South-West corner tower, and one of a twelve pounder, against the North gate, to enfilade the West front.

THE next day the Enemy threw a number of shells from the garrison without any effect. The batteries were opened on the fifth, and the next day two of our guns were disabled, and two men killed and four wounded.

ON the eighth, Colonel Coote having carried on his approaches to the South West, within two hundred and sixty yards of the crest of the Glacis, and those to the West within two hundred and fifty, summoned the garrison to surrender. He received for answer from Captain Hufsey who commanded there, that in case he was not relieved in six days he would then deliver up the garrison, on being allowed the honours of war.

UPON this hostilities were re-commenced, and some of our men were wounded at the batteries and in the trenches, by the Enemy's shells and fire-balls. Our whole loss amounted to no more than seven men killed and sixteen wounded: for the next day, the approaches being carried on within sixty yards of the crest of the glacis, the garrison surrendered prisoners of war.

COLONEL





## C O A S T O F C O R O M A N D E L.

269

COLONEL COOTE took possession of the fort of Arcot the tenth of February, and thereby not only restored to the Nabob the Capital of his Dominions, but greatly weakened the French force in India, by a capture of two hundred and thirty-six European soldiers, three Captains, and eight Subalterns. 1760.

THIS was not only a real and a present loss to the French, but a great blow to their credit, and operated no less on the minds of their own people, than it affected them in the opinion of the country powers. The very day that Arcot surrendered, seven and twenty Hussars, with their horses and arms, deserted and came over to us, and by the last advices from the Coast, it is said that the whole body of their European cavalry has since followed their example, and are now in our service. This is an earnest of the general discontent at Pondichery, occasioned by their want of pay and the scarcity of provisions, with a diffidence of one another, a sense of their misconduct, and in consequence thereof, their calamitous prospect from this sudden reverse of fortune.

M. LALLY, immediately after his defeat, sent orders to recall his troops from Seringam; by which means he augmented his army with a great reinforcement of Europeans (near five hundred horse and foot) but at the same time being obliged to abandon that part of the country, all those valuable districts, from whence the Nabob draws so considerable a part of his revenue, and, without which, Trichinopoly does not produce enough to defray the ordinary expences of the garrison, were now left to be visited by his several renters and collectors without molestation.

REAR-ADMIRAL CORNISH arrived at Madras the twenty-third of February. As the French had no fleet upon that Coast, he had no object but to co-operate with the land forces; however the Falmouth meeting with the Haerlem in her way from Merguy, obliged her to run a shore two leagues to the Northward of Pondichery. The garrison of Permacoil and Allamparva having surrendered prisoners of war, there remained only Carical of all the subordinate settlements on that Coast.

CARICAL is a very small but exceeding strong Fort, being a pentagon, built exactly on the plan of Lille. It being of great importance





270      WAR ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL.

1760. portance to reduce the Enemy to the possession of one single port, both the land and sea officers under Rear-Admiral Cornish and Major Monson, were employed in the attack of Carical, and on the fifth of April it was surrendered.

By the loss of this place, the French have not a single man in the Peninsula, except a small garrison at Mahé on the Malabar Coast, another at Gingee, and those which are blocked up within the walls of Pondichery.

T H E E N D.





---

# A P P E N D I X

---





---

The following LETTER of the CHIEF ENGINEER,

WITH THE PLAN ANNEXED,

Will shew the Nature of an

## Old Indian Fortification,

Converted to the Purposes of Defence against ARTILLERY ; and will be of Service to explain several of the Sieges of Indian Forts mentioned in the Course of the WORK.

**T**HE advantages which Chengalaput derives from the nature of its situation, are so great, that, according to the European method of fortifying, the most simple works would have rendered it a fortress of considerable strength: for the east, and above half the north side, is covered by a large tank, sufficiently deep to prevent any attack thereon: the west of the other half of the north side is covered by a low swampy ground, sown with paddy, and separated from the tank by a dam about thirty feet wide ; over which lays the road from Madras. On these sides it appears, from the preceding description, almost impracticable to reach Chengalaput in an hostile manner; and was the south equally secure, it might in this country be deemed impregnable; but there nature has changed her aspect, and, from the tank to the paddy fields, presents high ground, favourable to the approach of an enemy — Here, then, art must supply the defect; and, indeed, the person who fortified the place seems so thoroughly to have comprehended the advantages and disadvantages of this situation, that according to the method of fortifying practised by the natives of the country, he has made his works proportionally strong. These works, on the south, consist of a deep wet ditch, a small false bray, then a stone wall, elevated about eighteen feet above the water, with round or square towers on and between the angles: after this, another deep wet ditch (except just in the passage to the gate) before a stone wall somewhat higher than the outer one, furnished with round or square towers; also double walls and ditches of the same nature, with an interval of near one hundred yards

1757.





1757. between them, but inferior in strength and size to those on the south, surround the west side, and approaching nearer to each other continue round the north. On the east, along the tank, is but a slight single wall, about eighteen feet above the water, and fortified with very small towers, affording little or no defence. The walls all round, were formerly eight or nine feet higher than a bank of earth within, which served as a rampart; and the defendants had scarce any other means of annoying an enemy, than by firing through square holes, and crannies between the battlements: what cannon they had were laid in large pieces of wood, and mounted on high cavaliers, built in the gorge of each corner tower, from whence no great mischief could be done. Such is the situation of Chengalaput; and such was nearly the condition of the works when it fell into our hands. The alterations made by the several Commandants since that time, consist in repairing the breaches, raising a sort of glacis and counterscarp round the outer ditch before the south front; making a bridge, with sluices under it, over the said ditch, thickening the parapets of some of the towers and cavaliers, opening embrasures through them, and converting a round tower, on the south-west corner of the inner wall, into a small bastion. These additions and repairs having been ordered by different officers, who, I imagine, pretended to no skill in fortification, and executed by blacks, who were equally ignorant of their part, I may conclude (without prejudice to these officers) that they are not in themselves the most defensible, or judiciously constructed.

HAVING thus described the situation of Chengalaput, the original construction of its works, and the late alterations, and from thence shewn its present condition; I shall proceed to point out such additions as appear to me extremely necessary, and cannot be very expensive. To demonstrate, in the clearest manner, that they are so, I will, for a while, suppose that I am to direct an attack against Chengalaput, supported by such a force as our enemies can bring against it. Being thoroughly acquainted with the place (as I imagine the French are, who once had it in their possession) I shall begin my approach against the south front, by opening ground at (A), under cover of a small ascent, about five hundred yards from the outer wall. I shall there erect a small battery of four pieces, to draw the fire as much as possible from the workmen, till they are advanced by two branches to the extreme ends of the first parallel, where I shall erect two batteries of cannon, and in the middle one of mortars: the plan will shew at

one





one view the position of the whole. The battery (B) of seven pieces, 1757.  
 is intended to make the principal breaches through the outer and  
 inner wall, in a direct line (1. 2.) ; my reason for this is, that the  
 outer ditch is there narrow, and may probably be passed over by the  
 bridge ; that from (3 to 4) is a fine passage, and from thence to the  
 inner breach no obstacle, but the fire of the defendants, to divide the  
 force of the besiegers. And, to secure the greater probability of  
 success, the battery (C), with five pieces of cannon, will ruin the  
 parapets of the tower (a), beat down the angle (b), make a breach in  
 part of the curtain and flank of the square tower (c), and assist in  
 widening the breach (1) : and when an assault is given thereto, a real  
 or feigned attempt may be made with two or three boats on the side  
 of the tank.

WITH twelve pieces of cannon, four mortars, and such a dispo-  
 sition as I have repeated, it appears to me, that Chengalaput in its  
 present state, could not long resist so disproportioned a superior force  
 as twelve hundred Europeans, and two thousand Sepoys, which I sup-  
 pose is no more than the French can bring against it.

THE parts which I have pointed out are easily breached, and may,  
 as to external obstacles, be as easily come at. To remedy therefore  
 these defects with the greatest expedition and œconomy, I think it  
 necessary to raise the glacis (from F to G) at least two feet higher on  
 the crest. This most simple and excellent piece of fortification will  
 cover the outer wall almost to the top of the parapet ; and, by taking  
 away the earth near the second parallel (d e), will lower the ground  
 almost to the water, and render an approach more difficult. I would  
 also thicken the rampart of the outer wall (from f f to g), as Captain  
 Gardiner has begun, and lay on a parapet of twelve feet thick.  
 I would prolong the ditch before the inner wall (from h to k), fix a  
 strong pallisadoe over the bank of earth (from l to m) ; the inner  
 curtain (from n to o) should be continued as it is already begun, and  
 a parapet of good earth, fifteen feet thick, laid thereon, through  
 which five embrasures may be opened, and will play with great com-  
 mand on the outer breach : this is what I would particularly recom-  
 mend for the immediate defence of the south side ; and if the season  
 or time would permit, it is highly proper to continue the inner ditch  
 before the gate, according to the pricked line, and throw a bridge  
 over, from (p to q).

To





1757.

To secure that side next the tank, I think nothing better can be done without great charge than to open embrasures in the towers (a r c f t) as at (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,) and to take down the old battlements of the curtains (v w x) making them of a proper height for the musquetry to fire over. The same should be practised with all the curtains round the outer and inner wall, for at present they are too high to fire over, and being taken down, will afford a number of good bricks towards carrying on the other alterations already mentioned. On the north, a pallisadoe should be fixed across the bank, and an old sally port through a wall on the dam (13) should be filled up, the wall thickened, and a pallisadoe (14) fixed behind it under cover. The west having nothing to fear from an open attack, requires no material attention.

THERE is one circumstance indeed that I cannot omit, which will make a great alteration. This is the decrease of water in the tank, either by a dry season, or by draining it off into the paddy fields, the one may happen, and the other I doubt not may be effected; for the water in the tank at present being five or six feet higher than the paddy fields, if the dam is cut, it will run off to a level, and thereby I fear, leave the foot of the wall next the tank dry all round. An event of this kind, though there is even a ditch at thirty feet distance in the tank, will greatly diminish the security of the east and half the north side, and at the same time will weaken every part, by lowering the water in the ditches 'till they become in many places quite dry, and in all fordable. How to prevent this diminution I cannot suggest any contrivance; nor do I know any obstacle to an enemy's reaping all the advantage I have mentioned, but the bed of the tank being much deeper than the level of any of the paddy fields. While such a stroke is practicable, it is to be apprehended; but should any advantage of that kind be overlooked, I am apt to believe from the reasons above recited, that the south front will be the only one attempted; and there, (when the foregoing additions are made) I am persuaded a moderate garrison will oblige any force our enemies can now collect, to sacrifice more men than such an acquisition would compensate.

My observations on Chegalaput, have perhaps already been more particular than was necessary to explain the immediate business of my journey; but as I have in view, the preserving to future times,





a description of whatever may promote the defence, or capture of the place, I hope I shall be excused if I extend my remarks itill farther: for the sake of explanation, I will suppose the additions are made to Chengalaput which I have above proposed, and that it is garrisoned by three hundred and fifty Sepoys, and sixty Europeans, with ammunition and provision for two or three months. The French then being resolved to attack it, will no doubt collect their forces and artillery (in number equal to what I have before concluded) at Wandewash: In this situation, their real intention not being known, you will no doubt be equally apprehensive of Carangoly and Arcot: and consequently uncertain 'till they begin to march, which of the places to reinforce, should you be in a condition to do so. However, I will admit that by the time they move, you are assured of their intentions and are determined to reinforce Chengalaput with two companies of Sepoys and fifty Europeans. The enemy suspecting such a step, will no doubt leave their baggage and heavy cannon, to come leisurely on and march with the greater part of their troops to invest the place, that no succours may be thrown in; to effect this, they need only post a small party advantageously some where on, or near, the hill (A) at the end of the dam, which as there is no other road to get at Chengalaput, will at once cut off all communication. An eye-sketch of the country round the fort, which I annex hereto, shews more clearly that the main body being at (B) and a party at (A) it will hardly be possible to get into Chengalaput on the north or south side; nor will it be more practicable on the east or west side, where there is no gate, and the access obstructed by a large tank, and almost impassable paddy fields. The attempt to reinforce Chengalaput being thus defeated, and the enemy's cannon and baggage, &c. arrived, they will be in a condition to begin their batteries on the south side, and will probably resolve for many reasons during the siege to post at (A) a body of two hundred Europeans and five hundred Sepoys. The forces on both sides being as they are at present; I will venture to suppose Sir, that you are determined to attempt something very considerable for the relief of Chengalaput, and accordingly take the field with six hundred Europeans and one thousand Sepoys, a small field train, and as few incumbrances as possible; that the troops may march and counter march with the greatest diligence. By the time this body is half way to Chengalaput, the French will doubtless have notice of their motion, and will form a resolution to prevent your drawing any advantages from such an expedition. Their party





1757. party at (A) will on this occasion either retire, or be augmented to a force capable of maintaining themselves against ours. The question then is, “ will they have troops enough remaining to carry on the attack”? I am apt to think they will. But unless the post at (A) is well secured, they will be under constant apprehensions of having that division defeated, because it cannot speedily be succoured from the other side. At least, whatever succours may be sent, must march over the paddy fields out of cannon shot from the fort; and I question then, if they can find a passage for more than a single man at a time along the banks. I will next suppose that they abandon the post (A) and that they vigorously push an attack with their whole force at (B) succours of any kind may then be thrown into Chengalaput, and when things are brought to such extremity, that it must inevitably fall, by prudent management, and leaving a small party to continue firing, the greater part of the garrison may retreat in the night over the dam, the rest may soon follow; and the whole having only their arms and twenty-four rounds each in their cartouch-boxes, they may easily evade the pursuit of the enemy, who ’till morning will probably be ignorant of their flight. To secure such a retreat, the sally port on the north side should be kept clear, and put in a proper condition for this occasion.


UPON the whole, I am of opinion that Chengalaput from its strength and situation on the country, is a place of too much importance not to require the greatest efforts for its preservation: that with a garrison of five hundred Sepoys, one hundred Europeans, one hundred Malcars, some Coolies and other labourers necessary for its defence, the siege of it will become an undertaking extremely hazardous for our enemies; and should it fall, will prove a dear purchase. I mean if the additions which I have advised are made, and some other trifling precautions taken, which cannot but occur to every prudent officer, &c. &c.

I am, &c. &c.

10th Dec. 1757.

JOHN CALL.









( 9 )

THE FOLLOWING  
**A C C O U N T**  
 Of the Progress and Effects of one of those violent  
**H U R R I C A N E S**  
 Which so often attend the Change of the  
**M O N S O O N,**

Is the more curious, as few People have ever survived such a Disaster, who have been capable of giving so clear and distinct an Account.

A JOURNAL of the  
**Loss of the PEMBROKE,**  
 Which was wrecked in St. DAVID's road the 13th of April, 1749.  
 By the MASTER of the PEMBROKE.

**A**BOUT ten o'clock in the morning it blew fresh, the wind at N. E. by E. and a great sea began to come in. We then having a cable out, the Captain ordered half a cable more to be veered away. At noon I desired the Captain would please to order more cable to be veered away, he replied, he was afraid if we should veere more cable it would bring home the anchor, but that a new foresail and a mizen should be bent, which was immediately done. At one in the afternoon it blew very hard, the wind at N. E. his Majesty's ship Namur lying about a cable's length within us and abaft our beam ; I went to the Captain, as did likewise the Lieutenants, and desired him to go to sea. He replied, he could not  
 b answer

Single  
 Anchor.  
 Noon.  
 One  
 o'clock.





April 13, answer to go to sea, unless the Namur did, (on board which Rear 1749. Admiral Boscawen's flag was flying) but ordered all our ports to be barred in and well secured, and the tarpaulings down without lashing, which made them blow up again after we put to sea.

Three At three o'clock I went again to the Captain who was sick and in o'clock. his cabin, and again desired him to go to sea, he seemed very angry, and said he could not, giving the same reason as above; nor would he suffer any more cable to be veered away: at the same time the ship rode hard, strained much, and made water.

Four. At four the sea increasing, we expected the cable to part every minute, at five our cable parted and we cast our head off to the sea, otherwise we should have fallen on board the Namur; we immediately set the foresail and mizen, got on board the main tack, and set our mainfail and fore and mizen stay-fails, at the same time some of our people were employed in heaving in the cable, for the Captain would not have it cut, which took up some time. I found it to be parted about three fathoms without the service of the outer cable. It blew so very hard that the ship would not bear any more sail.

Six At six we sounded and found fourteen fathoms water, at the same time there being a great head sea, we made but very little way, and found the ship gained more water than one of the chain pumps could possibly discharge, which obliged us to set both pumps to work.

Seven. The weather continuing very bad with a great sea and strong gales; at half past six our mainfail split in pieces, we got down the yard in order to bend a new sail, but it blowing so hard and the ship lying down very much, we could not get the sail to the yard. At seven we sounded eighteen fathom water. At half past seven sounded twenty fathoms, the wind at N. E. the first and second Lieutenants at the pumps encouraging the men. At eight the carpenter sent word to the Captain that the ship gained upon them much, four foot water in the hold, at the same time, depth of water twenty-two fathoms; half past, our tiller rope broke short off at the rudder head, and we likewise found one of the rudder chains broke. The sails we had now set were our foresail, mizen, mizen, and fore stay-fails. At nine sounded twenty-four fathoms water. The sea now made a free passage over us, and the ship being water-logged, we hauled up our foresail to ease her, but expected to go down every minute. In hauling

Eight. pumps encouraging the men. At eight the carpenter sent word to the Captain that the ship gained upon them much, four foot water in the hold, at the same time, depth of water twenty-two fathoms; half past, our tiller rope broke short off at the rudder head, and we likewise found one of the rudder chains broke. The sails we had now set were our foresail, mizen, mizen, and fore stay-fails. At nine sounded twenty-four fathoms water. The sea now made a free passage over us, and the ship being water-logged, we hauled up our foresail to ease her, but expected to go down every minute. In hauling

Nine. The sea now made a free passage over us, and the ship being water-logged, we hauled up our foresail to ease her, but expected to go down every minute. In hauling  
ing





ing down our forestay-fail it split, and as I looked aft from the fore- April 14,  
 castle I saw the main and mizen mast gone, but never heard them go. 1749.  
 By this time the ship righted much, and in about seven minutes the  
 foremast went by the board, but the bowsprit held fast, depth  
 of water about twenty-five fathoms. Our pumps continually work-  
 ing. The third Lieutenant being on the quarter deck sent forward to  
 me to clear and let go the small bower anchor, which was immedi-  
 ately done. We veered the cable out to the service and stoppered the  
 cable, the wind at N. E. by E. we found the ship drive to shore very  
 fast, depth of water seventeen fathoms. Half past ten we had eight  
 feet water in the ship's hold, kept the pumps working. About  
 eleven o'clock we found the ship settle, depth of water twelve or Eleven  
 fourteen fathoms, and then the anchor brought the ship up, but the o'clock.  
 cable parted in a few minutes, then we let the sheet anchor go which  
 was all we had. The sea now made a free passage over us again, which  
 broke and tore away our boats and booms. The sheet cable tore out  
 with such violence that no man could venture near it, 'till the clench  
 brought up the ship. Depth of water about seven fathoms. The  
 cable held some time, but the sea came in with such force and so  
 very high, that in the hollow of the sea the ship struck, and the  
 cable immediately parted. It was now near twelve o'clock, the ship Twelve.  
 struck fore and aft but abaft very hard. The third Lieutenant was  
 near me when the ship first struck, but I saw no more of him after-  
 wards. I kept the forecastle accompanied by the boatswain, cook,  
 and about eight men more, I got myself lashed to the bitts before  
 the ship took heel, but shifted myself over to windward when she  
 began to heel, and lashed myself as before, the sea continually beat-  
 ing over us. About two saw the Captain's cabin washed away, and Morning  
 the ship almost on her broadside. When daylight came, we were  
 sixteen men on the forecastle, and four hanging abaft to the timber  
 heads, but three of the last got on a piece of the wreck, which was  
 loose and drove away, the other was drowned; all this time the sea  
 came over us in a dreadful manner so that we could scarce take breath.  
 About eight o'clock nine men were washed off the forecastle. We  
 could now see the trees ashore between the seas. About nine o'clock the  
 boatswain and cook were washed away from each side of me, then  
 I removed myself to the cathead as did another man also. About ten  
 o'clock all our men were washed away except we that were lashed  
 to the cathead; we judged we were near two miles off the shore;  
 we continued there all the day, the sea beating over us continually so  
 that





April 15, that we had little time to fetch breath or speak to one another. At.  
1749. noon we found the sea to come every way upon us, and could perceive the wind was shifted which was the cause thereof. This part of the wreck kept fast, but night coming on we had a dismal prospect before us, having no hopes of relief. About midnight the sea a little abated, so that we could speak to one another for the space of two or three minutes together; but I found myself so weak having been sick ever since we arrived in the country, that when the sea washed me on one side in my lashing I was not able to help myself up, but was obliged to get my companion to assist me. At day light I found myself much weaker and very thirsty. The sea at this time came over us once in a quarter of an hour: we found the wreck much nearer the shore than yesterday. Some time after day light my companion told me he saw a flag to the northward, which we judged to be at Porto-Novo, a Dutch settlement, which gave us great hopes that we should soon have some assistance. About noon we found the sea much abated, so that it seldom came over us, and the weather began to be fine, but I found myself very faint. About two or three o'clock we saw two paddy boats coming along shore about a mile without us; we spread abroad a handkerchief which I had about my neck that the boats might see us; one of them seemed to edge towards us for some minutes but hauled off again. Then we saw several Catamarans near the shore which we judged to be fishing, we spread abroad the handkerchief again, but none of them approached us. Soon after we saw several people gather together ashore, the sun began to grow low, so that we judged it to be about five o'clock. At last we saw two of the Catamarans above mentioned coming towards us with three black men on each. They took us off the wreck and carried us ashore. As soon as we were landed, we found ourselves surrounded by about three hundred armed men. My companion told me we were fallen into the hands of the Marattas who were at this time in arms against the English; they ordered us to come off the Catamarans: I strove to rise, but found myself so very weak, and my legs so terribly bruised, that I could not get up; upon which some of them came and lifted me off, and laid me upon the sand, for I could not stand. I made a sign to them that I wanted some water to drink, but they gave me none, and only laughed at our condition. Their commander ordered some of them to strip us, which they did quite naked; but before they stripped me, they took a pair of gold buttons out of my sleeves, two half crowns, my keys, and a knife out of my pockets,





pockets, and having metal buttons on my breeches, they cut them off also. When they had stripped me they made a kind of clout of my shirt to hide my nakedness. During this time, we were in the utmost want of something to quench our thirst. As I was not able to walk, they led us part of the way to **Davecotta** (a fort belonging to them) and there put us into a canoe and carried us up a river to the fort walls. About ten this night they put us within the walls and laid us on the ground, where we had nothing to cover us but the heavens, and about eleven they brought us a little rice and some water. Great numbers of people gathered round us, laughing at us, and expressing great contempt and derision. We got little sleep that night, being extremely cold, and not without apprehensions for our lives, as they had threatened to cut us to pieces with their cutlasses. When day light appeared the gates being opened, I found myself very sick, and seized with the flux, and my legs extremely bad, so that I concluded I could not survive much longer, if destitute of better relief. I told my companion I could not live long, and desired, that if ever he got home, he would give my friends the history of my death. Some days they gave us a little rice, and some days none at all. About the seventh day they gave me some lamp oil, with which I bathed my legs, and found some ease by it.

April 15,  
1749

16.

THE country people flocked daily to the fort to see us ; but none of them shewed us the least pity, but on the contrary laughed at, and threatened us with death. Our lodging-place was between the gate-ways, and when we had been there fourteen or fifteen days they carried us into the country. Tho' my legs were much better, yet still I could not walk, and my companion was likewise extreme weak, which I believe was chiefly owing to our want of more victuals ; so they put us into dooleys, or cradles, fastened together with ropes, which they got from the wreck. About four o'clock on the fifteenth day they carried us about twelve miles to their King, who was encamped against our Company's troops. By him we were examined, and he questioned us if either of us was an officer ; this I judged it safest to deny, as the contrary would render our escape the more difficult. The King was desirous we should enter into their service ; but we told him (by the interpreters who were three Dutchmen) that we could not consent to it. He said, we should want for nothing if we would serve him ; we replied, we were very ill and not fit for any service. However we were ordered a good meal's victuals, which

was





1749. was the only one we had had since our being amongst them. The linguists asked us, if it was not better to enter into their service than be sent to prison; we told them, we could not answer to fight against our own countrymen. With that they travelled us till midnight (it being near sun set when we set out) and then rested till near three in the morning, at which time they set out with us again, and kept on till noon, when they rested about two hours to eat, and then proceeded about S. W. till it was night, and we came to a fort, and were immediately put into a dungeon. There were two more prisoners, one of them our ship-mate, the other a deserter from the India company's troops. Our new comrades told us they had been there three days. At sun rising the next morning the door of the dungeon was opened, and signs were made to us to come out, which my comrades did; but for my part I kept in, being very ill and weak, and my legs exceeding painful and full of running ulcers. I begged they would get me some lamp oil to bathe them with, which they accordingly did. They fed us as before with rice, water, and a little gee, viz. a quart of rice a day for four, and a noggen of gee instead of butter. I bathed my legs with the gee and oil, and in four or five days they were greatly mended, which gave me some spirits. For we had liberty in the day time to walk before the dungeon.

In about three weeks time my legs were almost well, so that I was able to walk. We now began to entertain some hopes of making our escape. And taking an opportunity, I with some difficulty got high enough upon the wall to look over it, and found it was very high, and surrounded with a wide mote or ditch; but there was a path between the wall and the ditch, so that we might choose our place to swim over if it proved deep. We got at several times some strands of rope of the dooleys which they had carried us in, as they happened to be left within the bounds of our liberty. And in a few days we got so many pieces, as when knotted together made seven fathoms and an half. After some consultation we resolved to undermine the foundation of the dungeon at the farthest part from the guards, and on the twenty-seventh of May began to work. On the first of June we came to the foundation, being six feet deep; and the wall thirty inches through. In two days time we had worked upwards on the other side so far, that the light began to appear through the surface, so that we let everything remain till night. At seven it beginning to grow dark, they put us into the dungeon as usual; and soon after, we worked ourselves quite out, and without being





Being discovered, got over the wall by the help of our rope, and in less than half an hour, had all crossed the moat, though very deep and wide. We travelled all night we judged about sixteen miles, and in the day time hid ourselves among the bushes: the second night we travelled as before to the S. E. and day coming on, we concealed ourselves among some rushes. About three in the afternoon we were discovered, which obliged us to go on, but we were not molested. We proceeded till about midnight, and then slept till the dawning of the day. I now had a very strong fever on me, and was extremely weak for want of something to eat. This day, being the third, we agreed to travel till noon and plunder the first single house we could meet with. But providence was more favourable to us than we expected; for about ten o'clock we met a Cooley, who told us he would shew us to Carikal, which was a settlement belonging to the French. We thanked the Almighty for this joyful news, and gladly accepted the offer. About noon we arrived there, and were received with great humanity and kindness, but my fever was not at all abated. The next morning the Governor sent to Mr. Boscawen, to let him know we were there, and by the return of the messenger the Admiral desired we might be furnished with what money we wanted. In twelve days time we found ourselves well recovered, and went to Trinkabar, a place belonging to the Danes, where we stayed three days, and then got a passage to fort St. David's, where I arrived with my two shipmates (the deserter having left us at Carkal) the twenty-third of June, and immediately waited on our Admiral.

1749.





## PROCEEDINGS of the COMMISSARIES at SADRASS.

**A**RTICLES proposed on the 23d Jan. 1754, by Messrs. Robert Pa'k and Henry Vansittart, as a basis to the conferences they are appointed by the president and council of Fort St. George to hold at Sadrafs, with the reverend father Lavaur and Messrs. De Beaufet and De Kerjean, deputies on the part of the marquis Dupleix, governor of Pondichery, for terminating the present troubles in the Carnateck.

### A R T I C L E I.

Nabob Anaverdy Cawn Behauder shall be acknowledged as Souba of the Carnateck in as full and ample a manner as his father or any other Soubas have enjoyed the province.

II. The king of Tanjore shall also be comprehended in this treaty, and the peaceable possession of his kingdom guaranteed to him by the contracting parties.

*To the Honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

We met the French deputies early this morning according to appointment. They produced a paper of which the inclosed is a translation, and some Persian writings, which they called original grants, desiring we might examine them. We answered, that as they had already been communicated to you, it would be only losing time; that we could not take upon us to say whether these grants were genuine or not, nor whether those that gave them had a power so to do; that Salabatzing was well known to be in a situation not to refuse any thing to the French; and that it was a great doubt whether the Mogul knew what grants Salabatzing had given, though he is said to have approved of his acts. That Gauzedey Cawn's being sent to depose him was no strong argument on his side; that in short, all these points had been so often contested between you and Mr. Dupleix, that it was unnecessary to enter on a further discussion; that the marquis was well acquainted with your sentiments, and that it would be needless and vain for us to attempt to explain them better. We thought therefore that it would be employing our time much more to the purpose, if we proceeded to the proposals; and that we would begin by communicating our preliminaries; upon which we delivered them the paper of which we sent you a copy yesterday, assuring them at the same time, that if they were admitted, a speedy satisfaction might easily be found for all parties. They entered into a long detail to invalidate Anarverdy Cawn's title, which we supported by arguments founded on Nazirzing's Phirmaunds, confirmed by Gauzedey Cawn, and even by the Mogul. This ended in a declaration from them that they could not consent to our proposals, but that they would transmit them to Pondichery and wait for an answer. They then retired, with a promise of sending us what they intended as preliminaries on their part; and two hours afterwards we received the extraordinary propositions which come inclosed, but not without representing that such an unreasonable demand would rather help to inflame than accommodate the differences, however that we would transmit it to Mr. Saunders, who no doubt would be full of reconnoissance for the independancy of Madrafs.

On the receipt of our preliminaries it is not improbable but Mr. Dupleix may send orders to his deputies to return: in that case we shall be glad of the same liberty from you. We are only sorry there is no inclination on their side towards a reasonable accommodation. They would have it believed, that the marquis's right of government from the river Kri.nah to the sea is incontestible.

We are, with great respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY VANSITTART.

*Fi.ß*

Sadrafs, 23d Jan.

1754.

A





*First Memorial presented to the deputies of the English nation by those of the French nation, in the conferences held at Sadrafs to consult on means to terminate the troubles of the country.*

It being first agreed that we should begin by communicating reciprocally the pieces that are to serve as a basis to the present negotiation, the French deputies communicated the following pieces.

I. A Perwana of Muzapharzing, viceroy of Decan, which appoints the marquis Dupleix, intitled Zupherzing in the Persian language, commander of all the territories in his dependance from the river Kri'nah to the sea.

II. Another Perwana of Salabatzing, successor to Muzapherzing, confirming the foregoing.

III. A saned granted by the abovesaid Muzapherzing to Chunda Saib, otherwise called Hussan Dost Cawn, for the Carnateck country.

IV. Another saned granted to the same by Salabatzing after the death of Muzapherzing.

V. A Perwana of Salabatzing to give the countries of Arcot and Trichinopoly to the marquis Dupleix after the death of Chunda Saib.

VI. Two Perwana's of the same, confirming the foregoing, and nominating Mootis Ally Cawn, governor of the citadel of Velour, lieutenant under the marquis Dupleix in the Arcot and Trichinopoly countries. In one of these mention is made of a saned formerly granted to Raja Saib, son of Chunda Saib, for the Trichinopoly country.

VII. A most authentick Phirmaund from the Great Mogul, approving and confirming all that Salabatzing has done in favour of the marquis Dupleix.

Translated from the French  
original in our hands,

ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.

Signed FR. LAFAUR, superior general of  
the French jesuits in India.

BAUSSET.  
DE KERJEAN.

*The Answer and the Proposals of the French deputies to the English deputies assembled at Sadrafs, the 23d of January, 1754.*

Gentlemen,

The proposal that we cannot avoid making previously to all others, is the restitution of the French prisoners, which regularly ought to be the first preliminary, for the reasons which have so often been set forth to Mr. Saunders.

Coming next to the affairs of the Carnateck, and what you call your proposals, we beg you will remark first, that they are only a demand by which you require that we shall give up all, before we have treated of any thing. Secondly, that such a demand does not appear to be founded on any title; you do not even communicate to us the title of Mahomed Allee Cawn, on which you pretend to justify the legality of your alliance with him, which would not appear lawful to us, considering the peace between the two nations, were Mahomed Allee Cawn even authorised. The saned of Nazerzing, which you quote in his favour, should be a paper to be examined; but supposing its existence, you cannot dispute that they are invalidated by the Saned granted afterwards to others by those who have a right to appoint to the governments of the Carnateck. Thirdly and lastly, the marquis Dupleix has already absolutely declared to the honourable Mr. Saunders, that he looked upon it as a refusal to treat, to propose the aforesaid preliminary that is to begin with acknowledging Mahomed Allee as legal and absolute master of the Carnateck; if it was resolved to persist in that, it was to no purpose to invite us here.

We





We have proved by authentick pieces the right of the chief of the French nation to take part in the affairs of the Carnateck, and to make proposals concerning the said country. The following therefore are what we have to make, with the sole motive of restoring peace to the country, and which cannot but appear advantageous to your nation.

### ARTICLE I.

The town of Madrais, which has hitherto been possessed by the English nation only in dependance, and with the acknowledgment of a tribute of 4000 pagods a year to the Duan of Arcot, shall henceforth be independent, free from all tribute, and shall have no other master but the honourable English company; if there are any arrears due, they shall be forgiven.

II. The said company shall be secured in the legitimate possession of Pondichery and its dependancies.

III. Some establishment shall be secured to Mahomed Allee Cawn, which shall be agreed on if the preliminaries are received, and his differences with the Maissoreans about Trichinopoly shall be conciliated.

IV. In consideration of the foregoing advantages, the English shall evacuate the places taken from the French, to whom they belonged, whether by right of conquest or concession, as well as all other places in the Carnateck country, without opposing the disposition and regulations made by Salabatzing, to whom this right belongs without any doubt.

These proposals comprehend the principal heads which are the object of the negotiation. If any questions arise which have been omitted, we will add to this memorial, in proportion as they appear.

With regard to Tanjour, the marquis Dupleix has already declared to the honourable Mr. Saunders, that it was in the breast of the Tanjoreans to be at peace with the French; and that he would give them assurances, free from equivocation, if they on their part would lay down their arms. We renew the same declaration, as far as can be necessary.

Translated from the French  
original in our hands,  
ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.

Signed FR. LAVAUR.  
BAUSSET.  
DE KERJEAN.

*To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart.*

Gentlemen,

I have received your letters of the 22d and 23d, with the answer of the French deputies to yours, and their proposals, on which you shall have full instructions to-morrow morning.

This is chiefly to desire you will demand of the French deputies the dates of the several saneds to themselves and Chundah; from these depends the confuting them.

Should any orders come to them from Pondichery before you receive ours, acquaint them you expect final ones from me; and then I suppose the conference will break up.

The following is a paragraph of a Letter, dated Bandarmalanka, 19th January.

“ Since my last report has been spread, that Mr. Busley has been cut off, and Salaba zing made prisoner, and Jaffir Ally Cawn expects new phirmaunds for the country every day.”—Should this be true, it must be very soon confirmed.

I am, Gentlemen,

Fort St. George, 24th Jan.  
1754. 8 P. M.

Your most obedient Servant,  
THOMAS SAUNDERS.





[ 4 ]

*To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart.*

Gentlemen,

As on the validity of the several saneds Mr. Dupleix is said to be invested with, depends in a great measure the answer thereto, the translator (as you have none) will set out to-morrow morning, when you will demand that he may see them, take their dates, nay a copy of them; by which we shall easily judge of their authentickness.

I am, Gentlemen,

Fort St. George, 24th Jan.

Your most obedient Servant,

1754. 11 P. M.

THOMAS SAUNDERS.

P. S. Please to return him with the copies express.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

Your general letter of the 22d and 23d we received the 24th, and last night we were favoured with two from you of the 24th. Ours of the 23d will shew you that we have strictly adhered to your instructions in the first; and with regard to the latter, the French gentlemen are already acquainted with our intentions, and consent that the saneds shall be enquired into the moment the translator arrives. They hope that it may promote the conference, and give us to understand that by degrees it is not impossible but we may come to an agreement, though we do not find they are the least inclinable to our first article. If the news from Bandarmalanka should prove true, and Gauzedey Cawn's son have received the phirmaunds, it will be a very strong argument on our side, as they insist chiefly on the validity of theirs.

We are, with great respect,

Honourable Sir,

Sadrats, 26th Jan. 1754.

Your most obedient humble Servants,

$\frac{1}{2}$  past 10 A. M.

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY VANSITTART.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

The translator arriving this morning, the French deputies met us, and we set about copying the saneds. On Moodo Kishnah's observing the seven first were only copies, we told them that we expected to have seen the originals; they answered, that Mr. Dupleix had them at Pondichery, and, if required, they should be sent hither; but that copies attested by the Caudy were esteemed of equal validity. This caused some dispute, but we agreed to proceed in the copying. On examination it appearing that the first had no date, the father Lavour immediately objected, that unless we produced Nazarzing's saned to Anaverdy Cawn, they could not admit of theirs being copied; that an answer should first be given to their proposals, and the Nabob's powers produced, that the pieces on both sides might be examined at the same time. We replied, that as we had acted from the beginning only as allies to the Circar, the saneds could not be in our hands, but in the Nabob's; that Nazarzing supporting him at the head of a numerous army, was a strong saned in his favour; and that we did not join him but at the repeated instances of Nazarzing himself. Upon this they recalled the copies of three or four of the saneds that were already finished, desiring that we would acquaint you with what had happened; and farther, that if our preliminaries were to be insisted on, the treaty must drop; for that Mr. Dupleix was absolutely and positively determined never to acknowledge Anaverdy Cawn for Souba of the province. Here the conference ended; however we had time to observe, that the saned from the Grand Mogul, which they declared to be the original, had no top, only a seal of wax annexed to the cover in which it is said to have come. Moodo Kishnah took a copy of the

translation





[ 5 ]

inscription which we inclosed to you. If the figures at bottom are the year of the Hegyra (and we know not what else it can signify) it is thirty-four years o.d; for this is the year of the Hegyra 1167.

Moodo Kistna will set out this evening, as you may probably want him at Madras. Should you find it necessary to return him to us, your orders will meet him on the road.

Sadras, 27 Jan. 1754.

The superscription.

A Phirmaund of high dignity in  
the name of governor general  
Behauder Zapher Jung.

On one side of the seal.

The Country belongs to God——3

1133.

On the other side.

Order belongs to God——3

1133.

*To the Honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

Inclosed is the copy of a letter which we have just received from the French deputies, with our answer. Unless our interpreters are greatly mistaken, the Mogul's saned is not original.

We beg your answer as soon as possible, as the gentlemen begin to grow impatient.

Sadras, 27 Jan. 1754.

7 P. M.

We are, with great respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY VANSITTART.

*Letter from the French, to the English deputies.*

Gentlemen,

Be so good as to represent to Mr. Saunders, that if we require to see the original saneds that Mahomed Alee Cawn pretends to have from Nazirzing, it is only to convince yourselves, gentlemen, that Mahomed Alee Cawn has imposed upon you; but supposing even the reality of this saned, you are as well acquainted as we, of the little validity it could be of after the saneds granted by the successors of Nazarzing. It is therefore needless, gentlemen, to wait for this saned all the time it will take to send for it from Trichinopoly, where you told us it was, and to be so long idle. Besides, as you have declared to us, that independant of all pieces, Mr. Saunders insisted on the preliminary proposed; please to ask him for his fresh intentions on that article, since they are decisive for the continuation or the breaking up of the conferences; without them we could only at the end of fifteen days, which would be lost, tell him what was expressly declared to him before we came here.

We beg you will also communicate to him all that we have had the honour to say to you, gentlemen, on the subject of securing the most perfect liberty of commerce, such as the English may desire, as well on the means of establishing in this country a perpetual and inviolable peace between the two nations. We wish with all our heart, that these two objects may make on Mr. Saunders the impression they deserve.

We are, with true respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most humble

And most obedient Servants,

FR. L. LAFAUR.

BAUSETT.

DE KERJEAN.

Translated from the original

in our hands,

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY V.



*The Answer to the foregoing Letter.*

*To the reverend Father Lavour and Messrs. De Baufet and De Kerjean, deputies of the French nation.*

Gentlemen,

We have received the Letter which you did us the honour to write to us ; we have already communicated the contents to Mr. Saunders.

We are not a little surprised to find that Nazirzing's appointment of Anaverdy Cawn to the soubaship of the Carnateck is disputed, since neither the marquis Dupleix nor you, gentlemen, can be ignorant, that this master of Deckan not only granted him the saneds, but supported him with a numerous army to put him in possession of the government, which he would have enjoyed peaceably to this day, and the country have remained in perfect tranquility, had it so pleased the marquis Dupleix.

The English entered into an alliance with Anaverdy Cawn in support of this title, which, to give it all possible force, has since been confirmed by Gauzedy Cawn and his son Shaw Abadin Cawn, the succeeding masters of Deckan ; and it is for these substantial reasons, that his rights are made the basis of the present conferences : when this is settled, the equitable demands of all parties may be easily reconciled.

As to the saneds, it was your first proposal that yours would be enquired into ; and we are at a loss to guess the reason of your declining it after some copies had been taken : pieces of so publick a nature might, we apprehend, be exposed to all the world. But we cannot help remarking to you, that the first of these saneds is without date ; and the only original one you produced, said to come from the Great Mogul, wants what we are assured are the usual forms, which certainly should not have been neglected in a piece of so much consequence ; for instance, it has no chop of the Mogul or his Visier, it has no sign manual, and under the superscription of the seal annexed to the cover are the figures 1133, the date no doubt of the Hegyra, according to the custom of the country ; and if so, we need not tell you that it is thirty-four years old, this being the year of the Hegyra 1167.

With regard to the saneds of Anaverdy Cawn, we have had the honour to acquaint you, that as we are only allies, the originals he has from time to time received rest with him, and attested copies may be procured whenever it shall be thought necessary.

As Mr. Saunders has nothing more at heart than a just and equitable peace to the reciprocal advantage of both nations, we cannot but wish Mr. Dupleix would give proofs of the same sentiments. We have the honour to be, with the most perfect regard,

Gentlemen, Your most obedient humble Servants,

Sadras, 27 January,  
1754.

ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

We have yet received no answer from the French deputies to our letter of the 27th. The father Lavour took a translation of it that evening, as we explained the sense to him, for none of them understand any English ; and when he came to our remarks, he confessed that things to be sure could not be decided by saneds ; that we should proceed further in our proposals, and try if affairs could not be accommodated in that manner : however, he talked yesterday of sending us an answer ; but as it is so long coming, we imagine they have wrote to Pondichery for one. It seems to be past all doubt, that Mr. Dupleix's friend at the court of Delhi has deceived him.

We are, with great respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

Sadras, 29 Jan. 1754.  
past 8 A. M.

ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART





[ 7 ]

*To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart.*

Gentlemen,

We annex hereto our instructions for your answer to the French deputies memorial, reply to their answer and proposals, and our fresh proposals. By what has already past, we are convinced Mr. Dupleix has no intentions of peace. You will receive an answer in writing to our proposals, which we suppose will put an end to the conference.

Fort St. George,  
30 Jan. 1754.

We are, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient Servants,

THOMAS SAUNDERS.  
CHARLES BODDAM.  
HENRY POWNEY.  
ALEXANDER WYNCH.  
JOHN SMITH.  
CHARLES BOURCHIER.

*Answer to be presented by the English Commissaries to the first memorial delivered by the French Deputies at Sadras.*

Our first proposal being, that Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn should be acknowledged Souba of the Carnateck; his right being founded on saneds granted by the several princes of the Deckan, it is matter of surprise to us, that the marquis Dupleix, who is only an ally of the country powers, should assume to himself the authority and government, not only of this province, but of the whole country from Cape Comorin to the river Kristna, in direct opposition to the established laws of the Mogul, and his officers legally appointed, to us, and to every one well known. Yet as Mr. Dupleix in his letters to Mr. Saunders advanced, that he had several saneds to support this authority, pressing repeatedly an examination of them; and the French commissaries presenting the same, we agreed to it, upon the perusal of some of them, the incoherences appearing so very strong, they then declined, and denied us any further scrutiny. The reason assigned by Father Lavour, that unless the Nabob's saned from Nazerzing was first produced, they would not admit of a farther scrutiny, we think unjust and groundless; because on the validity of those saneds certainly depends Mr. Dupleix's authority to judge of Nabob Anaverdy Cawn's right, and is therefore what should be first settled. But we cannot help thinking that Father Lavour was influenced by a more cogent reason; he knew too well they they would not bear the test. The palpable defects found in those we had the perusal of, give us full liberty to make this conclusion.

As patents of so publick a nature are in their very intention granted to be published to the whole community, what can the suppressing an examination into them mean more than a consciousness of their illegality. To every candid reader it must certainly appear so; and as we are from undoubted facts convinced that they are of no force, we object to them, deny their validity, and declare that Mr. Dupleix has no more authority to govern this province than any private person whatsoever.

*Reply to be made by the English Commissaries to the answer and proposals of the French Deputies. Dated 23 January, 1754.*

That it is very certain Mr. Dupleix has often wrote to Mr. Saunders concerning the French prisoners, and that he has used his influence with the Nabob for their relief; which has been returned with breach of honour, by several officers appealing to arms against him contrary to their parole; and though by this they were liable to immediate death, they have by his intercession been pardoned: that as Mr. Dupleix cannot be ignorant that prisoners are never released till a peace is concluded, he will certainly think





it reasonable when we tell him that when the articles on which the peace and securities of the Nabob's government depends are settled, this will be immediately considered.

And as it appears evidently by the invalidity of these papers Mr. Dupleix is pleased to introduce under the name of saneds, that he has no authority to contest the commissions granted by the Mogul's legal officers; yet we are ready, if he desires it, to remove all doubt he may have concerning Nabob Mahomed Allee's just title, and will send for copies attested of the saneds granted him by Nazirzing. Gauzedey Cawn, and confirmed by Gauzedey Cawn's son, for the perusal of Mr. Dupleix or his commissaries.

Though our proposal of Mahomed Allee's being souba of the Carnateck is founded on justice and equity, as no Nabob but himself has been named to that government since his father Anaverdey Cawn's death, and is so far absolute, that no peace can be concluded without it; yet in regard to Mr. Dupleix it is conditional, and he is desired to give in his demands, which will be considered, and if consistent with the tranquility of the country, granted, so that it cannot be said that they should give up every thing. And if Mr. Dupleix is not satisfied with the saned from Nazirzing, Gauzedey Cawn's cannot be disputed; but should this be the case, surely when it is confirmed by Gauzedey Cawn's son it will be deemed just to any others.

They are pleased to say they have proved by authentick pieces, that the French had a right to take a part in the affairs on the coast of Coromandel. We are of opinion these very papers, the invalidity of which are as clear as the sun at noon, manifest evidently that they had no just grounds for so doing; or that we may be convinced that we err, let Mr. Dupleix produce a saned from the Mogul, empowering him to take a part with Erat Mooden Cawn and Chunda Saib, in deposing and killing Anaverdy Cawn; let him produce a saned also for assisting the same rebels in the assassination of Nazirzing, who it is universally known governed the Deckan by orders from the emperor; it will be necessary also to produce powers from Gauzedey Cawn, who was by the Mogul appointed successor to Nazirzing, to continue his support to Chundah Saib against Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn. If he cannot produce these pieces, what title has he to assume the government of the coast of Coromandel? and as Nabob Mahomed Allee has saneds from these legal princes, by what authority can Mr. Dupleix dispute them?

When Mr. Saunders made proposals to Mr. Dupleix to treat, he told him it was by virtue of a power from Nabob Mahomed Allee. What then can he mean by his offer, that Madrafs should be free from the tribute of 4000 pagodas per annum, paid to the circar of Arcot; and that Poonamalee should be secured to us? We can hardly surmise that he could be ignorant that the settlement of Madrafs never has paid such tribute, and that the country of Poonamalee is ours by a legal grant; but supposing it was otherwise, it has in this conference sufficiently appeared that he has no power to secure to us either; therefore these two articles are certainly ridiculous and insolent.

Equally so is the third article, to make a prisoner of a prince who has beat his enemies in every battle; and who, not compelled by necessity, but through a humane disposition to put a stop to the calamities of war, would treat his enemies as friends.

The fourth is absurd and quite unintelligible; the English have not taken any one place from the French, nor are they at this day in possession of a single one belonging to either French or Moors.

In regard to the king of Tanjore, the offer is an equivocation; as it is known the king of Tanjore is in alliance with the Nabob, and cannot treat separately; if a peace is concluded with the Nabob, and Mr. Dupleix will engage not to molest the king or his country, he will lay down his arms.

To recapitulate the whole of the French deputies memorial answer and proposals, they are, that Mr. Dupleix (the chief of the French) then grasps at the government of





of the coast of Coromandel : that he produces several papers, which he terms saneds, to prove his authority, which he offers to examination, but when found defective, a further scrutiny is denied : that he repeatedly desires the Nabob's right may be enquired into ; but when the deputies are told they shall be satisfied in this point, instead of entering into any enquiry, they declare absolutely that Mr. Dupleix never will consent to Nabob Mahomed Allee's being Subah of the Carnatick ; and that if the Nabob will betray his master, and consent that he shall rob him of the whole coast of Coromandel, he offers to secure to the English what he would not with impunity attempt to take from them ; and what if they had not, he has no power to bestow. To the Nabob, under whose protection he should live peaceably, and whose government he should obey, he would give a pension ; and the king of Tanjore he would tempt to be a villain, in deserting his allies. These proposals will sufficiently shew to our superiors his inclinations to peace ; as they will at the same time convince the Mogul and his officers of his intention to plunder him of his dominions, and induce them to take such measures as may convince him that the liberty of a nation will not easily become a prey to the ambition of a single subject.

*Proposals to be made by the English Commissaries in behalf of Nabob Mahomed Allee to the French Deputies at Sadras.*

As it is notoriously evident from what has passed in this conference, that by the examination of those few papers which Mr. Dupleix calls saneds, and by the suppression of any further scrutiny into the rest, as well as by the orders from the Mogul to his several officers of the government of this province and the other part of the coast of Coromandel ; that those papers are of no force, should Mr. Dupleix persist in assuming to himself an unlawful power thus by acts of violence in support of rebels to rob the emperor of his country and the people of their liberty, what can it be productive of but a continuance of the war ? And as when it was offered that attested copies of the Nabob's saneds should be laid before Mr. Dupleix or his deputies, they, without alledging any thing to disannul his right, or even waiting for a perusal of those pieces, contrary to all reason and justice, replied that Mr. Dupleix declared absolutely, Nabob Mahomed Allee should never be Subah of the province. A speech so arbitrary that it amounts to a publick declaration, that in open violation of all laws, he is resolved to usurp the government. How different is this from his solemn protestation, that he reserved no animosity to the Nabob, or that he had nothing more sincerely at heart than restoring peace to the country ? We flatter ourselves, upon mature consideration Mr. Dupleix's good sense will lead him to lay aside a scheme so contrary to the established laws of the country and so destructive to the people, and that he will seriously think of peace ; to promote which, and that he may be convinced of our good intentions, we in behalf of Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn make the following proposals.

That the Nabob, as he is determined not to swerve from the rules of his government, but afford protection equally alike to the European nations settled on the coast, and to put an end to the animosities the late unhappy troubles have occasioned, will make no distinction between the French and English, will grant to the French, Jagueers to the full amount of what were possessed by the English ; and that no dispute may in future arise, those Jagueers shall be so situated as not to be liable to any inconveniences from the settlements or possessions of the English ; and that in regard to commerce, both nations shall enjoy a free circulation through the province, without liability to either ; and that the goods passing or repassing through each others Jagueers shall not be liable to any custom or molestation.

That the French shall evacuate all places possessed by them or by their order, exclusive of these Jagueers, shall not interfere in the Nabob's government, give protection





tion to, or assist such of his subjects who may endeavour to disturb the peace or defraud him of his revenues.

That when the articles for securing to the Nabob his government are adjusted, the release of the prisoners shall be settled in such manner as may be consistent with the safety of his government.

That the Nabob will give the Mysoreans a security for such a sum of money as may upon an equitable statement of the account appear to be due to them.

That a pension for Ruzza Saib shall be agreed on and settled.

That in consideration of the above, Mr. Dupleix shall, in behalf of the French nation, acknowledge and pay all lawful obedience to Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn, as Nabob of the Carnateck, in as full and ample manner as his father Anaverdy Cawn possessed it.

That the King of Tanjore shall enjoy his country in peace, free from any molestation.

That this treaty be signed by Mr. Dupleix, as governor, &c. council of Pondichery, and Thomas Saunders, governor, &c. council of Fort St. George, with the seals of the respective companies affixed by Nabob Mahomed Allee, Subah of the Carnateck, with the seal of the Circar; by the King of Tanjore with his royal seal, and the King of Mysore with his. That the several articles contained in this treaty shall be guaranteed by each party to the rest; and that whosoever infringes it shall be deemed as a common enemy, and shall by the rest be compelled to render satisfaction to the party aggrieved. That all animosities shall cease, what has past be buried in oblivion, and a perfect friendship and harmony subsist.

*To be proposed in a separate Article.*

That as the influence Mr. Dupleix, as governor of Pondichery, and Mr. Saunders, governor of Madras, have on the country powers is well known, Mr. Saunders is ready to concert measures with Mr. Dupleix for establishing a perfect peace and friendship, not only in this province, but on the whole coast of Coromandel; not doubting but if they both sincerely exert their endeavours, it may be with facility effected.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

The inclosed Letter we received from the French deputies yesterday, which we deferred answering till the Tappies came in, expecting your further instructions, as they might in some measure direct us in doing it; but as we have not yet been favoured with them, we determined to send the answer, of which a copy also comes inclosed.

We have confined ourselves as strictly as the subject will permit us to your former directions; and having the best of the argument, we thought it our duty to enforce it.

We are, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

Madras, 30th January,  
1754. 2 P. M.

ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.

*To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart, deputies of the English nation.*

Gentlemen,

very true that we proposed to you to begin our conferences by the exposition and examination of the pieces that might support our reciprocal pretensions: it is the natural method, if it is intended to proceed according to the rules of justice. To this end  
the





the marquis Dupleix desired the honourable Mr. Saunders to furnish you with the titles on which you pretend to justify the rights of Mahomed Allee. We come here in confidence that you had brought them; but we were mistaken. That did not hinder us from producing and submitting to your examination all our perwanas, in the hopes you gave us of procuring immediately from Madras whatever might exist in favour of Mahomed Allee. But after the time necessary, we saw nothing arrive but interpreters destined to examine our pieces; and you said that your's or Mahomed Allee's (which is the same thing) were at Trichinopoly. Notwithstanding this second delay, which must be much longer than the former on account of the distance of the places, we put ours into the hands of your interpreters. You required copies of them, and we consented that they should be taken. They were at work upon them when you spoke to us of a new saned of Shahabedey Cawn, son of Gauzedey Cawn, in favour of Mahomed Allee; and of another from the Mogul in favour of Shahabedey Cawn. You had prepared us for these new pieces by distant hints in conversation, but you had not yet declared their existence. We were also prepared for them by information that had been given to Nandi Raja of a pretended saned sent by Shahabedey Cawn to Mahomed Allee, which falls of itself, as we shall make appear in proper time.

All that, gentlemen, (since we must declare it) gave us strong suspicions that our pieces, sent by you to Mahomed Allee, might serve his people to direct or correct the work they were employed about, which had not been yet communicated to us, and of which they sent you the first productions, as you are less interested to examine strictly into them.

Further, you informed us that you did not propose to treat upon pieces, but on the proposals which Mr. Saunders had made the invariable basis of our negotiation. Thereupon, gentlemen, we represented to you, first, that our condescension to you might appear excessive, in that we submitted our pieces to you on the distant hopes of seeing yours. In reality, would it be decent that we should be subject to undergo an examination on the part of your interpreters, without having on our side the liberty of examining on what you carry on a war against us? It is true, that we might suppose the saned of Nazirzing, which is the only foundation of the pretensions of Mahomed Allee, without weakening ourselves in the least, as we have demonstrated several times; but having very justifiable occasion to doubt of its existence, why should we give up such a superabundance of right?

We had the honour, gentlemen, to tell you, in the second place, that the delivery of our pieces would only produce disputes and useless delays, if Mr. Saunders was inflexible on his first proposition, and that we must demand, previously to every other thing, a final declaration on his part on this article. These, gentlemen, are the reasons which made us recall our pieces. We had the honour to mention them to you; undoubtedly you did not understand us perfectly, which makes it necessary for us to repeat them.

We shall answer your remarks on our pieces when yours arrive and we enter upon this examination. Be not surprised, gentlemen, at our doubt of the existence of Nazirzing's saned; if you establish it on proofs like what you have mentioned to us, namely, the assistance he gave Mahomed Allee with a numerous army to put him in possession of the Carnateck; this motive of the war of Nazirzing has hitherto been a mystery undiscovered; unluckily it is refuted, because all the world is acquainted with interests which brought him here, and for which he acted all of them very foreign to Mahomed Allee. It is moreover known in what light he looked upon him, or rather that he would not see him at all, after the unfortunate expedition which the said Mahomed Allee undertook with a view of meriting the saned in question. Nazirzing thought so little of him, or of his elder brother who was in the same army for the government of the Car-





nateck, that at the very time he offered the same government to many others, the French even not excepted, if they would abandon the engagements which they were in honour bound to keep. Mahomed Allee himself never mentioned this saned till the successes of the English, his protectors inspired him with views on Arcot. The English themselves when they went to join him at Trichinopoly, assigned no other pretext but to get payment of five lacks which Mahomed Allee owed them. We do not advance this without proofs. At what time was the saned in question cited? when it was found necessary to justify a train of facts by colours of justice.

We must add, gentlemen, to these reasons, of which we know the insufficiency for forwarding an accommodation, the assurances which we give you afresh, that we are ready to retrench from our rights for the advantage of your nation, when it shall be no longer required that we must begin with abandoning them totally, by acknowledging Mahomed Allee sole and lawful master of the Carnateck. We discovered this disposition in the sentiments of Mr. Dupleix, who sent us. If you are willing to make use of them, tell us openly and frankly what you require; we will answer you in a manner satisfactory to your nation, in the judgment even of those who command it, and who cannot but be acquainted with the advances we have at least made towards a peace, if we have not the happiness to conclude it.

Please to communicate Mr. Saunders's answer, translated from the original in our hands.

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY VANSITTART.

Not dated, but received the  
29th Jan. at 12 A. M.

We have the honour to be, with real respect,  
Gentlemen,

Your most humble and most obedient Servants,

Fr. L. LAVAUUR.

BAUSETT.

DE KERJEAN.

*To the reverend Father Lavaur and Messrs. De Bauffet and De Kerjean, deputies of the French nation.*

Gentlemen,

If all the reasons you are pleased to give for declining the examination of your pieces were mentioned at the conference, most assuredly we did not understand them, although we paid the strictest attention to all that you did us the honour to say; if we examined the Perwanas it was only at your request, and to pay a proper regard to what, by your own confession, was the foundation of your rights. We were willing, gentlemen, to put it in your power to justify your pretension to the utmost, that you might not have reason hereafter to say that we paid no regard to the powers you produced; not that we could conceive the marquis Dupleix had merited so much from the Mogul, or that the Mogul should confer so much authority on him, who is known to be the cause of a calamitous war in his country for five years together, by which a large part of his revenues, not only in this province, but many others, has been stopped, and his dominions laid waste.

You have endeavoured, gentlemen, to give specious reasons for declining the examination, but you have omitted the only material one; the discovery you no doubt made as well as we, that your saneds were not of a nature to stand the test of the slightest examination; which the superscription on the seal, not to mention any others, is an unstable proof: truth wants no colourings to set it off, and falshood is generally detected by a recting to lay on too many to disguise it. If that which by way of eminence you intitle the most authentick, carries its own conviction along with it, what judgment





ment can we form, gentlemen, of your other pieces? The highest compliment we can pay them must be only to place them in the same rank. Your silence on so material an article will be looked upon as a very strong proof, if we wanted others, of what we advanced. Our not having the saneds of Anaverdey Cawn to produce, could be no reason for your declining the examination of yours, which, had they been genuine, would not have suffered by being proclaimed to the whole world. The marquis Dupleix himself, in his letter to Mr. Saunders of the 23<sup>th</sup> December, speaking of the powers he was invested with to treat concerning the interests of the Carnateck, makes this proposal.

“ If you do not give credit to what I have had the honour to write to you very particularly on that subject, I am able and ready to justify it: you may therefore commission your deputies on this head, or send such person to me as you shall think fit, and I will shew him the original writings.” These writings we have seen, and given you unanswerable reasons why we cannot think them original; and you, gentlemen, have too much penetration not to perceive the force of them.

It is very true, that all the world is acquainted with the interest that brought Nazirzing into this province; it was to restore order, and to punish those that had been the disturbers of it. To this end he wrote to the English to assist the family of Anaverdey Cawn against all invaders; and it is for this reason confirmed by the authority derived from him to his son Mahomed Allee, afterwards named Anaverdey Cawn, that they have constantly supported him. That Nazirzing offered the government of this province to the French, contradicts all his other actions; and as to the article you advance about the five lacks, as the cause of our joining him at Trichinopholy, it serves only to convince us how little you are acquainted with what passed at that time.

You are very pressing, gentlemen, in your demand of our final declaration on our first article, but do not on your part make any proposals for the satisfaction of a prince who, both by his titles and successes, has a right, not only to be first considered, but to be himself the source from whence all other parties should derive a just satisfaction, and which we renew our assurances, he is ready and willing to give.

As soon as we receive Mr. Saunders's final answer, we shall make you acquainted with it; and we must request on our part also, that you will communicate the final resolution of Mr. Dupleix, which we sincerely wish may tend to promote a happy end to our negotiation.

We have the honour to be, with perfect respect,  
Gentlemen,

Sadrass, 30th Jan.  
1754.

Your most obedient humble Servants,  
ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.

*To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart.*

Gentlemen,

I have this minute received yours of the 30th, with a translate of one from the French deputies, and your reply, which I approve. This morning our instructions were forwarded to you, so that I have only to remark,

That an examination of Mr. Dupleix's Powers was what he earnestly insisted on; and that certainly those powers should be first proved authentick, as on the 1<sup>st</sup> he founded his authority to the river Kistna, &c. is but reasonable.

The reason they give for declining the examination is trifling.

Mr. Dupleix has not sent the originals, but copies, and says that the former were inspected by any person sent to him; and you certainly have the same liberty of replying, that the originals are with the Nabob, and may be inspected in the same manner.

Those





Those gentlemen should suspend their judgment of Shahabedey Cawn's saned till it was examined; strong suspicions are what any one may suggest. They ought to be regarded as such, but will never be thought convincing proofs.

The gentlemen seem to acknowledge, at least not to deny, the saned from Nazirzing. This justifies the Nabob's conduct in supporting his right, as it condemns Chundah and his allies in invading it.

They saw our proposals, and afterwards delivered a memorial of saneds. Why should they retract them till by my answer they were assured that I was inflexible? and this they certainly could not know before they received it.

The motives of Nazirzing's coming into the province you have very justly explained; that the government was offered to the French, till now I never heard, and might venture to affirm in the negative. The Mysoreans made a fruitless interest for it. Mauphus Cawn, the Nabob's eldest brother, did not bid high enough. Mahomed Allee was always reputed the Subah. The reasons assigned for our joining him at Trichinopholy are notoriously false and scandalous, for at that time he was not indebted to us.

What do these gentlemen mean by we shall do so and so? Who gave them the power? Mr. Dupleix may talk thus in Pondichery amongst his slaves; I do not doubt but they know his disposition, and possibly may approve it as little as we do. Surely Mr. Dupleix does not think we are begging a peace, and will accept of any terms he pleases. I observe they are particularly fond of granting advantages to our nation; this is designed to appear plausible at home; but however, we shall take care to secure the peace of the country, and ever have before us his designs on the whole coast. I think it will not be amiss to ask them, as we are treating for the Nabob, whether by these offers they mean to offer us a bribe to be villains, and betray the trust reposed in us.

Their saneds are so defective, we can by no means allow them. Without Mahomed Allee's enjoying the Subahship no peace can ensue; and when these articles are agreed on, that of the French prisoners, a knotty article, remains to be adjusted in a manner consistent with the security of the Nabob. Considering the disposition of Mr. Dupleix, little, I believe, inclined to drop so darling a scheme, I am of opinion the conference will terminate unsuccessfully. This advantage indeed we shall reap from it, that our reasonable inclinations for peace will be manifested to the publick, and his hostile disposition, with the falsity of the authority on which he founded it.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient Servant,

THOMAS SAUNDERS.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

Inclosed is a letter we received last night, in answer to ours of yesterday, on which we must observe, first,

That as they communicated their pieces to us in a cursory way, we had not then time sufficient to examine them, but enough to remark, that the first was not dated, and you are already acquainted with our objections to the last, which can never, we apprehend, be confuted: indeed by their method of reasoning they give up what they would be thought to defend. Secondly,

The only original, now for the first time called a letter or saned, was represented to us to be of the strongest validity; and if they had it double, they never once hinted it when it was produced; even all their pieces at our first conference were represented as originals and it was not till the copies were beginning that we found they were otherwise.





wife. It is true, Mr. Vansittart did peruse the paragraph from Mr. Dupleix, which was at the end of a very long letter, from whence we are inclined to think it was inserted there on purpose; but even here we believe the epochas will not agree: and as to their offering at the same time to shew him the original, they very well knew that we had no interpreters, and if we had, we very much doubt if they would have submitted it to their examination. Mr. Vansittart declined it, because they might have asserted afterwards that he had seen it with his own eyes. We leave it to you to make the necessary remarks on their method of accounting for the mistake at Delhi. Thirdly,

No answer at all is it seems the best they can give to this article, as well as to some others contained in our letter. Fourthly,

An answer to their proposals you see is positively expected before they proceed any further: we shall wait till the tappies come in, and then, if we have not the pleasure to hear from you, we shall give them a very short answer to their letter. We could multiply remarks to them, but we apprehend those we have already made will be thought sufficient.

Sadrass, 31st Jan. 1754.  
9 A. M.

We are, with the greatest respect,  
Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY VANSITTART.

*To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart, deputies of the English nation.*

Gentlemen,

Not to multiply writings, we have the honour to reply as briefly as possible to the different articles of your last letter.

First, We did communicate our pieces to you, and gave you sufficient leisure to examine them. We only refused to let you have copies till you should communicate yours; when this is done, we will produce ours again with all confidence, and we will refute by them all the inferences you strive to draw for the present from our refusal. We will also produce the originals without fear, provided you do the same on your part.

Secondly, The only original that we have hitherto shewn you, is the letter or saned of the Great Mogul which we brought with us, having it double, as we told you when we produced it. As this is a decisive piece, it could not be sent without difficulty. We immediately advised the marquis Dupleix of what you remarked to us on the subject of the epoch marked at the bottom of the seal. The following is the answer he sent us immediately on the receipt of your letter: *As to the date of the seal, I can say nothing to you on that subject; it was the duplicate that I delivered you: but to dissipate all doubts on that subject, I send you now what was first dispatched to me, which is dated the 11th of the month of Rejeb, the 5th year of his reign; and upon the chop is the year of the Hegyra \* 1162. This is what was delivered me by Us Bichi Caun, dispatched to bring it me.*

Such is the frankness with which Mr. Dupleix answers on this subject. Mr. Vansittart saw this paragraph of the letter with his own eyes, and we offered at the same time to shew him the original, which we had just received. It is impossible, gentlemen, to declare in a more polite manner than you have done, the suspicions you affect to form on this piece, and which you would extend to all the others. All of them, it is true, must be equally suspicious to you. But in reality, gentlemen, if we were capable of counterfeiting, do you think we should be so little upon our guard as to be mistaken in the date of the Hegyra, and to make use of two different Seals. The writers at Delhi might do the latter by making use of the seal of the reigning emperor for the first dispatch,





patch, and of the seal of his predecessor, which apparently came first to their hands, for the dispatch they afterwards made by way of duplicate; but such a piece of negligence, if it is one, is a proof of the truth of the piece. Make whom you will the judge, and he will tell you that the difficulty you make is at the very time a proof of the force with which this piece is invested.

Thirdly, The reproach you throw on the marquis Dupleix, as being the cause of the troubles of the country, might with more justice be applied to the chiefs of your nation; but whatever advantage we might be able to make by entering on this subject, we pass it slightly over as superfluous. In the same manner we say nothing of the motives that induced the Grand Mogul to recompense the marquis Dupleix; it would be easy to shew them, but the letter of this emperor subsists. That is the essential.

Fourthly, Laying aside for the present all allegations of which we have not yet got the proofs in writing, we will prove to you by a loyal letter from Mr. Saunders himself to Chundah Saib, that he interested himself at the beginning for Mahomed Allee, only on account of what this last owed, or was said to owe, to the English nation. We expect to be soon enabled to confirm this to you by other pieces of your chief's, and to make you also agree, if you will enter upon the proofs, that the English acknowledged Chundah Saib for governor of the Carnateck.

It is for us, gentlemen, to expect on your part an answer to the proposals we have made you; tell us if they are satisfactory or not? We do not allow, as you know of the precedency to be given to the interests of Mahomed Allee, but we have not neglected them in our proposals, and whenever you please we will settle the proper establishment which is to be procured for him.

Sadrass, 30th Jan. 1754.

Translated from the original  
in our hands,

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY VANSITTART.

We have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

FR. L. LAVAUUR.

BAUSETT.

DE KERJEAN.

*To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart.*

Gentlemen,

I had replied to your letter of the 30th when I received that of the 31st with a translate of one to you from the French deputies.

When Mr. Dupleix pressed the examination, it was without limitation, and without any reference to those of the Nabob's.

So difficult is it to give to falsity even the appearance of truth, that the circumstances offered to support it often tend to the exploding it; and thus in regard to the paper called the Mogul's saned, a duplicate is something extraordinary; but that this duplicate should differ in so essential a point from what, after the falsity is exploded, is produced as an original, serves only to convince more strongly of the invalidity, and to give us the greatest reason to believe that whatever defects might be found in the rest, as soon as noticed would be amended, without the loss of time or trouble of sending to Delhi; and therefore I think we may persist in our objection to their validity, and wave all further enquiry, as it will only give them an opportunity to recover from their error, whereas it now turns much to our advantage.

The frankness with which Mr. Dupleix answers on the subject (*as to the date of the saned I can say nothing to you on that subject?*) is a truth that serves to corroborate his weakness in offering to found his authority on a falsity, and his chicanery in having the Mogul's





gul's seal in such readiness to supply its defect. The excuse afterwards framed is equally as absurd.

The aspersions that we engaged in the war on account of money, owed by Mahomed Allee to the English nation, is false and scandalous. Inclosed is a copy of that letter to Chundah Saib, dated 3d August, 1751, a long time after the war commenced. Trichinopholy was mortgaged, Mr. Dupleix was informed of it, and so great was the affront he offered us, as to answer that our colours should be no sanction to us. More will be said on this occasion to Mr. Dupleix when he possibly may not expect it.

By what I have wrote you, you will be able to return the proper answer. Do not press any farther an examination of saneds, it will be of no effect, when they can so easily at Pondichery on every occasion have in readiness a proper seal for the Mogul, and without doubt for his officers.

Fort St. George, the  
1st Feb. 1754.

I am, Gentlemen,  
Your most obedient Servant,  
THOMAS SAUNDERS.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

Yesterday we were favoured with your letters of the 31st January and 1st instant, and in the afternoon we received the answer from the French deputies, of which we have just finished the translation we now inclose you, with a copy of our letter to them of the 1st.

Their arguments are all founded on a supposition of the rights of the marquis Dupleix. We shall therefore make the proofs we have seen of the invalidity of these rights the principal object of our reply; and as they have at once rejected all our proposals without even answering them, they are very evidently determined to come to no reasonable accommodation. We shall therefore tell them it is to no purpose to wait for an answer from the marquis Dupleix, as his designs are plainly published in the letter; and that if they can give us no better hopes of a successful congress, we are ready to set out for Madras; so we shall probably wait on you ourselves with the copy of our answer.

We do not understand what they mean in their last paragraph by *the article which we call decisive*, unless they have misapplied the sense of the first paragraph of our letter to them of the 31st, where we say, *as that must determine*: perhaps they have applied *that* to the *separate article* instead of *their positive answer*, to which it refers so plainly, that we can hardly think it possible they should misunderstand it without some design.

We are, with the greatest respect,  
Honourable Sir,

Sadras, 4th Feb. 1754.  
8 A. M.

Your most obedient humble Servants,  
ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.

*To the reverend Father Lavour and Messrs. De Baufet and De Kerjean, deputies of the French nation.*

Gentlemen,

We annex hereunto our general answer to your memorial, our reply to your answer and proposals, and our fresh proposals together with a separate article; to which we desire your positive answer, as that must determine the continuance or end of the congress.

With regard to your letter of the 30th of January, it is true, that you communicated your pieces to us in a cursory manner. We had not, however, time to examine them all, but sufficient to discover the defects we have already represented to you.





You cannot forget that the only original, now for the first time called a letter or faned, was represented to us to be of the strongest validity ; and if you had it double, you never once hinted it to us when it was produced ; even at our first conference we understood that all your pieces were to be looked on as originals, and it was not till the copies were beginning that we found they were otherwise. Nothing can be termed a duplicate that is not in every respect an exact copy of the original.

We could multiply remarks, but we apprehend those we have already made, when impartially considered, will be thought sufficient.

We have the honour to be, with real respect,  
Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

ROBERT PALK.

HENRY VANSITTART.

Sadrass, 1st February,  
1754.

*Answer to the three Memorials, accompanied with a Letter from the English Deputies, dated the 1st February 1754.*

Gentlemen,

The extract of the reasons you have pretended to shew in your three memorials, accompanied with a letter, would soon be made, if we were to leave out the vain allegations, some subtleties easy to be refuted, and the reproaches little becoming you and us ; all is then reduced to a constant supposition, without proof or foundation of the rights of Mahomed Allee. Begin then with proving this right ; this answer, gentlemen, would suffice to refute all that you have hitherto said to us. But we are besides willing to justify the perplexity this question puts you in, and to manifest clearly that it is not your fault, if you cannot answer it but by endeavouring to make that pass for certain which you ought to prove.

First, You ought to prove, according to your allegations, that the government of the Carnateck was given to Mahomed Allee. We are waiting ready for this proof, supposing however that we were to receive it, it would not help your affairs much.

Secondly, You should further prove, that this pretended nomination of Mahomed Allee has not been revoked ; here, gentlemen, is your stumbling block. The faneds granted to Chundah Saib by two immediate successors of Nazirzing, one of whom is now reigning, stops you beyond a possibility of passing further. You are obliged to apply to accusing us of falsity. Do you then look upon such a reproach to be so trifling as to be thrown so lightly on the chief or the deputies of the French nation ; before you employed this resource in a desperate cause, you ought to have given a little more attention ; for upon what would you found it ? Upon our pretended refusal, which you ring out so loudly, to give you copies of our pieces, after having communicated them to you, and given you a list, at the same time that you evade the exhibition of yours, if you have any ; it is not too much to treat upon an equality with you. We will submit our pieces again to your examination, when you shall produce to us those that you mention as your title ; without shewing them, you may say as often as you will, that your remarks alarmed us ; we will give you full liberty to continue them ; those which you have made would insure us, if we had occasion for it, against those that you shall make ; for to what do they amount ? The faned, you say, or phirmaund of the Great Mogul, which we have once called a letter which according to you makes an article against its validity, has not the sign manual of the emperor. Inform yourselves, gentlemen, of the custom of this court, before you hazard the answer you make us. It is besides, you add, without a seal, but it is on the seal you discover a proof of its falsity. The date at the bottom is superannuated. Do you pretend that the emperor must change his seal every year, and that he can never  
make





make use of that of his predecessor, although it be the same, except just the date of the time of its being made? Do you pretend too that a phirmaund sent by the emperor himself, and brought from Delly, to the knowledge of the whole world, by a considerable person, named Us Bachi Cawn, should be of no credit; because the writers in the dispatch of the duplicate made use of an older seal than that of the first dispatch. We have replied in an incontestible manner to this chicanery; and we shall only add, that upon the arrival of this phirmaund, the marquis Dupleix not only communicated it by a copy sent to Mr. Saunders, but also offered to send him the original by two counsellors, which Mr. Saunders refused. You had it not in your power, gentlemen, thus to evade the communication, but an accusation of falsity was your resource, as it has been before to the English upon some occasions when they had no answer to make. This did not suffice to relieve you from your perplexities: the invalidating of the phirmaund being proved in the manner we have seen, must communicate itself by a kind of contagion to all the other pieces; upon which, however, you have withheld your remarks. Mr. Vansittart only told us verbally, that they were nothing but copies, and that he thought we had produced them on the footing of originals. We told you however at that time, that we had brought only copies attested by the Caudy, and that we did not care, without necessity, to expose any more than the original, because we had that double. Mr. Vansittart thinks requisite to contradict us also in that circumstance: be that as it will, it has very little regard to the force of the thing, and we only mention it to shew the disposition in which you came, gentlemen, or in which you were sent; that is, to seize every straw to keep you here, and not to forward the end to which we ought all to strive. You are nevertheless very zealous for the publick good, and for the maintenance of the fundamental laws of the kingdom. You declare to us that these two points made you take up arms. Thereupon we ask you in the first place, who gave you the necessary authority for that? Is it Mahomed Allee, Nabob by your favour? but you relapse always into a circle of errors, supposing what is to be proved and what you cannot prove. In the second place, we refer you yourselves to the two great objects of justice, with which you defend your cause, which are, who troubled the publick repose, and who troubles it still? We refer you to the letter in which the marquis Dupleix has detailed to Mr. Saunders himself the practices of your nation, and to which the last made no reply: [however, gentlemen, when we mention in this manner the English nation, we only mean such as have had a part in the practices in question, which many among you condemn:] remark in this detail what was the state of affairs before you stirred up Mahomed Allee. Chundah Saib acknowledged, not only by the country, but by the English themselves. Hoge Addee sent by these last to compliment him, and offer him the Nazer [present] according to custom, the same Vackeel who worked with him to obtain the town of St. Thome for you, but in vain. The same negotiation resumed after you took possession of it, but still without effect. On the other side, Mahomed Allee fled to Trichinopoly to capitulate on the considerable arrears due by his father to the master of the Deckan; the same Mahomed Allee who had recourse to the marquis Dupleix to be his mediator: this last obtained a pardon and an establishment for him. This, gentlemen, is what preceded the time when the English worked with Mahomed Allee Cawn, to inspire him with other views corresponding with their designs. They nevertheless still wrote to Chundah Saib in the style of friends, while they were paving the way for Mahomed Allee to revolt. Proofs of all this have been furnished you: let it be judged from thence who began, continued, and somented the war.

In vain you endeavour to turn this, by demanding that the marquis Dupleix should shew a saned authorising him to assist in killing Anaverdey Cawn and Nazirzing. The question is much out of place, as it is imprudent. Mr. Dupleix can easily justify himself on this





head; and you expose yourselves to the same demand on the subject of the death of Chundah Saib, a much more horrid one, and the circumstances of which prove a crime on all that were the authors. But all this is but a digression to turn off the attention from the Perwanas, with which the marquis Dupleix was supported by the immediate successors of Nazirzing, and which have been confirmed by the Mogul. The mention of these Perwanas, as well as those appointing Salabatzing viceroy of the Deckan, leads us back to the second object of justice with which you affect to be touched.

What are, gentlemen, the fundamental laws of the country, as you call them, and what is the constitution of the government of this country? Is it to acknowledge the Grand Mogul for first sovereign, the governor general of the Deckan for the representative of this emperor in the country, and the particular governors appointed by the governor general as holding their authority from him? Do you conform to these laws in disputing the phirmaund of the emperor, and in declining the authority of Salabatzing? Leave him in the exercise of his authority, every thing will be in order in all respects, the constitution of the government in vigour, and the war at an end. If you refuse to acknowledge Salabatzing master of the Deckan by all the laws, who is the infringer of the laws, and the disturber of good order? You see very plainly, gentlemen, and it is for that reason that you bring the son of Gauzedey Cawn into play, or rather (for we are willing to be more confederate with regard to you, than you about us) you seize at a venture on the phantom Mahomed Allee presents to you, and which he is preparing to produce to us by opposing Shaw Aabin Cawn to Salabatzing; but on what title? Is it as having obtained the place of Salabatzing? This last has then been till now the true master, while you have been trifling with his authority. Besides, in the ill-contrived pieces that Mahomed Allee has already transmitted to Nandi Raja, it is signified to Shaw Aabin Cawn, that the Carnateck for a long time has not been dependant on the government of the Deckan. By this it is rendered useless to you to invest this son of Gauzedey Cawn with the viceroyalty of the Deckan. Is it then, as Omir Buckshee, that Shaw Aabin Cawn shall dispose of the Carnateck? But yourselves have hitherto, with all people acquainted in this matter, acknowledged that the Carnateck does depend on the Deckan. It is on this score, that you support the titles which Mahomed Allee Cawn pretends to have received from Nazirzing and Gauzedey Cawn.

What can be concluded from all that, except that Mahomed Allee had a mind to oppose us with two batteries, one of which should support the other; but he finds that one destroys the other. We shew ourselves before hand apprised of this job of work, to the end that Mahomed Allee may no longer be at liberty to finish it.

To continue, gentlemen, to proceed according to the established order; after acknowledging the viceroy of the Deckan, you should equally acknowledge him who is now invested by him with the power of governing the Carnateck. This is Mootis Allee Cawn of Velour, whose sanction was notified to you in full form. It is true, that he is so only by the authority of the marquis Dupleix, but still he is so by authority which you cannot contest; not by that of the marquis Dupleix, but of Salabatzing. Mr. Dupleix, you may say, got him appointed; confess in that, his moderation for you and consideration for you in consenting, although associated in the authority of Salabatzing, that this last should appoint to the government of the country a Moor's lord, who has always shewn at least as much regard for the English nation as for the French; to the end that you might take no umbrage. In this manner he paved a way to the peace he desires, and which you are not inclined to, without giving laws to all the legal masters of the country.

Still, to give a turn, you disclaim in favour of the rights of these, against the ambition of Mr. Dupleix, which is no more coherent than all the rest of your exclamations. The  
ambition





ambition of the marquis Dupleix never has appeared, nor will appear, other than to answer the trust of those who have given him authority in this country, to preserve their rights, and to procure legal advantages to his nation, whilst the only end you propose is to dismember the country, to dispossess the lawful masters, and to deprive them of what is lawfully due and acquired to them. How can you advance, that you have taken no place from these last ; their flag torn down by your hands, notwithstanding the protests of the French commanders, contradicts you. You say with the same sincerity, that you do not possess one place in the Carnateck, while you have commanders and garrisons in them. You advance too that there has been no other governor of the Carnateck since Anaverdey Cawn the father, but Mahomed Allee his son ; whilst we shew you, and prove to you, that the said Mahomed Allee is not, that Chunda Saib was, and that Mootis Allee Cawn is at present. Did you intend, gentlemen, to make fools of us.

All that we have been exposing is a preparation, what judgment to form of your proposals : we shall not follow them in detail with all the reflections they offer, it will suffice us to say, first, that you will never put the change upon us so far as to engage us to build on such a foundation as the authority of Mahomed Allee, and that you only seek to establish this foundation ; therefore all the rest of your proposals are vain and insignificant.

Secondly, You seem by them to be afraid to promise the release of the prisoners even after the peace is made ; and you reserve some chicanery to employ on that occasion. However, whether peace be made, or war, we demand of you their immediate liberty in the name of the king our master, without admitting the usual shift, that Mahomed Allee does not consent to it. If Mr. Saunders does not pay regard to our demand, we shall continue to insist on this point in Europe, where perhaps it is already decided. There also will be manifested, if it is not already done, the force of the chimerical reasons that may have been alledged in justification of a war so contradictory on our side to the peace which reigns between the two nations. There, in the same manner, judgment will be formed on the violation of the law of nations, and of the rights of war, which may have happened in this country.

Thirdly, You seem, or you affect to have forgot the most sacred engagements, made by Mahomed Allee, and confirmed by yourselves, for the delivery of Trichinopoly to the Maissoreans.

Fourthly, The security which the marquis Dupleix will give, when serious proposals are entered upon, will be to get Salabatzing's consent, and procure from him the necessary perwanas, without which any disposal of the least part of the country would be unjust and unstable ; all guarantees would be equally so, and he would not, from the same principle, acquiesce in the disposal of any country to the interested parties, but on the footing these countries have been on formerly, in relation both to the master of the Deckan and the governor of the Carnateck.

The evident necessity of the consent of the master of the Deckan for the alienation of any rights in his country, tells you, gentlemen, if nothing was offered you, when you was offered an immunity from all subjection, and acknowledgment for the town of Madras ; admitting even that Mahomed Allee Cawn was what you make him, such a concession on his part could at furthest only take place during his life. But Mahomed Allee having no right, to what is the immunity you told us you hold from him reduced ? 'Tis nevertheless a point of more consequence than any other to a nation like the English. If you have never paid the tribute in question, as you say, the arrears are very considerable, and the offer merits the more regard. Be so kind to apply what we have said to Pondemaly and Trivendupuram also. We have proofs in writing which contain your confession that you applied in vain for the perwanas of these two territories in the  
life





life time of Nazirzing. A time may come when some governor of Arcot may trouble you on those heads. If the offers made you do not suffice, we have desired you to tell us what is wanting to your purpose. We offer you besides, to procure you on this very country the sum that Mahomed Allee may be indebted to you: this will save you the trouble and delay of a payment to be received on the country which shall be granted him, and which shall be loaded with many other mortgages.

Are such offers as these, gentlemen, what should appear insolent to you, or the proposal you make us of submitting to the laws of him whom you make a prince in Europe and your slave in India, although invested with the name of Nabob. You ought not, nor cannot reasonably expect that the French will give up their rights and submit to this. You will not persuade them to it, neither by lending victories to Mahomed Allee, nor by alledging a right which possession, or rather force gives you.

We will, however, communicate, according to the duty of our commission, your proposals to Mr. Dupleix; and we shall have the honour to communicate his answer, particularly on the article which you call decisive, and of which we yet comprehend nothing.

We have the honour to be, with real respect,  
Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servants,  
Fr. L. LAVAUUR.  
BAUSETT.  
DE KERJEAN.

*To Messrs. Palk and Vanfittart.*

Gentlemen,

I have received your letter of the 4th February, with a copy of one to the French deputies, and translate of their answer to your several pieces. Though this paper is very prolix, yet I can perceive nothing in it but what is easily confuted.

Mr. Dupleix earnestly pressed, and these gentlemen offered to examine the several papers called saneds; certainly these should be proceeded on first, not only for the above reasons, but as Mr. Dupleix places so great stress on them as thereon to found his authority for the government of the whole country; and this surely must be proved before it can be submitted to.

We have not refused to prove Mahomed Allee's rights; attested copies of the saneds have been wrote for, and will be sent for those gentlemen's perusal: those pieces, so far from having been revoked, have been confirmed.

If papers, produced as legal proofs, are upon examination found defective, and we as such reject them, 'tis reasonable and just, and no reflection on the French nation; for they cannot expect an implicit submission to their papers, without they carry with them the necessary force: these do not, and that those gentlemen were sensible of it, sufficiently appeared by their suppressing any further enquiry. We are very well informed of the custom of the court, that on the decease of an emperor his seal is totally laid aside the seal of the reigning prince made use of: besides, does it not appear very extraordinary, that upon this saned's proving defective, another should spring up in so short a time as a set of Peons could go from Sadras to Pondichery; is it not equally so, that in a patent of a publick nature, of such consequence as to transfer the right of kingdoms, the duplicate, and what is called the original, should differ so much?

Our authority to support Mahomed Allee is from Nazirzing, Gauzedey Cawn, and Gauzedey Cawn's son. This you have no occasion to gratify them in mentioning, as his lawful right is a sufficient authority for our supporting him.

Mr.





Mr. Dupleix has wrote me many things, and I have answered them ; nor is there any letter of his unreplied to. I have proved to him that he is the author of the war ; but to what purpose ? the refusal of concurring in the reasonable proposals for peace sufficiently demonstrate it.

That Hodjee Addee was sent to Chunda Saib is scandalously false ; so far from it, that on the death of Nazirzing he was suspended from his employ, and has never been trusted since.

The fortune of war throws down all distinction. If Mahomed Allee did apply to Mr. Dupleix, which is not certain, did not Mr. Dupleix also, when Seringham was on the point of surrender, apply to him and offer him Trichinopoly ?

I do not apprehend the calling upon Mr. Dupleix to produce his authority for opposing a legal prince is unreasonable ; if he cannot produce it, it will be concluded he has none : to say that he can easily justify himself, and to evade justifying himself (which he always does) will by all mankind be looked upon as a convincing proof that he is in the wrong.

We agree that the fundamental laws of the country are to acknowledge the Mogul for first sovereign, the viceroy of the Deckan for his representative in that country, and the particular governors by him appointed as holding their authority from him. This is the rule we have always made the government of our conduct ; the Mogul we acknowledge ; Nazirzing as his viceroy we obeyed ; and Mahomed Allee as his governor, in distress we assisted. On the Death of Nazirzing we continued our assistance to Mahomed Allee, till a successor, Gauzedey Cawn, was appointed ; and agreeable to his directions, we persevere in our alliance to the Circar. We could confute even the foundation of Mr. Dupleix's authority ; for Salabatzing never had a sanction for the Deckan ; but as he is at the head of a large army, it is a prudent measure to avoid it. As Mr. Dupleix lays down this progressive rule for us, ought he not to observe it himself ? Instead of saying he can easily justify himself, let him produce his authority for deposing Anaverdey Cawn and murdering Nazirzing ; and as he cannot deny that Gauzedey Cawn was viceroy of the Deckan, how comes it that this sanction does not appear ? Shaw Abadin Cawn derives his right to the Deckan from the Mogul. Of what force is the mentioning Mootis Allee Cawn, who has acknowledged the Nabob ? However, we must wave the mentioning of this also, as I have only the copy of the agreement made by Mootis Allee Cawn with the Nabob. At the same time I have a letter from Mootis Allee Cawn desiring a Letter of indulgence, when we shall in a few days have the attested copies of Mootis Allee Cawn's agreement, it will plainly appear whether they intend to make fools of us, or we of them. We have not taken, nor are we in possession of, any places belonging to the French ; wherever we have any force in the Circar's forts, they are under the orders of the Nabob.

We have no prisoners of the French King's ; as a proof of this, all the officers have given their parole to Mahomed Allee, which is an acknowledgment they were his prisoners ; and though several of our men and officers have been taken prisoners, we have never demanded them of Mr. Dupleix, except those that, contrary to the law of nations, Mr. Dupleix ordered to be seized as they were going to St. David from Madras with regular passports ; besides we declared we treated in behalf of the Nabob ; therefore this is a deviation, and foreign to the intention of the conference.

The fourth article is grounded on a supposition of the legal power of Salabatzing, and the illegal one of Mahomed Allee. The first has not been proved, nor the latter confuted.

There next was that tribute which the French deputies mentioned fixed on Madras ; therefore how ridiculous is it to make an offer of what does not exist ; and as to the offer of procuring us the money, Nabob Mahomed Allee is indebted ; 'tis but an offer,  
and





and not a certainty; and no dependency can be had on an offer from those who have not a power to fulfil it.

If the French have any rights they should be proved, and then will not be disputed, but acknowledged; but if such proofs are not produced, Nabob Mahomed Allee will conclude that the French are deaf to all reasonable proposals for an accommodation, and are determined to continue their alliance with rebels, which must compel him by real victories (which he has already had) to convince them he will defend his government against all unlawful usurpers.

If you can prolong the conference a few days, it will give us an opportunity to get copies of Mootis Allee Cawn's agreement, and be serviceable in other respects.

I know nothing that has passed in the conference of their side that carries with it the least weight, but that you have not Mahomed Allee's saneds on the spot; they are wrote for, and will be sent attested by the Caudee: you will therefore acquaint those gentlemen, that no exceptions may be taken, the saneds will be produced. That Mr. Dupleix will hearken to any measures for peace I have not the least expectation, but that in rejecting them he may appear to act unjustly. Let your answer, which probably will be the last, be as full as possible.

Fort St. George,  
5th Feb. 1754.

I am, Gentlemen,  
Your most obedient Servant,  
THOMAS SAUNDERS.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq;*

Honourable Sir,

Inclosed we send you a copy of our answer to the last letter from the French deputies, which we hope you will approve. They have informed us that Mr. Dupleix is inflexible, which determines us to leave Sadras in the morning, unless another letter which they have been preparing all day requires an answer.

Sadras, 5th February,  
1754.

We are, with the greatest respect,  
Your most obedient humble Servants,  
ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.

*To the reverend Father Lavour and Messrs. De Bauffet and De Kerjean, deputies of the French nation.*

Gentlemen,

You accuse us of vain allegations and some subtilties, easily to be refuted, in your answer to our last memorial; but we do not find you have been able to prove them so. Reflections and reproaches are easily made, but when ill grounded they return on those that make them.

You have begun with asserting the rights of the marquis Dupleix. You have endeavoured to convince us of his authority, by producing what has sufficiently convinced us that he has none.

You say you are waiting ready for us to prove that the government of the Carnateck was given to Mahomed Allee; but at the same time you give us to understand that it will answer no end when it is proved. Is not this declaring beforehand that you are determined no laws shall restrain you?

You would have us further prove, that this nomination of Mahomed Allee has not been revoked; you say the saneds granted to Chunda Saib by two immediate successors of Nazirzing, one of whom is now reigning, stops us beyond a possibility of passing further. By the first you must mean Muzapherzing. Did he live long enough to be appointed





appointed by the Mogul, or did he get his commission at Pondichery? Perhaps the emperor by a spirit of divination foretold Nazirzing's cruel fate, and therefore appointed a successor in time; and what is almost extraordinary, a fomentor of divisions amongst his subjects, and an actual invader of his government. By the second, you mean Salabatzing, of whom you are confessedly the prop and support. Was this because his appointment of Chunda Saib was of more validity than that of Anaverdey Cawn by Gauzedey Cawn, who was sent by his master to depose him?

When Mr. Dupleix pressed the examination, it was without limitation, and without any reference to those of the Nabob. Our remarks, gentlemen, most certainly alarmed you; but you had a stronger reason suggested to you by your own eyes, as we have already had the honour to tell you, and to prove incontestably. We never advanced the piece said to come from the Mogul was without a seal. If you will take the trouble, gentlemen, to turn to our letter, or the Father Lavour's translation of it, you will find that it was the want of a chop that we objected to. The most candid way we account for it is, that this considerable person, named Us Bachi Cawn, has imposed upon you. You may also recollect, gentlemen, that we had our doubts of the other pieces, one of them in particular was not dated, for which omission Mr. De Kerjean endeavoured to account, by blaming the incorrectness of these Eastern Princes in writings of the greatest consequence. If you told us at the first conference, that you had brought only copies attested by the Caudy, we declare to you again, gentlemen, that we did not hear it; and as to the plausible method you have found out of accounting for the defects in that said to come from the Mogul, by calling it a duplicate; even in your letter immediately in answer to our objections, you say nothing of it, no not till after you had received the marquis Dupleix's letter, in which he thinks it necessary to tell you that yours is a duplicate.

We were sent, and we came, gentlemen, with the best disposition in the world; it was with a strong disposition to do our utmost to restore peace to this unhappy country: it is true, if we will seize any thing, they are but straws to detain us here; for we have the misfortune to find that your commission will not permit you to forward the end which you affect so much to desire; and if you will not, gentlemen, our staying longer is to no purpose.

If you had made a just statement of the question, Who troubled the publick repose? you would have begun with giving us a view of the state of the province before you joined your troops to Chunda Saib: you would have shewn us Anaverdey Cawn in peaceable possession of his rightful government, and the country in a flourishing condition: you would then also have seen that the English did not take up arms till the disturbers of this tranquility, carrying desolation to the edge of our own limits, and there spreading your flags close to our presidency, by virtue of authority from Chunda Saib, obliged us to assist the lawful Nabob of the country for the restoration of order, and the repose of the people.

If Chunda Saib was acknowledged either by the country or the English, it is a secret, gentlemen, which never till now came to our knowledge, and which he would have been glad to have been acquainted with: we have heard, indeed, that the Phoufjar of Vellour went through the ceremony of being made Nabob at Pondichery; but, if from his actions we may judge, he seems to have but an indifferent opinion of the rights you have given him, as little almost as we have of the good intended the English in the pretended appointment. We allow it, however, to be a great piece of condescension, moderation and consideration in the marquis Dupleix to consent that Salabatzing should appoint a Mohammedan to the Carnateck. Ambition is laudable when it only aims at answering the trust of those who have given authority, preserving their rights, and procur-





ing legal advantage. Could you but prove that the marquis's ended here, we would be the first to commend it.

We are treating for Nabob Anaverdey Cawn, whose rights intitle him to be first considered, but they are found inconsistent with the pretended ones of the marquis Dupleix ; and is it for this reason only that all our proposals are called *vain* and *insignificant*, or is it, gentlemen, because we will not betray the trust that is reposed in us? You gave us to understand, what we cannot apprehend, that Nazirzing offered the province to the French if they would have deserted Chunda Saib. Were we so firmly attached to a rebel? Then give us also leave, as we may do it with more justice, to support a lawful Nabob in his government.

Mr. Saunders, gentlemen, refers all his transactions to be judged of in Europe, where it will be done with less partiality ; and if we may make any judgment from the reasons you, gentlemen, have given us, with more candour, there will be manifested the many affronts which have been continually offered to our nation, by laying waste our territories, and a declaration that our colours should be no sanction to us, together with the violence committed by seizing our forces on the open seas, in direct contradiction to the peace established between the two nations: there also it will be manifested, that the English are not the only nation whose rights have been invaded.

In Europe it will also appear, that the English never confirmed any engagements made by Mahomed Allee for the delivery of Trichinopoly, which would have been as unjust in them, as the laying it to their charge is rash and imprudent in you ; and it will there be plainly seen, that the marquis Dupleix has usurped an authority which never was conferred upon him, and if we may judge from the regard he pays the emperor, never will. You could not have given your superiors and ours a clearer demonstration to whom the name of slave most properly belongs, Salabatzing or Anaverdey Cawn, than your own declaration, that the former, at the same time that you call him master of the Deckan, had need of the marquis Dupleix's consent to impower him to give a governor to the Carnateck, which is at the same time a conviction of the regard you pay to the fundamental laws you so justly describe.

The demand you make to us for the release of the French prisoners is ill placed : you should apply to the prince against whom you have been, and are carrying on an unjust war, and he will release them whenever it is consistent with the safety of his government.

We do not understand what you mean by *the article we call decisive*, unless you misunderstand our letter of the 1st ; when we desired your positive answer, it was to our general answer to your memorial, to our reply and new proposals ; because by that we might be able to determine the continuance or end of the conference. You have rejected all these proposals with disdain ; to what end then, gentlemen, shall we wait for an answer from Pondichery? It will be to little purpose, unless you can give us better hopes of the marquis's pacifick disposition, than we have hitherto been able to form.

The conference then terminates unsuccessfully. This advantage indeed we shall reap from it, that Mr. Saunders's reasonable inclinations for peace will be manifest to the publick, and also the marquis Dupleix's contrary disposition, with the invalidity of the authority on which he founds it.

Sadrass, 4th Feb.  
1754.

We have the honour to be, with perfect respect,  
Your most obedient humble Servants  
ROBERT PALK.  
HENRY VANSITTART.





To Messrs. Palk and Vansittart.

Gentlemen,

The 5th Feb. 1754.

We see with great regret an unsuccessful end to our conferences. The satisfaction we shall receive from your personal conduct, and your politeness with regard to us, will not be the less sincere. We will not even refuse you the justice you claim on the subject of your good disposition to conclude. We will add further, gentlemen, that we do not doubt of your uprightness in the allegation of the facts you have had occasion to advance. You have followed your instructions to a tittle.

It was recommended to you to insist firmly and strongly that Mahomed Allee is the only lawful master of the Carnateck; and you have done it, gentlemen, to your best. It would be superfluous to repeat the answers we have already made you on that subject.

You were told to deny boldly that the English confirmed any engagement made by Anaverdey Cawn for the delivery of Trichinopoly; and you have done it with so good a grace, that you proceed even to say, *that such an engagement would have been as unjust in the English, as the accusation is rash and imprudent in us.* We see evidently by that, gentlemen, that you have been left in ignorance of the pieces we shall offer to communicate to you before our parting: you will then see the strongest promises of Mahomed Allee, repeated, and confirmed by oath; a letter from Mr. Saunders himself to the Rajah of Maissore, wherein he tells him in express terms, *as to the act or convention concerning Trichinopoly, it is I that am answerable.* As this affair, gentlemen, is one of those which you refer to be examined in Europe, it will there undoubtedly be seen with pleasure, with how much charity Mr. Saunders, in the above mentioned letter, warns the Maissoreans, *to be well on their guard against the French; that he is afraid lest some misfortune should happen to their Vackeel at Pondichery; and that if the enemies (that is the French) succeed, which God cannot permit, they will go to Maissore.* It is thus Mr. Saunders has piously watched after the safety of the princes of India, by spiring them up against us by false alarms.

You were told, gentlemen, in the same manner to dispute our rights obstinately, to admit none of our titles, and to talk high of the necessity the English were in to take up arms, *after having seen the French flags close to their presidency under the authority of Chunda Saib.* You have done all that, gentlemen, and it has been often answered to. Give us leave, however, to say one word more to you on the subject of the last article, to beg you will distinguish the times. The only umbrage Chunda Saib and the French can have given you before you took up arms against them, was their encamping within five leagues of Cuddalore in his way to Tanjore. That was their road, and a country which acknowledged Chunda Saib for master. He never came nearer to your limits, and kept several days journey off in the march he made a long time after to go from Chel'eput to Trichinopoly. Mr. Saunders at that time complained to him of nothing but his going into a country engaged by Mahomed Allee to the English. We shall offer you also, gentlemen, a sight of this second letter of Mr. Saunders's, where you may remark that he makes a plea of the *mutual friendship* which then subsisted between Chunda Saib and the English. This letter may furnish you with many reflections; we shall make but one at present, on the subject of the injustice it would have been on your part (as you say) if you had confirmed the engagement of Trichinopoly in favour of the Maissoreans. Was it more just that Mahomed Allee should engage it to your nation, and you accept it? If a legitimate defence obliged us to join with the Maissoreans alienated from your party by the faithlessness of Mahomed Allee, we do not pretend to procure him what he desires, but with the consent of Salabatzing, who only, as master of the Dec-

kan, can legitimate any alienation of a country in his dependance.





If the above complaint, gentlemen, regards the time when you no longer observed any measures, when you seized upon the country and place of Arcot in the absence of Chunda Saib, who was employed at Trichinopoly, we do not dispute that Raja Saib, his son, was in the neighbourhood of Madras; with this circumstance however, that the French who were in his army refused to follow him when he went towards your limits. But a further detail would only lengthen this letter to no purpose; and we are charmed that you reserve this article for Europe, as well as the others mentioned in your letter.

The only one which admits of no delay, is that of the prisoners, whose deliverance we again demand of you; because we cannot see the subjects of our king perish in your prisons in a manner so little conformable to the mutual regard due from the two nations in peace, and particularly on a point wherein we have shewn you the example. The king depends on Mr. Saunders, and on him only. The shift he makes of referring us to the prince *Mahomed Allee*, is only proper, give us leave to say, to render his refusal more stinging.

You have then heard, gentlemen, that the Phoufdar of Vellour was made at Pondichery, governor of the Carnateck; his appointment by Salabatzing was however notified to you, and this last even wrote you of it himself.

We did not say that Salabatzing could not have made this appointment without the consent of the marquis Dupleix, only that he did make it with the approbation of this last, for whom it is not surprising he should have some respect. If this Phoufdar does not act accordingly, as in effect he did not push the advantage he once had over you, it is a consequence of the regard he has always had for your nation, and which is not unknown to us. This confirms what we said before of the good intentions of the marquis Dupleix, and shews plainly that you only refuse to acknowledge such a governor of the Carnateck; because you have a mind to remain masters of it under the name of Mahomed Allee. This, gentlemen, will always be a point of division as long as you insist on it.

Be so good to remind Mr. Saunders that we have made good the declaration the marquis Dupleix made him before we came here, namely, that it would be to no purpose to make us such a proposal.

If Mr. Saunders thinks proper to treat on the footing we have proposed, by acknowledging the titles of which we are bearers, we will endeavour, gentlemen, to give you all possible satisfaction.

It would be lost time, gentlemen, if our conference do not continue, to reply here to the other articles of your letter. Besides, the new strokes you strive to give to our pieces do not alarm us more than the others; if that to which you object the want of a date did not even exist, our rights would not be the less supported by all the others. But not to mention that the date is supplied by other circumstances, such an omission does not denote, as we have said before, a piece contrived to impose: remark, gentlemen, that the want of a date is not a sign of invalidity, that it can only affect particular points, of which the date must decide, and that is sufficient for us the piece exists. We ought to know better than any body what impressions such objections make upon us: be assured they do not frighten us.

We have the honour to be, with real respect,  
Gentlemen,

Your most humble and most obedient Servants,  
FR. L. LAFAUR.  
DE BAUSETT.  
DE KERJEAN.





*To the reverend Father Lavour and Messrs De Baufet and De Kerjean, deputies of the French nation.*

Gentlemen,

After our commissaries had been disrespectfully made to wait twenty days, and spent a fortnight more, when nothing was offered to them but some few papers, by which the very name of saneds is obviously disgraced, when to their reasonable proposals only an arbitrary answer was given, contrary to that equity and justice which is the foundation of all lawful right and authority, plainly convinced that Mr. Dupleix had no sincere intention to adopt measures for the restoration of tranquility to the province; on the contrary, a violent resolution illegally to usurp an unjust authority, productive of the calamities of war, conscious to themselves they had done their duty, they took their leave; then, Gentlemen, you presented them with a letter of the 5th of February, which, as it contains new matter, I shall do myself the honour to reply to.

You are not ignorant we conferred, empowered by Nabob Mahomed Allee; and when we insisted on his being lawful master of the Carnateck, it was your part either to disprove or acknowledge his right. It is indeed superfluous to repeat your answer; for when, upon your asking for the saneds, you was told that attested copies should be sent for, it only produced a positive and arbitrary declaration from you, that Mr. Dupleix was resolved upon no account to acknowledge Nabob Mahomed Allee as Suba of the Carnateck. Those saneds are by this time on the road, you may send a person to inspect them.

I cannot but with surprise remark, gentlemen, that you are extremely over hasty in your conclusions, and too apt to assert for fact what you cannot have a clear knowledge of. In regard to the confirmation of the delivery of Trichinopoly, you make this quotation from a supposed letter of mine; "*As to the act or convention of Trichinopoly, it is I that am answerable.*" You are imposed on, I never wrote to the Maissore King or Dalloway any such thing, nor they to me; nor had I a knowledge of any agreement between the Nabob and the Dalloway, till after Seringham was taken. Our records, where all letters are entered will prove it; nay the Maissore King's vacheel, now here, is convinced of it. I send you a copy of the only letter that has any resemblance, and that very distant from what you mention: further, you forget, gentlemen, the letter to Chunda Saib, wherein I write him that Trichinopoly was mortgaged to the English. Mr. Dupleix also was advised of it, and his answer will always remain as a remarkable instance of his respect for his Britannick Majesty's flag, which he says shall be no sanction to the English subject. I have used my mediation to accommodate matters between the Nabob and the Maissore Dalloway, and recommended to his vacheel to get a saned for it; his reply was, Salabatzing had no saned for, and was not legally invested with, the government of the Deckan; and therefore had no power to grant one. Now I am on this subject, I cannot avoid giving you the sentiments of that prince's vacheel in his letter to me, viz. "You are sensible of the pretended right of Chunda Saib, who applied to Mustaphazing, and by the assistance of the French proved a rebel, and is ruining the inhabitants of this province by his wicked proceedings. If this man is punished according to his deserts, the Great Mogul will be vastly pleased, and you will obtain a good name and reputation. As to Nabob Anaverdey Cawn, he is of the family of the Omrahs, and was honoured with a serpau by Nazirzing for the government of the Carnateck: besides, he has lately received the Mogul's Phirmaund and Gauzedey Cawn's *Itikar* in confirmation of that government."

To what purpose is it, gentlemen, to say our commissaries were told to dispute your rights obstinately and to admit none of your titles: I know of no rights but Pondichery





chery and its district, nor any titles but the marquis Duplex, the French East India company's governor; it is true, your vanity furnished you with chimerical ones, and the same excessive blind vanity hurried you on indiscreetly to press an examination of them; but when the principal one was exploded, and the spots began to appear in the others, you suppressed a further scrutiny; by this you meant to hide their defects. This, gentlemen, you perfectly convinced us of their invalidity; so difficult is it to support a wrong cause, that the arguments made use of to corroborate, often exposes it the more. I repeat, we acknowledge, no territories or titles but what are founded on lawful authority; and till the marquis has proved his, we reject them, and regard them as invalid. It is needless to repeat the many acts of violence done us by Chunda and his Allies; I could produce some pieces of the marquis and marchioness's, many more there are, I will give them their due weight, let the rabble, for whom they were designed, put them to the use they please; but when the officer of Mr. Dupleix's forces, whom Chunda's son writes that he had sent with a detachment to insult our colours at St. Thome, when the French also plundered and burnt our houses at the Mount; and the furniture was carried to Pondichery, when our officers at Conjeveram were ordered on the ramparts to be shot by their own countrymen. These facts carry with them a force not to be contradicted; and when Mr. Dupleix writes me that his Britannick Majesty's flag shall be no sanction to his subjects; when on the open seas he, contrary to treaty, piratically with armed vessels assaults and makes prisoners our men going with a regular passport from Madras to Fort St. David: how cheerfully do I submit it to his most Christian Majesty to judge and punish this breach of treaty, this affront to his Britannick Majesty. I have before told you, that Trichinopoly was mortgaged to us, the bond is now in our hands; it is a legal one. I have related to you, that we never confirmed the agreement of Trichinopoly, and that Vencatrow, the Maissore Vackeel, is convinced of it, and acknowledges it; and further, that he says Salabatzing has no power to give a sanction for it; for that he has none himself.

By the date of my letter to Chunda Saib, it appears to have been written above a year after we had joined Nabob Mahomed Allee. The purport was to inform him that Trichinopoly was mortgaged to the English, and desire he would cease committing hostilities there; so great, gentlemen, is your ignorance of real facts: and as groundless is your assertion that Chunda Saib was acknowledged by the whole province; he was not by any one power in the country: as a proof of this, he was obliged immediately on his leaving Pondichery, by the help of your forces to begin his assumed government by the besieging of forts; for no officer paid him obedience. Please to remark the Maissore Vackeel's words: "You are sensible of the pretended right of Chunda Saib, who applied to Mustaphazing, and by the assistance of the French proved a rebel, and is ruining the inhabitants of the province by his wicked proceedings." You say that Hodjee Addee, our Vackeel, was sent to Chunda Saib to compliment him; your knowledge of this affair, which I think may be doubted, is beyond mine: Hodjee Addee immediately on the death of Nazirzing was dismissed from his employs, and never since that time trusted. In regard to the second letter to Chunda Saib, it tells him, that after the treacherous assassination of Nazirzing, Nabob Mahomed Allee was Subah of the Carnateck; that he had since been confirmed by the Mogul and Gauzedey Cawn; and that I would support him offering terms to Chunda Saib if he desisted from his rebellion. Of all the pieces you have referred to, there is not a single assertion but what has been proved groundless, the supports of your pretended rights defective and null: they correspond indeed with a wicked cause, perpetrated with assassination and rebellion.





It has been often repeated to you, that we never had, nor have any prisoners of yours : those in our settlements are there by the mutual agreement of your commandant and the Nabob. This act of ours was through a motive of compassion at your officers request. We are ready to surrender them when you and the Nabob agree on the terms. What others are in the Nabob's forts were made prisoners fighting against him in his own dominions, and are by him confined. You are acquainted with this, a convincing proof is in Pondichery ; please to ask your officers to whom they gave their parole.

You have been already informed, that we were not ignorant of the sham investiture of Mootas Allee Cawn at Pondichery ; that sugar was distributed for the children, and the cannon discharged to awe old women. How tender, gentlemen, are you in protesting you did not say that Salabatzing could not make such an appointment ; but yet so pleasing, so tickling it was to your vanity, that you could not avoid letting us know that he did it with the marquis's approbation, for whom it was not surprising that he had some respect. This is in French telling us what we have declared to you in English, that Salabatzing is not at liberty to do as he pleases, cannot make officers himself at Aurengabad, but must submit to Mr. Dupleix's approbation at Pondichery. From hence the murmurs and general dissatisfaction that prevail amongst the omrahs and leading men from Aurengabad to the sea. The truth is, the rebellion at Delhi prevents the Mogul at present from putting an end to these irregularities. What acts of generosity has the Nabob ever experienced from the enemy ? Surely you cannot call the killing of his father and depriving him of his government such. Mootas Allee Cawn may indeed be sensible of the friendship of our nation, in leaving his fort unmolested, when last year there was no force to oppose it, and in recommending a friendship between him and the Nabob ; and if Mootas Allee Cawn did suspend taking any advantages that offered, it must be ~~but~~ <sup>but</sup> to the sense he has of the illegality of the title you invested him with. That we aim at keeping the Carnateck is so absurd, that the very offers made in the conference immediately refute it.

I cannot concur with you that Mr. Dupleix has made good his declaration to me : he offered his pretensions to an examination, but it was suppressed : he assured me he dropped all animosity to Nabob Mahomed Allee ; but without waiting for a scrutiny of his saneds, it was declared positively he would never upon any account acknowledge him as Nabob of the province.

I am very willing (and have already shewn myself so) to treat of measures for restoring tranquility ; but to what purpose is it, when Mr. Dupleix will not co-operate with me ; and insists on an acknowledgment of titles which have been already proved unjust and illegal.

It is very evident that the dates of commissions cancel or prove their validity ; for instance, suppose a saned dated 1754, and another 1755, the former would of consequence, by the latter be revoked and annulled ; so that what you have advanced on this subject falls of itself.

Thus far in regard to subjects that have been introduced and discussed during the conference, it will not be foreign to the purpose, I conceive, to examine the proposals and answers of each party ; as both declared their sincere inclination to restore tranquility, let it appear why it has not succeeded.

Empowered by Nabob Mahomed Allee, we conferred, what regards the other parties is so dependant on this point, that it would of course be easily adjusted ; therefore I shall proceed to say, we proposed Mahomed Allee should, agreeable to his legal saneds, be Nabob of the province ; and that he would give the French Jageers to the same amount as the English : a free liberty of trade should be impartially granted to both, and both be considered as common friends to the Circar.

Can





Can any thing be more reasonable, more equitable, than to propose that a prince invested with a legal authority should be acknowledged as such by those who as strangers live under his protection. If it is not acknowledged it certainly should be disproved, or the person disputing it without any legal authority, must be deemed acting contrary to the established laws of the country: What was the answer? Without waiting for an examination of these titles, it was, that Mr. Dupleix never would on any account acknowledge Nabob Mahomed Allee as Suba of the Carnateck.

When the Nabob offers to his enemies the same advantages as to his friends, and when these must appear beneficial to all that think themselves subject to the established government, what can a refusal of them mean, more than a firm resolution by power of arms to usurp? Let me add, that from these proposals the English have not endeavoured to gain to themselves any particular advantages, but are satisfied, in obedience to the government, to be concerned as common friends with the French; and that the liberty of trade should be mutual, without partiality to either. How unjust then is the reflection you make, gentlemen, that the English design to remain masters of the province under the name of Nabob Mahomed Allee: those very proposals refute it; and if you are resolved that this shall always be a point of division, we shall always retain our just sentiments and inclination for peace, and only defend when hostile invasion requires it. So moderate are the Nabob's proposals, that to persons unacquainted with facts, they would seem to come from a prince in distress, and not one whose army has never been repulsed; but wherever his standard has been displayed, the spoils of the enemy's arms have been constant marks of his victory.

The expression you used when our proposals were made you is remarkable; "That it would be at once giving up all." If your intentions are to usurp all, it may be so; though it may be asked at the same time what right you have to do so, and at reason to expect a tame submission to it, and this must appear to all mankind unreasonable; probably you may conclude that Nabob Mahomed Allee, sensible of our friendship to him, will act partially in his favours to us; no doubt he will gratefully remember our steady alliance to the Circar, but so far as concerns what might be concluded and ratified by treaty. The contracting parties, the King of Madsore, King of Tanjore and Morarow, would guarantee it; by this means the jealousy is removed.

Now follow your proposal to exempt Madras from a tribute of pagodas 4000 per annum, to secure to us Poonamalee, to see our debt paid, and to make a provision for Nabob Mahomed Allee in a private capacity. The marquis Dupleix's titles are to be acknowledged as prince of all the territories to the river Krishna.

By these concessions to us, and the divesting the Nabob of his government, at first view it would seem to be with a design to tempt us to be villains, in betraying the trust reposed in us by the Nabob, by whose powers we treated. If Mr Dupleix's own actions are of so black a nature as to induce him to think so meanly of the rest of mankind, to them let him add this. But we have some reason to conclude that he well knows that our alliance with the Circar, and attachment to the Mogul's legal officer is such as not to be shaken by any motives of self-interest, and rather think this is artfully designed to amuse his and our superiors; but by writing them, how beneficial to our interest his offers have been? This might be answered at once, that he would generously promise us what is not his to give. To invest him with a power, to take not only them, but every thing else away from us when he pleased: but I shall descend to particulars, and first, Madras never has paid nor been taxed with such a tribute; next, we have a local grant for Poonamalee; and as to the third, it must be done by a mortgage on other countries. Neither this nor the other two has Mr. Dupleix any power to do, or procure effectually;





effectually ; for when Mons. Buffy extorted from Salabatzing an order for the re-  
 Rajamundrum and Chickakole countries, the Nabob of those governments  
 regard to it, but dispersed the troops who were sent to collect the revenue. T  
 men, are not specious arguments, but facts which clearly prove the infu  
 power you assume.

Though you thought fit by no other means to set aside the Nabob's rights, than po-  
 sitively to declare it was not Mr. Dupleix's pleasure to acknowledge them - this did  
 not lead our commissaries to make use of the like arbitrary weapons, when in  
 mination of the marquis's pretensions was pressed, they judged it an improper rule for  
 their conduct, and cheerfully acceded to the proposal, with a resolution to acknowledge,  
 if just, and if not, to object to them. Of the capital one from the Mogul, upon a  
 slight view the defects appeared ; it had the seal of the precedent emperor of so old a  
 date as 1133 of the Hegyra : and when blots in some others also became obvious, you  
 were staggered, and immediately suppressed a further scrutiny ; the reason you alledged  
 was weak, for an examination of the Nabob's would have neither added to or diminished  
 the force of your saneds ; besides, as these papers were produced by you voluntarily, as  
 the first and principal subject to be discussed, should not it have been finished before fresh  
 matter was introduced ? You were so sensible of their invalidity, that you declined the  
 proposed examination of your saneds ; but Mr. Dupleix soon furnished you with a salve,  
 that it was a duplicate ; that the original was in Pondichery ; that the error in the  
 seal was a mistake of the Mogul's secretary, in affixing the old emperor's seal instead of  
 the present. To these I answer, that it is unusual to send duplicates of saneds from the  
 Mogul ; that if this is admitted, as the duplicate is to supply the place of the ori-  
 ginal, common sense dictates that it should be in every respect the same as the original ;  
 and that in transferring the right of kingdoms, great accuracy and correctness is  
 observed ; and that the seal could not be the mistake of the secretary, as it is universally  
 known, that after the decease of an emperor, his seal is never made use of. As the  
 falsity of this saned has been palpably proved, and the arguments to supply its defects  
 confuted ; as it is a saned from Delly, and not from Pondichery, that will carry with it  
 the proper weight ; and as a total suppression has been made of an examination of the  
 rest upon their defects appearing ; for these reasons we do object to, and deny the rights  
 which Mr. Dupleix may from these papers pretend to, and regard him with that polite-  
 ness which one nation owes another, only as governor of Pondichery and its depen-  
 dencies.

If, Gentlemen, this letter should appear spun out to a great length, impute it to a  
 strong desire that no one subject you have advanced may be unreplied to. Our superi-  
 ors may justly claim a right to be acquainted who commenced, continued, and still con-  
 tinue this calamitous war : you have very disingenuously said the English, but not sup-  
 ported your allegation. In treating this point, I will be governed by those very rules  
 you have prescribed : that the fundamental laws of the country are to acknowledge the  
 Grand Mogul for first sovereign ; the governor General of the Deckan for his represen-  
 tative in that country ; and the particular Governors appointed by the Governor Gene-  
 ral of the Deckan as holding their authority from him.

Should we trace these troubles so far back as the unhappy war between our two na-  
 tions, we have the greatest reason to complain ; for according to the established laws of  
 nations, in a neutral prince's dominions peace should be preserved ; such prince has a  
 right to insist on it : and if after the loss of Madras, Nabob Anaverdey Cawn, sensible

the injury to his country through our misfortune, endeavoured to prevent future mis-  
 chiefs, from this you can take no umbrage, without contradicting those fundamental  
 principles by which the rest of the world are governed. This war subsided, and some





time after Mustaphazing, who had by his ill conduct undergone a reproof from his master Nazirzing, and disgusted retired to his small government of Adoni, where he was in some disputes with his neighbours, when Chunda Saib, who had by his escape from the Maratta's, entered into the service of Berma Zemaadar of Cheatal Darga as a Jemidar over two or three hundred horse, and was defeated in a battle fought with the people of Bedanore or Savanore. He first instilled into Mustaphazing the seeds of rebellion; the scheme was laid for seizing the government of the Carnateck; certain people who had before assisted Chunda Saib in the reduction of Trichinopoly, came into an alliance with them; they collected what force they were able, and marched towards Arcot, a skirmish with the Circar's troops happened, when they were joined by the forces of their allies, a battle was fought wherein Nabob Anaverdey Cawn was slain, Arcot was taken, and the usurpation commenced. From hence, gentlemen, those calamities which have so long prevailed took their rise: Had the English any concern in them? None: Why then do you unjustly cast the odium on them? Let Mr. Dupleix produce a saned from the Great Mogul or Nazirzing for destroying the legal governor of the province and fomenting a rebellion; I call upon him to do it, or his and our superiors must plainly be convinced that he has acted in open violence to the fundamental laws of the country in rebelling against Nabob Anaverdey Cawn, the legal governor of the province, holding his authority from Nazirzing, the Governor General of the Deckan, the representative of the Great Mogul; an obedience to which you have laid down as the fundamental laws of the country, and consequently ought to obey.

As every thing that has since happened is evidently the effect of that rebellion of which Chunda and his allies were the cause, it is but a reasonable assertion that they are the authors of the whole; and on the contrary, those who have withstood these rebels acting in opposition to the fundamental laws of the country, are justified. This you may urge is a conclusion very general, but it is a just one.

Rebellion can only be supported by acts of violence: such have appeared; the lives and property of the subject were invaded; Mahomed Allee, son to Nabob Anaverdey Cawn, invested with the Trichinopoly government, which was the principal one of the province, after Arcot was taken, faithful to his master, protected the rights of the Circar. Here, gentlemen, the English first make their appearance; from the Mogul and his officers they had received phirmaunds for their settlements and trade, and lived under the protection of his governors; and it was but gratitude to support his officers, it was just too. They joined Mahomed Allee, and acquainted Nazirzing with the state of the province; he approved of their conduct, wrote to Mahomed Allee to be firm in the government of the Carnateck, marched himself to settle the province, and then confirmed Mahomed Allee in it; Mustaphazing, sensible of his error, submitted; but Chunda and his allies continued rebellious, a conspiracy was formed with the Cuddapa and Condanore Nabobs, and Nazirzing the lawful Prince of the Deckan was assassinated. So true is what I have before said, that rebellion must have recourse to, and be supported by acts of violence; this commenced with the death of the lawful governor of the Carnateck, and was continued by the assassination of the Great Mogul's viceroy of the Deckan. These are facts which clearly prove that Mr. Dupleix (not we) who commenced, still continues this war, and as we have acted very conformable to, so has he in open violation of those fundamental laws of the country, which he is subject to, and ought to obey. In your memorial of a saned, I do not observe, gentlemen, one for this authority; if you have any, please to produce it, or acknowledge you had no right to act thus, but have acted as an ally to a rebel.

After





After the assassination, Mustaphazing was released and set up as prince of kan, who, with Chunda and Nazirzing's treasure and jewels, were conducted to Pondichery. It was industriously spread about that a division was made of the treasures. Some gratuities might be distributed to the villains who acted in the betraying and assassination of Nazirzing; but the supporter of this rebellion, having the right of possession, took for himself the greatest part. Mustaphazing had a small matter generously bestowed on him for his expences; greater honours were indeed allowed him, those of prince of the Deckan, and to Chunda Saib the Subahship of the Carnateck. It was a prudent measure first to appoint a prince of the Deckan and Subah of the Carnateck; for who will dispute but a prince of the Deckan has a power to give jageers, and a Subah of the Carnateck to govern the province. Nabob Mahomed Allee indeed might ask whether all this was done by the Mogul's order, and if Mr. Dupleix cannot (as is it well known he cannot) produce any of the saneds; every thing from this mock authority proceeding, is defective, contrary to the established laws of the country, and only the acts of rebels. To proceed, gentlemen, Mustaphazing, thus according to the forms of Pondichery regularly invested, began his government, it is said, by acts of generosity for the assassination of his uncle; to Mr. Dupleix a large district, to madam Dupleix another, to the gentlemen of the superior council each according to his rank, jageers to the officers according to their rank, the same to Mr. Dupleix's black ministers likewise; though to do justice to the gentlemen of the superior council, I never heard that they have had any share in the management of these affairs, but silently condemn and detest them; the same I may say of the gentlemen officers. These are what Mr. Dupleix calls his rights: it may be by some imagined that these gratuities were intended as a reward for the assassination of Nazirzing only; no, the rebellion was still to be prosecuted. Mustaphazing saw and heard the murmurs in the army, then awed by the guns of Pondichery; he dreaded their fury when they were removed from thence, knew the horrid murder was unanimously detested, and was sensible that a power usurped must be supported by force, and that he could never establish his government in the Deckan without it; the French troops were necessary, they accordingly joined him; but short-lived is power usurped by indirect means: after a few days march from Pondichery, the Nabobs of Cadaapah and Condamore, who had murdered Nazirzing, put an end to his life and usurpation. I accompanied this prince so far, that I might, as I begun with his rebellion, conclude with his fate, such as is generally the end of usurpers. I shall now return to the province: Chunda Saib and his allies, soon after the departure of Mustaphazing, took the field and begun their operations, by plundering, besieging of forts, and by force garrisoning them. Nabob Mahomed Allee on the murder of Nazirzing had taken refuge in Trichinopoly, where the English sent a small detachment for his security; and on Chunda Saib's taking the field with his allies, the English detached a larger force to join the Nabob's army, which after taking of Verdachilum, they did near Volconda; here a skirmish happened, and at Utatore another; the rebels being greatly superior, the Nabob's army crossed the Cauvery and Coleroon, and encamped under the cannon of Trichinopoly, the rebels followed; as a siege was impracticable, they formed a blockade for several months, and raised works, but at such a distance as proved of no signification. At length the Maissoreans and Morarow joined the Nabob, when the rebels, to do them justice, made a good retreat with their cannon and baggage to Seringham, which in a short time capitulated; and the traitor Chunda Saib, who had formed a design of escaping by promises to Monagee, was in the fulness of his crimes executed. Please to remark, gentlemen, as the French continued their alliance with Chunda Saib, the English were firm in their attachment to Nabob Mahomed Allee, who had received a legal phirmaund from Nazirzing: the death of that prince did not





cancel his phirmaund; he was killed by rebels; the government was by them usurped; the Nabob faithful to his sovereign, still continued to defend his rights. We wrote to the revolution, and our attachment to the Circar, and desired his orders, that it in obedience to them. He was graciously pleased to send Nabob Mahomed Allee a phirmaund for the Carnateck, to appoint Gauzedey Cawn viceroy of the Deccan, who likewise granted Nabob Mahomed Allee a saned, and gave us orders to support him: this phirmaund from the Mogul, this saned and these orders from Gauzedey Cawn have never been revoked; from which it is obvious, that Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn's title is just, and that we have acted according to the fundamental laws of the country; and as Mustaphazing never could receive any saned from the Mogul, nor is it the least probable that any would ever have been granted to a publick disturber of the peace of the country; such rights as Mr. Dupleix may pretend to desire from him, such authority as Chunda Saib might have alledged for the Carnateck, are unjust, illegal, and of no force; and consequently Mr. Dupleix is proved by these facts to prolong the war, contrary to the established government.

As I have discussed the affairs of this province, which were transacted on your part by a pretended authority from Mustaphazing, I shall now return to the army, the command of which was given to Salabatzing, who was released from confinement; and your troops, very indifferent who it was, so as they had a specious pretence, continued their march with him to Hydrabad. As soon as the news of the assassination of Nazirzing reached Delly, Gauzedey Cawn received from the Mogul a saned for the Deccan. Some months were spent in settling this affair, when he marched at the head of his army towards his government, and arrived at Aurengabad, where he was poisoned by Salabatzing's mother. Here, gentlemen, is another horrid act to support that cause, the justness of which you take so much pains to defend; and when the mother was with the Omrahs, entreating her son Salabatzing to dismiss the French troops, bitter was his reply, that had she not poisoned his uncle, he might peaceably have enjoyed some small government under him, but now he detained the French as his security. Stung with remorse, she retired to her tent, setting fire to it with design to perish in the flames, but was prevented. In this appears a plain conviction that Salabatzing acknowledged Gauzedey Cawn, and would have submitted to him. He remains at the head of his army at Auringabad, environed by a French guard, and (as I have had the honour already to tell Mr. Dupleix) not at liberty to act as he pleases, in continual apprehensions from the Omrahs, who are in general dissatisfied. The phirmaund from the Mogul to Nabob Mahomed Allee is still in force, and confirmed by his visier Shecaubudy Cawn, son to Gauzedey Cawn, I have already told you, shall be forth-coming. By a train of facts closely connected, I am persuaded of the justness of the Nabob's title, and consequently our alliance with him, will to yours and our superiors appear that you have ingeniously endeavoured to throw that odium on us, which a series of circumstances prove you the authors of; and that you commenced, continued, and still continue a calamitous war, contrary to the fundamental laws of the country, every one must be convinced of. I am sorry, gentlemen, proposals so reasonable, so moderate, so just, and so beneficial to your real interest, as those which our commissaries had the honour to make you, should meet with so cold a reception; I would, if there were any grounds, I would hope that Mr. Dupleix figuring to himself the idea, and as from a rising ground beholding the group of miseries springing from poisons, assassinations, breach of confanguinity, thousands by different deaths perishing, yet less miserable than thousands surviving, he would conclude that the happiness of a whole people must be of more importance than the ambition of one subject satisfied by such crimes; and as he will still reflect further, that this scheme during a course of five years, supported by the per-

petration





petration of crimes shocking to relate, assisted by armies generally superior in number, yet always defeated, has been as yet frustrated; conscious of the wickedness of the design, he would prefer peace, and hearken to reasonable measures for restoring tranquillity; but if resolved still to pursue his plan, he must know that the measures which have already served to disconcert, will vigorously continue to oppose

Please, gentlemen, to acquaint Mr. Dupleix, that whatever pieces I receive from him are transmitted to my superiors; and I am persuaded he will do me the same justice in transmitting mine to his, as it will furnish them with the surest means to judge of the real state of affairs on this coast. I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Fort St. George, the  
15th Feb. 1754.

Your most obedient humble Servant,  
THOMAS SAUNDERS.

*To the honourable Thomas Saunders, Esq; Governor of Madras.*

Sir,

We have received the writing in form of a letter, which you did us the honour to address to us in the time when our last Europe ship was on the point of sailing. The French interpretation could not be finished soon enough to send it by that conveyance. We doubt not but you have supplied this want, and put it in the power of your superiors to communicate, if they think proper, to ours, this last writing; of which we could give them but a slight knowledge. We did all in our power to fulfil what you recommended to us on this point; we are now going to reply a little more leisure to the honour you have done us in prolonging our commission as deputies of our nation.

We shall begin, sir, with confessing to you that being at Pondichery, we at the utmost only flattered ourselves, that you would honour us with an answer on the subject of Trichinopoly, whose miserable situation induced us to intercede with you for them, before our departure from Madras: it was no longer their liberty that we demanded, only the preservation of their lives; and we acted in this, less as deputies than as members of the French nation. We were therefore doubly surprised at the reading of your letter; first at your leaving us in the dark about the success of our request, and then at your pleasing to continue with us the discussion of what had been treated in the conferences at Madras. With regard to this last point, we have requested of our governor to give his consent to our entering on one more act of our past dignity; and we made him sensible of our reasons, among which give us leave to remark to you the desire we have of justifying ourselves, in your opinion, Sir, and in the opinion of all that may read your writing, from the reproaches you have there thrown on us. We desire no more than the strictest justice.

The first reproach is, *to have been wanting in respect and regard towards your commissaries*, in making them wait at Madras. We might complain, Sir, that you put us to this necessity by not sending us the necessary passports. Their delay indeed was lucky for us; for if we had received them a fortnight sooner, we should have run a risque of meeting with some misfortune on the road, which, as it was, we did not pass without danger from the quantity of water we yet found.

If you would please to acknowledge on the side of the French commissaries, an equal right to complain of want of regard and respect, you would find them better founded. This does not point at the personal behaviour of your commissaries, at which we cannot but express our satisfaction, but at the manner in which they were obliged to act.

When we produced our titles, the very next day after our arrival, the 22d of January, although you are pleased to say it was not till after a fortnight; they answered us that they were not sent to treat upon titles, but to propose to us the preliminary you  
had





had prescribed as the basis of the whole negotiation. This was to acknowledge Mahomed All &c. Forced, however, by the sentiments of natural justice, they could not promise us that they would immediately get his titles sent from Madras. They accordingly, and received for answer, that they were at Trichinopoly. We again demanded that they should be sent for; and while we were waiting for them, you recalled your commissaries, who declared to us the end of the conferences the 4th February, and actually set out the 6th.

Notwithstanding all this, Sir, you found a second reproach to make us, on *the impatience which hindered us waiting longer for the arrival of those titles*. Where were we to wait for them? and how long? Vouchsafe to consider that your deputies set out from Madras two days before us; for we did not begin our journey till the 8th in the morning; and that you tell us in your last letter, that the titles in question are yet on the road from Trichinopoly; you invite us nevertheless beforehand to come to Madras to see them. We cannot guess how much it may take more for their arrival there: besides, what would be the effect? Judgment may be formed from what has already passed, and from the reflections which we have already sufficiently made on these titles, supposing even that you could actually produce them. Among these titles you speak of some, which though of an old date, are nevertheless now mentioned for the first time. Such is the Mogul's phirmaund in favour of Mahomed Allee. We shall see hereafter how you seek to contrive some probability for this piece, becomes necessary in order to oppose to the phirmaund of that emperor in favour of the marquis Dupleix.

You tax us in the third place with *precipitation and lightness, in believing and advancing as attested facts such as we cannot know with any certainty*. The utmost of our desire is however, Sir, that they will be pleased in Europe to pay regard, both in your writings and in ours, to such parts only as are supported with proofs. But to see if your reproach be well founded, let us take by way of example the very fact on which you attack us, and of which you are specially concerned to shew the falsity, as well as our precipitation in giving belief to it.

This is the promise of Trichinopoly, made by Mahomed Allee to the Maissoreans, and guaranteed by the English: we founded, and do found our belief of the first part on two authentick acts made by Mahomed Allee, and confirmed by oath. The second, which regards you, is clearly expressed in the letters of Messrs. Gingen, Cope, and yourself, Sir; those of the two former are addressed to Nanderauze, one of the ministers of the Raja, and yours to himself.

Is it believing lightly after such evidences? We knew now that you pretend *never to have wrote such a thing either to the Raja or his ministers*. Let us see then whether the arguments you produce to persuade of this, ought to work in us a change of that sentiment which the letter abovementioned had very justly given us.

In the first place, *the Maissore envoy* who is with you, *is convinced*, you say, Sir, *that you never took part in the engagement in question*; but his master, better acquainted with his own affairs, advances the contrary. He has put into our hands the pieces which justify his assertion; he empowered us to prosecute it, and to this end sent one of his envoys with us when we went to Madras. Which of these two authorities should prevail?

In the second place, you send us a copy of a letter which *may, add you, have some reference to what we believe, and the contents of which deceived us*. It is in reality very much like that which we produced. There is no difference, according to the translation we have got of it, except that the article, importing your engagement, is left out, and a phrase with which we have no reason to be pleased, totally changed. What would you have us think of this difference? On one side, you tell us that it is registered





at Madrafs, the same as you communicate it, and it would look ill in us not to believe you: on the other side, it is in the hands of the Raja, such as we produce it. The conformity between the two shews that the draft produced by the Raja is not a made piece: the want of erazements and interlinations which would appear in this, if the Raja had altered it, convinces us that he has not attempted it. This is the middle of which we leave the unravelling to different people from us, and proceed to your third argument; it is drawn from one of your letters to Chundah Saib, the which you would insinuate we omitted with design, although we mentioned it, and communicated it at the same time with that which makes the present question. The advantage you propose to draw from this letter, turns on the mention you there make of the engagement of Trichinopoly to the English, before that which was made to the Maissoreans, as if the first demonstrated the impossibility of the second. The marquis Dupleix has already shewed you, Sir, in his letter of the 18th February, 1752, that the engagement made to the English could not be brought so far back as the Epoch; you assign it, but supposing the fact to be as you say yourself, might not the necessity of affairs which induced Mahomed Allee to make a second engagement, have led him likewise to confirm it by sacrificing the first to the want and the desire you had of fixing the Maissoreans in your party? We dare not take upon us to say, as these people advance; that is, that your real design was, not to abandon your views on Trichinopoly, even when you gave them your promise; and they justify their assertion by the conduct you have observed towards them.

For us, we shall be content with representing to you, that, by your own confession, you cannot produce the engagement you pretend to have been made to you, as a reason proper to prove, that you took no part in that which was made to the Maissoreans. You add, Sir, most instantly, in your letter, that being become a mediator between Mahomed Allee, and Nandi Raja, the Maissore minister, *you advised the vakeel, or envoy, of the Raja to obtain a saned from Salabatzing.* How is it possible you should have given him such advice to secure Trichinopoly to him, if you had rights upon it; had you forgot these rights in making an advance so contrary to them? At least, it appears that in writing this last article, you was crouded with so many objects, that they made you forget what you had said to us a little before. You was in a hurry to produce this envoy again, to insinuate through his means, and in his name, many things essential to your cause, which you would wish to be true, or at least to be believed in Europe. Such are the uncertainty of the authority of Salabatzing, the invalidity of the rights of Chunda Saib, the nobility of Mahomed Allee, *a serpaw given to him by Nazirzing for the government of the Carnateck.* This investiture confirmed by the Mogul, and by a letter from Gauzedey Cawn, if this envoy had read your own thoughts, Sir, he could not have better collected under one point of view, all the different articles which you have at heart to confirm, among which the phirmaund of the Mogul in favour of Mahomed Allee does not hold the last rank; for the rest he does not talk like a man of this country, in ascribing so much honour to Mahomed Allee, for his having received a serpaw from Nazirzing and in declaring him by this token governor of the Carnateck. The Moors and Indians all know that a serpaw, which commonly is only a present of some cloth, is not a distinction to build so much on, and much less a proof of an employ given. Perhaps this envoy spoke with a design to support only on conjecture, a point which he knew not to be true: he should have used the same circumspection in mentioning the Mogul and Gauzedey Cawn. Before we leave this envoy, give us leave to remark of how much weight can be all that he has wrote, and all that he says. The letter which you quote of his, Sir, refers plainly to the time when the Maissoreans, engaged with you, had the same interests, and declaimed in the same tone against Sa-

labatzing,





labatzing, against Chunda Saib, and against us, in favour of Mahomed Allee; and as to what this envoy may say at present, if you have a mind to know his true sentiments, give leave to explain himself at twenty leagues distance from Madras; he will tell you what was said by the minister Nandi Raja to engage you to perform those very promises, which you deny upon his own evidence. We have been assured from good hands that you have detained him against his inclinations: certain people who would be prying into all mysteries, pretend that you do it with a design to make it be believed in Europe that the Maissoreans are not far from returning to your party, since they keep an envoy with you. But without detaining ourselves on these kinds of politicks, we continue our justification.

The first reproach which presents itself, after those which we have already refuted, is that of *an excessive vanity, which blinded us to that degree, as to make us demand the most imprudently in the world, that our titles should be examined.* Others than you, Sir, will see in our proceeding a difference quite opposite to vanity; and those that shall read what was wrote on one side and the other on this subject by the deputies of the two nations, will remark, that in your letter you put in your own dress what passed in the conferences, to take an advantage which the truths of the facts, which we suppose you have not had leisure to examine, would not give you. It will be seen in the authentick writings, which we refer to, that we only refused to give copies of our pieces till you had produced yours; and there also will appear the very well grounded reasons we had to act in that manner. If you have a mind to know what was our design in advancing that your commissaries had orders to dispute our rights, it was only to describe what had passed in our conferences, when, after the account that was given you of the first communication of our pieces, you sent instead of titles, which we had been made to expect, interpreters to examine ours afresh. Our pieces were so entrusted to them that they were taking copies in a separate chamber from that which we were in. It was upon certain words of your commissaries, through which we saw, that some secret piece of business was preparing at Trichinopoly; and upon the declaration which was repeated to us of the necessity of acknowledging Mahomed Allee, previously to every thing, that one of us went and withdrew as well the pieces as the copies, by this time almost finished, saying, that we would again produce all of them, and even the originals (for we had brought only attested copies) as soon as you should have in readiness those you ought to communicate, and have it in your power to produce them. For the rest, your interpreters did not say a word against our pieces; and if we may assume a right of asserting any thing without proof, we could pronounce with truth, that they found them irreproachable. Your commissaries amused us to the end of the conferences in the chicanery, which may be seen in their writings, and of which we leave the judgment to those to whom it shall belong.

You had your reasons, Sir, for adding to all the other reproaches already pointed out, that of *our ignorance of the facts*; but you are not more lucky in the choice of the example by which you would convince us. It is on the subject of one of your letters to Chunda Saib, which we quoted to shew that you talked to him still as a friend, when he was on his way to Trichinopoly. This letter is of the month of August 1751; it is mentioned in that of the marquis Dupleix of the 18th February 1752, upon this your answer, to prove *our ignorance*, that *by the date of your letter it must have been wrote above a year after you had joined Mahomed Allee.* Does this prove that it was not of the time we referred to it? No assuredly; nay, admit if you choose it, that it was even later than we make it, it will only be a stronger proof of what we advanced, and will make it appears, that you kept up still longer with Chunda Saib the appearances of friendship, true or false; let our ignorance rest, Sir, on that, we place the declarations of  
friendship





friendship you made to Chunda Saib, in a time when you had already joined his enemy a whole year; this last circumstance does not render our assertion false : and if your conduct gives the lie to your letter, the contradiction falls rather on you than on us. It can indeed an accusation of quite a different nature from *ignorance*, which you make to us.

It is however after this so lucky an imputation, that you think you have a right to overset with one single word what we had advanced upon the justest grounds, and to advance on your part, what is contradicted by a crowd of witnesses. How can you say, Sir, that Chunda Saib never was acknowledged (at least you add by any one of authority) and that he was obliged on his leaving Pondichery, to besiege the strong places of the Province. Name one single siege that he made, except that of Chet-teput, a place that had for many years belonged to his personal enemy, and which even he only invested to make him pay the money he owed to the Circar: he had then in his camp and in his attendance the greatest part of the lords of the country. We assert what we saw, and what we could get attested by thousands of witnesses, if it was necessary: but you know very well yourself, that if the whole country had not been in submission and peaceable, Chunda Saib would never have entered upon the siege of Trichinopoly, wherein, notwithstanding all your assurances of friendship, he could never doubt but you would oppose him. The truth of this is, that little do you concern yourself how much the invalidity of what you alledge appears here, provided the same evidence cannot be given in Europe.

You are contented with replying on the fact of Hodgee Adlee, from which it appears plainly, that the English themselves did acknowledge Chunda Saib, that *what we know of this affair may be called in question, and is beyond your knowledge*. Only a few lines after this answer you conclude, *that in all our pieces there is not one true fact, or one that has not been injured*. You are in the right, Sir, if the method of refusing which we have been just observing appears to you sufficient, of which the very respect we have for you must make us doubt. It is however sound convenient for the avoiding all perplexities; it would have been a great one in the plan of the history you proposed to exhibit, if in the course of it you had found Chunda Saib acknowledged and peaceable possessor, in tracing the rise that you would assign to the present war. You strive your utmost to prove that the French began it, and to that end you advance, that before this the French had a quarrel with Anaverdey Cawn, which has been demonstrated to you to have been totally finished before the beginning of that now in question. But Mahomed Allee, you will say, is son of Anaverdey Cawn, dispossessed by Chunda Saib, and we only support his rights, which Chunda Saib had usurped. What, Sir, are the rights of Mahomed Allee derived from his father in a moveable government? Did Mahomed Allee himself pretend to have any till you forced him to suppose so? Was not all settled with him as he desired it, till you led him to revolt? This is not founded on simple allegations, the proofs exist and have often been shewn you.

In vain do you endeavour to make but one of these two different wars; you will find no connection between them but such as two succeeding events must necessarily have: the efforts you make to establish another, to justify you in the war you are now making, proves clearly that this last gives you no pretext to act in a manner as if the French did appear to be the authors.

The detail you have taken the trouble to go through, of what has passed since the Epochs you have chose to fix, would furnish us with a fair field to take our revenge for the reproach you so frequently make us on the subject of facts; but it is with regret we see ourselves in a situation to contest on such a matter with the chief of a nation, and especially of yours; and we shall dispense with it as far as possible: we can do it on





this occasion, without appearing to abandon either the interest of our nation or of the truth. The marquis Dupleix addressed to you, Sir, two years ago a recital of these same events, to which you have not yet given any answer. We refer to the memorial of the 18th February 1752, all such as would attain a true knowledge of the affairs in question. The difference they will find between your narrative and that which we speak of, is that the marquis Dupleix does not support what he advances on his sole authority, but that to every fact he annexes the proof.

We refer it in the same manner to the pieces and memorials of the marquis Dupleix, for the information of those who are to judge of the grievances of the two nations, and which you display so pompously to the advantage of yours; we do not deny that they will have reason to be surprised in Europe at what has passed in India between Europeans, whose sovereigns and the bodies of the nations are in peace; but the point is to see on which side the blame should fall. You complain bitterly that our governor declared to you that your flag should no longer be a security to you: such an article merited that you should have quoted the letter; and you will give us leave, at least to doubt, from the strong reasons that we have to believe he never did write to you in this tone. He might however in some degree have been supported in it: Had he not a right to make reprisals after you had insulted and torn down the French flag from the places where it was planted, and demolished Covelong after a possession of two years and a half; but the French went to St. Thome; supposing that true, does St. Thome belong to you? But the country houses of the English were burnt! their furniture carried off, some of which was brought to Pondichery! It was in a Moor's country, that the Moors, lawfully enraged, made these expeditions, although some French might have been found in the croud at a time when the body of the French detachment refused to follow Rajah Saib on these kinds of expeditions, what would there be surprising in it? Without commending those whom it may concern, we may venture to say, that their fault will be nothing to compare to that of your people, who carried fire even into our limits. But the governor of Pondichery stopped some English troops passing through the road of that town: was he to blame, since these troops were going to the camp of Mahomed Allee? that against all reason you keep our people prisoners at Cuddalore; and that he had reason to believe you would embark them to send them out of the country.

We do not, Sir, but the list of your grievances is well furnished to reply to all those that can be opposed to you: there remains to make the comparison and verification. This last point will be often embarrassing; but a sure rule to judge of the excess of the two nations would be this, let it be seen on which side appears most animosity. The same spirit which has guided the sword and the fire to act, guides also the pen to write. It may be seen in the writings of the two chiefs on which side harsh expressions, the severest reproaches, and the most offensive invectives reign principally. We shall not think of answering those which your last letter is filled with against our governor; if on one side we are touched with them, on the other we cannot be led to offend the least in the world against that respect which we are willing always to shew to your post. The marquis Dupleix cannot but approve a modesty of which we find the model in his writings: we see in them that you reproach him continually with *the blackest of conduct, assassinations, poisonings*, some of which too have no foundation but fables which you have adopted, and which we never before heard of; such is that which concerns the mother of Salabatzing: you strive to make him appear as the author or the accomplice of all these crimes. Nothing more however is requisite for his full justification but to read your own narrative. On his side, he never speaks to you of the death of Cunt Saib, but on those occasions where yourselves oblige him to it, and then in the most concise manner, although nothing so shocking has passed, nor that can with more grounds





be imputed to Europeans. It seems to us, Sir, (give us leave to tell you so) that it would better become the chief of a nation, such as you are, to let this crime rest with those that did it, than to justify it by giving room to believe that the whole nation approve it. You have endeavoured to disguise the affair by several means; at last you agree that Chunda Saib was executed as a criminal; so far is certain, that his head was cut off at the breaking up of a council, at which the chief of your army assisted; it is said that even this council was held in his tent. It is therefore of the English that it might be demanded with much more justice, than of us; whence derive their right to judge, and to put to death in an infamous manner Nabobs and governors? For all that you say, Sir, against Chunda Saib and his titles, does not disprove him to have been legitimate governor of the Carnateck. Vouchsafe not to be offended at this word, and to support for a moment our *temerity*, until it shall be dissipated by our justification. We have but one very plain question to ask you; Was not Salabatzing the master of Deckan, when Chunda Saib was put to death? and had not this last a saned from Salabatzing? You was not ignorant of it, and when we produced afresh this saned at the conferences, no objection was made to it. All that you say as yet against it yourself, amounts to no more than empty declamations against all our pieces in general; nothing decisive on this subject, only that one is without date, and that two draughts of another are sealed with two different seals. We have sufficiently replied to these two chicaneries, neither of which has any reference to the saned Chunda Saib was invested with. You will here produce Gauzedey Cawn, as having annulled the saned of Chunda Saib by that which he granted to Mahomed Allee. Shew us then this, Sir, for we deny it; and further, to satisfy you that we do not deny after your method, we will prove to you that we have authority for denying it, and this by a letter from Gauzedey Cawn himself to Chunda Saib. We spoke of this to your commissaries, and they may recollect it.

Suppose even there was a saned of Gauzedey Cawn in favour of Mahomed Allee; when Salabatzing became without the least doubt sole master, had not he a right to revoke it? If he did not do it expressly, it is because such a saned never appeared; but he wrote to you expressly that Mahomed Allee was a rebel, and that he forbid you assisting him: this is proved by the very letter of Salabatzing. After this can one conceive how a man like you can persist obstinately in saying that Mahomed Allee is legitimate master of the Carnateck: still less can one conceive how you can hope to supply his want of right by inveighing against those that say he has none; it is nevertheless the method you adopt, and observe whither it leads you, to the disputing Salabatzing his authority, or the inventing to evade it, the vainest subtleties; to the refusing to acknowledge those that he has named for the government of the country, and to the denying or making a shew of ignorance of their titles, even after they have been notified to you; at the same time that you have said in another place, that you acted only by the orders of Salabatzing, in your letter to the marquis Dupleix, dated 21st Sept. 1753; and in your letter of the 18th October following, you admit of his right to substitute whom he should think proper to the government of the provinces in his subjection; and in that of the 18th December following, you say that the prince of Deckan, from whom you received letters to assist Mahomed Allee, would rejoice: to the refusing to hearken to any conditions of peace, unless they are begun by submitting to Mahomed Allee in acknowledging invisible titles and chimerical rights: to the establishing on so slight a foundation, the advantages you would procure for your nation when it depends only on yourself to procure very solid ones. We offered you some, which do not deserve the contempt you hold them in; but it is plain to be seen by the manner in which you reject them, that there are none you would accept from any other





hand but Mahomed Allee's, of whom you have made your idol, but an idol of the country fashion, which has no other movement but that which you give it.

you are offered the independency and immunity of tribute for the town of Madras (which is an inestimable advantage) you pretend that you have it already; for in denying the acknowledgment in question, you cannot, Sir, mean with regard to former times, when we knew very assuredly that it did exist: you have the proof in your books, and we in the demand that was made of it by the father of Mahomed Allee himself to the marquis Dupleix; it is therefore with regard to the present time by virtue of some concession; but from whom? it can be from no one but Mahomed Allee. If you are offered large sums on the footing of reimbursing your expences in the war, it is a share, you say, to disengage you from Mahomed Allee; and you take the opportunity of bestowing the blackest epithets on the marquis Dupleix. If you are offered territories, you reply the grants are already given you.

We know very positively that they were not by Nazirzing; this then is again by Mahomed Allee. It must indeed be confessed that these advantages offered on our part do not come near what you propose to yourselves, and of which you leave no longer the least doubt. *You give us to understand that Trichinopoly is in your hands as a mortgage and security, and that you have a contract in good form.* The first form and most essential should be, that he who made it, have a right to what he disposes of, and this condition he most certainly fails in; but this is no difficulty with you; you have got possession, and you propose to keep it. As to the Arcot country, you content yourself with possessing a few Jageers there, in order that the French may pretend to no more; because your justice inclines you to establish equality between the two nations. For all the rest of the country, you are satisfied with being masters of it under the name of Mahomed Allee: it is for this you choose that this country should remain to him, and that every other person be incapable of possessing it. Mootis Allee Cawn of Velour, with whom you acknowledge to live in good intelligence, even since Salabatzing sent him the saned which was communicated to you, cannot get your consent, because he is not Mahomed Allee. Salabatzing himself cannot name any other; because his choice cannot be deemed free, if it falls on any other but Mahomed Allee; in such a case the right devolves on yourself to appoint this last. We offered this same Mahomed Allee a considerable establishment out of the Arcot country; the proposal is intolerable, it is treating a prince like a private person. This pretended prince was contented heretofore, but you are not satisfied. What is the meaning of all that, Sir? It is easy to divine; this is the method by which you seek to establish equality between the two nations, by remaining in possession of a considerable kingdom, protectors of Mahomed Allee in all the rest of the Carnateck, and making a particular distribution of a few Jageers to serve as a measure of the liberality Mahomed Allee is to shew the French.\* See there the end of these proposals, so full of reason and justice, so conformable to the laws of the country, and which we cannot reject, according to you, without declaring ourselves unreasonable, and something worse. *The commerce, you add, shall be free to French, just the same as to the English, although we may well be persuaded that Mahomed Allee, out of gratitude and friendship, would distinguish the English in his favours.* However this preference need not alarm us; *the liberty of commerce in the Arcot country shall be guaranteed by the chief of the Marattas, the king of Tanjore, the Mysoreans, &c.* What again does this mean, Sir, and what can the present and the future lords of Deckan think of it? What! Shall a country of their dependence be subject to be guaranteed by the powers you have named? What! these powers which are tributary to them shall oppose the alterations they may think proper to make in this province; and it is in this manner that you would make it appear that you support only the fundamen-





mental Laws of the Mogul Empire, while the very idea overthrows them utterly. This pretended guaranty which cannot take place, and which is little known to the Asiatics, presents an idea quite different from that which you would lend it for the commerce of the Arcot country: we see the end of it, it is the maintaining Mahomed Aliee and his descendants in the government of this province, in spite of the lords of Deckan, and of the emperor himself; it is the continuance of a war, the duration of which has already been too long; it is the ruin of Mysore and Tanjour, which will be the consequence of the necessity this guaranty will put the masters of Deckan to, in order to reduce these tributaries into the just bounds they ought to observe with regard to them: this is all that can be hoped from a guaranty as chimerical as it is opposite and injurious to the Mogul government. We do not ask you what means you would pursue to engage these powers in this imaginary guaranty. We do not carry our curiosity so far; but supposing it had no other objection but the commerce, which assuredly is not the case, we beg you will permit us to offer the following reflections. If we should meet with any molestation, any insult, or any injustice, our resource will be to arm all the people abovementioned, to make a league like that, which by many contrivances you at length formed against us, and to begin a war worse than this, provided our guarantees will consent to it. If a private Frenchman should suffer the loss of a thousand pagodas, the nation shall give lacks to Morarow to engage him to come and ravage the whole country, and get justice done to the person aggrieved. *It is thus that the English do not seek any advantage for themselves alone, and propose to hold all in common with the French.*

In comparing, Sir, your proposals with ours, three very just conclusions should be drawn, with which we shall finish this letter.

The first conclusion is, that very much is wanting to your desiring a parity of treatment for the two nations, and to your having taken, for the rule of your pretensions, and your proposals, an equality of justice. Parity of treatment would be, that no more favour be shewn to one nation than the other; you are willing however, by your own confession, to have as much as the French (and even infinitely more, as you shew without acknowledging it; while for this the French are obliged to strip themselves by the rights they have; and to invest you with those you have not. Equality of justice demands that every one receive according to his rights. Those of the French are real and well founded, and your refusal to acknowledge them cannot weaken them, no more than your protestations annul them.

The second conclusion will be, that you have without the least title, an ambition more real and more unmeasurable, than that which you seek to infer from the titles of the marquis Dupleix. You exclaim for that the lawful masters of Deckan have associated him, to do him honour in the government of their country, as if he aspired to nothing less than the usurping the whole. What exercise, or what use has he hitherto made of this authority? Shew it us, and justify by some lawful instance, the dread you feign. He will not consent that you give for master of the Carnateck a man who is enslaved to you, who is a rebel against Salabatzing, to whom he is accountable, as well as to us, for the blood of Chunda Saib. See here the subject of your cries against him; the masters of the country have given him expressly the province of Arcot, with that of Trichinopoly. He sees with pleasure the government of the first in the hands of him whom Salabatzing has chosen to govern it, and he is endeavouring to procure, by lawful means, the second for the Mysoreans, to whom you promised it, and whom you disappointed. Would you in his place have acted like him? It is very evident not. by your endeavouring to usurp the kingdom of Trichinopoly on a title as groundless as the cession of a man who has no manner of right to it, and who never can have  
that





that of alienating it. Let the country recover its tranquility, and the marquis Dupleix will astonish, by fresh strokes of disinterestedness and moderation, those that have not so much as he.

The third conclusion should be, that you are very far from wishing for peace as he does. He has endeavoured at it quite in a different manner from you, whether you consider his conduct or his offers. The affectation, which may be called immoderate, wherewith you strive to lay the rupture of the conferences he proposed to you at his door, shews plainly that you only endeavoured to save appearances, and to turn them against him, if the thing were possible.

Excuse, Sir, the length of this letter; one word advanced without proof requires often many reflections to refute it; we should have many others, but the equivalent will be found in former writings. If any thing should displease you, Sir, in what we have been exposing to you for our justification, we beg you will attribute it only to the necessity we were drove to, both by the end we were seeking and the matter we were treating.

The marquis Dupleix laughed when we requested of him on your part, Sir, that he would not forget to transmit your letters to his superiors. He is not, says he, the person that wishes the least to give them a knowledge of pieces so favourable to his cause.

We have the honour to be, with profound respect,

Sir,

Pondichery, the 7th March,  
1755.

Your most obedient and humble Servants,

Fr. L. LAVAUR.  
BAUSETT.  
DE KERJEAN.





## PRIDEAUX's ACCOUNT of the HEGIRA.

**F**ROM the flight of Mahomet, the Hegira, which is the *Æra* of the Mahometans, begins its computation. It was first appointed by Omar, the Third Emperor of the Saracens, on this occasion. There happened a contest before him about a debt of money: the Creditor had from his Debtor a bill, wherein he acknowledged the debt, and obliged himself to pay it on such a day of such a month. The day and the month being pass'd, the Creditor sues his Debtor before Omar for the money. The Debtor acknowledged the debt, but denied the day of payment to be yet come, alledging the month in the bill mentioned, to be that month in the year next ensuing; but the Creditor contended that it was that month in the year last past; and for want of a date to the bill, it being impossible to decide this controversy, Omar called his council together, to consider of a method how to prevent this difficulty for the future; where it was decreed, that all bills and other instruments should ever after have inserted into them the date both of the day, of the month, and also of the year, in which they were signed. And as to the Year, he having consulted with Harmuzan, a learned Persian then with him, by his advice, ordained all computations to be made for the future from the Flight of Mahomet from Mecca to Medina. And for this reason this *Æra* was called the Hegira, which in the Arabick Language signifieth a Flight. It takes its beginning from the sixteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord Six hundred twenty and two. And ever since this decree of Omar (which happened in the eighteenth year of it) it hath constantly been used among the Mahometans, in the same manner as the computation from the incarnation of our Lord Christ is with us Christians. The day that Mahomet left Mecca, was on the first of the Former Rabia, and he came to Medina on the twelfth of the same month. But the Hegira begins two months before, from the first of Moharram. For that being the first month of the Arabian Year, Omar would make no alteration as to that, but anticipated the computation fifty-nine days, that he might begin his *Æra* from the beginning of that year in which this Flight of the Impostor happened, which gave name thereto. Till the appointing of this *Æra*, it was usual with the Arabians to compute from the last great war they were engaged in.

The Hegira being that, which all of the Mahometan Religion have, ever since the constitution of Omar, computed by; the subject matter of the History which I now write obligeth me henceforth to make use of this *Æra* through the remaining part of it. But because it computeth by Lunary Years only, and not by Solary, it is requisite that I here inform the reader of the nature of those years, and the manner how the Hegira computeth by them. Anciently the Arabs, although they always used Lunary Years, yet by intercalating seven months in nineteen years, in the manner as do the Jews, reduced them to Solary Years; and consequently had their months always fixed to the same season of the year. But this growing out of use about the time of Mahomet, their year hath ever since been strictly Lunary, consisting only of three hundred fifty-four days, eight hours, and forty-eight minutes, which odd hours and minutes in thirty years making eleven days exactly, they intercalate a day on the 2d, 5th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 15th, 18th, 21st, 24th, 26th, and 29th years of this Period. So that their year, in those  
years





years of this period, consists of three hundred fifty-five days, by reason of the intercalated day, which they then add to the last month of the year. And this year all that profess the Mahometan Religion have ever made use of; and there is a passage in the Alcoran whereby they are confined to it. For the Impostor there calls it an Impiety to prolong the Year, that is, by adding an Intercalary Month thereto. So that according to this account, the Mahometan Year falling eleven days short of the Solary; it hence comes to pass, that the beginning of the year of the Hegira is unfixed and ambulatory (the next year always beginning eleven days sooner than the former) and therefore sometimes it happens in Summer, sometimes in Spring, sometimes in Winter, and sometimes in Autumn; and in thirty and three years compass goes through all the different seasons of the year, and comes about again to the same time of the Solary Year, although not exactly to the same day. Which being like to create some confusion to us who are used to the Solary Year; to prevent this, after the year of the Hegira, in the margin I add the day of the month in the year of our Lord in which it begins. The months of the Arab Year are as follow; 1. *Msharram*. 2. *Saphar*. 3. *The former Rabia*. 4. *The later Rabia*. 5. *The former Jomada*. 6. *The later Jomada*. 7. *Rajeb*. 8. *Shaban*. 9. *Ramadan*. 10. *Shauall*. 11. *Dulkaada*. 12. *Dulhagha*. The first hath thirty days, and the second twenty-nine, and so alternatively to the end of the year; only in the intercalary years, Dulhagha hath thirty days, because of the day added, but on all other years only twenty-nine.

*A Chronological Table for thirty-five Years of the Hegira, with the Days of the Month on which they begin in the Solar Year.*

| Years of Christ<br>from 1st Jan. | Years of the<br>Hegira. | Years of Christ<br>from 1st Jan. | Years of the<br>Hegira. |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 622                              | 1 - July 16             | 640                              | { 19 - Jan. 2 }         |
| 623                              | 2 - July 5              |                                  | { 20 - Dec. 21 }        |
| 624                              | 3 - June 24             | 641                              | 21 - Dec. 10            |
| 625                              | 4 - June 13             | 642                              | 22 - Nov. 30            |
| 626                              | 5 - June 2              | 643                              | 23 - Nov. 19            |
| 627                              | 6 - May 23              | 644                              | 24 - Nov. 7             |
| 628                              | 7 - May 11              | 645                              | 25 - Oct. 28            |
| 629                              | 8 - May 1               | 646                              | 26 - Oct. 17            |
| 630                              | 9 - April 20            | 647                              | 27 - Oct. 7             |
| 631                              | 10 - April 9            | 648                              | 28 - Sept. 25           |
| 632                              | 11 - March 29           | 649                              | 29 - Sept. 14           |
| 633                              | 12 - March 18           | 650                              | 30 - Sept. 4            |
| 634                              | 13 - March 7            | 651                              | 31 - Aug. 24            |
| 635                              | 14 - Feb. 25            | 652                              | 32 - Aug. 12            |
| 636                              | 15 - Feb. 14            | 653                              | 33 - Aug. 2             |
| 637                              | 16 - Feb. 3             | 654                              | 34 - July 22            |
| 638                              | 17 - Jan. 23            | 655                              | 35 - July 11.           |
| 639                              | 18 - Jan. 12            |                                  |                         |

T H E E N D.





# I N D E X.

## A

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p><b>A</b> Che De, Adm. of the French fleet, anchors in fort St. David's road 123</p> <p>—engages with Adm. Pocock, —breaks the line of battle and bears away 125</p> <p>—his loss 126</p> <p>—engages with Adm. Pocock a second time 134</p> <p>—avoids him 135</p> <p>—his fleet, greatly superior to the English, who they endeavour to avoid, but are prevented 245</p> <p>—escape in the night and sail to Pondichery 246</p> <p>—engage the English fleet, but give way with all the sail they can make 247</p> <p>—retreat to Pondichery 248</p> <p>—on sight of Adm. Pocock's fleet weigh anchor and make good their retreat to the islands 250</p> <p>Adlercron Colonel, marches to the relief of Trichinopoly 112</p> <p>—takes possession of Wandewash</p> <p>—evacuates it and returns to Madraſs 113</p> | <p>—and his regiment ordered to England 123</p> <p>Ahmed Abdalla, chief of the Pattans, marches to Delli and takes the Mogul and all his Omrahs prisoners, and after plundering the palace replaces the Mogul on his throne 241</p> <p>—marches to Agra, ſeizes the revenues, and iſſues his orders to the Nabobs and Rajas to acknowledge his ſon Timur King of Lahore, whom he appoints to ſuperintend Indoftan</p> <p>—enters Delli a ſecond time and places his ſon Timur on the Mogul's throne 243</p> <p>Alamparva taken 279</p> <p>Allum Geer, placed on the throne of the Moguls by the Omrahs 59</p> <p>—is taken priſoner with all his Omrahs by Ahmed Abdalla, who replaces him on the throne 241</p> <p>—murdered by two Moors diſguiſed in the habits of Fakeers 242</p> <p>Amet Shaw, a young prince, his remarkable behaviour 120</p> <p>Amoortarow, the Maratta Vakeel, comes with the Nabob to Madraſs 117</p> |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|



—assaults Trepalour, and is killed 119  
 Anaverdy Cawn, appointed Nabob  
 of Arcot and confirmed by Nazir-  
 zing 3  
 Andrews Mr. sent from Madras, to  
 take charge of the factory at Vi-  
 sagapatam 203  
 Angria, Governor of Severndroog,  
 turns pirate 92  
 —extends his conquests sixty leagues  
 —takes the Darby and Restora-  
 tion from the English, and the Ju-  
 piter from the French  
 —throws off his allegiance to  
 the Marattas, who apply to the Go-  
 vernor of Bombay for assistance  
 against him 93  
 —attacks a Dutch fleet, burns  
 two ships and takes a third 94  
 —on seeing the English fleet  
 abandons the fort of Geriah 97  
 —tries to make his peace with  
 the Marattas, who insist on being  
 put in possession of the fort  
 Arabs, very insolent and given to  
 plunder 235  
 —plunder the English factory at  
 Gombroon 239  
 Arcot, taken by Col. Coote 269  
 Articles of agreement between the  
 company and the Raga of Visana-  
 pore settled by colonel Forde, 203  
 Articles of capitulation for fort St.  
 David 128  
 —for Gombroon 136  
 —for Visagapatam 4  
 Aurengzebe, tries to reduce the Ma-  
 rattas for twenty years, but in vain 79  
 d'Auteuil, his message to Col. Law-  
 rence 6  
 —his march to surprize Trichino-  
 poly 107

—disgraced for having suffered  
 C. Caillaud to get into Trichi-  
 nopoly 108

## B

**B** Allapa, commander of the Ma-  
 rattas, killed 47  
 Balazerow, succeeds his father Bud-  
 gerow in the government of the  
 Marattas 80  
 Bank remarkable, between the Cau-  
 very and the Coleroon, described  
 18  
 Bazaletzing, visited by M. De Buffy  
 260  
 Bendermalanka taken by the French  
 103  
 Bengal, bad news from thence pre-  
 vents the English from supporting  
 the Viceroy against the French 102  
 Black Capt. wounded thro' the leg in  
 a sally 181  
 Bombay 69  
 Bonnagery, taken by the Marattas,  
 who abandon it 42  
 Brereton Major, makes a Sally from  
 fort St. George to the Governor's  
 garden-house 173  
 —takes the command of the army  
 and surprizes Conjeveram 198  
 —takes Trivitore 255  
 —attacks Wandewash, and takes  
 the Pettah 256  
 —his behaviour in the battle of  
 Wandewash 265  
 —dies of his wounds 266  
 Bourdonnais M. de la, his account  
 of the Monsoon 251  
 Buchanan Capt. and Capt. Forbes re-  
 fuse a large bribe from the Marat-  
 tas





# INDEX.

iii

- tas to put them in possession of  
Geriah 98  
Budgerow, usurps the government (of  
the country south of Guzarat) over  
the Marattas, and is called the  
Nanna 80  
Buffy De, and his troops, ordered by  
Salabatzing to return to Pondiche-  
ry 101  
——takes possession of Hyderabad,  
and fortifies it to defend himself 10  
——plunders the Bazars 102  
——is reinforced from Pondichery  
——takes Visagapatam 103  
——taken prisoner 266

## C

- C**Adapah Nabob of, killed by the  
Marattas, 118  
Caillaud Capt. his party, surrounded  
by the French in Tondeman's  
country 64  
——mediates between the King  
of Tanjore and Tondeman, and  
prevents hostilities 99  
——marches out of Trichinopoly  
to the assistance of Isouf Cawn 105  
——goes against Madura 105  
——attempts to take Madura by  
surprize, is disappointed 106  
——turns the siege of Madura in-  
to a blockade, and marches to re-  
lieve Trichinopoly 107  
——deceives the French, and re-  
lieves Trichinopoly 108  
——marches from Trichinopoly to  
besiege Madura: batters in breach,  
and is repulsed 115  
——lands with a Detachment at  
Madras 136  
——receives a Major's commission 138

- sent to get assistance from the  
King of Tanjore, &c. 146  
——gets some troops of horse from  
him and marches to Chengalaput 147  
——lays a plan for surprising Sa-  
dras, but is disappointed 149  
——Major, wounded at the taking  
of Conjeeveram 198  
Call, chief engineer, his journal 155  
——alteration of Chengalaput, *See*  
*Appendix*  
Carical, described and taken 269  
Cauvery river 17  
Cauverypark, taken by Capt. Clive 24  
Chengalaput, described by Capt. Call,  
*See Appendix*  
Chillambrum, taken by the French 43  
Choultry, described p. 48  
Chout, or tribute, paid to the Ma-  
rattas 80  
Chunda Saib, serves as General un-  
der Duest Allee Cawn, who gives  
him one of his daughters to wife 2  
——goes with the Nabob to the as-  
sistance of the Queen of Trichino-  
poly, and under pretence of a visit  
gets possession of the town, impri-  
sons the Queen and puts the sever-  
al competitors for the government  
to death 2  
——besieged in Trichinopoly, and  
carried prisoner to Sattarah by the  
Marattas 3  
——at the request of Muzapherzing  
released from imprisonment 4  
——goes to Pondichery, and gains  
over the French to join Muzapher-  
zing  
——appointed Nabob of Arcot by  
Muzapherzing  
——retreats with the French into  
Pondichery 7  
——raises





- raises an army, is assisted by the French, and appointed Governor of Arcot by M. Dupleix 12  
 —marches with the French against Trichinopoly, and invests it 13  
 —is taken prisoner by Monagee 28  
 —and privately beheaded  
 —his character  
 Clive Capt. joins the army at Trichinopoly; is sent for to Madras to command the siege of Arcot, which he takes 14  
 —commands Arcot during the siege 15  
 —sallies out and takes all the enemy's cannon and level their trenches  
 —marches out of Arcot after the enemy, whom he totally defeats, and takes the forts of Timery, Cauverypauk, and Conjeveram  
 —detached to cut off the Supplies of the enemy 24  
 —is surprised at Samieveram by the French, who take the Pagoda 25  
 —is in danger of being cut down by a French Sepoy  
 —storms and retakes the Pagoda, and besieges Pitchunda 26  
 —takes M. D'Auteuil and his whole party prisoners 27  
 —takes Covelong and Chengalapat 37  
 —lands with the troops at Geriah 97  
 —takes possession of the fort 98  
 —sent from Madras to retake Calcutta 102  
 —detaches two thirds of the army from Calcutta into Golconda to prevent M. De Conflans from reinforcing M. Lally's Army 202  
 Coffrees described 27  
 Coleroon river 17  
 Colguddy plundered by Col. Heron, 86  
 Colleries, described 21  
 Conflans De, commands the French army in Golconda, and marches to attack Visanapore 201  
 —army encamped near Tallapool 204  
 —determines to cannonade Col. Forde in his camp, and is defeated by him  
 —retreats after the battle to Rajamundry and Masulipatam 206  
 —and encamped two miles from the walls of Masulipatam 207  
 —upon the approach of Colonel Forde retreats into Masulipatam 209  
 —sends an officer to Col. Forde to ask quarter for the garrison, which is granted 211  
 Commissaries, at Sadras 60  
 Congress, appointed by Mr. Saunders and Dupleix to be held at Sadras, Mr. Palk and Vansittart sent on the behalf of the English, F. L'Avaux, M. De Kerjean and De Bauffet for the French  
 Coop Saib, comes over from the French and joins the English army with one thousand horse and fourteen elephants, &c. 27  
 Coot bodeens, treaty with Mr. Spencer 223  
 Coote Col. joins the army at Conjeveram, and takes the command of it 259  
 —takes Wandewash and Carangoly 260  
 —marches to relieve Conjeveram 261  
 —marches





# I N D E X.

v

Coote, Col. marches to oppose the French 262  
 —line of battle 263  
 —marches to Wandewash 264  
 —gains a compleat victory over the French 265  
 —takes possession of the French camp and artillery  
 —takes Brigadier Gen. De Buffy and Le Godeville, with several other great officers, prisoners 266  
 —destroys the country round Pondichery 267  
 —obliges Innis Cawn, the Maratta General, to return home  
 —takes Chetteput  
 —takes Arcot 268  
 —restores the Nabob to his capital 269  
 —takes Parmacoil and Allamparva  
 Cornish, Rear Adm. joins Adm. Pocock 251  
 —arrives at Madras 269  
 Cope Capt. marches to the assistance of Mahomet Allee Cawn 9  
 Coza Abdallah Cawn, appointed Nabob of Arcot 3  
 Cuddalore, taken by the French 127  
 Cumberland reduced from sixty-six guns to fifty-eight 245  
 —in great Distress 252

## D

**D**Alton Capt. dislodges the French from Outatoor 26  
 —shut up in Trichinopoly & in want of provisions 43  
 Danes, attack the King of Tanjore's pagodas 100  
 Davecotah, taken by the English who have a grant for it from the King of Tanjore p. 16  
 —abandoned by the English,

the French take possession of it 136  
 D Leyrite succeeds, M. Godeheu 100  
 Delli, plundered for three Days by the Pattans, who retire to Lahore 122  
 Deckan, a third part of the Mogul's empire 77  
 —views of the several provinces in it  
 Divy island, taken by the French from the English 40  
 Draper Col. arrives at Madras and marches to Wandewash 140  
 —makes a sally from fort St. George into the Black Town, and puts the French into confusion, who abandon their cannon 144  
 —leaves the army and returns to England for recovery of his health 198  
 Duest Allee Cawn, Nabob of Arcot 1  
 —killed in battle with the Marattas 2  
 Dupleix M. writes to Nazirzing and insists that none of the family of Anaverdy Cawn shall ever govern Arcot 8  
 —and Chunda Saib lay a scheme to assassinate Nazirzing  
 —associated with Muzapherzing in the government of the Decan, and assumes the state of an Eastern Prince, and is proclaimed a Nabob  
 —proclaims Rajah Saib Nabob of Arcot, and by forgery got himself declared Governor of the Carnetick, keeps his Durbar, and supports the character of Souba of the Deckan 31  
 —false assertion in his Memoire *see Note* 28  
 —offers the Nabobship of Arcot to Mooti's Allee Cawn 32  
 Dupleix,

B





## I N D E X.

- Dupleix, his manner of relating a loss  
of 364 French *see Note* 57  
———forgery of the Mogul's sanads  
detected by Mr. Vansittart 61  
———is superceded, and returns to  
France 77  
Dupleix Fateabat, built in 1750, and  
burnt by Capt. Clive 1751, 11  
Dustuck, or order, under the Chan  
Sumaun, or Steward's Seal, for the  
honourable company's holding the  
King's fleet at Surat 231

## E

- E**llavanafore taken by the French 109  
Ellis Mr. applied to by the inhabi-  
tants of Surat to recommend the  
fitting out an expedition from Bom-  
bay for taking possession of the cas-  
tle and Tanka 218  
Elmiseram, surrenders to Capt. Dal-  
ton 24  
———surrenders to Monagee 51  
English and French proposals 60  
Eradmoodin Cawn, *see* Muzapher-  
zing 3  
d'Estaing Count, taken prisoner 145  
———inserts a very extraordinary  
clause in the articles of capitulation  
for Gombroon 237

## F

- F**itzpatrick Lieut. wounded thro'  
both arms 181  
Forde Col. marches to Nelloure 110  
———batters it 111  
———deserted by the Sepoys and  
retreats  
———is ordered to the southward to  
prevent the designs of the French  
against Trichinopoly  
———his expedition to Golconda 201

- Forde Col. list of the forces under his  
command 202  
———embarked from Calcutta the  
12th October, and arrives at Visa-  
gapatam  
———joins the Raja's army 203  
———encamps within three miles of  
Tallapool 204  
———marches to get between M.  
De Conflans and Rajamundry  
———forms in line of battle 205  
———engages the French army  
———after an obstinate dispute gains  
a compleat victory  
———gets possession of the French  
camp, baggage, ammunition and  
all their artillery, except four field  
pieces 206  
———delivers up the fort of Raja-  
mundry to the Raja of Visanapore  
———marches towards Masulipatam  
———enters into an alliance with the  
Raja of Narsipore, and is reinforc-  
ed with his troops 208  
———takes possession of the French  
camp near Masulipatam 209  
———invests and takes Masulipatam  
by storm 210  
French army, demand a sum of mo-  
ney of Tanjour but are refused;  
retire to Pondichery 4  
———retreat in the night, and leave  
their artillery behind them 6  
———encamp near fort St. David 34  
———march to Aurangabad, and  
are disturbed by Baidazerow the  
chief of the Marattas 39  
———intrench near Trividy 41  
———attack a convoy going to Col.  
Lawrence, near Trividy, and are  
repulsed 42  
———retreat to Alletore and Mou-  
tehillenour 51  
———troops on the island of Sering-  
am reinforced from Pondichery  
cross





# I N D E X.

vii

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>cross the river, and attempt to es-<br/>calade Trichinopoly; take Dalton's<br/>battery, and turn the guns against<br/>the town 55</p> <p>— are repulsed with great loss 56</p> <p>— design to invade Tanjore<br/>with a party of Marattas 57</p> <p>— stop the proceedings of the<br/>congress 61</p> <p>— march into Tondeman's coun-<br/>try with an intent to prevent him<br/>from sending any provisions to the<br/>English, or joining them 62</p> <p>— invade the King of Tanjore's<br/>country, take Killy Cottah and<br/>Koiladdy, and make themselves<br/>masters of the bank, which they<br/>begin to cut in three or four<br/>places 67</p> <p>— invest Trichinopoly, and cut<br/>off the communication from the<br/>the English 70</p> <p>— retreat, and encamp on the<br/>island of Seringam 71</p> <p>— dispute the Nabob's right to<br/>Velloure 89</p> <p>— march an army to support<br/>Mooti's Allee Cawn</p> <p>— endeavours to get the domi-<br/>nion of all the provinces of the<br/>Deckan 100</p> <p>— ambitious design discovered<br/>by Ballazerow 101</p> <p>— appear against and invest Tri-<br/>chinopoly 107</p> <p>— ordered to return from Tri-<br/>chinopoly to Pondichery 108</p> <p>— retake Outremalour 112</p> <p>— plunder Conjeveram and are<br/>repulsed 113</p> <p>— remain strongly intrenched at<br/>Wandewash for two months 114</p> <p>— take Chetteput 115</p> <p>— receive a reinforcement from<br/>Europe 123</p> | <p>— fleet anchor in fort St. David's<br/>road</p> <p>— army enter the bounds of and<br/>take fort St. David</p> <p>— Admiral breaks the line and<br/>bears away 125</p> <p>— their loss in the battle on the<br/>28th of April, 1758 126</p> <p>— fleet forms a line of battle 133</p> <p>— get off by favour of the night<br/>and anchor in Pondichery road 135</p> <p>— sail from Pondichery road for<br/>the islands</p> <p>— seize a large Dutch ship and<br/>carry it into Pondichery 136</p> <p>— army abandon Seringam and<br/>the English take possession of it</p> <p>— take Nagore 137</p> <p>— march to Trivalour, and send<br/>deputies to the King of Tan-<br/>jore to demand seventy lacks of<br/>roupees, a free passage for their ar-<br/>my through his country, and assis-<br/>tance of his troops</p> <p>— demand a second time five<br/>lacks of roupees; the King will<br/>give them but four 138</p> <p>— advance against Tanjore and<br/>fire into the town, on which the<br/>negociation is stopped</p> <p>— encamps at the mount, takes<br/>possession of the Garden-house and<br/>invests Madrafs 143</p> <p>— takes possession of the Black<br/>Town</p> <p>— seizes Sadrafs, turns out the<br/>Dutch soldiers and garrisons it 149</p> <p>— seizes Pouliacat, a Dutch set-<br/>tlement 167</p> <p>— soldiers sent to guard three<br/>boats laden with ammunition from<br/>Sadrafs to the Black Town, while<br/>asleep are overcome and bound by<br/>the boat-men who land at fort St.<br/>George 170</p> <p style="text-align: right;">— spring</p> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|





## I N D E X.

|                                                                                                                                                      |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| —spring a mine which is of no service to them                                                                                                        | 185 |
| —evacuate their trenches, quit the black town and raise the siege of fort St. George                                                                 | 192 |
| —army ready to mutiny                                                                                                                                | 198 |
| —abandon Narsipore and retire to Masulipatam                                                                                                         | 208 |
| —army of observation prevent Col. Forde's receiving supplies from Rajamundry                                                                         | 209 |
| —take Rajamundry                                                                                                                                     |     |
| —ships, with Dutch colours, appear before Gombroon and take it                                                                                       | 235 |
| —break the articles of capitulation for Gombroon and blow up the English factory                                                                     | 239 |
| —fleet superior in number and force to the English fleet, which endeavoured in vain to provoke them to fight                                         | 245 |
| —endeavour to escape in the night, but are prevented by the Revenge                                                                                  |     |
| —escape by hazy weather                                                                                                                              | 246 |
| —begin to give way with all the sail they could make                                                                                                 | 247 |
| —continues to retreat                                                                                                                                | 248 |
| —sail for Pondichery to disembark their men                                                                                                          |     |
| —in Pondichery road on sight of Adm. Pocock's fleet weigh anchor and escape him by steering to the south, and make good their retreat to the islands | 250 |
| —resolved to take Tagada                                                                                                                             | 256 |
| —a party defeated near Trichinopoly                                                                                                                  | 258 |
| —army takes Seringam, and cut the garrison to pieces                                                                                                 |     |
| —assembled at Arcot, joined by the son of Chunda Saib and Innis Cawn                                                                                 | 260 |

|                                                 |     |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| —defeated at Wandewash and lose their artillery | 265 |
| —prisoners on parole                            | 266 |
| —Hussars desert to Col. Coote                   | 269 |

## G

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>G</b> Auzedey Cawn, Buckshee to the Mogul                                                                                                                                                                           | 3   |
| —appointed Viceroy of the Decan by the Mogul                                                                                                                                                                           | 13  |
| —poisoned by his own sister                                                                                                                                                                                            | 39  |
| —his son, Shaw Abadin Cawn, appointed by the Mogul to succeed him, who is opposed by Salabatzing, set up by M. Dupleix                                                                                                 | 40  |
| Geriah, described and taken                                                                                                                                                                                            | 98  |
| Gingee, taken by the French                                                                                                                                                                                            | 10  |
| —described                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 32  |
| —invested                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 33  |
| —is abandoned                                                                                                                                                                                                          |     |
| Gingens De Capt. encamps under the walls of Trichinopoly                                                                                                                                                               | 13  |
| Godeheu Mr. Commissary General and Governor General of all the French settlements, arrives at Pondichery from France, supercedes M. Dupleix and introduces his proposals for a suspension of Arms to Governor Saunders | 71  |
| Godeville Mr. taken prisoner by Col. Coote, who grants him his parole                                                                                                                                                  | 266 |
| Gombroon, an English settlement, taken by the French                                                                                                                                                                   | 234 |
| Gore Capt. killed.                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 248 |

## H

|                                                          |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>H</b> Ardwicke Indiaman, attacked by two French ships | 214 |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----|

Heron,





# INDEX.

Heron, Lieut. Col. his expedition to collect the revenues in the Madura and Tinnevelly countries 83  
 ——— accompanied by Mauphus Cawn 84  
 ——— arrives at Madura  
 ——— takes the Governor, with all his treasures  
 ——— marches to Tinnevelly  
 ——— returns to Madura 86  
 ——— carries away the images from Colguddy Pagoda, which enrages the Colleries, who attack him in the defiles in Natam woods and recover their images  
 ——— returns to Trichinopoly, and tried at a court-martial for misconduct  
 Hookum, or order, under the Vizier's seal, to Mr. Spencer, to assist and advise with Sciad Moynodeen Cawn in the government of Surat 228  
 Housbul hookum, under the great seal of the Nabob, to Mr. Spencer to take the castle of Surat for the Mogul 229  
 ——— to the English company accompanying the phirmaund 233  
 Hussars, fifty desert from the French and enter the English army. Are of great service 198

## J

J Ageers, explained 72  
 James Commodore, commands the company's marine-forces, joins the Maratta fleet, and sails in quest of Angria's fleet 94  
 ——— chases them  
 ——— is prevented from coming to an action by the dilatoriness of the Maratta fleet  
 ——— anchors off Bancote, which surrenders to him on a summons 96

——— anchors off Dabul with an Intent to attack it, but receives orders to return to Bombay  
 ——— sent to reconnoitre Geriah  
 ——— joins the fleet under the command of Admiral Watson  
 Jembikishna and Seringam taken, the French army surrender prisoners of war, and are sent to fort St. David 29  
 Ingeram, taken by the French 103  
 Johnston Mr. sent to Visanapore 202  
 Journal, of the siege of fort St. George 155  
 Isouf Cawn, the Nelloure Soubdar sent to the assistance of Mauphus Cawn  
 ——— marches from Trichinopoly to join the English near Madras, and in his way takes Ellavanafore 141  
 Juncan, explained 76

## K

Kilpatrick Capt. shot thro' the body, and prevented by the surgeon from being cut to pieces by the Marattas 53  
 Kirk Capt. killed at the head of his grenadiers, who are immediately led on by Capt. Killpatrick to revenge his death, and rout the French army 50  
 Kistnarauze, an ally to the Nabob, Killedar of Tegada 256  
 Knox Capt. detached to pursue the enemy as far as Rajamundry 207  
 ——— is joined by Capt. Maclean with a reinforcement, comes up with the enemy. His Sepoys throw down their arms and disperse  
 ——— takes possession of Rajamundry  
 C Knox





—detached against Narfipore 208  
 —takes possession of Narfipore

## L

**L** Ally M. arrives at Pondichery from Europe 123  
 —takes Fort St. David, and blows up the fortifications 132  
 —encamps in the bounds of Negapatam, and demands of the Dutch money, &c. cannon, ammunition and provisions 136  
 —sends a third time an officer of rank, with a priest, to treat the King of Tanjore, and to remain as hostages for the performance on his part 138  
 —accomplishes his design with the King of Tanjore, and defeats it by his own hasty temper 139  
 —defeated in a sally, raises the siege of Tanjore, and returns to Pondichery  
 —takes Arcot, Tripassore and Conjeveram Trinomalay, and shews a design to take Chengalaput but is prevented by the arrival of four companies of Sepoys 140  
 —attacks Major Caillaud's party at the Mount, and after an obstinate dispute retreats 148  
 —remarkable letter to the Gov. of Pondichery intercepted by Major Caillaud, and sent to Madras 150  
 —raises the siege of fort St. George, and leaves his cannon behind 153  
 —retreats precipitately from the Black Town, and blows up Col. Lawrence's country house 197  
 —takes possession of Conjeveram, and fortifies it  
 —resumes the command of the French army at Arcot 260  
 —plunders Conjeveram 261

—defeated by Col. Coote at Wandewash 264  
 —retreats to Chetteput, assembles the army at Gingee and retires within the walls of Pondichery 267  
 —recalls his troops from Seringam 269  
 Lawrence Col. marches from Madras to the assistance of Nazirzing, and is appointed Generalissimo over his army 5  
 —informs Nazirzing of a design against him  
 —takes the chair in the council on the removal of Mr. Floyer; sets out for England 9  
 —returns from England and takes the command of the army 21  
 —is attacked by the French whom he repulses, and relieves Trichinopoly 22  
 —gains a compleat victory over the French 23  
 —retires from the army on account of his health 31  
 —his reasons against attacking Gingee 33  
 —embarks from Madras with Capt. Gaupp's company and arrives at fort St. David 34  
 —marches out to attack the French, who retreat to Pondichery 35  
 —encamps at Trichanky, and attacks their advanced post at Villanour  
 —marches back and encamps at Bahoor, the French army is ordered by M. Dupleix to follow him and are defeated  
 —enters Trivedy with his troops 37  
 —marches to relieve Capt. Dalton at Trichinopoly 43  
 goes





# INDEX.

xi

—goes to meet the King of Tanjore, and is elegantly entertained by him  
 —arrives at Trichinopoly 44  
 —encamps on the plain, and is detained twelve months for want of provisions 45  
 —with Mr. Palk, is commissioned to treat with the King of Maifore, but prevented by the French 46  
 —marches into Tanjore country and is joined by that King's forces 48  
 —joined with recruits from England  
 —threatened to be attacked by the French, which he endeavours to avoid but find it impossible 49  
 —attacks and defeats them 50  
 —his army reinforced by Capt. Ridge 52  
 —attacks the French army near the Golden Rock, defeats them and takes possession of their camp with eleven pieces of their artillery 53  
 —wounded in the arm  
 —cantons his troops in Koiladdy  
 —marches to the assistance of the King of Tanjore 67  
 —reviews the army, and marches with Monagee to the relief of Trichinopoly 70  
 —cannonades the French  
 —goes to join the army as a volunteer, and lands at Sadrafs 114  
 —takes post at the Mount, and keeps open the communication between Madrafs and Chengalaput 140  
 —reinforced at the Mount 142  
 —marches from the Mount, and reinforces the garrison at Madrafs  
 —letter from him to the Go-

vernor, giving an account of the superstition of the Indians, and the practices of their Priests. See

*Introduction*

Lorrain regiment mutiny, and declare their resolution to put the country under contribution, unless they are paid their arrears in three days, which they receive and return to their quarters 200

## M

**M**Aclean Capt. attempts to take Concale by surprize 209  
 —is reinforced and takes it  
 Madrafs, reinforced with troops from England 69  
 —reinforced 153  
 —besieged 143  
 —journal of the siege 154  
 —the siege raised 192  
 Madura Gov. of, cuts off a party of Col. Heron's troops, and plunders the villages about Tinnevely in fight of his army 85  
 Madura, described 105  
 —delivered up to Capt. Caillaud by treaty 116  
 Mahè, a French garrison 270  
 Mahomet Allee Cawn, Nabob of Arcot, Governor of the Carnatick, his title disputed by the French, which was the origin of this war 1  
 —made Nabob of Arcot, upon the defeat of his father retires to Trichinopoly 4  
 —solicits with the English for assistance to support him against the Rebels, and is joined by Capt. Cope at Waldore: his gallant present to Nazirzing 5  
 —his camp is routed by the French 10

—ap-





- Mahomet Allee Cawn, escapes from  
 the French to Trichinopoly 12  
 —appointed Nabob of Arcot, and  
 is supported by Capt. Cope  
 —his character 82  
 —is distressed by the extravagance  
 of his brother, and unable to pay  
 the workmen to compleat his for-  
 tification  
 —is advised by the English, and  
 settles at Arcot to save expences 83  
 —met by Col. Lawrence, Mr Palk  
 and Mr. Walsh, and invited to  
 Madras 88  
 —is received at the company's  
 Garden-house, by the Governor,  
 &c.  
 —sets out to collect his revenues,  
 accompanied by Major Killpatrick  
 Mahomed Isouf Caun Soubadar of  
 Nelloure, his character 64  
 Maissore King of, his army joins the  
 English 78  
 Maissoreans, demand Trichinopoly  
 but are refused 29  
 —withdraw their troops from the  
 English army 30  
 —declare war against the English-  
 company, and are defeated by  
 Capt. Dalton 40  
 —they attack an advanced post  
 and cut all the men to pieces  
 Marattas invade Arcot and kill the  
 Nabob in battle 2  
 —cavalry cut the French Sepoys  
 to pieces 26  
 —chiefs at variance 30  
 —demand Trichinopoly and are  
 refused; separate their troops  
 —attack the English camp and are  
 repulsed 41  
 —and Maissoreans join the French  
 at Seringam 46  
 —try to cut off the communica-  
 tion between the garrison of Tri-  
 chinopoly and Tondeman's coun-  
 try and are repulsed 46  
 —enter the Tanjore country, plun-  
 der it, burn the villages, and drive  
 off the cattle 59  
 —described 79  
 —governed by Bramins or Priests  
 —profess the Gentoo religion, and  
 believe in the transmigration of  
 souls 80  
 —free-booters, their dress and  
 and manner of living 81  
 —grow rich by making their  
 neighbours tributary to them  
 —are a destructive foe, and an un-  
 serviceable friend  
 —ambitious views of extending  
 their territories, they march to  
 Delli and set up a Mogul 82  
 —conclude a treaty with the  
 Governor of Bombay, to join in  
 the reduction of Angria 93  
 —enter the kingdom of Mail-  
 fore  
 —demand the chout of Arcot  
 and Trichinopoly 116  
 —threaten to lay waste the coun-  
 tries if not paid 117  
 —expence of taking a party into  
 English pay 141  
 —farm out their revenue of  
 Surat to an officer 217  
 —very troublesome to the Eng-  
 lish in the affairs of Surat 225  
 —retire at the instance of Col.  
 Coote 207  
 —army routed by the Pattans 243  
 Masulipatam siege of 216  
 —the French garrison surrender  
 prisoners of war to Col. Forde 211  
 Mauphus





# INDEX.

xiii

- Mauphus Cawn enters Arcot with  
2000 horse, to join the English 63  
——with his troops joins Col.  
Lawrence 69  
——refuses to march till his sub-  
sidies are paid 70  
——blocked up by the Polygars,  
gains a compleat victory over the  
rebels 104  
——opposes his brother, and drives  
his forces out of Madura 105  
Meah Atchund, applies to the Ma-  
rattas for assistance to turn out  
Novas Allee Cawn from the go-  
vernment of Surat 217  
——is joined by the Siddee 218  
——his treaty with Mr. Spencer 222  
Meer Saib, repulses the French near  
Ellavanafore, and dies of his wounds  
109  
Michie Captain, killed 248  
Mogul Shaw Hamet, deposed by  
Shaw Abadin Cawn, the Vizier,  
and deprived of his eye-sight 59  
Monagee, pays the Nabob a visit  
with the assurance of friendship  
from the King of Tanjore 87  
Monson Major, wounded at the  
taking of Conjeveram 198  
——takes Timmery fort 268  
Monsoon described  
——the hurricanes at that season  
exemplified in the loss of the Pem-  
broke *Appendix*  
Moolah Allee Shaw, Governor of  
Gombroon, resides at Ormus 235  
——very troublesome to the mer-  
chants, and extorts, by means of his  
Arabs, great loans from them  
——assures the English of assistance  
238  
——refuses, when called on, for  
fear of the French  
——enters into an alliance with the  
French 240  
Moors, the Mahometans improperly  
so called *Introduction*  
——their manners *ibid*  
——and character 119  
Mootis Allee Cawn, his character 79  
——his deceitful conduct 89  
——outwitted by Dupleix  
——refuses to pay his tribute to the  
Nabob  
——sends his Vakeel to negotiate at  
Madrafs 90  
——pays part of his tribute to Ma-  
jor Killpatrick  
——refuses to fulfil his engage-  
ment  
Moracin Mr. sent to reinforce M. De  
Conflans at Masulipatam 214  
——finds it taken; sails with his  
troops to Gangam, where they are  
greatly harrassed by the Raja  
——arrives at Pouliacat; is at-  
tacked by Col. Fisher, who takes  
ten of his officers prisoners  
——returns to Pondichery with  
the remains of his army  
Morarow, Commander of the Marat-  
tas in Narzirzing's army, account  
of him 7  
——sent in pursuit of the French,  
and with fifteen men breaks through  
their army  
——his detachment defeated by  
the French 9  
——has a design upon Trichino-  
poly 37  
——is joined by 3000 Marattas  
——goes over to the French 38  
——ravages the country, and  
cannonades Trividy, which the  
English take from them, and  
they retire 41  
——attacks





- contact - a party of the Tanjore troops 68
- for a stipulated sum, paid by the Nabob and King of Tanjore, leaves the French army and returns to his own country 69
- rebels, and endeavours to make himself independent 101
- Musfoot, Siddee, seizes the castle of Surat 1756, and appropriates to himself one third part of the revenues of the town 217
- his force 220
- surrenders the castle of Surat 223
- Muzapherzing, lays claim to the government of the Carnatick 3
- goes to Coottaarah, enters into alliance with Chunda Saib, whom he gets released, and applies to Ballazerow for assistance to support his pretensions, who disappoints him
- raises an army, is joined by the French, gains a victory over Anaverdy Cawn whom he kills near Arcot, and takes Mauphus Cawn prisoner 4
- takes Arcot, over-runs the whole province, retires to Pondichery, and appoints Chunda Saib Nabob of Arcot
- raises contributions and lays siege to Tanjore, and receives a large sum to raise the siege
- and Chunda Saib, marches out of Pondichery with a large army commanded by M. D'Auteuil 5
- his army dispersed, he submits to Nazirzing, who detains him a prisoner of state 7
- proclaimed by the French Viceroy of the Deckan 11
- routed 12

## N

- N Anna, the acting Chief of the Marattas 85
- Nanna Pundit Praden, Chief of the Marattas, his proposals to confirm the government of Surat to the English company 224
- Nanderauze, his plot to seize Trichinopoly 38
- is prevented by Capt. Dalton 39
- endeavours to get possession of Trichinopoly by stratagem, and makes a proposal to M. De Sauffay to join him, which he rejects with disdain 86
- decamps from Trichinopoly, marches home and raises a rebellion 87
- takes Tinnevelly and besieges Madura 99
- Nazeabulla Cawn, refuses to pay his arrears and is supported by the French 112
- Nazirzing, appointed Viceroy of the Deckan by the Mogul 3
- marches an army from Aurengabad, to punish Muzapherzing and Chunda Saib for their Rebellion 4
- routs the rebels forces, and cuts the French gunners to pieces 7
- retakes Arcot 8
- marches to retake Gingee; surrounds it 10
- is murdered by the Nabobs of Cadapah and Condanore in concert with the French. They plunder his tent, and divide the spoil at Pondichery 11
- Nelloure, described 111
- Nizam Almouluck, Viceroy of the Deckan 3

———dies.





# I N D E X.

xv

—dies, and leaves four sons, Gau-  
zedey Cawn, Nazirzing, Salabat-  
zing and Nizam Allee 3

## O

**O**Mrabs, their Cowardice and  
treachery 120

—their design against the life of  
Amet Shaw: are out-witted by him  
121

—are put privately to death 122

Opium, given both to men and horses  
to serve instead of food, as it damps  
the appetite and enables them to  
endure fatigue *See Introduction*

Order under the Viziers, &c. 234

Origin of the war 1

Ormus, described 232

—built by the Portuguese, who  
are expelled by the Persians and  
English Traders 234

Outremalour, fortification destroyed  
by Col. Aldercron 112

## P

**P**Alk Mr. in company with the  
Nabob and Col. Lawrence, goes  
to the King of Tanjore's court 44

—commissioned with Col. Law-  
rence to treat with the King of  
Maissore 46

—succeeds with the King of  
Tanjore, and engages him to send  
3000 horse and 2000 Sepoys to  
join Col. Lawrence 48

—appointed one of the Commis-  
saries to treat with the French, and  
goes to the congress at Sadra's 60

—is unsuccessful at Tanjore,  
occasioned by the treachery of his  
Linguist 64

—succeeds with the King of  
Tanjore to send his cavalry to join  
Col. Lawrence's army 68

—influences the King of Tan-  
jore to restore Monagee, whom he  
makes Prime Minister and appoints  
Commander in Chief of his army 68

—sent with Mr. Vansittart to  
Pondichery and they return with  
the treaty and truce 73

—deputed with Col. Lawrence  
and Mr. Walsh to invite the Na-  
bob to Madras 88

Pattans, described 119

—good soldiers 120

—invade the Mogul's empire 241

—defeat Shaw Abadin Cawn,  
and place Timur on the Mogul's  
throne 243

Perwana, granted to Mr. Spencer 226

—&c. 228

—under the coochuck, or small  
seal, to Mr. Spencer, to protect  
the inhabitants, merchants, pil-  
grims and trade of Surat 230

—under the small seal, to Mr.  
Spencer, for hastening the remit-  
tances from Surat to the Mo-  
gul

Peelagee, a Bramin, usurps the go-  
verment of Guzarat over the Ma-  
rattas 80

Pharra's Cawn, Deputy Governor of  
Surat, is proposed Governor 218

Phirmaund, (firman) or order, under  
the great Mogul's seal and under-  
sealed by his Viceroy, for the Compa-  
ny's holding the government of  
the castle of Surat 231

Pigot Mr. Governor of Madras, his  
behaviour; distributes 50000 rou-  
pees to the garrison 153

Pocock, Adm. his fleet sails from  
Madras in quest of the French  
fleet 124

—comes up with and engages  
them on the 21th of April, 1758

—repairs





—repairs his damages at Madrafs, and sail in quest of the French fleet which he finds in Pondichery road 126  
 —is prevented from coming up with them for many days  
 —returns to Madrafs road 127  
 —discovers the French fleet in Pondichery road, and makes signals to chase them 133  
 —engages the French fleet the third of August, 1757 134  
 —his fleet anchor off Carical 135  
 —refits his squadron at Bombay, and sails for the coast of Coromandel 244  
 —cruises off Pondichery  
 —waters his fleet at Trincomalay  
 —discovers the French fleet and chases them  
 —makes a signal for a general chase 246  
 —makes a signal for the line of battle, which the French avoid by hazey weather  
 —discovers the enemy's fleet, and both make the signal for battle and engage 247  
 —anchors with his fleet in Negapatam road, and repairs, his damages 249  
 —receives a letter from the governor and Council of fort St. George  
 —sails from Negapatam road and discovers the French fleet in Pondichery road 250  
 —obliged to leave off the chase and return to Madrafs to water his fleet for his voyage to Bombay before the change of the Monsoon 251  
 —detaches Rear Admiral Cornish with six ships for the coast of Coromandel 252  
 —detaches Rear Adm. Stevens

from Bombay with four ships for the coast of Coromandel 253  
 —receives orders to return to England  
 —anchors at Anjengo and sails for England  
 —arrives at St. Helena, and waits to convoy a large fleet of India ships: arrives safe in the Downs 254  
 Polier Capt. prevents the enemy from cutting off his retreat 65  
 —cannonades them, gains a victory and retreat in good order 66  
 —conducts the Nabob to his capital 87  
 —commands the troops in fort St. David when it surrendered to M. Lally: signs the Capulation 131  
 —takes Outremalour 112  
 —to wipe off his disgrace for the loss of fort St. David, offers to go a volunteer with Col. Draper in a sally from Madrafs 132  
 Polygar of Marava, offers a free passage for the English troops, and invites them to settle in his country 85  
 Preston Capt. cuts off M. Lally's supplies, and greatly harrasses him during the siege of Madrafs 147  
 —intercepts a convoy of the enemy's stores, &c. 158  
 Priests the Bramins, absolve their warriors by sacrificing of a Buffalo 80

## Q

**Q**ueenborough takes the Ruby, a French Inow 135

## R

**R**Aja, or nominal Prince of the Marattas, described 80  
 Raja of Visanapore, imprisons the French Chief, plucks down their colours and hoist the English 201  
 Raja





# I N D E X.

xvii.

——applies to Col. Clive at Calcutta for assistance to free him from French tyranny  
 ——troops more intent upon plundering the enemy's camp than fighting 206  
 Raja of Narisipore, joins his troops with Col. Forde's army 208  
 Rajamndry, given to the English by the Raja of Visanapore 203  
 ——described 207  
 ——taken by the French 209  
 Raillard Lieut. sent to the relief of Tagada 257  
 ——is deserted by the horse and Sepoys  
 ——loses his guns, is routed and destroys himself 258  
 Recruits, unused to the climate, some drop down dead after a march of eight miles 199  
 Reflections on the siege of fort St. George 193  
 References to the plan of fort St. George 196  
 Representation made to the Mogul, by Mr. Spencer, in behalf of the English East-India Company 226

## S

**S**Adet Allee Cawn, Nabob of Arcot 1  
 Saha Raja, the nominal Prince of the Marattas 80  
 St. David fort, invested by the French  
 ——surrenders 128  
 St. Thomas's Mount, described 142  
 Salabazing, proclaimed by the French Vice-oy of the Deckan 12  
 ——in opposition to Gauzedy Cawn, appointed by the Mogul 58  
 ——his character 78

——he, with M. De-Buffy and Law, enter the kingdom of Maiffore, and raise a contribution of fifty-two lack of roupees 85  
 ——discards M. De Buffy 101  
 ——writes to the Governor of Madrafs, for his assistance to oppose the French  
 ——is deprived of assistance by the loss of Calcutta 102  
 ——comes to terms with the French 103  
 ——quits the French interest, and meets his brother Nizam Allee at Hydrabad 212  
 ——treats with the English, and grants them Masulipatam, Nizam-patam, and obliges the French troops to leave the country 213  
 Salisbury, springs a leak and is in great distress 252  
 Saunders Mr. Governor of Fort St. George, arrives at Madrafs 10  
 ——endeavours to negotiate a peace with M. Dupleix 60  
 ——agrees with Mr. Godeheu on a suspension of arms 71  
 ——entertains the Nabob at Madrafs 88  
 ——complains to Mr. Godeheu of Nanderauze's breach of the suspension 99  
 Sauffay De, Commander of the French at Seringam, refuses to join Nanderauze in an attack on Trichinopoly during the suspension of arms 86  
 ——communicates the design to Major Killpatrick 87  
 Schaub's Captain, company sent in boats from Madrafs for Fort St. David, are taken by the French and carried into Pondichery 34

## E

Seringam





|                                                                                                                    |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Seringam island, described                                                                                         | 17  |
| Seringam pagoda's, described                                                                                       | 18  |
| ——occupied by the enemy                                                                                            | 19  |
| Severndroog, described                                                                                             | 95  |
| ——attacked, burnt, and taken,<br>by Com. nodore James                                                              |     |
| Shaftsbury arrives at Fort St. George<br>from Bombay                                                               | 183 |
| Smith Capt. sends a reinforcement<br>to Tagada                                                                     | 257 |
| ——surprizes a French convoy                                                                                        | 259 |
| ——attacks Seringam, and is<br>wounded                                                                              |     |
| ——is joined by the King of Tan-<br>jore and Tondeman                                                               |     |
| Siddee, Admiral of the Mogul's fleet,<br>resides at Dundee Rajapore                                                | 216 |
| Somerfet Captain, wounded in his<br>ankle                                                                          | 248 |
| Spencer Mr. prevents the Marattas<br>from joining the Siddee or Meah<br>Atehund                                    | 225 |
| Shaw Abadin Cawn, his ascendancy<br>over the Mogul; resolves to mur-<br>der him                                    | 241 |
| ——employs two Moors to murder<br>the Mogul                                                                         | 242 |
| ——confines all the sons and friends<br>of the Mogul, and places on the<br>throne one of the Mogul's rela-<br>tions |     |
| ——joins an army of Marattas                                                                                        |     |
| ——is defeated and routed twice<br>by the Pattans                                                                   | 243 |
| Stevens Rear Admiral, command of<br>the fleet devolves on him                                                      | 253 |
| ——retakes three English vessels from<br>the Malwans, pirates, and sails to<br>the coast of Coromandel              | 254 |
| Surat, inhabitants, invite the English<br>to take possession of the castle, in<br>order to preserve their property | 219 |

|                                                                      |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Surat castle and tanka, delivered up<br>to the English               | 222 |
| Surat guns, &c. found in the castle,<br>given to the English company | 224 |
| Suspension of arms, articles of, &c.                                 | 71  |

## T

|                                                                                                                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>T</b> Agada fort, surrendered to the<br>French on honourable terms                                                             | 258 |
| Tanjore, described                                                                                                                | 19  |
| ——kingdom of, its extent and<br>revenues                                                                                          | 20  |
| ——and Tondeman's troops join<br>the English                                                                                       | 21  |
| ——troops, commanded by Mo-<br>nagee, retake Koiladdy                                                                              | 26  |
| ——King, promises to join Col.<br>Lawrence, and deceives him                                                                       | 41  |
| ——King, his splendid court                                                                                                        | 44  |
| ——troops, join the English<br>army, and leave it the same day                                                                     |     |
| ——horse, instead of pursuing the<br>enemy, plunder their camp                                                                     | 54  |
| ——King, threatened by Nande-<br>rauze to have his country laid<br>waste, if he did not quit his en-<br>gagements with the English | 55  |
| ——troops, commanded by Mo-<br>nagee, defeat the Marattas, and<br>take eight hundred horse                                         | 59  |
| ——troops, disbanded by the ad-<br>vice of Succogee                                                                                |     |
| ——in the French interest                                                                                                          | 64  |
| ——troops, under Monagee, join<br>the English                                                                                      | 70  |
| ——King, his character                                                                                                             | 78  |
| ——King, and Tondeman, pro-<br>test against the English treating<br>with the Marava                                                | 85  |

King.





# INDEX.

xix

——King, insists on the restitution of his country taken from him by the Polygar of Marava 99  
 ——also two districts that Monagee had conveyed to Tondeman  
 ——King, consents that the French should pass through his country, offers them a small sum of money, but refuses them his troops 137  
 ——confines the two French hostages, and in a sally defeats the French army 139  
 ——chicanery to Major Caillaud 146  
 Tanjoreans, make a successful sally, rout M. Lally's army, of two thousand three hundred and seventy French, and raise the siege of Tanjore 139  
 Tondeman's character 78  
 Trichinopoly King of, dies 2  
 ——three competitors for the throne  
 ——Queen, imprisoned by Chunda-Saib, burns the Alcoran, on which he swore to be true to her, and poisons herself  
 ——government changed, and becomes dependant on the Nabob of Arcot  
 ——taken by the Marattas 3  
 ——described 15  
 ——garrison makes a sally, and distresses the French in their retreat 54  
 ——reinforced 57  
 ——in distress for want of provision and fuel 62  
 ——reinforced from Fort St. David 109  
 ——its importance 110  
 Tripety feast, described 118  
 Trivedy, taken by the French 9  
 ——garrison, sally out on the French, and are put to the sword 46  
 ——surrenders to the French  
 Truce, signed by Governor Saunders and Sieur Godeheu 75

## V

**V**Ansittart Mr. appointed one of the commissaries to treat with the French, and goes to the congress at Sadras 60  
 ——discovers Dupleix's forgery of the Mogul's sanads 61  
 ——sent with Mr. Palk to Pondichery, and returns with the treaty and truce 73  
 Vasserot De Captain, with ten troopers, performs a gallant action 147  
 ——lays waste the bounds of Pondichery 269  
 Visagapatam, summoned by M. de Buffy, and surrendered 103  
 Volconda Governor of, declares for the French 13

## W

**W**Andewash, taken by Col. Adlercron, and evacuates it 113  
 ——taken by the English 260  
 ——battle near 265  
 Watson Admiral, arrives at Madras, with a fleet from England 71  
 ——commands the English fleet against the pirates on the Malabar coast 91  
 ——arrives at Bombay 96  
 ——summons the fort of Geriah to surrender, but receives no answer 97  
 ——silences their batteries and burns Angria's fleet, and takes the place 97  
 Weyaconda, attacked and battered in breach, escaladed, and taken by Col. Lawrence 54  
 Wood Capt. routs Zulapherzing's forces, and takes his camp 268





## DIRECTIONS for placing the P L A T E S.

|                                               |                                  |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Map of the Mogul empire                    | <i>to face the Introduction.</i> |
| 2. The Mogul on horseback                     | 14                               |
| 3. The Swing                                  | 28                               |
| 4. Map of the coast of Coromandel             | I                                |
| 5. Plan of Trichinopoly                       | 15                               |
| 6. Map of the kingdom of Madura               | 83                               |
| 7. Plan of Madura                             | 105                              |
| 8. Map of the Maratta country                 | 91                               |
| 9. View of the attack on Severndroog          | 95                               |
| 10. Plan of Geriah                            | 97                               |
| 11. View of the attack on Geriah              | 98                               |
| 12. Plan of the siege of Fort St. George      | 196                              |
| 13. A view of Fort St. George after the siege | 154                              |
| 14. Plan of Masulipatam                       | 210                              |
| 15. View of Surat                             | 216                              |
| 16. Plan of Surat                             | 222                              |
| 17. Plan of the battle of Wandewash           | 265                              |
| 18. Plan of Chengalaput                       | 8 <i>Appendix</i>                |